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 Introduction
After months of denials amidst growing international scrutiny and concern, 
in October 2018 Chinese authorities publicly admitted the existence of a 
system of prison camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). 
By that point, the camps, off icially labelled as “re-education” facilities, had 
been exposed for several months in the international media. A number of 
scholars, based mostly in European and North American institutions, had 
uncovered the imprisonment of over a million people in Xinjiang through a 
combined analysis of satellite images, government websites, media reports, 
and long-term ethnographic engagement with local communities.
Following its admission of the existence of the camps, the propaganda 
machine of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began to produce a variety 
of stunning – both in terms of number and content – justifications for their 
existence. As part of this defence against international criticism, China’s state-
run news agency, Xinhua, released a lengthy interview with Shohrat Zakir, the 
Chairman of the XUAR, in which he expressed the Chinese government’s views 
on the subject. Following the predictable Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
line, he placed the camps within the framework of China’s struggle against the 
“three evil forces” of terrorism, extremism, and separatism, deemed responsible 
of undermining “the stable and peaceful order and the atmosphere of solidarity 
and progress of Xinjiang.” In order to fight terrorism and safeguard stability, 
Shohrat Zakir continued, “Xinjiang has launched a vocational education and 
training program according to the law.” Such programme is supposed to help 
ethnic minorities in Xinjiang to “improve their ability in commanding the 
country’s common language, acquiring legal knowledge and vocational skills, 
among others.” Shohrat Zakir then mapped out the Party’s vision for the future 
of Xinjiang, based on the transformation that this form of training will bring:
Next, Xinjiang will further implement the strategies and policies on the 
region, set by the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the 
core, adhere to the people-centered philosophy of development, properly 
handle the relations between stability and development, and concentrate 
on the three major tasks: construction of the core zone of the Silk Road 
Economic Belt, the implementation of the rural vitalization strategy and 
the development of the tourism industry.1
1 The full transcript in English is available at Xinhua (2018b). In the interview Xinjiang’s 
“re-education” facilities are described in optimistic terms: the cafeteria offers “nutritious free 
12 BoRdeRlAnd InFRAsTRuC TuRes 
Despite the propagandistic tone of the interview, what the Chairman of the 
XUAR laid bare is the connection between control and development that is 
at the core of CCP policies at China’s borderlands. Xinjiang’s prison camps, in 
this sense, cannot be seen as detached from their connections with the “three 
major tasks” that the Party has set for itself: the Belt and Road Initiative, 
modernisation of the countryside, and tourism development. This nexus 
is the main focus of this book. In particular, I show how the development 
of trans-border infrastructure, currently reflected in the ambitiousness 
and ambiguities of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), cannot be addressed 
independently of the CCP’s broader aim to capture and control the Chinese 
borderlands and its people. According to the same logic, projects to “build a 
new socialist countryside” and to turn minority areas into tourist resources 
underscore an attempt to re-design the borderlands and the communities 
to which they are home according to a particular ideology. The aim, as 
Shohrat Zakir explicitly pointed out, is transformational: while borderland 
territories are secured through radical infrastructural interventions, ethnic 
minority subjects are re-defined according to the CCP vision of modernity. 
This book attends to both processes in the context of trans-border investment 
in infrastructure and trade. In so doing, it shows that, as investment has 
grown, small-scale traders have lost their strategic advantage and are now 
struggling to maintain their businesses. Concurrently, local ethnic minorities 
have become the target of radical resettlement projects, securitisation, 
tourism-related initiatives, and, in many cases, have become increasingly 
dependent on state subsidies. Borderland Infrastructures traces this uneven 
development over the past two decades, thus raising fundamental questions 
about the future of the Chinese borderlands and about China as a whole. How 
does infrastructure development affect cross-border livelihood in today’s 
diets”; the dormitories are equipped with all comforts, TVs, air conditioning, and a bathroom; and 
there are even sports venues for outdoor activities. The reality of what is happening in Xinjiang, 
however, is far from what Shohrat Zakir depicted. There is ample evidence that large numbers 
of Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Hui are held against their will and without trial, thus 
circumventing Chinese law itself. Instead of “vocational training,” as Shohrat Zakir claimed, 
what is taking place inside the camps resembles rather a brainwashing exercise, as part of which 
detainees are forced to abandon their native language and religious beliefs – obliged to learn 
Mandarin Chinese and to study Chinese Communist Party doctrine. The facilities themselves 
resemble well-guarded jails, secured by walls, fences, and state-of-the-art surveillance systems. 
Several reports point to various torture methods routinely employed inside the camps, ranging 
from physical punishments to bright lights left on throughout the night in overcrowded rooms, 
with inmates unable to exercise or go outdoors for weeks at a time. On the subject of mass 
internment of Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, see Zenz (2018); The Economist (2018); Thum (2018); 
Bunin (2018); Brophy (2018).
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China? What is the place and role of ethnic minorities in larger processes 
of development? How are newly envisioned forms of connectivity as part 
of the BRI agenda affecting pre-existing mobilities and forms of exchange?
The idea that economic development will generate more stable societies 
has long underpinned the CCP’s approach towards its border regions. In 
particular, the under-development of these areas, combined with the pres-
ence of sizeable ethnic minorities with kinship connections beyond China’s 
borders, has traditionally been seen by PRC authorities as a major security 
risk. In the case of Xinjiang, for instance, Becquelin (2004) argues that this 
particular insecurity led to highly centralised policies in which Beijing plays 
a more important role in internal regional affairs as compared to other parts 
of China.2 Other scholars have focused on ethnic policies and ethnic relations 
in the context of the CCP’s consolidation of power in its peripheries. These 
have included important works on ethnic identif ication, cultural politics, 
representation and resistance, and development.3 In showing how this nexus 
of development and security plays out across a number of transnational 
spaces, this book argues that processes of economic development – mainly 
implemented through infrastructure – along the Chinese borderlands are 
characterised by an active attempt to erase particular histories. Such pro-
cesses encompass both the consolidation of CCP power in China’s peripheries 
as well as the development of a geography of transnational connectivity 
through the BRI. Starting with the latter, I show how the imagined geography 
underpinning new Silk Road fantasies ignores pre-existing forms of mobility, 
exchange, and connectivity more generally. In this process, what I call 
proximity – the set of skills developed by cross-border communities to take 
advantage of their particular positionality – is jeopardised in an attempt 
to create legible conduits and transactions. The third part of this book 
engages with this particular outcome through the image of the corridor, 
one of the Belt and Road Initiative’s main features. In its relations with 
ethnic minorities and minority regions, on the other hand, the CCP has 
embraced an approach that actively erases anything that departs from 
its own definition of minority history and culture. I def ine this selective, 
violent, and transformational approach as a “curational” intervention, 
drawing on the original meaning of the Latin word curare: “to heal.” Chinese 
authorities, I argue, by projecting backwardness upon minority subjects, 
2 On Xinjiang’s “autonomy” and CCP “insecurity” in its historical claims, see Bovingdon (2010); 
Khan (2018); and Leibold (2019).
3 See for instance, Schein (2000); Litzinger (2000); Gladney (1991, 2004); Bovingdon (2010); Yeh 
(2013); Fischer (2014).
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cultures, and spaces, see their “civilizing” mission in the borderlands as a 
project with profound moral and ideological implications. Albeit framed 
within the language of economic development, then, curational interventions 
underpin a disciplinary – and not economic – objective. This, in turn, results 
in further marginalisation and dependency. The Xinjiang’s prison camps, 
with which I began this book, can be understood as an extreme outcome 
of this particular logic of curation and cannot be framed outside of China’s 
larger push for transnational connectivity as part of the BRI. As Shohrat 
Zakir remarked, and as I will show in this book, the construction of new 
Silk Roads and disciplinary measures to create – or “curate” – new minority 
subjects cannot be thought of as separate from one another.
The research upon which this book is based was conducted in the decade 
prior to the establishment of a prison camps system in Xinjiang. Nevertheless, 
the dynamics that I address help shed light on how we have come to this 
ultimate – and ultimately tragic – development. The story is not limited 
to Xinjiang; in fact, it characterises China’s Western borderlands, from 
Yunnan to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) to Inner Mongolia. In 
order to demonstrate this and to make a broader argument about China’s 
development, I juxtapose the borderlands of Xinjiang and Yunnan as two 
specif ic case studies showing how marginalisation, control, and infrastruc-
ture development go hand in hand.4 In so doing, I do not aim to gloss over 
important regional specif icities, but rather to address a common mode of 
ruling – a form of governmentality, to follow Foucault – that is characteristic 
of China’s approach to its minority-populated borderlands.
Researching the borderlands
I travelled for the f irst time to one of China’s border crossings in 2009. 
Standing at over 4600 metres, on the Khunjerab Pass, I walked through the 
imposing Chinese-built gate into Pakistan. Once across, I shook hands with 
a Pakistani border guard, who seemed to be inappropriately dressed for the 
brisk temperature and high altitude, took a picture in front of a border marker 
alongside a small group of Chinese tourists, and then walked back into 
4 Both the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Yunnan Province, as territorial units, are 
recent creations. As this book is mostly concerned with the current situation at the borderlands 
of today’s PRC, for the sake of clarity and convenience I generally use the names “Xinjiang” and 
“Yunnan”, even though it might appear anachronistic or historically inaccurate in certain parts 
of the narrative.
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China. Not two hours later I was in my hotel room in Tashkurgan, less than 
a day’s drive from Kashgar along the Karakoram Highway (KKH). Following 
that f irst visit, the Karakoram Highway became the focus of my doctoral 
research, and the Khunjerab Pass a recurrent destination. Between 2012 
and 2013, I spent twelve months between Xinjiang and northern Pakistan, 
meeting cross-border traders in crowded bazaars, drinking endless cups 
of tea during idle mornings in their shops, visiting their relatives, business 
partners, and friends. In Pakistan, I interviewed prominent members of the 
Kashgari community – a group of Uyghurs who had migrated from Xinjiang 
to Pakistan throughout the 20th century – and members of the Pakistan 
Army Corps of Engineers involved with the construction of the Karakoram 
Highway in the 1960s and 1970s. In China, I visited traders in Urumqi, Khotan, 
and even Yiwu – a trading city in Zhejiang province, only three hours by 
train from Shanghai, and home to a large contingent of Pakistani traders.
While I returned to Xinjiang for brief periods of research in 2016 and 2017, 
by 2015 most of my research had shifted to another location: the China-Burma 
borderlands in Western Yunnan province. Over another 14 months of ethno-
graphic f ieldwork, I worked closely with Chinese off icials and traders in the 
border town of Tengchong and lived with a Drung family in the Dulong Valley. 
I travelled extensively along and across the border, as did many traders, local 
officials, employees of Chinese companies working on infrastructure projects 
in Burma, and informants who helped with my research.5 On more than one 
occasion, we crossed it without the proper documents, yet nevertheless did 
so with the tacit consent of local authorities. These “permissive politics” 
(Zhang 2018) regarding cross-border mobility in Yunnan never ceased to 
surprise me, particularly when I counterposed them with the strictness of 
the border regime in Xinjiang. Yet, much of what I saw in Yunnan engendered 
productive connections with what I had experienced in Xinjiang: the ubiquity 
of Silk Road rhetoric, the push for transnational infrastructure projects 
aimed at re-designing the geography of cross-border mobility in the area, 
the marginalisation of local ethnic groups through development processes 
that were described in off icial rhetoric as beneficial to them.
Between 2009 and 2019, many of my informants became my friends. 
Our lives became intertwined in ways that would have been impossible to 
foresee. I still have regular conversations over Skype, or WeChat, even with 
5 The military government changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar in 
1989. However, both names are still widely used both within and outside Burma/Myanmar. As 
this book spans a period of time going back to the late 19th century, I have decided to refer to 
the country consistently as Burma.
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people I have not seen in years. Others, I have met in unexpected places: 
Beijing, Tokyo, Munich. As this research challenged the often perceived 
“boundedness” of f ieldwork, the period of my research became impossible 
to define, extending into the present and further into the past. Thus, besides 
interviews and the personal engagements that can be understood under the 
broad methodological umbrella of what anthropologists call “ethnography,” 
my research also took unexpected, textual turns. In order to gain a historical 
perspective of ambitious plans of transnational connectivity, I spent time 
in the British Library and in the National Archives in London. In China, 
I was given access to private archives in Tengchong. This latter phase of 
research has informed many of the conversations I have had throughout 
years of engagement in ways that cannot be underestimated.
Throughout these years, my own position as a researcher has been a 
constant object of reflection and consideration, particularly in relation to the 
different groups of people I was engaging with. When it comes to research-
ing cross-border ties, mobilities, and informal exchanges, access can be a 
fundamental problem. For instance, while conducting research in Xinjiang, 
I did my best not to interact with local off icials. Given the impossibility 
of obtaining a research permit for what would have been considered too 
“sensitive (mingan)” a topic, I did my best to avoid any encounter that might 
have jeopardised my access to the f ield and, more importantly, endangered 
my informants. This meant remaining highly mobile, avoiding long stays in 
small places where the persistent presence of a foreigner would likely have 
attracted unwanted attention. So, for instance, I never spent more than two 
weeks in Tashkurgan, a small border town near the China-Pakistan border. 
Instead of staying put for a long stretch of f ieldwork, as in the established 
anthropological tradition, I travelled to Tashkurgan frequently but only for 
short periods of time. A week, ten days, sometimes only one night to catch 
up with someone visiting from Pakistan. In Kashgar, on the other hand, 
where I spent longer stretches of f ieldwork, I avoided staying with Uyghur 
families, even when I had the chance to do so. Instead, I preferred hotels 
and hostels, in which I could be mistaken for a foreign tourist. In Tengchong, 
conversely, a signif icant part of my relations engaged with, and were made 
through, local CCP off icials. I visited their houses and conducted formal 
interviews in government off ices around town, and joined them on off icial 
visits to the border and to the construction sites of ongoing projects related 
to trade with Burma. I engaged with wealthy businessmen and was given 
access to the development plans for a new Border Trade Zone. Through 
them, I met their Burmese counterparts in Myitkyina and Mandalay, as 
well as Chinese businessmen operative inside Burma.
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This multi-sited (Marcus 1995) and itinerant (Schein 2000: 28) ethno-
graphic experience presented both strengths and weaknesses. Concerning 
the latter, I did not experience the kind of deep, long-term, embedded access 
to a particular locale and community that has long characterised classical 
anthropological scholarship. On the other hand, I gained a multiplicity of 
perspectives on the same issues through interactions with actors that, I 
came to realise, were entangled in similar processes despite their apparent 
distance. By taking this particular approach, I was able to bring to the fore 
dynamics and connections that would have otherwise remained out of sight. 
Take, for instance, the connection between new projects of transnational 
connectivity now brought together under the BRI agenda, and processes of 
excluding local forms of trade across the borderlands that forms the back-
bone of the f irst part of this book. Or, as the second part shows, the ways in 
which radical resettlement projects motivated by ecological, developmental, 
and tourist reasons are inherently designed to create new forms of minority 
subjectivity. And lastly, the intimate connection between development and 
control in 21st-century China, which I highlight by putting Xinjiang’s prison 
camps in conversation with the opening of a Border Trade Zone in Yunnan’s 
Tengchong. These arguments, and the ethnographic research that informs 
them, would have not emerged in such clarity if it were not for my ability to 
travel along and across the Chinese borderlands, engaging with groups of 
people as diverse as Tengchong off icials, Uyghur migrants in Pakistan, car 
parts dealers in Urumqi, and Burmese intellectuals in Mandalay.
The overarching aim of this book is to highlight some of the key dy-
namics that def ine life at the borderlands of China. Thus, to account for 
the interconnections of local histories, national development agendas, 
personal interests, and perceived foreign security threats that def ine how 
people live across the Chinese borderlands today. I do so through a “rush of 
stories” (Tsing 2015: 37) – describing brief, and at times repeated, encounters 
with a small number of traders, off icials, and migrants. Such examples 
are idiosyncratic – they refer to specif ic personal stories and places. Yet, 
they are also not entirely exceptional. Rather, they are representative of 
larger processes within which the Chinese borderlands are embedded. My 
selection of such stories is therefore not fortuitous. It rather points to the 
ways in which ethnography can be used to address, untangle, and interpret 
current dynamics of global impact and scale.
The issue of China’s integration and administration of peripheral and 
multi-ethnic region has been examined by several excellent studies in recent 
years (cf. Bovingdon 2010; Yeh 2013; Fischer 2014; Lary 2007; Ma and Liu 1998; 
Ma 2000; Clarke and Smith 2016; Blum and Jensen 2002). Less attention has 
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been devoted to the Chinese borderlands as particular zones of friction, 
encounter, and (dis)connection.6 This study, on the other hand, focuses 
on the areas along and across China’s western borders as particular zones 
from which to examine the material manifestations of state territoriality, 
the evolution of China’s ideas of development and connectivity, and the 
relations between the two. Border residents, as well as those who cross 
such national borders on a regular basis, deal with the “nation state” as a 
concrete reality, rather than as a line on a map or a set of mental images 
(Anderson 1991; Bhabha 1990; Gellner 1983; Chatterjee 1986; Thongchai 
1994). As such, the book follows Veena Das and Deborah Poole’s (2004) 
call for anthropology to look at marginal places and practices in order to 
gain a robust understanding of the state. Through such margins, I look 
at how state power is experienced, mediated, and enacted across China’s 
borderlands today, and raise a number of crucial questions. What does 
the integration of the borderlands through infrastructural interventions 
mean for those who live along and across such borderlands? How does the 
seemingly paradoxical approach of extending a homogenising vision of 
development into the borderlands while branding difference for tourist 
consumption affect peripheral spaces? What does the borderlands’ renewed 
“centrality,” particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative, mean for 
local livelihood and long-term cross-border relations? And f inally, what do 
China’s attempts to monitor and control overseas minority communities 
tell us about the extension of CCP power in the 21st century?
China’s western borderlands from the Open Up the West 
Campaign to the Belt and Road Initiative
In 1911, Archibald Rose, then British consul in Tengchong, a border town in 
western Yunnan province, submitted a report on the “Chinese Frontiers of 
India.” The chronicle, based on years of service in Sichuan and Yunnan and 
on a journey to Central Asia through India and Kashmir, the Pamirs, and 
what at the time was known as “Chinese and Russian Turkestan,” was later 
published in The Geographical Journal (1912). A short memorandum attached 
to the original report, however, remained confidential.7 In it, Archibald Rose 
proposed an exchange of territory to overcome an impasse in negotiations 
6 Notable exceptions include Parham (2017); Evans, Hutton, and Eng (2000); Saxer and Zhang 
(2016).
7 The report is now available at the British library archive: IOR/L/PS/11/6.
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over the demarcation of a section of the border between China and British 
Burma, and to prevent major Russian interference in today’s Xinjiang. 
According to his proposal, the British would make a concession over Pianma 
(or Hsipaw), a piece of territory west of the Gaoligong Mountains, at the 
China-Burma frontier, which both the Chinese and the British claimed as 
their own.8 In exchange, the British would take advantage of the small state 
of Hunza’s claims over Sariqol, a high-altitude valley in the Pamir mountains 
today at the border between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The aim 
was to bring under British control a strategic portion of territory that, Rose 
feared, the Russians were eyeing in order to expand their reach eastward, 
into southern Xinjiang. Henry McMahon, the recipient of Rose’s report, did 
not take his proposal seriously.9 China never fully settled its border issues 
with the British, and Rose’s proposal, connecting two remote regions at the 
extremes of the Tibetan plateau, was buried at the India Off ice.
The two border areas discussed by Rose, between China and the now 
independent states of Burma and Pakistan, represent the main focus of 
this book. What is of interest to me, however, is not so much a discussion 
of the territorial limits of each state’s jurisdiction, but rather to understand 
how such power is deployed and experienced. China and Burma, to be 
sure, settled their border dispute already in 1960. China and Pakistan did 
the same in 1963.10 Both settlements, while putting an end to decades of 
negotiations, stand-offs, and disputes, represent critical starting points 
in the aff irmation of particular forms of state power in the borderlands. 
In his report, Archibald Rose describes China’s historically troublesome 
relation with its frontiers and details how precarious its control over large 
sections of today’s Xinjiang and Yunnan was. In the century following 
Rose’s journeys, the borderlands of China were securely brought into the 
embrace of the Chinese Communist Party, its “frontier tribes” categorised 
into a system of minority nationalities (shaoshu minzu), and border areas 
made accessible to security forces, but also businesses and, more recently, 
8 On Pianma and the “Pianma incident” following a British mission to seize Pianma in 1910, 
see McGrath (2003).
9 McMahon, in his role as foreign secretary of British India, later negotiated a boundary line 
with the Tibetan Government (known as the McMahon Line) at the 1914 Simla Convention 
(to which Archibald Rose took part). The line def ines the boundary of Tibet and British India 
between Bhutan and what is today Burma. The line, however, was never agreed upon by the 
Chinese, and it is to this day contested and the site of conflict between India and China.
10 This agreement has not been recognised by India, which still claims sovereignty over portions 
of territory administered by Pakistan and China. See the seminal work of Alistair Lamb (1964, 
1968, 1973).
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tourists. An old Chinese saying on the peripheries of the empire notoriously 
states that “the mountains are high and the emperor far away” – referring 
to the traditionally unruly and relatively out-of-reach frontier regions. 
After seven decades of communist rule, the saying no longer holds true. 
The borderlands have been brought into the sphere of direct control of the 
state for the f irst time in China’s history, and they are now integral parts 
of the national geo-body.11 They remain, nevertheless, particular places 
from which to observe how processes of inclusion and territorialisation 
take place. In particular, this book focuses on the latter phase of what, 
echoing James Scott (more below), could be termed the “last enclosure” of 
the frontier – a process that materialises mostly through infrastructure 
development since the turn of the millennium. To understand how this 
process unfolded, it is important to brief ly detail the history of China’s 
borderlands since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, 
in 1949.
A fundamentally anti-imperialist force, the CCP unsurprisingly sought 
to restore what it considered China’s territorial integrity following the 
establishment of the PRC. Such efforts need to be understood against the 
backdrop of China’s late imperial and Republican history, in which foreign 
powers, particularly the British, Russian, and Japanese empires conquered 
and administered sections of Qing territory through open acts of aggression 
and “unequal treaties” (bu pingdeng tiaoyue) imposed upon the weak Chinese 
state. Following the so-called century of national humiliation (bainian 
guochi), CCP leaders thus made it their priority to restore the country’s 
prestige. When the PRC was established in 1949, its leaders identif ied the 
borders of the newly formed communist state to coincide with the territory 
recognised to be Qing lands at the point of the empire’s collapse in 1911. The 
challenge, to put it in the words of Benedict Anderson, was to stretch “the 
short, tight skin of a nation over the gigantic body of the empire” (1991: 86). 
Signif icantly, this territory included most of the late Qing’s ethnic frontier, 
including parts of Xinjiang and Yunnan, which the Qing managed only 
intermittently, and for the most part indirectly.12 Thus, while such claims 
allowed CCP leaders to successfully inscribe the PRC into an imagined 
imperial geography going back thousands of years, the legacy of the Qing 
11 In borrowing Thongchai (1994) famous expression, I understand the notion of geo-body 
as a process as much as a product. For a discussion of the issue of China’s geo-body vis-à-vis 
Thongchai’s work, see Klingberg (2017). See also Duara (1995) and Fiskesjö (2006).
12 On the Qing’s administration of Yunnan, see Giersch (2006). On Xinjiang, see Millward 
(1998; 2007); Kinzley (2018); Perdue (2005).
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frontier presented several challenges for them.13 Two in particular are of 
interest here: the incorporation and management of an ethnically diverse, 
vast, underdeveloped, and sparsely populated periphery,14 and a number 
of territorial disputes with post-colonial nations such as India, Pakistan, 
and Burma.15
The Party’s territorial objectives and anxieties materialised through 
particular development efforts and institutions across the country’s most 
peripheral areas. Such processes were not uniform across China’s diverse 
borderlands and vis-à-vis distinct neighbours. In Xinjiang, the initial task of 
asserting CCP control and overseeing the creation of a new administrative 
organ was led by the People’s Liberation Army. To this end, Xinjiang saw 
the creation of a “peculiar institution” (Millward 2007: 251), the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps, generally known as bingtuan.16 Designed 
to combine production with militia duties, the bingtuan were enshrined with 
the task of securing the borderlands and opening up Xinjiang’s “wilderness” 
for agriculture and resource extraction. As such, the bingtuan played a 
major role in the settlement of China’s western frontier and the integration 
of Xinjiang. As Tom Cliff put it: “the frontier can be seen as having moved 
beyond places where bingtuan farms have created a frontier of settlement 
in the past. The bingtuan and the frontier move in close alignment, the 
latter being swept along by the former” (Cliff 2009: 91). The situation was 
different in Yunnan, which, by 1949, was better integrated within the Chinese 
13 China’s approach to territorial issues and the production of a particular national geo-body 
by CCP authorities have been the object several studies. See in particular Callahan (2009) and 
Leibold (2006, 2007).
14 Many scholars have raised the question of what the construction of a Chinese nation meant 
for those who were “less authentic, more peripheral, and farther removed from a core Chinese 
tradition” (Gladney 1998: 5), thus expressing concerns about the role of ethnic minorities in 
China’s contemporary nationhood (cf. Litzinger 2000; Schein 2000; Bulag 2002; Bovingdon 
2010; Lipman 1997; Rossabi 2004). Importantly, this work explored the ways that China’s ethnic 
populations have been territorialized in a Han national geography, not only as subjects of a 
hegemonic national vision, but also as knowledge-making groups that have affected that national 
conception.
15 On China’s territorial disputes, see Fravel (2008).
16 Bingtuan is a short form for Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan, which is usually translated 
in English as Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. The Corps system has its predecessor 
in the military-agricultural colonies of Han China, called tuntian, where it was employed to 
sustain troops and enhance control over the frontier. Established in 1954, today’s bingtuan are 
a semi-military government organisation that “assumes the duties of cultivating and guarding 
the frontier areas entrusted to it by the state” (State Council of the PRC 2003). Subordinate to 
the leadership of the central government, the Corps operate schools, hospitals, courts, militia, 
and produce about one sixth of Xinjiang’s GDP. On the bingtuan, see Cliff (2016)
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administrative system, particularly due to its importance for the Nationalist 
government’s “great rear base” (dahoufang) strategy and the province’s 
crucial role during World War Two. Economically, too, some urban areas in 
Yunnan had become an important base for industrial relocation following 
Japanese invasions of much of the country’s coastal and northern provinces 
(Summers 2013: 45). The Yunnan borderlands too, however, presented a key 
security challenge to early communist rule. Following the end of the civil 
war, a number of Nationalist (Guomindang, henceforth KMT) troops fled 
to northern Burma. There, with the support of Taiwan and (most likely) 
the CIA, they attempted a number of forays into Yunnan in the early 1950s, 
without success (Gibson and Chen 2011).
During the first few decades of communist rule, both Xinjiang and Yunnan 
saw the implementation of a number of similar policies: land distribution,17 
state-sponsored Han migration to the region, and the creation of autonomous 
minority areas. Externally, however, in their relations with their neigh-
bouring states, Xinjiang and Yunnan faced rather different challenges with 
tangible consequences for their border population. In Xinjiang, in particular, 
as part of the Sino-Soviet split, China and the Soviet Union increased border 
security through military presence and border infrastructure deemed 
to protect the nation’s boundaries in case of an attack.18 Vast areas along 
Xinjiang’s western borders with present-day Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
were turned into a constellation of no man’s lands, an empty (or indeed, 
emptied) cushion between the two rivals. In Yunnan, on the other hand, 
while cross-border ties were not formally encouraged, small-scale trade and 
a fair amount of cross-border mobility remained major characteristics of 
the border areas. Furthermore, in 1968, China facilitated and supported the 
Communist Party of Burma’s (CPB) invasion of large sections of the northern 
borderlands of the country. In the subsequent two decades, men, weapons, 
and supplies flew across what had become an open border, between Yunnan 
and the “liberated areas” of northern Burma under CPB administration.
17 Land reform in Yunnan occurred in two distinct phases. In 1950, the province was divided 
into two areas, an inland zone and a frontier zone (bianyanqu). The frontier zone included areas 
mostly along Yunnan’s international borders, where the native chieftain (tusi) system was still 
in place. While land reform in the inland zone was completed by 1952, it was postponed in the 
frontier zone in the wake of the minzu identif ication project (minzu shibie) and completed only 
in 1956. See Yang (1972: 253–4).
18 Chinese deployment of military forces in Xinjiang was modest compared to that of the Soviet 
Union. As Shichor (2004) argues, the PLA viewed Xinjiang as “strategic depth” that would slow 
down a Soviet attack, rather than a vital piece of national territory to be defended at all costs. 
This, according to Millward (2007: 295-8), might be one reason for Xinjiang’s relatively “late” 
development.
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Ma Dazheng, one of China’s most prominent scholars of borderlands 
and frontier issues, remarked that China’s peripheries are, simultaneously, 
frontlines of national defence and key places for today’s open-door policy. 
“Prior to the 1980s,” he elaborated, “the frontier served only in the f irst 
capacity; since then in both” (Ma and Shan 2012: 68). This statement is 
only partially true for Xinjiang and Yunnan. While, as this book highlights, 
the particular duality between openness and closure is a main facet of 
today’s borderlands, for Xinjiang and Yunnan the 1990s were signif icantly 
more eventful than the beginning of the reform period in the 1980s. The 
borderlands of Xinjiang, in particular, did not witness any major shift until 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991, and the consequent formation of 
Central Asian states.19 In Yunnan, on the other hand, the borderlands were 
largely caught in the Cold War rivalry between communist and Burmese 
army forces until the implosion of the CPB in 1989. In both cases, it was 
only in the early 1990s that the promises of mobility, trade, and investment 
embedded in Deng Xiaoping’s reforms took concrete shape.
By then, China’s western provinces were markedly poorer and less 
developed than the rest of the country.20 To counter this gap, in 1994 the 
Chinese government launched a f irst major poverty alleviation campaign 
(the “8–7 strategy”), which ended up focusing primarily on China’s central 
and western regions. As part of it, subsidies in the forms of loans and grants 
were distributed to poor counties for a total of US$ 13.6 billion, or 5–6 per 
cent of total government expenditures.21 Poverty alleviation campaigns were 
followed by strategies explicitly targeting the western regions, particularly 
in the ninth f ive-year plan (1996–2000) and, notoriously, with the launch 
of the “Open Up the West Campaign” (xibu da kaifa) in 1999 in conjunction 
19 As James Millward puts it, “Xinjiang had been relegated to a status of strategic buffer zone 
and economic cul-de-sac since the rise of Sino-Soviet tensions in the late 1950s and 1960s. In the 
new international context [that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union] Chinese leaders 
moved simultaneously both to open the region as a conduit to the rest of Eurasia and to integrate 
it more tightly with the rest of China” (2007: 289).
20 Already in the course of a visit to Tibet in 1980, Hu Yaobang, the CCP General Secretary, 
called for major reforms in minority areas. Deng Xiaoping himself, during a visit to Xinjiang 
the following year, stressed the importance of raising the standards of living in frontier regions. 
Both calls, however, must be understood within the broader objective of curbing separatism 
through development, which would become a major feature of China’s borderland policies in 
the post-reform era. Deng’s remarks, in particular, were explicitly referring to this fundamental 
aspect of China’s policies in minority regions (see Millward 2007: 278–9). For an overview of 
China’s security concerns in Xinjiang in the 1990s, see Becquelin (2000).
21 Wang, Li, and Ren (2004). On the role of subsidies in China’s development of its western 
regions, see Millward (2000); Fischer (2015).
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with the tenth f ive-year plan. The xibu da kaifa represents a signif icant 
turning point in the CCP’s efforts to develop its western borderlands, not 
least because of the discursive attention that it projected on China’s least 
developed, minority populated, and resource-rich frontiers. The motiva-
tions behind the programme were conspicuous. After twenty years of 
economic reforms, the gap between fast-growing coastal areas and poor 
and under-connected internal provinces was widening.22 In practice, as 
part of the xibu da kaifa, most investments were initially dedicated to 
developing transportation, energy, communication, and improving urban 
infrastructure in the western regions. Some large-scale projects stood out, 
such as the Qinghai-Tibet railway and the West-East natural gas transfer 
project, for a cumulative investment on infrastructure of one trillion RMB 
between 2000 and 2005.23
The xibu da kaifa was also characterised by a security component whose 
ideological roots can be found in the so-called “security-development nexus”, 
i.e. the expectation that economic development will reduce insecurity in 
states and societies (cf. Duff ield 2001). Border region underdevelopment, 
combined with the presence of sizeable ethnic minorities, has been viewed as 
a security risk since the inception of the PRC. Hence, state-led development 
agendas, like the xibu da kaifa, sought to pacify social unrest by encour-
aging local governments to boost economic growth through developing 
trans-boundary economic ties.24
The spate and scale of investment further accelerated in 2008 when, in 
order to cope with the negative impact of the global f inancial crisis on the 
Chinese economy, the central government announced a f iscal stimulus 
programme of four trillion RMB. The largest share of the stimulus package 
went into infrastructure projects, including public utilities and affordable 
housing in rural areas (Schüller and Schüler-Zhou 2009: 169). While not 
only focused on western provinces, this new stream of f inancial transfers, 
combined with ongoing development projects initiated as part of the xibu 
22 As Jiang Zemin put it in March 1999 at the Ninth National Party Congress in Beijing: “The 
Western area is large, and comprises over the half of the whole of the state’s territory. But the 
majority is in a state of underdevelopment or wilderness. The West [of China] must sooner or 
later be developed. Otherwise, how could we reach a modernization of the whole country? How 
could China become a strong economic state?” (Yan 2001: 1).
23 Démurger (2014). On the xibu da kaifa, see also Holbig (2004).
24 Jiang Zemin himself made this connection clear in 1999: “The minorities are quite con-
centrated in the West [of China], and it is also a border area. Hastening development of the 
West would preserve political and social stability. Therefore, promotion of national unity and 
safeguarding of border security is of great signif icance” (Yan 2001: 2). See also Clarke (2008).
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da kaifa, led to major constructions across the Chinese borderlands, from 
Xinjiang to Yunnan, the TAR to Inner Mongolia.
It is argued in this book that through such explicit forms of “giving” (Yeh 
2013), the Chinese state discursively re-positioned its western borderlands 
from under-developed backwaters to spearheads of investments and connec-
tivity. Consequently, although principally focused on internal development, 
the xibu da kaifa reverberated beyond China’s borders and led to a number 
of initiatives aimed at enhancing cooperation between China and its border 
nations. In Yunnan, plans to connect China with India, Bangladesh, and 
Burma through a network of state-of-the-art infrastructure were drafted 
at a high-prof ile meeting at the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences in 
August 1999. In Western China, similar efforts culminated in 2001 with 
the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) between 
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In the 
“Declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” that resulted from 
the founding meeting of the group, the main focus was on the strategic value 
of the SCO and its implications for regional security. However, a general 
call for “multilateral cooperation” and “trade and investment facilitation” 
between the member states was also included.25
This discursive shift, in which the borderlands had become embedded 
in China’s broader mission to open-up, is particularly evident if we consider 
the coincidence of the Open Up the West campaign with the “Going Out” 
strategy (zouchuqu zhanlüe), also launched in 1999 to encourage Chinese 
investments abroad. As Yeh and Wharton have argued, the two overlapping 
strategies, while rarely considered together, “can shed light on Chinese 
development approaches” (2016: 288) due to their multi-faceted intersec-
tions. In particular, they identify the centrality of physical infrastructure 
as a key element of the country’s development trajectory both within its 
national boundaries as well as outside of them. “Whereas Western countries’ 
development programs have moved from modernization to a series of other 
approaches including basic needs, structural adjustment, and later a focus 
on governance and social goals,” they point out, “Chinese development has 
remained much more constant in its focus on assistance for infrastructure 
and production” (2016: 297).26
25 People’s Daily (2001); see also Rippa (2017).
26 According to Yeh and Wharton (2016), this form of development is also characterised by the 
imposition of specif ic “models” upon both frontier landscapes and foreign investments – be it 
the urbanisation of the countryside or the omnipresent Special Economic Zone. Such models, 
they argue, are not f ixed, rather lending themselves to manoeuvring and accommodation, yet 
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If approached from within this perspective, China’s latest — and most 
ambitious — global campaign, the Belt and Road Initiative, is sticking for its 
remarkable continuity with China’s approach to development over the past 
two decades. Not unlike the xibu da kaifa and the Going Out strategy, the 
BRI “largely consolidates and elevates already existing ideas and practices” 
(Yeh and Wharton 2016: 308), although re-packaged and re-branded into a 
major foreign policy priority. Whilst such acts of branding should not be 
underestimated for the discursive power that they hold and produce, the 
BRI needs to be understood within this particular history. In this book, I 
approach the BRI as the culmination of a particular development trajectory, 
rather than as a stand-alone, brand-new strategy. As such, it is useful to take 
some of the effects of the xibu da kaifa as critical starting points to address 
BRI projects in Xinjiang and Yunnan. The xibu da kaifa initially did not 
succeed in the reduction of regional disparities between east and west, or in 
attracting foreign investment, despite the creation of a network of cross-bor-
der Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and ad hoc preferential policies. Indeed, 
subsidies and centre-to-province f iscal transfers were the main resources 
through which western development had been approached (Becquelin 
2004; Fischer 2015; Grewal and Ahmed 2011, Yeh and Wharton 2016). What 
the xibu da kaifa did succeed in, however, was a number of unstated goals, 
namely resource extraction (Oakes 2004), rent distribution (Shih 2004), and 
the consolidation of state power in the peripheries (Goodman 2004; Yeh 
2013) through an increased Chinese in-migration in minority areas and the 
selective distribution of resources (Becquelin 2004; Jeong 2015). These, in 
turn, resulted in increasing discontent among ethnic minorities, fuelling 
unrest in a number of border regions (cf. Fischer 2014; Bovingdon 2010).
Building upon this research, this book brings to the fore another effect 
of two decades of large-scale investment in infrastructure development in 
the borderlands: the marginalisation of local forms of cross-border trade as 
a result of increased control. In particular, by focusing on the borderlands of 
Xinjiang and Yunnan, I show how the changing infrastructural landscape led 
to a re-configuration of cross-border mobilities and minority subjectivities, 
as well as to new forms of regulations and technologies of surveillance. 
These, in turn, curbed the quantity and quality of pre-existing forms of 
transnational connectivity, displaced – both physically and culturally – 
ethnic minorities, and ushered in new forms of exclusion amidst trading 
communities.
they drive policies and investment across the Chinese borderlands and beyond, as I detail in 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this book.
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From refuge to the infrastructure frontier: Perspectives on 
(China’s) borderlands
There are a number of words in English that refer to the edges of a nation 
state, with scholarly discussions often distinguishing between frontier, 
borders, and borderlands, among others.27 As Stéphane Gros (2016: 15) notices, 
in the East Asian context, “frontier” evokes two prominent f igures that have 
written on the topic: Owen Lattimore and Edmund Leach. In his Inner Asian 
frontiers of China (1940), Lattimore makes the case for understanding the 
frontier as a dynamic zone through which cultures meet, move, merge, and 
collide. In Frontiers of Burma (1960), on the other hand, Leach discusses the 
inapplicability of the concepts of frontier, state, and nation as def ined by 
contemporary political geography and essentially based on the “dogma of 
sovereignty” underpinning the nation state. Conceived of together, these 
two works reveal a conception of the frontiers as peculiar zones in which 
boundaries are inherently unstable, and the geography of the nation state 
rarely corresponds to that expressed by indigenous notions and political 
systems. Such seminal works also speak to a more current debate in the social 
sciences in which the notion of frontier has been revived in order to capture 
and understand a range of developmental processes at the intersection 
of resource extraction, state-making, and different forms of social power 
(Moore 2000; De Angelis 2004; Watts 2014, 2015). Within this literature, the 
frontier is generally regarded as a “relational space” (Barney 2009), which 
is to say a space actively produced through the interactions of different 
actors and institutions. Frontiers, in other words, are understood as mobile 
spaces – a “permanent prospect” (Watts 2014: 193) – that create the ecological, 
social, and political conditions for hyperbolic forms of exploitation and 
accumulation. As Anna Tsing put it: “Frontiers are not just discovered at the 
edge; they are projects in making geographical and temporal experiences” 
(2003: 5100; see also Tsing 2005). Borders and borderlands, on the other 
hand, refer more directly to that most uncanny bequest of the modern 
nation state: the Westphalian border-as-line.28 While we have become 
accustomed to the ways in which lines define national boundaries on maps, 
their physical presence is elusive at best. Border lines can hardly be found, 
27 And perhaps more so between borderworlds (Sadan 2013) and border zones. There have also 
been attempts to identify a typology of borderlands, in particular, see Baud and Van Schendel 
(1997). See also Paasi (2014).
28 For an introduction to the vast body of literature on the subject, see Wilson and Donnan 
(1998; 2012). For a def inition of these different terms, see also Baud and Van Schendel (1997).
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identif ied, and followed. Despite a recent resurgence of border walls to 
materially claim – and allegedly “defend” – the edges of our nations (Jones 
2012), their material presence does not seem to affect most citizens of such 
nations, if not in the spectacle of televised politics. National borders remain, 
in other words, a somewhat mysterious creation, yet one that maintains 
a fundamental social function.29 In Chinese, bianjiang encompasses the 
definitions of both borderlands and frontiers. As such, the term indicates 
a liminal space of confluence and encounter, as well as the physical limit 
of the nation state. As a concept, it seems to acknowledge some of the key 
features of a borderland: a zone def ined by the presence of a boundary 
yet extending well beyond the border-as-line that def ines a nation state’s 
claims to territorial sovereignty (Calanca and Wildt 2006; Lary 2007: 5–6; 
Wade 2000).
Scholarship in the social sciences has, in recent years, shown several 
attempts to reconcile the “temporal” dimension inherent to the notion 
of frontier with the more “spatial” approach underpinned by borders and 
borderlands in the study of the national edges of nation states. To do so, 
scholars have stressed the need to study the histories of particular borders, 
how they have come to be defined, enforced, and represented.30 A particu-
larly fruitful approach is that of seeing national borders as examples of more 
general processes of b/ordering – and in so doing, to analyse the practices 
surrounding borders and border-making rather than focus on borders as 
stable political entities (Paasi 1999; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002; 
Wilson and Donnan 2012: 17). In such a conceptualisation, borders are 
understood relationally, as a process – as Sarah Green (2012) put it, more a 
verb than a noun. Such approaches allow us to explore the complexity in 
both form and function of contemporary national borders, including their 
displacement and materialisation at places that, geographically at least, do 
not often coincide with the border-as-line drawn on maps.31
29 As Ishikawa puts it: “in theory the full sovereign power of the state extends to this imaginary 
line, and there it stops completely. In practice, the space around the border becomes a special 
f ield, a threshold that accommodates a series of social, economic and cultural f lows from one 
national arena into another, a zone where things are no longer what they were, but not yet what 
they will be” (2010: 5).
30 Recent examples include Nick Megoran (2017) “biographical” approach and Madeleine 
Reeves’s focus on “border work” (2014) in Central Asia, Sarah Green’s (2005) work on marginality 
and gaps in the Balkans, and Franck Billé’s (2017) writing on the subject.
31 My understanding of and approach to the national boundaries of China that represent 
the core topic of this book, is deeply inf luenced by this latter body of literature. As such, the 
distinctions sketched above between border, borderland, and frontier, are not to be understood 
as f ixed and rigid. Nevertheless, I use border when referring to the national boundary of the 
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In the context of China’s – and Asia’s, more broadly – borderlands, another 
approach to the study of frontier spaces has been particularly influential. 
In The Art of Not Being Governed, James Scott put forward a bold argument 
claiming that the hills and mountains of upland Southeast Asia served 
as the last of a series of escape zones to which people moved to in order 
to avoid incorporation into oppressive agricultural states and empires. 
Accordingly, a signif icant part of highland population consisted of people 
who had chosen not to be part of a state. Groups such as the Naga of today’s 
northeast India, or the Wa of the China-Burma borderlands, had acquired 
cultural inventories that were appropriate to this end: forms of agriculture 
compatible with frequent movement, the ability to shift between multiple 
ethnicities, non-hierarchical religious systems, and so forth. Scott’s thesis 
of self-chosen refuge has been met with much criticism from scholars with 
experience in the area, pointing out numerous flaws and imprecisions in his 
rendering of historical highland life and politics.32 Nevertheless, Scott’s work 
brought to the fore a crucial dynamic that has often been over-sighted: that 
highland communities are not the survivals of primordial cultural forms 
and bearers of timeless traditions, but are rather integral to larger processes 
of geopolitical transformation throughout history.33
Scott’s thesis explicitly concerns pre-World War Two history. He argues 
that upland Southeast Asia as well as other escape zones have all by now 
effectively been incorporated into nation states, thanks in particular to 
what, echoing David Harvey (1989), he calls “distance-demolishing technolo-
gies” such as railroads, all-weather roads, and telephone networks. In the 
following decades this process all but expanded, in both scale and speed. 
In the Chinese context, the years following the turn of the millennium in 
particular have seen a frenzy of transportation infrastructure projects in 
the borderlands. Thousands of kilometres of roads and railways were built 
or upgraded – some of them meant to tie peripheries more closely into the 
nation state and secure its “core interests,” others with the dedicated purpose 
of fostering border trade. Together with new roads came checkpoints, dry 
ports, and customs facilities, all of them accompanied by rhetoric of progress, 
state, the physical edge of national territory. Borderlands, on the other hand, refer to the areas 
in proximity to such line. With frontier, on the other hand, I refer to two distinct notions. First, 
I use frontier when discussing pre-nation state borders – particularly in the context of border 
disputes in imperial times. Secondly, frontier refers to particular processes of accumulation 
as described above.
32 See for instance Jonsson (2014) and Sadan (2010).
33 For a discussion of Scott’s thesis applicability to other contexts, see the Special Issue of the 
Journal of Global History edited by Jean Michaud (2010).
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order, and security. Outside of China’s borders, Chinese companies have 
contributed to numerous infrastructure projects in neighbouring countries, 
from Pakistan to Burma, and constructed thousands of kilometres of feeder 
roads penetrating ever deeper into the last remaining jungles of Southeast 
Asia to access resources and turn sleepy rural villages into investment 
opportunities for agribusinesses, logging, and mining. Moreover, plans for 
even bigger infrastructural projects are on the horizon, many of them in 
relation to the Belt and Road Initiative (Callahan 2016; Johnson 2016; Sidaway 
and Woon 2017). Infrastructure – some promised, some built – has captured 
the minds and dreams of a vast portion of borderland residents across and 
along China’s borders. The pace at which infrastructure developments are 
currently reshaping livelihoods, opportunities, and ambitions is staggering. 
However, as several anthropologists of infrastructure have noted, roads, 
corridors, and SEZs seldom live up to the promise of mobility and prosperity 
on which they are built or planned (Larkin 2013; Nyíri and Breidenbach 2008; 
Campbell 2010; Dalakoglou and Harvey 2012; Harvey and Knox 2015; Rippa, 
Murton and Rest 2020). At times, they even end up becoming obstacles rather 
than conduits for development and connectivity (Walker 1999; Pedersen 
and Bunkenborg 2012; Demenge 2013). In other words, roads and corridors 
do not always “demolish distance” – they rather create nodes of legibility 
and state presence, but in the process, they also increase the remoteness 
and illegibility of border areas outside their immediate scope (Saxer and 
Andersson 2019; Rippa 2019b).
This book represents a departure from Scott’s narrow interpretation 
of upland areas as historical refuge in favour of a general ref lection on 
state authority, development, and infrastructure at China’s borders today. 
In particular, building upon the literature on b/ordering mentioned 
above, I address the nexus of cross-border mobility and infrastructure 
development that def ines China’s borderlands in the 21st century. In-
frastructure, in the Chinese context, is a shorthand for development. 
Infrastructure is both an index of development and the conditio sine 
qua non in its implementation. Development, on the other hand, is for 
the most part understood and performed through new infrastructure. 
Such infrastructure also represents a civilising machine: something that 
puts people, things, and the state into new relations (Gidwani 2008). 
The Chinese borderlands, in particular, have come to be def ined by 
state-led efforts to “open up” or “integrate” them through infrastructural 
interventions. Fostered by programmes such as the xibu de kaifa, this 
infrastructure has radically reshaped livelihoods in most borderland 
areas across the country. Through such projects, as I show in this book, 
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the Chinese state itself is encountered, enacted, and represented by those 
living in proximity to the borders.
In order to account for China’s borderlands unique role and position, 
I structure the book around three key notions: proximity, curation, and 
corridor. Each notion speaks to a particular body of literature that is central 
to the study of borderlands, namely: mobility, state power, and exchange. 
Proximity, curation, and corridor do not represent novel concepts through 
which I am to capture particular ways in which space is made, state power 
deployed, and transnational exchanges carried out. Rather, they represent 
an attempt to come to terms with the processual, historical, and contingent 
nature of cross-border relations that I have discussed above. In so doing, 
they aim to guide the reader by providing analytical tools to view China’s 
borderlands in their complexity and multiplicity. They are starting points 
for approaching the borderlands, rather than totalising frameworks that 
fully embrace them.
Outline of the Book
The book is divided into three parts, with each part built around two 
chapters, an interlude, and a coda. For each part, one chapter analyses a 
case from the Xinjiang borderlands and one from the Yunnan borderlands. 
The interlude and coda serve the main purposes of connecting the two cases 
and making a general argument about, respectively, proximity, curation, 
and corridor, while helping the reader to navigate between the two different 
geographical contexts. Each chapter, and indeed each of the three parts of 
the book can be read independently: while some of the people, places, and 
conceptual references return throughout the volume, each chapter makes 
a specif ic point. There is, nevertheless, a coherence to the whole book that 
suggests a linear reading – one that acclimatises the reader to the line of 
argument that is developed throughout the text.
The f irst part of the book – proximity – departs from the following real-
isation. While there is a “strong association between borders and stopping 
things from happening” (Green 2012: 576), it is equally true that the friction 
created and performed by national borders can create possibilities for 
people to take advantage of particular economic differences by virtue of 
personal relations and skills. As I show, many such skills and networks are 
not new, they are rather rooted in long histories of cross-border exchanges 
that are often obscured by current understandings of globalisation. Prox-
imity, in this regard, rather than referring to a purely spatial condition is 
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defined as something that needs to be constantly made and remade.34 In 
the context of cross-border interactions, this notion is used to address the 
set of skills that allows for particular exchanges to occur, and businesses to 
thrive. Chapter 1 introduces the notion of proximity through an analysis of 
China-Pakistan cross-border trade along the Karakoram Highway (KKH). 
As proximity def ines the geographical, cultural, and historical closeness 
that characterises (at least some) border regions on China’s peripheries, 
my argument is that this particular closeness became an asset for many 
traders in the aftermath of China’s opening up in the 1980s, 1990s, and still 
well into the 2000s. By way of such proximity, I show how Pakistani traders 
from the northernmost parts of the country managed, in those years, to set 
up successful cross-border businesses. This Chapter traces the lives of some 
of these traders and discusses the content of their businesses, as well as the 
skills necessary to operate in such environment. The second chapter tells a 
similar story of cross-border connections from Western Yunnan. Situated 
at around 100km from the Burmese border, the city of Tengchong has a long 
history as an administrative, military, and trading outpost. Following the 
fall of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989, and the opening of off icial 
border crossings with Burma, Tengchong traders with long-term experience 
and overseas family connections profited from dealings in jade, timber and, 
most recently, amber. This chapter in particular details the story of the trade 
in timber to show how the state is embedded in processes of proximity. By 
doing so, I also show the intertwined nature of private and public interests, 
and how the def inition of particular border infrastructure was the result 
of private initiative, rather than government decision.
Part two of the book is structured around the notion of curation. Not 
intended as a reference to the work of museum curators, with this notion I 
seek an alternative to reductive dualisms such as hegemony-resistance and 
ideology-practice in the study of development projects at China’s borderlands. 
Rather, by stressing the moral and aesthetic components of such projects, 
the notion of curation points to infrastructural interventions’ attempts 
to change the material and social space in minority regions – and by so 
doing, re-make minority subjectivities. Chapter 3 begins with an analysis of 
another Yunnan border community, the Drung of the Dulong Valley, in the 
province’s north-west. I introduce the notion of curation through an analysis 
of the impact of China’s state-led programme, the “Building a New Socialist 
Countryside,” according to which all inhabitants of the valley have been 
moved into newly built houses in larger settlements. I argue that the state, 
34 A doing that echoes Saxer and Zhang’s (2016) notion of neighbouring.
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by defining the Drung as primitive, sees a particular form of development 
as a “healing” process through which ethnic minorities can be lifted out of 
poverty and into modernity. Furthermore, “curation” refers to the aesthetic 
components of such development projects, where villages, in order to be 
modern, need to look modern. In the Dulong Valley, however, promises 
of development attached to this particular resettlement project are yet to 
materialise. For most local inhabitants, in fact, the new houses and the forced 
abandonment of traditional forms of agriculture have led to increasing 
reliance on state subsidies. For the Drung people, modernisation brought 
more rather than less dependency. Chapter 4 returns the book to Xinjiang 
and touches upon issues of tourism, cultural production, and cultural 
dispossession through the case of the reconstruction of Kashgar’s old town. 
This project, which was at its peak during my doctoral research in 2012–13, 
involves over 30,000 households and has completely remodelled Kashgar’s 
cityscape. Most parts have been rebuilt in a neo-traditional style meant to 
preserve, or rather redef ine, an atmosphere of authenticity – and thus to 
determine what it means to be Uyghur today. In this context, practices of 
curation capture a particular mode of ruling that the Chinese state employs 
in its minority-populated borderlands. It thus evokes yet another meaning 
of the word: that of “taking out”, or “selecting.” Elements of Uyghur-ness that 
are not akin to the government vision, such as the importance of Islam, are 
simply left out of the display of Uyghur culture showcased in the newly 
built Kashgar old town. As such, curational interventions are particular 
relations of power that are expressed in aesthetic values def ining notions 
of heritage-making and based on market-driven interests as well as the 
state’s attempt to enforce legibility and control.
Issues of legibility and control at the juncture of proximity and curation 
are at the core of Chapter 5, which addresses one of China’s most ambitious 
projects under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative: the China-Pa-
kistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This chapter argues that together with 
spectacular promises of development, CPEC brought a renewed attention 
to security in Xinjiang’s far west. Moving from f ieldwork among Uyghur 
migrants in Pakistan, I show that securitisation has been part of China’s 
strategy since the early 2000s, and that it represents an integral element of 
Chinese-style development in the region and abroad. In the case of Xinji-
ang, securitisation has had an uneven impact among the local population, 
targeting in particular Muslim Uyghurs, for whom it became increasingly 
diff icult to obtain passports and visas to travel abroad. Therefore, despite 
BRI claims of inclusiveness and win-win outcomes, the development of 
cross-border infrastructures has hindered local traders’ ability to partake 
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in cross-border businesses in which they previously thrived, as described 
in Chapter 1. In general, this third part looks at some of the consequences of 
the ongoing corridor-isation of trade through BRI-related projects, namely: 
increased security (Chapter 5) and the institutionalisation of illicit practices 
(Chapter 6). As I discuss in the interlude, I address “corridor” as both a 
conceptual tool to unpack how infrastructure can act as a technology of 
exclusion, as well as the material devices through which such marginalising 
dynamics unfold. Chapter 6, in this regard, focuses on recent research with 
amber traders in Tengchong to show that economic corridors and Belt and 
Road fantasies, while undermining small-scale businesses by making a 
claim to legality and transparency, foster the integration of illicit practices 
by state authorities. The amber case in Tengchong is particularly compelling, 
showing how, in recent years, wealth derived from amber concentrated 
in fewer hands, while pushing small traders into illegal undertakings, or 
out of business altogether. In the process, however, the “illegality” of the 
business – based on unregulated imports of amber from Burma – persists.
Part 1
Proximity
Figure 4: Chinese timber dealers at the China-Burma border (photo by the author, 2015)

1 Connections
“China’s hold upon her nomad population is of the slightest and, although a 
handful of men is maintained on the Pamirs at Tashkurgan, there is little sign of 
Chinese authority until one drops into the great plain of Central Asia, and f inds 
at Kashgar a Chinese Taotai, a garrison, and a walled city on the regular Chinese 
model, set in that green ribbon where the line of irrigation brings wealth and 
prosperity and the most luscious fruits to a dense Mohammedan population, on 
the very borders of the deserts of Takla Makan. Here we f ind the Chinese in their 
furthest outpost, their westernmost extremity, a position which they have lost 
and won time after time throughout the ages”
— Archibald Rose (1912: 212-13)
“China’s new “empire” will be an informal and largely economic one, posited on 
cash and held together by hard infrastructure”
— Tom Miller (2017: 17)
At the Kashgar Central & South Asia Commodity Fair in 2013 an entire stand 
was dedicated to the new Kashgar Special Economic Zone.1 At the entrance 
of the stand, a large poster highlighted Kashgar’s strategic position for cross-
border trade. “Five ports (of entry) through eight countries, a road connecting 
Europe and Asia,” the poster read, referring to the eight countries that share 
a border with Xinjiang and the f ive international ports of entry in Kashgar 
prefecture.”2 According to a panel inside the stand, Kashgar was “China’s 
great entryway to Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and even Europe.” 
Beside it, another poster showed the vision for the city’s new Finance and 
Trade district – a modern urban cluster with skyscrapers, highways, and green 
spaces on the shores of an artif icial lake. Towering above all, a maxi-screen 
projected videos of Uyghur men and women dancing in traditional costumes, 
praising ethnic unity and Kashgar’s world-famous cuisine. In the middle of 
the stand, two young hostesses explained the plans for the development of 
the Finance and Trade district while pointing at an impressive plastic model 
1 Generally known simply as Kashi tequ 喀什特区.
2 Wu kou’an tong ba guo, yilu lian ouya 五口岸通八国，一路连欧亚. The eight countries are 
India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Mongolia; the f ive 
ports of entry are the Irkeshtam Pass (with Kyrgyzstan), the Torugart Pass (with Kyrgyzstan), 
the Kulma Pass (with Tajikistan), the Khunjerab Pass (with Pakistan) and Kashgar Airport.
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of the two “Development Twin Towers” – the main features of the ambitious 
project. They told me that the two towers were to be completed in three years, 
and with their 280-metres they would be the tallest buildings in Xinjiang. 
“One of them will host the Kashgar Hilton Hotel,” said one of the two girls, 
“while the second tower will provide space for high-end offices.” Next to the 
towers, I was shown a model of a four-floor tax-free shopping mall, expected 
to open by the end of the year with brands such as Prada, Valentino, and Louis 
Vuitton. On the walls, more maps and posters showed Kashgar’s favourable 
location in Eurasia, underlying its proximity to the various Central Asian 
capitals, as well as to Kabul, Islamabad, and Delhi. All of this, in the various 
panels, brochures, and presentations, was framed according to Kashgar’s 
envisioned past, present, and future role as a major hub along the Silk Road.
For the f irst time, the 2013 instantiation of the Kashgar Central & South 
Asia Commodity Fair was paired with another initiative: the “China 
Kashgar-Guangzhou Commodity Fair.” This second fair was held in a 
different location, the Guangzhou New City, an exposition complex in 
the South-Western part of town, some 30 minutes by taxi from the main 
venue. Conveniently situated along the Karakoram Highway, the newly 
opened Guangzhou New City was envisioned to become a major trading 
hub for Pakistani and Tajik traders and companies – an entry point into the 
Chinese market. At the time of the fair, in fact, over 100 stands managed 
by Pakistani businessmen were located inside the Guangzhou New City 
and many traders were optimistic that the venue could turn into a major 
showcase for their products. I had met many of the traders over previous 
months of research, and some of them had shops in Tashkurgan – the last 
settlement before the Pakistani border some 300 km to the south of Kashgar, 
in a high mountain plateau. There, too, despite the remoteness of the small 
town, China had ambitious plans. Not long after the 2013 Kashgar Central 
& South Asia Commodity Fair, in 2016, China began construction work 
on a massive China-Pakistan logistics complex in Tashkurgan as part as 
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The project would include 
“an Internet service administration center, a cross-border e-commerce 
enterprise incubator, and a modern warehousing and logistic center,” in 
addition to an exhibition centre, hotels, and entertainment facilities (Xinhua 
2016). The logistic centre, expected to cost three billion renminbi (US$ 
464 million), highlights China’s commitment to investing in its border 
regions, fostering cross-border exchanges, and increasing its economic 
presence among neighbouring countries. For many Pakistani traders who 
were considering moving their business to Kashgar, Tashkurgan was soon 
to become not all that remote and isolated after all.
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Although the Kashgar SEZ and the CPEC have a history that precedes Xi 
Jinping’s 2013 launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both projects have 
now been subsumed in it. CPEC, in particular, is an ambitious project centred 
around a series of energy and infrastructure projects totalling upwards of 
US$ 62 billion in grants and soft loans, which now features as one of the BRI’s 
main economic corridors. It includes a major deep-water port and Special 
Economic Zone in Gwadar, on the coast of the Indian Ocean, as well as dams, 
roads, f ibre optic cables, and a light railway in Lahore. While the f inancial 
feasibility of the project and the terms of the various contracts have been 
repeatedly questioned (cf. Fair 2017), Pakistan’s previous government, led 
by Nawaz Sharif ’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), had been a 
vocal supporter of the CPEC. Despite a campaign based on change and on 
the promise of f ighting corruption at the highest levels, the current (2020) 
Pakistani government, led by cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan, 
has shown support for the China-led initiative since its installation. In the 
course of his victory speech, Imran Khan stressed his desire to have good 
relations with China, def ining CPEC as a “huge opportunity” to contribute 
to his larger goal of eradicating poverty (Al Jazeera News 2018a). Similar 
praises can be heard by politicians and investors in Gilgit-Baltistan, where 
CPEC has become a regular topic of discussion. Expectations run high.
Direct experience of cross-border trading practices along the KKH, 
however, offers a sobering counter-narrative to the lofty promises embedded 
in projects such as CPEC. At the time of my primary period of f ieldwork, 
for instance, between 2012 and 2013, the road on the Pakistani side was 
interrupted by a landslide that, in January 2010, caused the damming of the 
Hunza River near the village of Attabad and the formation of a 30km-long 
lake over the Highway. Following the disaster, lacking government support, 
local traders doing business with China established a boat service that 
reconnected, albeit at a particularly high cost, Gojal – the area north of the 
lake – with the rest of Pakistan (Sökefeld 2012). The reconstruction of the 
road around the lake was completed only in 2015 by the China Road and 
Bridge Corporation, a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) that is responsible for 
many construction projects abroad. In the summer and fall of 2013, then, 
while Xi Jinping was launching his Belt and Road Initiative through two 
speeches in Kazakhstan and Indonesia and expectations connected with 
the CPEC reached their apex, traders along the Karakoram Highway were 
still loading and unloading their goods into wooden boats. Together, we 
conjured up dreams of frictionless corridors while slowing crossing the blue 
waters of the newly formed lake, in the company of local farmers, shepherds, 
and goats heading south after a summer in the high pastures of Gojal. Two 
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worlds that could hardly be more radically apart, seemed, for a moment in 
time, intertwined in a common destiny.
Recent anthropological literature compellingly shows that infrastructures, 
as indexes of modernity and development, seem to possess the ability to trigger 
expectations even in spite of their recurrent failures (Anand, Gupta, and 
Appel 2018; Harvey, Jensen, and Morita 2017). Roads, in particular, can be seen 
as a priori failures: they never entirely fulf il the promises and expectations 
inscribed onto and into them (Harvey and Knox 2015). In order to understand 
how these promises are negotiated at the local level, Harvey and Knox (2012) 
apply the notion of “enchantment.” They suggest that regular encounters with 
dereliction and abandonment, for instance, rather than diminishing people’s 
faith in the positive impact of infrastructural projects, or in the government’s 
ability to deliver them, “strengthens the desire for them and constantly renews 
the sense that sometime soon they will appear and life will change for the 
better” (534). The case of the Attabad landslide is emblematic of infrastruc-
ture’s capacity to “enchant.” During my research and travels along the KKH, 
the possibility of closure – whether due to landslides, snowstorms, strikes, or 
demonstrations — was ever-present. In discussions with traders, however, 
the persistence and recurrence of such obstacles was often overlooked in lieu 
of generous assessments of the potential of the highway as a transnational 
and trans-continental artery of exchange. How should we understand the 
role that fears and expectations play among cross-border traders? How can 
we disentangle the apparent paradox of recurring failures and growing 
expectations so pervasive when it comes to the KKH and CPEC? At f irst, I 
simply tried to ask these questions to the traders I was spending time with, 
while browsing products in a bazaar, waiting for customers behind a shop’s 
counter, sipping sweet chai, or over warm plates of laghmen (a noodle dish 
common across Central Asia and a highlight of Uyghur cuisine). Their answers 
brought little insight, besides a distinct familiarity with unpredictable events. 
“Landslides are part of the business here,” one driver told me just outside 
of Karimabad, in the Hunza Valley. Or as Monib, a trader from Rawalpindi 
who has been living in Urumqi for 15 years once phrased it: “maybe you are 
surprised, but it’s normal for me, sometimes it takes two weeks [to get a truck 
to Islamabad], sometimes three, it doesn’t matter.” Raj, a Pashtun trader in 
Yiwu, used a more concrete set of images to picture the unpredictabilities that 
shipping goods via the KKH entails: “If you know the area, you know that the 
road goes through the biggest mountains in the world. It is not safe, there is 
always a problem. Now there is the [Attabad] lake, then maybe a landslide, 
then maybe a glacier will come down and there is nothing you can do. You 
don’t know what will happen next.”
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What should we make of this? In the remaining part of this chapter, 
instead of questioning the nature of such obstacles, I follow traders as they 
conduct their businesses. The questions, suddenly, become more practical: 
how do traders navigate obstacles? When facing a disaster such as the 
Attabad landslide, who continues trading with China, and who moves 
onto different businesses? How does a changing regulatory landscape 
impact small-scale cross-border trade at China’s peripheries? Through 
such questions, this chapter brings to light a tension that, I argue, is char-
acteristic of the Chinese borderlands at this particular moment in time: 
between future-oriented, state-led visions of connectivity and already 
existing connections that are rooted in the history of the borderlands. At 
the Kashgar Central & South Asia Commodity Fair, such future-oriented 
visions were tightly rooted in a Silk Road imaginary supposed to give them 
historical resonance. Yet, the Silk Road imagined by authorities in Beijing, 
Urumqi, or Islamabad, connecting the extremes of Eurasia through broad 
and sweeping arrows, has little to do with the history of trade across China’s 
borders. There, a combination of local practices, kinship relations, and the 
ability to navigate specif ic cultural, institutional, and physical landscapes 
mark the conditions of possibility for such connections to take place. This 
apparent contradiction between two different visions of transnational 
exchange underpins a tension that this chapter aims to explore, between 
two different and largely incompatible understandings of “connectivity.” 
In particular, in the f irst part of this book I describe some of the existing 
practices of connectivity – embedded in what I call proximity – that define 
cross-border relations across China’s vast and variegated borderlands. Such 
existing networks, I argue, are largely ignored by the current ideology of 
trans-continental connection embedded in China’s plans for CPEC, or the 
Belt and Road Initiative more generally. I show, however, how the state is 
complicit in the existence and maintenance of such networks, while at 
the same disrupting some of these practices through its recent push for 
trans-border infrastructure development.
It is in the town of Tashkurgan, remote yet central to such visions of 
transnational connectivity, that I begin this discussion.
A remote border town at the centre of the Silk Road
One never has to look far to f ind scenes of change in China. Stories of con-
summate transformation have become a rather common trope, even among 
those who have never set foot in the People’s Republic. Thus, Shenzhen, we 
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are repeatedly told, the country’s most famous and successful Special Eco-
nomic Zone, went from being a f ishing village to a fast-growing megalopolis 
of over ten million people in little more than three decades. The country’s 
high-speed railway network, introduced in 2007, grew to consist of over 
25,000 km of tracks in 2017. Overall, China poured more cement between 
2011 and 2013 than the United States did in the entire 20th century (Swanson 
2015). The f igures, as is so often the case in China, are overwhelming. They 
are on a scale that is, at times, impossible to grasp. They are also misleading, 
as they draw a totalising picture, one that suggests even-ness and fairness. 
In so doing, they reveal as much as they hide – the different speeds at which 
development occurs, and the frictions that it constantly generates.
Far from the skyscrapers of Shenzhen, at over 3500 metres in the Pamir 
mountains, a small border town tells a different story – another side to 
the much celebrated (and debated) “Chinese century.” This contrast could 
have not been more striking than during my f irst visit to Tashkurgan, in 
the summer of 2009. Less than a year earlier, China celebrated the Beijing 
Olympics, an event that projected an image of modernity and wealth onto 
TV screens and newspapers around the globe. And yet, while walking around 
Tashkurgan what caught my attention was old loudspeakers. They were 
placed along the main roads and on the few intersections and squares the 
little town had to offer, broadcasting every evening two hours of propaganda 
about ethnic unity, the leading role of the CCP, and revolutionary songs in 
Mandarin that most local Tajik3 could not even understand. By 2012, at the 
start of my doctoral f ieldwork, the loudspeakers were gone, and the town 
had undergone radical development. A construction frenzy brought new 
apartment blocks, hotels, model socialist villages, and a number of tourist 
attractions that apparently remained unused. The port of entry for the 
Khunjerab Pass, where immigration and customs operations for Pakistan 
take place, had moved into a newer and much larger building.4 The presence 
of the state, though not audible through loudspeakers, nevertheless remained 
strong and visible. Not only in the monumentality of infrastructure, but also 
3 The meaning of the term “Tajik” signif icantly differs in the Chinese context from that in 
neighbouring countries. Within China, the Tajik minority group (shaoshu minzu) is composed 
of all speakers of Iranian languages who belong to the Ismaili denomination. Two groups are 
counted here: Wakhi and Sariqoli (Kreutzmann 2015: 384). For an overview of how the term 
“Tajik” became used in the region, see Saidula (2014: 16–20).
4 Following the inauguration of the Karakoram Highway between Gilgit and Kashgar in 
1982, the settlement of Pirali (over 80km south of Tashkurgan) became the Chinese customs 
and immigration station for Pakistan. The checkpoint was shifted to Tashkurgan in 1992 (for 
more details on the area, see Kreutzmann 2015).
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in the obvious markers scattered around town. Chinese flags adorned each 
lamppost along the Karakoram Highway. Large posters praised ethnic unity 
and the role of the Party in the development of Tashkurgan. A small electric 
car with six to eight heavily armed soldiers patrolled the town throughout 
the day. The ubiquitous presence of the state was also a constant object of 
conversation among those living in the small town. A Uyghur shopkeeper 
whom I visited each day when I was in town, warned me once: “be careful, 
everyone in Tashkurgan works for the government (zhengfu). Whatever 
you do, it will be reported.” Or, as a Pakistani trader who frequently visited 
Tashkurgan put it while walking down the town’s main road: “Everybody 
here talks to the police, answers questions. I have a cousin who was born 
here, he’s Tajik [Chinese], he always tells the police about our movements, the 
people we see, who is visiting us.” The state, whether through infrastructure, 
policing, or rumours, seems to be everywhere in Tashkurgan. It is embodied 
by every single inhabitant of the remote town: “everyone in Tashkurgan 
works for the government.” The state’s presence, however, is at the same 
time indirect: though it functions as a threat it can be approached only 
at particular places and times. It is pervasive yet elusive, staggering in 
its material presence, yet intangible. While conjured up as powerful and 
omnipresent, the state remains fugacious and deceptive, particularly when 
one is attempting to locate it ethnographically.
Such puzzling contradictions have contributed to making “the state” a 
much-discussed object of analysis across the social sciences. In anthropology, 
the most recent work on the subject has generally been influenced by the 
writings of Michel Foucault on the topic of power. For Foucault, power is not 
something that can be held by particular individuals or institutions. Rather, 
power is a relation and an effect of particular disciplinary techniques, the 
ordering of space, hierarchical structures, and embodied knowledge. Power, 
as such, produces subjectivities – a theme that will be at the centre of the 
second part of this book. In China, as elsewhere, Foucault’s writings led to a 
critique of the idea that state and society are distinct entities (Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002). For instance, anthropologist Frank Pieke powerfully argued 
against the idea of a state-society dichotomy in China, proposing instead to 
view the state itself as society (2004). In order to do so, he suggests that the 
state should be addressed according to the ways in which it is “discursively 
and practically constructed” (518) at the local level, accounting for “the 
complex interaction between higher-level policies, existing institutional 
arrangements, and the informal relations between current and aspiring 
holders of posts at various bureaucratic levels” (533). Moving from a similar 
set of questions in her analysis of a road in Peru, anthropologist Penny 
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Harvey understands the state as an effect: something that, “given the way 
in which the state is entangled in mundane sociality” can be approached 
only “tangentially” through its material manifestations (Harvey 2005: 138). 
Both Pieke and Harvey, in other words, locate the state in situated practices, 
knowledge, and materialities through which it can be “ethnographically” 
approached. Also making this point clearly are Rasanayagam, Beyer, and 
Reeves in their introduction to an edited volume on Central Asian politics 
(2014), in which they claim that their main interest is not in the question 
of “what does the state do?,” but rather in the question of “how is the state 
being done?” A focus on how, they argue, “allows for a multiplicity of action 
and interpretation, and it takes seriously the capacities for reflection of our 
informants,” thus emphasising “contingency, ambiguity, and indeterminacy” 
(11). This book builds upon this literature, yet in approaching the state it 
pays particular attention to its concrete materialisation in specif ic places 
and at particular times. To this end, the question of the how of the state as 
brought to the fore by Rasanayagam, Beyer, and Reeves is integrated with 
the questions of the where and the when of the state. If, in fact, the state is 
understood as socially embedded – thus making it accessible to ethnographic 
inquiry – the question of the state’s materialisation is both a spatial and 
temporal one. Such dimensions highlight a crucial element of the ways in 
which the state operates: its ability to appear and retreat at particular places 
and times (customs off ices, checkpoints, police inspections, and so on). 
This dimension, as I show in this chapter through an analysis of the lives 
of cross-border traders along the KKH, is a core characteristic of the state’s 
“contingency, ambiguity, and indeterminacy,” and plays a fundamental role 
in the ways it is experienced and understood.
The borderlands are a particularly compelling place from which to observe 
the state. As junctures and points of friction, borderlands offer a particular 
perspective on the complexities of contemporary global development – one 
that arrives not from the centres or necessarily from below, but rather from 
multiple edges, corners, and peripheries. Borders are not only key sites where 
social actors come to imagine state sovereignty in both its regulatory and 
its territorial dimensions. Borders are also always “under construction” – 
fundamental sites of “on-going negotiation between society and the state” 
(Chalf in 2001). Despite its remoteness, harsh weather, limited size, and 
resources, Tashkurgan is at the forefront of the party-state’s plans for the 
economic integration of Pakistan and Central Asia. It is thus an apposite 
place from which to analyse how the relations outlined above play out. In 
particular, my questions in this chapter revolve around the relationship 
between the party-state’s vision for the development of its borderlands and 
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local forms of connectivity that often emerge from two different sets of 
temporalities. As shall become clear, current imaginaries of transnational 
connectivity promoted by Chinese authorities are often at odds with local 
understanding of the history of the area. It is in these moments of friction, 
and the different discourses within which such narratives are embedded, 
that the border is continuously enacted and re-constructed.
The history of Tashkurgan presents a fascinating case from which to 
observe how such competing visions emerge. From being a sleepy administra-
tive outpost, the small town has over recent decades become one of China’s 
envisioned trade hubs, and the target of much investment. Tashkurgan’s 
location, authorities reason, represents its main asset: the perfect gateway 
for China’s growing investments in the region. In the eyes of many, the 
history of the region, if nothing else, proves this argument to be correct. 
Tashkurgan (which can be translated as “stone fort” or “stone tower”) has 
often been identif ied with the “Stone tower” described by Ptolemy in his 
treatise on cartography: a major node of exchange between East and West 
along what German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen called, in 1877, 
the Silk Road.
In today’s Tashkurgan, the Silk Road features prominently on posters and 
investment brochures. At the same time, and for different purposes, the 
Silk Road has become a major subject of discussion among social scientists 
and historians alike. A major concern of this body of literature has become 
that of debunking established assumptions and myths.5 The Silk Road, 
historians tell us, was not really about silk – and nor was it much of a road. 
Rather, as James Millward (2013: 6) recently argued, “there were many things 
traded and many ideas transmitted across Eurasia, some of which (the 
domesticated horse, cotton, paper, and gunpowder) had a far greater impact 
than silk.” Furthermore, rather than a single road connecting East and West, 
historians have come to think of the Silk Road more as a network of routes 
linking many entrepôts across Eurasia. The Silk Road as it is imagined 
today, then, is little more than a recent invention: one animated by ideals 
of globalised exchange and one that serves as a “geopolitical chronotope, 
that is, a condition or strategy for geopolitical thought and action” (Chin 
2013: 195). Today, places like Tashkurgan offer a stark example of how such 
collective imagination can mobilise political and economic capital. As this 
5 See also Rezakhani (2010), who argues that historians should “do away” with the concept of 
the “Silk Road” altogether, as “the concept of a continuous, purpose-driven road or even “routes” 
is counterproductive in the study of world history” and “it has no basis in historical reality of 
records” (420).
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book will show, China’s peripheries seem to be animated by a Silk Road fever 
promising investment and opportunities. If the old Silk Road represents 
China’s entry into a world history made of “open” empires (Hansen 2012), 
the new Silk Road envisioned by the current leadership is meant to re-claim 
the country’s primary position on a global scale. Instead of being peripheral 
outposts meant to guard the national territory from foreign threats, places 
like Tashkurgan thus assume a new centrality as spearheads of development 
and foreign investments (Rippa 2017, 2020).
The history of Tashkurgan, and of the area known as Sariqol (also Sarikul, 
Sarikol) of which it is part, while not quite as glorious and romantic as the 
Silk Road imaginaries might have it, testif ies to several phases in which 
the remote valley played a role in long distance exchanges – although not 
always of the economic kind.6 In the 16th and 17th century, for instance, 
following imperial expansions across Eurasia, the issue of new trading 
routes across the region became of central importance to off icials in Beijing, 
Saint Petersburg, and London. One such route connected today’s Xinjiang 
with Ladakh, and had its main hubs in Yarkand and Leh, respectively. 
From there, other routes went as far as Kashgar, Central Asia, Lahore, and 
Peshawar (Kreutzmann 1998; Rizvi 1996; 1999; Warikoo 1996). Until the 
1930s, the main artery of this trans-Karakoram trade was via the Karakoram 
Pass, today the (sealed) border between India and the PRC. Tashkurgan 
and the Hunza Valley, further to the west, played only a minor role, and 
the Khunjerab Pass was rarely used for trading purposes. The settlement 
of Tashkurgan, in particular, was described by travellers who visited it 
between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, as a rather 
remote military outpost with little economic signif icance.7 Tashkurgan 
6 Archaeological evidences show the presence of a very mobile population on the high plateaus 
from at least the 1st millennia BC. Objects unearthed across complex grave sites demonstrate 
long-distance interactions (Wang et al. 2016), as well as established trading relations with the 
population of the Tarim basin, in today’s southern Xinjiang (Di Cosmo 1996; Mallory and Mair, 
2000: 220; Barber 1999: 33–34).
7 Aurel Stein, who visited Tashkurgan in 1900, describes it with the following words: “A line of 
massive but crumbling stone walls crowns the edges of a quadrangular plateau of conglomerate 
cliffs, roughly one-third of a mile in length on each of its faces. A small portion of the area thus 
enclosed, on the east side facing the river, is occupied by the Chinese fort. Its high and carefully 
plastered walls of sun-dried bricks stand undoubtedly on far more ancient foundations. Outside 
them now all is silence and desolation. The rubble-built dwellings, whose ruins f ill part of the 
area, were tenanted as long as the insecure condition of the valley made it impossible for the 
scanty cultivators to live near their f ields. Since peace has come to Sarikol new villages have 
sprung up near all the cultivated patches of land, and the stronghold has become deserted” 
(Stein 1904: 68–9).
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was, however, a point of strategic interest for the British government, which 
installed a representative in the small town whose main responsibility was 
to collect information and ensure the safe passage of mail between India 
and the British consulate in Kashgar. Reports show concerns on the Chinese 
side regarding this presence, as well as the ongoing issue of cross-border 
smuggling in the area. Facing numerous insurrections within its own border, 
the nationalist government in Urumqi saw British interference as a possible 
cause of unrest, and the porosity of a border without defence as a major 
liability (Dillon 2014: 106–116). Attempts to reform the border guards and 
enforce a stricter border regime were hampered by a lack of resources and 
in-f ights within the ranks of the Chinese administration – as well as by 
Tashkurgan’s remoteness and the harsh terrain that characterise the area 
making it diff icult to monitor and control.
In the aftermath of the communist so-called liberation of Xinjiang, 
the Tashkurgan Tajik Autonomous County was founded in 1954, before 
the establishment of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1955.8 
Following the f irst census of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), carried 
out in late 1953 and early 1954, and the completion of China’s “Ethnic 
Classif ication Project,” or minzu shibie, a project deemed to determine 
the precise ethno-national composition of the country, two groups were 
identif ied as permanently inhabiting the Chinese Pamirs: Kyrgyz (Ke’erkezi 
zu) and Tajik (Tajike zu). The Kyrgyz, according to this classif ication, are 
Sunni Muslims, speak their own language, and are pastoralists. Tajik, on the 
other hand, is a generic classif ication for all Ismaili and Pamirian speakers 
8 The off icial version of the history of this period is, unsurprisingly, one of outstanding 
achievements: “In 1954, the Taxkorgan [Tashkurgan] Tajik Autonomous County was founded on 
the basis of the former Puli Count where the Tajik nationality lived in compact communities. 
[…] There was no factory or workshop in Taxkorgan before liberation, and even horseshoes had 
come from other places. Now more than 10 small factories and handicraft workshops have been 
built, such as farm and animal husbandry machine factories, hydroelectric power stations and 
fur-processing mills. Mechanization of farming and animal husbandry has expanded. Veterinary 
stations have been built in most communities. Tajiks have been trained as veterinarians and 
agrotechnicians. Tractors are being used in more than half of the land in the county. One 
breed of sheep developed by the Tajik herdsmen is among the best in Xinjiang […]. In the town 
of Taxkorgan, the county seat, which is perched right on top of the Pamirs, wide streets link 
shops, the hospital, schools, the post off ice, bank, bookstore, meteorological station and other 
new buildings in traditional architectural style and factories under construction. Great changes 
have also taken place in many mountain hamlets, where shops and clinics have been built. The 
herdsmen and peasants are enjoying good health with the improvement of living conditions and 
medical care. Since 1959, schools have been set up in all villages, and roaming tent schools have 
been run for herdsmen’s children. Many young Tajiks have been trained as workers, technicians, 
doctors and teachers” (quoted in Kreutzmann 2015: 392–3).
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in China. Tashkurgan, in this phase, became the administrative centre for 
the scattered population of the county, as well as its main supply point. 
With the nearby borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan closed for trade, 
Tashkurgan’s development became strictly intertwined with the PRC’s 
internal policy of collectivisation. In particular, as geographer Hermann 
Kreutzmann has documented in a number of studies (cf. 2012, 2015), the 
main outcomes of autonomy and minority policies in the Chinese Pamirs 
were the sedentarisation of nomads in permanent winter quarters. These 
processes of integration of the remote county within the emerging national 
economy experienced a sharp boost in 1958 with the inauguration of the 
road connection to Kashgar. The construction of the road was celebrated 
by Chinese authorities in the following way:
Taxkorgan [Tashkurgan] was a backward, out-of-the-way area before 
liberation, when it would take a fortnight by riding a camel or a week on 
horseback to reach Kashi [Kashgar], the biggest city in southern Xinjiang. 
In 1958, the Kashi-Taxkorgan Highway was completed, shortening the 
trip between the two places to one day (quoted in Kreutzmann 2015: 395).
The county’s main output was identif ied in this period as livestock pro-
duction, and although Tashkurgan never became self-suff icient in terms 
of food supply, overall agricultural output seemed to have grown over the 
years. As in many other border contexts, state subsidies f illed the gap, and 
indeed continue to play an important role today.9
With the reform period, outposts such as Tashkurgan took on a new role. 
Not just as supply hubs and peripheral army posts, but also as the bridgehead 
for new schemes of transnational connectivities. The 1980s, in particular, 
was a period of great change, in Tashkurgan as much as anywhere else 
in the country. First, in line with Deng Xiaoping’s “four modernisations 
(si hua),” agricultural enterprises became increasingly commercialised, 
with signif icant parts of the population moving into service industries. 
Secondly, with the inauguration of the Karakoram Highway in 1982, new 
9 The story of a remote outpost becoming a major supply hub is not uncommon in the highlands 
of Asia. Across the border with Tajikistan, only a few dozen kilometres away from Tashkurgan, 
during Soviet times marginal settlements such as Khorog and Murghab became central nodes 
to the system of “Moscow provisioning” (moskovskoe obespechenie) (Saxer 2016b: 124; Reeves 
2014, 110–122). Not unlike in the People’s Republic of China, roads and airports were built in 
the most unlikely of places. Unlike China, however, with the collapse of the Soviet Union this 
system of provisioning came to an end, quickly leading to new forms of exclusion and remoteness 
(Mostowlansky 2017).
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opportunities arose for cross-border activities. In 1992, the customs and 
immigration station was moved to Tashkurgan, transforming it from an 
administrative outpost to a gateway for cross-border exchanges, including 
trade, tourism, and migration. Hotels, restaurants, and shops opened within 
town, and the population grew as businessmen and government off icials 
moved there. The implementation of the “Open Up the West Campaign 
(xibu da kaifa)” in the early 2000s brought a new spate of investments to 
the remote county. A major dam was built – the Xiabandi Water Control 
Project – north of Tashkurgan between 2001 and 2006, and the Karakoram 
Highway went through a signif icant makeover that was completed, on the 
Chinese side, in 2008. In the last decade, moreover, tourism has become a 
major target of investment in the county. In this period, a new museum was 
opened in Tashkurgan, an ethnic village was constructed in the northern 
part of town, the old fort renovated, and a complex system of walkways built 
on the riverbed wetlands, all with the aim of increasing tourist numbers.
“What’s more convenient?”
The history I have outlined above is in no way lost on those who are trying 
to make a living out of cross-border trade in Tashkurgan. In 2013, during 
one of several trips to Tashkurgan over the course of my f ieldwork, I was 
walking up the settlement’s main road – Tashkurgan Road – planning 
to visit one of the traders in his shop. The cold winds were making my 
teeth chatter, as rain mixed with snow clung to my nose. It was already the 
end of May, the China-Pakistan border had only recently re-opened after 
the annual winter closure, yet on this high plateau the weather remained 
stubbornly unpredictable. For the previous two days, the Khunjerab Pass, 
at over 4600 metres, was shut due to a snowstorm, while a landslide in the 
Gez canyon had blocked all traff ic into and out of Kashgar. At least, that 
was the story I had been hearing from the traders and truck drivers who 
were idly chatting and smoking around the town’s small bus station. As I 
entered his shop, I found Karim sitting behind the main counter, shivering 
in his heavy coat, only his eyes turning from his computer towards me. 
“Pretty cold, isn’t it?” he said as he pointed to a chair so that I could sit beside 
him. He was watching something on youku, one of China’s largest video 
streaming websites, and I sat down next to him as I had done on several 
other occasions in the previous months. Karim was in his mid-20s when I 
f irst met him, in 2012. Tall and stout, with voluminous, curly black hair, thick 
eyebrows and a wide forehead, he went mostly unnoticed in Tashkurgan 
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where he was often mistaken for a local Tajik. In Kashgar, however, Karim 
was clearly identif ied as a foreigner. At the time, he had a wife and young 
daughter in Pakistan (they would have a second child a few years later), 
yet his business kept him away from his family for a large part of the year. 
He was from Gojal, in the upper Hunza Valley, only a few hours’ drive from 
the Khunjerab Pass and the Chinese border. Karim was Ismaili and his 
mother tongue, Wakhi, was shared by many Tajiks living in Tashkurgan, 
among whom he has a few relatives.10 It was in Tashkurgan that, nineteen 
years before, Karim’s father and uncle started their business. According to 
Karim, they were the f irst Pakistanis to buy a property there: a two-storey 
house that they still use as a shop, warehouse, and domicile. Ten years ago, 
Karim’s father opened another shop in Kashgar, near the Idgah mosque, 
which had been moved only a few months before our f irst encounter in a 
new shopping centre for jade and other semi-precious stones not far from 
Kashgar’s People Square, in a new part of town. In 2016, they would open 
another shop in one of the main shopping streets of Kashgar’s old town. 
Karim, who has a degree in software engineering, had been working with 
his father since 2010, and when I met him for the f irst time, he was in the 
process of designing the company’s website.
Karim’s business was a family enterprise and the two shops in Tashkurgan 
and Kashgar are managed by a number of his brothers and cousins. They 
mostly access China using the “Pak-China border pass,” generally referred 
to simply as “border pass,” a travel document that allows residents of Gilg-
it-Baltistan to make an unlimited number of annual visits to China, so long 
as they travel through the Khunjerab Pass and do not stay in the country 
for more than thirty days. Karim’s relatives make use of their frequent trips 
across the border to take some goods with them, as everything carried in 
luggage is “tax free.” Larger items, however, are typically sent in a single 
container and divided between the Kashgar and Tashkurgan shops. In 
China, they sell various handicrafts, mostly made out of marble and brass, 
but they also have an interesting selection of precious and semi-precious 
stones and carved wooden pieces. In the Tashkurgan shop, they also sell 
imported soaps, perfumes, and other health and beauty products. It is a 
“one-way business,” Karim would often say, as most of the goods come either 
from Gilgit-Baltistan or Karachi – but he does not make it his business to 
10 Most Tajiks in Tashkurgan speak Sariqoli, while about only a third speak Wakhi. Both 
languages are branches of eastern Iranian languages that, within Tajikistan, are simply known 
as “Pamiri languages” (for a recent, and rare, ethnography of Tashkurgan’s Tajiks see Saidula 
(2014)).
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export Chinese goods to Pakistan. Some stones – such as the famous lapis 
lazuli from Badakhshan – are imported from Afghanistan and taken to 
Xinjiang via the Karakoram Highway.
The f irst time Karim and I met, he was working in the Kashgar shop. The 
following year he moved to the Tashkurgan shop, and as I visited him there, 
he would regularly complain about how boring the small border town was. 
Kashgar, on the other hand, was different, and he later spent part of the 
winter studying Mandarin in Islamabad with the purpose of returning there 
on a more regular basis. When I met him in Pakistan in early 2013, China 
was often part of our conversations. “China is our future,” he told me once 
as we were speeding up Islamabad’s Margalla hills in his cousin’s jeep, “I 
think people in Hunza should study Chinese.” He even told me that he was 
trying to teach his wife and mother back home how to use chopsticks. As 
he put it once: “for us, it takes two days to go to Islamabad, the capital of 
Pakistan. But if I leave my home in the morning, I can be in Kashgar in the 
evening. What’s more convenient?”
That day, by the time I had warmed up my legs next to the electric stove 
in Karim’s shop, the weather had cleared up, and the sun was peeking 
tentatively through the thick clouds. With no customers in sight, I suggested 
going out for a little walk, and Karim seemed happy at the idea of leaving 
the shop for a couple of hours. Despite having spent considerable time in 
Tashkurgan, I realised that Karim had never had a chance to visit the fort, 
which was possibly the town’s main tourist attraction (Figure 5). We quickly 
headed there and as we approached it, I noticed that since the time of my 
previous visit a new, small structure had been built beside the steps leading 
up to the ruins of the fort. What turned out to be a ticket off ice seemed 
initially deserted, yet as we walked beyond it a voice called us back. A girl, 
seemingly busy sweeping the concrete floor on the back of the ticket off ice, 
asked us (in Mandarin) to pay the 30 RMB entrance fee. As I reached for my 
wallet Karim began to talk to her in Wakhi – which I could not understand 
a word of. After a few moments, he turned towards me and told me that 
we did not have to pay any entrance fee. “We are Wakhi, we are all related 
here”, Karim pointed out, “there is no need to pay,” he added with a smile.
The ruins of the Tashkurgan fort11 rest on a rocky hill overlooking the wide 
meadows of the Taghdumbash River. What once must have been massive 
stone walls crowned the edges of the hill, giving shape to a quadrangular 
structure. On two of the four sides, the stone walls had been recently 
11 The ruins of the fort were used for the shooting of some crucial scenes of the f ilm The Kite 
Runner, from the novel by Khaled Hosseini.
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renovated, and the small trail leading from the main entrance to the fort 
had been cleared for visitors. I told Karim that none of this was there the 
previous year, at the time of my last visit, when the stone fort looked not 
only abandoned – as it had been for decades – but also uncared for by local 
authorities. Tourism, we reasoned together, had yet to really pick up in the 
remote town, yet recent investments clearly displayed the intention to make 
it a more consistent part of the local economy. Karim, however, seemed to 
be more interested in the history of the fort than in its potential for tourist 
development. As we walked through its crumbling walls, he gave me a brief 
history lesson of the area:
Tashkurgan and all the land down to Gez used to be part of the Hunza 
kingdom. Then, in 1950, Mao [Zedong] occupied Tashkurgan with his 
army. The Mir of Hunza wanted to keep Tashkurgan under his control, 
but his counsel was against it. They thought that it was too much land 
to control for Hunza. So, they gave it up, but this [territory] all used to 
be part of Hunza.
What Karim was referring to was the fact that the Mir – or tham – of Hunza 
enjoyed grazing rights in the Taghdumbash Pamirs until 1936–1937. However, 
Figure 5: The Tashkurgan Fort (picture by the author, 2013)
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the town of Tashkurgan, and the land to the Gez canyon, remained under the 
control of Yarkand and Kashgar until the time of the communist revolution. 
In fact, as Stein reports following his travels in the area in 1900, locals in the 
Tashkurgan area were rather afraid of Hunza’s raids in the valley (1907: 35).12 
While Karim’s take on the history of the area might not have been entirely 
accurate, it nevertheless expresses an appreciation for dynamics that, when 
seen from a modern nation-state perspective, would remain largely hidden. 
Social scientists and historians have consistently shown how, for modern 
states, unlike many of their institutional predecessors, national borders 
assume a fundamental role in the construction of a national identity. While 
the nation is, as Benedict Anderson (1991) famously put it, an “imagined 
community” of individuals who share a common sense of identity, the 
nation state that informs this identity is essentially def ined by its borders. 
Externally, borders mark the limits of sovereignty. Internally, they encompass 
a space in which a population is subject to the particular laws of the state. 
For the modern nation state, the cartographic and physical marginality of 
border areas are thus “central” – to borrow Sarah Green’s expression (2005: 
5) – to the ways in which a national community and space are imagined. 
Implicitly, then, this particular imaginary is based on an act of separation, 
or, as Bruno Latour would put it, of “partitioning” (1996). Like on the political 
maps of the world that we have become so accustomed to, different states 
are def ined by different colours. There is no overlap (with the exception 
of contested territories) on these maps, as the current composition of the 
Westphalian world does not allow for any grey areas.
Karim’s understanding of such history, on the other hand, seems rooted 
in another discourse. Not one that draws boundaries, but one that shows 
continuities. Not one of separation, but one of proximity. Similarly, recent 
scholarship on borders and borderlands has begun to look at these particular 
spaces as historical processes, less def ined by the exceptionality of the 
border-as-line than by the historically and culturally informed practices of 
its coming into being on a daily basis. As Sarah Green puts it, “the literature 
on bordering (or b/ordering) has demonstrated that borders are more of a 
verb, a practice, a relation, and also importantly a part of imagination and 
desire, than they are a noun or an object” (Green 2012: 579–580). On a similar 
level, in her excellent work on Central Asian borders, Reeves notices that 
the “Westphalian logic of border-as-line” is often challenged by the – by 
12 Work by Hsiao-ting Lin (2009a, 2009b) shows that it was in fact the Nationalist Chinese 
government that, in the immediate post-World War Two period, tried to bring Hunza under 
China’s control, reclaiming imperial “tributary ties”.
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no means exceptional – presence of “contested” and “decidedly nonlinear” 
borders in her area of research (2014: 9–10). Reeves, in particular, uses the 
expression “border work” to show how, when approached ethnographically, 
borders are contested spaces that require continuous negotiation. This 
focus allows Reeves to focus attention on the temporality of borders, “their 
ability to appear and disappear, to materialize at certain times of for certain 
groups of people with sudden intensity; to morph, or acquire the quality of 
permanent f ixtures” (7). Speaking to this understanding of the border as a 
space in continuous becoming as well as to the historicity of borders that 
Karim had in mind while walking through the ruins of the Tashkurgan 
fort, Green invokes the image of the tidemark (2009). In linking space with 
historical time, while retaining the idea of the “line,” the metaphor of the 
tidemark implies both divisions and connections within sites of ongoing 
re-territorialisations.
For Karim, as it became clear to me throughout our conversations in 
Tashkurgan, the “convenience” he referred to was not only a matter of 
geographical proximity. As he shared his views on the history of the region, 
he would repeatedly stress that Wakhis from the Hunza Valley and the Tajiks 
of Tashkurgan were, in fact, the same people. Old connections have not been 
forgotten in those dry highlands. For Karim, doing business in China was 
not merely a choice. Neither, as I was often told, was it a strict necessity – in 
different periods the same traders would resort to different activities, in 
other sectors and areas. Rather, it seemed like the inevitable outcome of the 
particular position, history, and cultural orientation of the region he was 
originally from. In this sense, as Green points out, the border as tidemark also 
“evokes the sense of trace” (2009: 17), something inherently temporal. In the 
case of the China-Pakistan border, this temporality speaks to both the past 
and the future. For Karim, the “convenience” of Tashkurgan’s geographical 
proximity speaks to a particular opportunity connected to China’s rise and 
economic growth – an opportunity, however, rooted in the history of the area 
and the long-lasting connections between the two sides of the Karakoram. 
Similarly, Saxer (2016a) argues that contemporary trans-Himalayan trade 
must be understood against the background of old trade routes, seasonal 
entrepôts, and brokering practices. Focusing on two new roads in Western 
Nepal, Saxer convincingly argues that “rather than leading to modernity 
(for good or for bad), the new roads are primary conceived of as ways back 
to what is remembered as prosperous trans-Himalayan exchange” (2016a: 
76). Although with significantly different economic asymmetries and border 
regimes, those “new” trades remain, at least initially, in the hands of the 
same “old” suspects: local dealers, brokers, and re-invented traders.
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A matter of custom(s)
Tashkurgan, like many small border towns across China, presents an interest-
ing display of such local dealers, brokers, and re-invented traders. Take, for 
instance, the few Pakistani-owned shops in town, where traders like Karim 
spend most of their time. While most Pakistani traders – Punjabi and Pashtun 
from other provinces, as well as traders from Gilgit-Baltistan – doing business 
in southern Xinjiang travel via road through Tashkurgan, the only Pakistanis 
who own shops in Tashkurgan come from the Hunza Valley. In the course of 
many visits to the town, between 2009 and 2017, the number of such shops and 
their owners changed frequently. At the beginning of my doctoral fieldwork, in 
2012, I counted six, yet by the summer of 2017 nine shops were selling various 
Pakistani imports: marble and brass vases, gemstones, jewellery, carved 
wooden handicrafts, pashmina shawls, prayer rugs, and European watches. 
While Karim’s business was a family one, in other cases a few “partners” 
pulled together their resources to open a shop in China. Some of the shops, 
however, did not last for more than one or two seasons, and in the course of 
just a few years I had seen the same shops changing hands more than once. 
Karim’s shop, with its 20-plus years of activity was, in this regard, an exception.
In the summer of 2016, returning to Xinjiang nearly three years after 
completing my doctoral f ieldwork, I met Karim in Kashgar. His family had 
just opened another shop in the city (their third in Xinjiang), and he was 
overseeing the new business. After years of living in China, his Mandarin had 
become fluent, and he was the only one in his family who could effectively 
communicate with Han Chinese customers and off icials. The new shop, in 
one of Kashgar’s renewed shopping streets, was clearly targeting Chinese 
tourists and Karim’s presence there was needed. Over tea, after some long 
overdue catching up, he provided me with an overview of the various shops 
his family owned in Xinjiang. “The Tashkurgan shop,” he told me without 
any hesitation, “is definitely our best business.” I was quite surprised, given 
Tashkurgan’s remoteness and apparent lack of tourists and customers. 
Karim elaborated. “You see, in Kashgar there are many tourists, but they 
don’t stop, they don’t have time. In Tashkurgan they are free, they have 
time [to stop and look at our products], there’s nothing else to do there.” 
But that was not, as I was soon to f ind out, the main reason for the shop’s 
prof itability. “We have been in Tashkurgan for many years and we have 
very good relations with local off icials. So, whenever some off icials come to 
visit Tashkurgan, and this happens quite often, because it’s a border town, 
the guest off icials are taken to our shop. And they have a lot of money, and 
need to buy gifts, you know.”
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Karim’s relations with local off icials had been a recurrent topic in our 
conversations since I f irst met him. I was particularly curious to learn more 
about the processes of moving goods in and out of Pakistan, as well as about 
customs clearance in Tashkurgan. Over the years, I had heard many tales 
related to these processes, and I knew that good relations with local officials 
were crucial to a successful outcome. While going through customs and 
immigration myself, I had noticed that at the Khunjerab port of entry, different 
traders were subjected to different inspection regimes. Some were simply 
waved through without much hassle, others were pulled aside and thoroughly 
questioned. All, myself included, were nevertheless questioned, however 
briefly, about the motive of their trip, its length and planned itinerary. Our bags 
and bodies were assiduously inspected and scanned. Upon entering China, 
travellers also had their laptops and phones opened and unlocked by border 
guards.13 Virtually all of the Pakistani traders I talked to complained about the 
strictness of Chinese customs officials and had several tales to tell about their 
pedantic attitude towards them. For instance, Abdul Wakel, a major Pakistani 
carpet dealer in Kashgar, told me that it can take days for a container of carpets 
to clear customs, as Chinese border guards unroll every single carpet checking 
for drugs. Tales such as Abdul Wakel’s were common among Pakistani traders 
and, in several instances, I witnessed both the “strictness” of border guards 
towards them, as well as the traders’ strategies to circumvent it.
In May 2013, when I travelled from China to Pakistan, I witnessed a sig-
nificant scene at the Tashkurgan port of entry. The bus to Sost was meant to 
leave at 10.30am and I arrived at the port of entry at 10 only to f ind the gates 
still shut and a lone man waiting outside. He was surrounded by a number 
of boxes of various sizes and shapes, and I caught a glimpse of some pots 
and what looked like a rice steamer. He was a diminutive man from a small 
village in the Hunza Valley, with grey hair and a moustache, wearing a dark 
brown shalwar kameez. As we were waiting for someone to turn up, he told 
me that he had a small shop in his village where he was selling “everything 
that people need.” He had been coming to China over the previous seven 
years in order to purchase, by himself, various things that he would then sell 
in his shops. “Mostly teapots and other small, cheap things,” he told me. As 
the gates opened and we moved inside the parking lot, a crew from CCTV 
(China Central Television) showed up. There were three Han men and a large 
video camera. They explained that they were f ilming a documentary on the 
13 Starting in 2018, travellers who enter Xinjiang via land are also forced to install a spyware 
app onto their mobile phone, which allows Chinese authorities to monitor the use of prohibited 
apps such as Facebook, Twitter, and Whatsapp.
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Khunjerab Pass. They were looking for some traders to interview, and the short 
man from Hunza – still the only one there – agreed to answer a few questions. 
The cameraman asked him to stand with his back towards the building of 
the port of entry, checked the light, adjusted the camera, and eventually 
began f ilming. The interviewer did not seem to speak much English, and he 
struggled to f ind the words to formulate a question. Eventually, he managed 
to ask the trader to talk about his experience as a businessman in this area. 
The man from Hunza was, by then, quite nervous, and although his English 
was fluent, he struggled to express himself. Eventually, he managed this reply: 
“The first thing I want to say is that the Chinese government has always been 
very helpful with me and other businessmen from Pakistan. I have been doing 
business with China for seven years, and border guards and customs officers 
have always been very kind and helpful. Every time I come here there are no 
surprises, everything is very eff icient.” The interviewer, seemingly pleased 
with this f irst answer, came up with another question after consulting the 
other members of his troupe: “What do you think of the Khunjerab Pass?” 
The trader, visibly uncertain over how to respond, eventually mumbled 
more of the same things as before: border guards are good, business is f ine, 
government helpful. As the brief interview ended on this underwhelming 
note, and the troupe moved out of the “port” and back into town, the trader 
turned to me to ask how he did. I said that he did well and that hopefully he 
will see himself on TV soon. He shook his head, sat down beside his boxes 
and said: “you know, you always have to say that the [Chinese] government 
is good and things like that.” He seemed embarrassed by what he had just 
said, and I told him that he did the right thing. “You have to be careful about 
what you say here,” he continued, “I had to say that.”
In fact, contrary to what the trader from Hunza told the CCTV troupe, 
the attitude of Chinese off icials was seen as particularly disrespectful and 
annoying by many of my Pakistani informants. “Chinese people are generally 
good, but border guards are really bad,” said one trader from Aliabad. “Every 
time I cross the border, I feel uncomfortable, it’s like I’m a terrorist.” Yet, at 
the same time, Chinese border guards’ “strictness” was, for many traders, 
a sign of China’s modernity and successful development. In particular, the 
situation at the Tashkurgan port of entry was often compared to that of 
Sost, on the Pakistani side. There, baggage was rarely inspected and, given 
the lack of equipment and frequent blackouts, it could not even be scanned. 
A trader from Karimabad, Hunza, once told me that he often brings beers 
and other alcoholic beverages into Pakistan, by simply lying to the customs 
off icial: “I usually bring a box of Red Bull, or some other soft drink, and a 
few more boxes with beers. Then, at the border I open the box with the Red 
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Bull, and they never check the other boxes. It’s easy.” My f ieldnotes from 
the same trip, in May 2013, elucidate this further:
Three hours after crossing the Khunjerab Pass we arrive in Sost. The small 
town lies at the end of a long, narrow and quite spectacular gorge, at the 
conjunction of two rivers. An old man with a long white beard in a black 
military uniform greets us and lifts a bar at the entrance of the village, to 
allow for the bus to pull into an unpaved square in front of the “Pakistan 
Customs” building. The building itself seems empty. As we leave the bus 
nobody comes out to receive us. I look back towards the old soldier but he 
has gone back to sit on a plastic chair beside the bar, now closed again. The 
driver eventually walks into the building and I follow him. The place is dark, 
I glimpse a large room with no furniture. It looks abandoned. After a short 
moment a man in a dark shalwar kameez walks out of a door, greets the 
driver and tells him to wait. The driver explains that there is no electricity 
at the moment, and that the man has to turn the generator on in order to 
get the computer running to process our passports. The man comes back 
and shortly afterward the light comes on too. He shows us into a small 
room with a wooden bench, two plastic chairs and three old computers. 
He turns one on and briefly processes the Pakistani traders’ passports 
and border passes. It’s my turn. He asks me a couple of questions: where 
are you going, how long will you stay, what is the purpose of your visit. He 
stamps my passport and tells me to wait outside. I’m not quite sure what 
we are waiting for, and the driver tells me that I have to “clear customs”. 
And who’s supposed to do it? I ask. He tells me that the man in charge of 
it is out praying, and that he should be back soon. Twenty minutes later a 
man arrives driving a motorbike. He’s wearing a white shalwar kameez, a 
black waistcoat and a pair of dark Ray-Ban glasses. He has a short, trimmed 
beard and the dark skin of somebody from “down country”. He tells the 
Pakistanis to go, without checking their luggage and boxes. He opens the 
bags of the two Uyghur travellers, gives a quick look and then tells them 
that they’re “OK”. Eventually he looks at me and asks me where I’m from. 
“Italy”, I say. “Good”, he says, “you can go”. I grab my backpack and leave.
The contrast with the Chinese side could not be starker, as another trader 
from the Hunza Valley explained to me while leaving the Sost customs and 
immigration facilities:
In China they have modern machinery, X-rays and things like that with 
which they can check everything. And they are very strict – very, very 
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strict. In Pakistan there are no machines, nothing. Soldiers, as well, in 
China are all young and well-trained. I’ve heard they are posted there for 
two years and then go somewhere else. But in Pakistan people are old, 
and you know, you can give them some money and they don’t even open 
your boxes. It’s very different.
The difference between the two immigration services is often connected, 
and mirrored, in the differences between the towns of Tashkurgan and 
Sost. Modernity and development, on the one side, and abandonment and 
a sense of marginality on the other. Many traders shared similar feelings. 
In Tashkurgan, I once talked with Tariq, a trader from Sost who, with his 
brother, opened a small shop in Tashkurgan selling different products all 
imported from Pakistan. He mentioned Sost as we were talking about the 
different conditions of the road on the two sides of the border. “The road is 
bad, everything is bad,” he told me, “if you look at here [Tashkurgan] and 
Sost you can understand. The Pakistani government invests only in urban 
and not in rural areas.” Compared to Tashkurgan, therefore, Sost highlights 
the failings of the Pakistani government and its inadequate commitment 
to the development of the border areas. As if he wanted to stress this point, 
Tariq told me a joke. He asked me if I knew what “Tashkurgan” means, 
explaining that “Tash” means “stone,” and that “Kurgan” means “to look 
like” – thus, Tashkurgan means something like “looking like a stone” (in 
fact, “Tashkurgan” is usually translated as “stone tower” or “stone fortress”). 
Sost, on the other hand, he told me laughing with his friends, means nothing 
more than “lazy.” Tariq was playing with the Urdu word for lazy, sust, which 
sounds just like the name of the small border town. Yet, what he was stressing 
through this joke, as I discovered during further conversations with him, 
was Tashkurgan’s economic strength and power, while highlighting Sost’s 
poor conditions, its lack of development, and the scant investments made 
there by the Pakistani state. In an article that appeared on Gilgit-Baltistan’s 
most famous blog at around the time of my f ieldwork, the author compares 
the situation on the two sides of the border in similar terms, stressing how 
entering China felt like entering “the modern world” (Panah 2014). Chinese 
border guards and immigration facilities, then, with their new uniforms, 
modern machinery, and seemingly incorruptible behaviour, thus stand 
epitomize modernity and development. In other words, the materiality of 
the border and of the infrastructure connected to it lead to contextual – and 
often comparative – representations of the state(s). These representations are 
rooted in the particular material context from which they seem to emerge; 
yet, at the same time, they evade it and operate on a general, abstract level. 
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It is in these places and at these particular moments – crossing a border, 
going through customs, inviting border off icials for a banquet – that the 
state is enacted in particular ways. Such encounters, recurrent, ritualised, 
and thus “performative”, in the sense indicated by Rasanayagam et al. 
(2014), objectify the state as a legitimate and singular political entity. They 
provide an example of how the state becomes an effect (Mitchell 1999) of 
mundane processes of negotiation and representation and, in doing so, it 
manages to distinguish itself from the material and social processes that 
continuously reproduce it.
That the state, following Mitchell, should not be understood as a coherent 
agent, is something that emerges clearly from the second major issued high-
lighted by traders along the KKH: the continuous changes in customs policies. 
As one trader put it to me: “it’s not that they change every year, they change 
every month!” As I will show in the fifth chapter, new regulations introduced 
in 2016 and 2017 would provoke major changes in the quantity and quality 
of Pakistani imports; yet, even in the period 2012–13, the ostensibly erratic 
nature of customs regulations was a matter of discussion and concern among 
traders. For the most part, such changes were centred around the taxation 
of certain items, or over the amount of duty-free goods that each passenger 
was allowed to take on the daily Sost-Tashkurgan bus. Most of the time, in 
fact, the costs and small-scale nature of Pakistani businesses in Xinjiang did 
not allow traders to operate large quantities, and they only rarely resorted to 
container shipping. Most rely, in particular, on what is commonly referred to 
as shuttle trade (cf. also Karrar 2013, 2019; Ryzhova 2018; Ngo and Hung 2019). 
In the case of the Karakoram Highway, Pakistani traders generally take small 
quantities of goods with them on the daily buses to and from Sost, avoiding 
taxation, which does not apply to this kind of luggage. During 2012–13, each 
trader was allowed to transport 40kg of duty-free products, but this f igure 
was largely negotiable on a case-to-case basis – and it was constantly subject 
to “new” regulations. This form of suitcase trade, well known to authorities 
in both countries, lead to regular outbursts following attempts by Chinese 
authorities to impose stricter regulations (Rippa 2018, 2019a).
During our conversation over tea in Kashgar, Karim offered a possible 
explanation for the sudden changes in border regime. “The Chinese soldiers 
and the immigration off icials change all the time, they stay for one or two 
years, and then they leave. But the people in charge of customs, they never 
change, they are from here, some of them are.” Karim continued: “But you 
see, the people in charge of customs have 20-day shifts, for 20 days they 
are in Tashkurgan and for 20 days they are moved to Kashgar or to other 
off ices. Every time there is a shift, people change, and everything changes. 
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Regulation, taxes. You can never know.” During the course of my f ieldwork, 
other traders offered similar explanations. Some, for instance, relied on 
personal connections with a specif ic customs off icial, and would wait for 
his shift to begin before attempting to move anything across the Khunjerab 
Pass. As I was repeatedly told, the difference in fee could be quite significant. 
For instance, Hammad, another small-scale trader from the Hunza Valley, 
told me that on a recent trip official customs taxes suddenly rose to 30 RMB/
kg, regardless of the item transported. While, according to him, some of his 
fellow travellers had to pay such a high rate, he was only asked to pay a total 
of 500 RMB, less than half of what he was off icially supposed to give. As an 
explanation, he pointed to his decade of experience in cross-border trade, 
and personal connection with that specif ic customs off icial.
For traders like Hammad and Karim, with many years of experience along 
the Karakoram Highway, new regulations and changes in tariffs are, for the 
most part, negotiable. Over the years, local, Wakhi customs off icials have 
become central parts of their network. Karim, for instance, often invites 
them for dinner parties in Tashkurgan, during which he organises music from 
the Hunza Valley to be played. He also claims distant kinship relations with 
some. Similarly, other Wakhi shop owners in Tashkurgan often underlined 
that it was easy for them to open up businesses there as they could speak 
the same language as local off icials. Moreover, they would stress that they 
shared many cultural elements with local Tajiks. On a number of occasions, 
for instance, I followed Karim as he was paying visits to Tajik friends in 
Tashkurgan. Once, we visited Ziwar, a retired customs off icial who used 
to be a close friend of Karim’s father. The occasion was the construction 
of a new house, beside Ziwar’s old mud house. Our host was particularly 
keen to show us the main room of the house, where he was planning to 
entertain guests, host parties, and weddings. The room was clearly designed 
according to traditional Pamiri architectural standards. Most notable, as 
Ziwar pointed out when we entered the room, were the f ive supporting 
pillars, symbolising the f ive members of Ali’s family, and a skylight in the 
middle of ceiling, designed with four concentric square layers (chorkhona) 
representing, respectively, the four Zoroastrian elements of earth, water, air, 
and f ire. Karim seemed pleased, and repeatedly complimented our host on 
the beauty of his new house. Turning to me and speaking English, however, 
Karim pointed out that the Tajiks of Tashkurgan had all but forgotten about 
traditional Wakhi architecture in the years following the area’s incorporation 
into the PRC. “Only now that we travel here, they are learning again how 
to build these houses. We teach them what to do, otherwise they wouldn’t 
know their own custom.”
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The art of moving stuff: Logistics, infrastructure, and the 
hardening of borders
Karim’s business, like that of Hammad, Abdul Wakhel, and many other 
shuttle traders along the KKH, is centred around what they often def ine 
as a very simple operation: moving specif ic goods across the Khunjerab 
Pass, from Pakistan to China and vice versa. With the exception of the 
rare tourist and the odd anthropologist, in the course of my f ieldwork 
virtually everybody crossing the border, on buses, in trucks, or in private 
vehicles, was involved in this operation of transport. As will be described 
in more detail in Chapter 5, for Pakistani Uyghurs paying visits to family 
in Xinjiang, a trip to Kashgar was an opportunity for some small business. 
For traders from Gilgit-Baltistan travelling on a border pass, even a one-day 
trip to Sost was never done empty-handed. For Karim, and others like him 
owning businesses in China, it was a chance to bring new merchandise to 
Tashkurgan, or to carry some toys or gifts for relatives and friends in Hunza.
Logistics and infrastructure are tightly interwoven along the Karakoram 
Highway in particular ways. Not only, and most obviously, transport infra-
structure, i.e. roads, bridges, tunnels, and so on. Small-scale traders, as Agar 
put it, rely on “webs of dependency” (Agar quoted in Walker 1999: 113) that 
incorporate both state and non-state agents, as well as digital infrastructure. 
Most traders on the Karakoram Highway in particular, operate on an individ-
ual or family level, within larger networks of traders, either family members 
or partners, located in various places: Yiwu, Guangzhou, Rawalpindi, Dubai 
and so on. Different technologies, such as Skype, Facebook (when available) 
or, more recently, WeChat, help traders maintain their transnational contacts 
and explore new business opportunities. Traders make extensive use of 
these technologies. WeChat, in particular, thanks to its translation service 
and voice message option, helps to overcome language barriers between 
groups of people who cannot either speak or write the same language. For 
traders from Gilgit-Baltistan, moreover, another kind of infrastructure, this 
time of a rather more bureaucratic nature, is of central importance: the 
“Pak-China Border Pass.” The Border Pass is valid for one year, it is neither 
expensive (1500 Rupee, about 15 US$), nor diff icult to obtain, and it allows 
multiple visits for a maximum stay of one month each time. This kind of 
permit is not exceptional to the China-Pakistan area, but has been in use 
for border residents in other contexts such as Nepal (Shneiderman 2013), 
Vietnam (Schoenberger and Turner 2008), Laos, and Burma (Chapter 6). 
The situation on the Chinese side of the border is more complex. Border 
residents in Xinjiang are also, off icially, entitled to the Border Pass. However, 
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given China’s concerns over security in Xinjiang (Roberts 2012; Starr 2004), 
they have de facto been excluded from obtaining it, thus leaving most 
opportunities for shuttle trade in Pakistani hands (Chapter 5).
That markets and trading practices are embedded in the social, insti-
tutional, and infrastructural worlds in which they take place is not news 
for anthropologists. More generally, it is not surprising to learn that the 
business of moving stuff (in the forms of shipping containers, suitcase 
goods, or f inancial products) is closely related to the history of modern 
nation states. Deborah Cowen (2014), in her recent book on global logis-
tics, compellingly shows how military networks played a fundamental 
role in the establishment and maintenance of a transnational system of 
production and exchange. In fact, both English words for logistics and 
infrastructure have their roots in the military world. The Oxford English 
Dictionary entry for “logistics” begins broadly: “The detailed organization 
and implementation of a complex operation.” Further, two more specif ic 
meanings of logistics are provided: “The activity of organizing the movement, 
equipment, and accommodation of troops;” and “The commercial activity of 
transporting goods to customers.” The word itself is fairly recent, going back 
to mid-nineteenth-century France, where l’art logistique referred specifically 
to the business of “moving, quartering, and supplying troops.” The English 
word for infrastructure shares a similar history. As anthropologist Ashley 
Carse recently pointed out, it also has its origin in nineteenth-century 
French civil engineering, and “when it was adopted in English in the early 
twentieth century, infrastructure referred primarily to the organizational 
work required before railroad tracks could be laid” (2017, 27). Since then, the 
meaning of the word expanded and multiplied – as in the case of logistics, 
which went from being a term used in a strictly military context to a more 
general way to refer to what makes something work, in the day-to-day (Guyer 
2016). Even more interestingly, both logistics and infrastructure began to 
appear in general English-language dictionaries in the aftermath of World 
War Two, and quickly gained in popularity.
The historical etymologies of these two words point to something that for 
Karim, Hammad, or any other small-scale trader along the KKH is a rather 
obvious fact: the state, however defined, encountered, or experienced, plays 
a fundamental role in cross-border exchanges. This includes attempts to 
regulate, promote, forbid, enclose, open, tax, and provision. Whether as a 
major player against such forms of exchange – as was the case for periods 
of the Mao era – or, more recently, as an active promoter of cross-border 
developments, the state represents an integral part of the market along the 
KKH. Something that, through regulations, customs off icials, and police 
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off icers at checkpoints needs to be dealt with on a regular basis. As I have 
shown in this chapter, such encounters between traders and “the state” 
produce particular visions of the state and entail different strategies for 
traders to deal with and take advantage of.
In the context of Western China and particularly the China-Central Asia 
borderlands, recent years have seen a growing interest in the notions of 
informality, shadow economy, and shuttle trade more generally (cf. Morris 
and Polese 2014; Karrar 2019; Steenberg 2016; Alff 2016a). As Steenberg (2016: 
296) notes, this body of literature tends to focus on the relations between 
informal exchanges and the state and thus implicitly reinforces a paradigm 
according to which bureaucratic state institutions are seen as primary, while 
kinship, friendship, and neighbouring ties – or what he calls “social networks” 
– are only secondary. Against this view, he contends that in many contexts 
“social networks constitute central elements of society and are fundamental 
– not supplementary – parts of most people’s daily lives” (2016: 297). In the 
case of cross-border trade, he observes, informal structures are at least as 
important as formal ones, to the extent that “[t]he close intertwinement of 
state institutions with social networks is evident all over Central Asia, but 
which of the two can be considered primary or secondary is rarely easily 
decided.” (2016: 297). If the issue of small-scale cross-border trade might lend 
itself to such interpretations, then recent anthropological investigations of 
the workings of global markets and logistics have led to similar results. The 
work of Caitlin Zaloom (2006) and of Karen Ho (2009), for instance, shows 
how f inancial markets are constructed through everyday experiences 
and practices that are inseparable from the particular social and material 
environments in which they take place and by face-to-face interactions in 
the trading room. A far cry from the abstract notion of a global market, such 
scholarship points to the embedded, embodied, and experiential creation of 
both a particular f inancial market, as well as its abstraction. Brenda Chalfin 
(2010), writing on the Ghanaian context, shows how the introduction of 
“neoliberal” reforms and regulations are always transformed, appropriated, 
and distorted on the ground in customs houses and off ices. The market, far 
from abstract, is thus the result of constant negotiations between a wide 
range of actors – IMF economists, state authorities, “informal” traders, and 
customs off icials among others.
My contribution to this body of literature is twofold. First, as I show in 
this chapter, “informal” practices of proximity are embedded in institutional 
and infrastructural landscapes that they contribute to re-making and legit-
imising through specif ic encounters with state authorities. Secondly, as will 
become clear throughout the book, a particular ideology of connectivity 
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that forms the basis of China’s current global expansion is deeply re-shaping 
such networks and the ways local traders conduct their business. On the one 
hand, as I have begun to show in this chapter, this new idea of connectivity 
that materialises in large-scale infrastructure projects across the Chinese 
borderlands does not reduce the presence of the state, but rather generates 
new conditions for its regulatory power to take hold and more space for it 
to grow.14 On the other hand, as this vision takes shape in the form of new 
roads, border gates, and logistics centre, it not only overlooks pre-existing 
networks and practices, but is often detrimental to them.
Conclusion
In this f irst chapter, I have sketched out a tension between two different 
visions and ideologies of connectivity that will become a recurrent theme in 
this book. One is the vision currently embraced, exerted, and exploited by 
the Chinese government. With its roots in a particular understanding of the 
history of trans-continental trade expressed via the image of the Silk Road, 
this vision underpins a particular ideology of connectivity as represented 
in the Kashgar SEZ stand at the Central & South Asia Commodity Fair, 
described at the beginning of the chapter. Such ideology, as it materialises in 
large-scale infrastructure projects, entails legibility, order, and regulations. 
Its stated goal is to connect the main centres of political and economic power 
through a number of frictionless corridors, thus incorporating once-remote 
peripheries into an extensive network of state-of-the-art infrastructures.
On the other side of the spectrum lies another form of connectivity. One 
that is not rooted in Silk Road fantasies, but that is rather lived through 
practices and day-to-day encounters. One that slips through the cracks of 
today’s Belt and Road Initiative as promoted by Beijing. To illustrate this, 
I have introduced the history of Tashkurgan and showed how existing 
cross-border ties in the region go back generations and have their roots in 
geographical and cultural proximity, as well as a sense of shared values 
and even kin relations. The examples of Karim, in particular, and of his 
family’s long-term business interest in Xinjiang more generally, allowed 
14 Walker (1999) has described a similar process enfolding in the China-Burma-Thailand-
Laos borderlands, arguing that “as trading and transport conditions become more liberalised, 
opportunities and incentives for regulation flourish” (5). Or, as Tina Harris puts it, “The opening 
of borders is often simultaneously a hardening of borders, bringing with it increased fences, 
walls, gates, security, and limitations of what can and cannot be brought across” (2018: 110).
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me to untangle the nexus of personal relations, economic opportunities, 
and familiarity that qualif ies as “China trade” for many entrepreneurs 
from across the border. Furthermore, by detailing the quotidian processes 
of crossing the Khunjerab Pass and the different obstacles that traders 
encounter and must learn to navigate on a regular basis, I brought to light 
the combination of formal structures and informal practices that make this 
particular business possible.
My goal has been twofold. First, I aimed to provide an ethnographic 
understanding of how the state is perceived, represented, and engaged at the 
margins of its territorial power. Borderlands, I argued, are spaces in which the 
state acquires a particular materiality, one that is enacted at particular places 
and times. With the example of Pakistani traders’ experiential engagements 
with state off icials and infrastructures on both sides of the border, I have 
shown that, as an object of knowledge and practice, “the state” is not seen as 
a coherent agent, but rather as something that requires constant engagement. 
Building upon this discussion, my second aim was to introduce and begin a 
conceptualisation of the set of practices that define what I call “proximity.” 
This notion is used to address and def ine the set of skills necessary for 
small-scale traders such as Karim to navigate the ever-changing landscape at 
the China-Pakistan border. I develop this notion in the next section, before 
moving into a discussion of how the state is embedded in such processes 
through the case of the China-Burma borderlands.
The ways in which the state is encountered, represented, and enacted, 
and the embedded practices of crossing and moving goods across national 
boundaries have been undergoing tremendous transformations in recent 
years. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will return to the case of Xinjiang and the 
KKH to discuss how Uyghurs in Kashgar and Pakistani traders have been 
affected by massive investment in infrastructure development in the region. 
In so doing, I return to the tension that has underpinned this chapter, 
between two different visions and ideologies of connectivity. I will show, 
in particular, how the vision professed by elites in Beijing and Islamabad 
aims at fostering not only economic development, but also people-to-people 
ties and cultural exchanges. Yet, as I have begun to show in this chapter, 
by ignoring pre-existing relations and cross-border practices, the new Silk 
Road is detrimental to old, established connections. Rather than fostering, 
it destroys. In connecting, it separates. Before making this argument, 
however, I will return to and unpack some of the forms of connectivity 
already described in this chapter in order to def ine and details the notion 
of proximity.
 Interlude — proximity
It was Ali who introduced me to the big mosque, shortly after he arrived in 
Kashgar for the second time in the late summer of 2012. He asked that we 
meet in front of the Seman Hotel, where he usually stays during his frequent 
visits to the city, and I was quite surprised to see him walking towards me 
from the opposite side of the road. The Seman Hotel is one of Kashgar’s 
landmarks. Formerly the abode of the Russian Consulate between the late 
19th and the mid-20th century, it lies at only a short distance from the Chini 
Bagh, the former British consulate, and today another major hotel in Kashgar. 
This important page of history in what has come to be known as the Great 
Game (Hopkirk 1992) seems forgotten in the cityscape of contemporary 
Kashgar – as lost as the two empires that were its main players. Only two 
old signs stand in front of the former consulate buildings, which, despite 
frequent rumours of imminent renovation, laid mostly abandoned between 
2009 and 2017. Yet, both the Seman and the Chini Bagh are major hotels 
for foreign businessmen and tourists alike. Many Pakistani traders, in 
particular, are frequent guests. The new Chini Bagh Hotel also hosts two 
Pakistani-owned shops as well as the Kashgar liaison off ice of the Northern 
Areas Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NACCI) from Gilgit-Baltistan. 
The few Pakistani restaurants in town, moreover, are all located in close 
proximity to either the Seman or the Chini Bagh.
Like Karim, Ali is a trader originally from Gilgit-Baltistan. Unlike Karim, 
he is a Shia from the Nagar Valley, and his family does not claim any kinship 
relations on the north side of the Karakoram, nor does it own any shops in 
China. Since the early 1990s, however, Ali has been making regular business 
trips to Tashkurgan and Kashgar, trading mostly in dry fruit. “I’ve asked 
you to meet me in front of the Seman hotel because I knew you would know 
this place,” he told me as we shook hands, perhaps sensing my puzzlement. 
“But I’m staying at the Sahar Hotel, across the street now. Come, I’ll show 
you.” As we crossed Xibei Road, Ali explained that prices at the Seman Hotel 
had become too high, and that he had to resort to a cheaper option: the big 
mosque. “The big mosque?” I asked, looking at him quizzically. Ali laughed, 
then told me that “the big mosque” was the nickname that he and some of his 
friends from Nagar gave to the Sahar Hotel, as most of its guests are Punjabi 
or Pashtun. “You see, they always wear their shalwar kameez, always pray. 
There’s even a prayer room in the hotel, it’s like being in Pakistan.”
The Sahar Hotel was, indeed, quite an interesting discovery for me, and 
became a frequent destination on my daily strolls through Kashgar during 
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the following months of f ieldwork. Like the Chini Bagh, some of the rooms 
of the Sahar Hotel were permanently occupied by import-export compa-
nies advertising fast and secure shipping of goods between Pakistan and 
China – either via the Karakoram Highway or via sea, through Karachi and 
Guangzhou or Shanghai. As we sat in his room, Ali walked me through the 
various steps that running his business involves. In the following days, and 
over his subsequent visits to Kashgar and a couple of meetings in Rawalpindi, 
I witnessed f irst-hand the complex network of contacts, commodities, 
logistics and technologies that Ali makes use of in the course of the many 
ongoing transactions that comprise his business at any given time.
On a normal day in Kashgar, Ali would visit at least one of the city’s ba-
zaars. In recent years, he mostly traded in Afghan dry fruit, which he would 
purchase in Peshawar, Quetta, or Rawalpindi, and then bring to Kashgar via 
the Karakoram Highway. In a good year, he was able, together with one or two 
partners, to ship two, sometimes even three containers. Summers, however, 
are not the best time for the dry fruit business, and Ali was also trading in 
other commodities. He would perform a number of tasks during his visits to 
Kashgar’s bazaars. He checked up on clients who still owed him money from 
previous deals. He visited current and former clients, shop owners, and fellow 
traders, who might have had one particular need or another. He checked the 
current prices of a number of goods, ranging from dry fruits to beauty products 
to cheap electronics. Lastly, he asked about new products that looked to sell 
well, and that he could possibly f ind for a cheaper price in Pakistan. All the 
while, he remained in contact with partners, suppliers, and clients from both 
China and Pakistan through his mobile phone. While in 2012 he used Skype, 
Viber, Facebook and WeChat with a similar frequency, already by 2013 most of 
his business transactions were carried out exclusively via WeChat. Through 
this platform, Ali could send pictures and videos of particular commodities 
to his suppliers in Pakistan, or show them to potential clients in Kashgar’s 
shops. He was sending audio and text messages relentlessly, often making use 
of WeChat’s translation function. While, after over a decade of experience in 
Kashgar, Ali’s Uyghur language was fluent, his Mandarin was only basic and 
he was unable to read any Chinese characters. When we were together, he 
would frequently ask me to write a message in Mandarin to a Han Chinese 
client; when apart, he would occasionally send me a message to translate 
when the WeChat translation function failed him.1
1 WeChat’s success is also tied to the Chinese government’s current suppression of potential 
competitors, such as Facebook and, more recently, Whatsapp, which have developed similar 
functionalities to those described here and used by Ali.
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Back in Pakistan, Ali repeated many of these operations, travelling time 
and again from his hometown, in Nagar, to Gilgit, Rawalpindi, Peshawar 
and Quetta, with occasional visits to Karachi. As is often the case with 
transnational merchant communities (Marsden 2015a; 2015b), traders such 
as Ali operate within a larger network of contacts stretching across multiple 
locations. As I came to realise walking through Kashgar’s bazaars with Ali, 
or sitting in Karim’s shop for long afternoons, as well as through days spent 
at markets and fairs in Gilgit, Urumqi, and Rawalpindi, this network was 
far from stable. Not only because players, commodities, regulations, and 
technologies that constitute this network are constantly changing, but 
also because the relations between these different actors are in constant 
evolution. It is an established anthropological argument that, by reinforcing 
the relationships between different actors, these patterns of exchange are 
also productive of groups and of the boundaries between them (Sahlins 1974). 
KKH traders thus made it their business to keep themselves well-informed: 
from season to season they followed the fluctuations of the prices of goods 
in the bazaars of Kashgar and Rawalpindi. They were always quick to relay 
news to their friends through Skype or WeChat, and good relations with 
local off icials ensured that they would get wind of any new regulation that 
might be implemented. This particularly unstable relationship, which I 
have elsewhere described as an intrinsic characteristic of what is locally 
understood as “the market” (Rippa 2019a), is a defining element of the lives 
of traders along the Karakoram Highway. As such, it is productive of social as 
well as spatial relationships, and conductive of various forms of mobilities.
Such relationships, and the forms of mobilities within which they are 
embedded and of which they are productive, are rooted in socio-spatial 
configurations that I call proximity. Proximity is not a heuristic invention 
that necessarily applies in any and every context in the world. Rather, the 
notion of proximity simply intends to highlight connections and continuities 
where we might otherwise expect none. As such, it follows John Agnew’s 
fundamental conception of territorial states as “made out of places” (1987: 
1). Accordingly, with the notion of proximity, I stress the need to shift the 
focus to the presence of diverse historical and socio-cultural trajectories 
from those often projected by today’s borders, and by the promoters of 
current forms of transnational connectivity. As such, proximity is intended 
as an analytical starting point for addressing the multiple meanings and 
notions associated with the Chinese borderlands and the relations that 
characterise them today.
Proximity is a configuration that is both geographical and social, contin-
uously made and remade. As such, it speaks to a particular understanding 
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of space, one rooted in a processual and experiential ontology as defined by 
a number of scholars in the social sciences. Take, for instance, geographer 
Doreen Massey and anthropologist Tim Ingold, particularly their works 
entitled respectively For Space (Massey 2005) and Against Space (Ingold 
2009). Despite the seemingly oppositional titles, Massey and Ingold share a 
similar vision. For both of them the world is essentially made up of relations, 
continually under construction and defined by interactions, multiplicities, 
and becomings. Massey calls this “space,” Ingold prefers the term “lifeworld.” 
Yet, both thinkers aim to move behind a flat and f ixed conception of space, 
a two-dimensional canvas upon which connections take place. For Massey, 
space is the product of interrelations, it represents the possibility of the exis-
tence of multiplicity, and it is always under construction (2005: 9). Similarly, 
Ingold criticises the abstractness of the concept of space we have become 
accustomed to, and proposes instead an understanding of the world as 
defined by movement, openness, and a form of knowledge rooted in history, 
experience, and memories – or what he calls “a knot of stories” (2009: 41).
The world of traders along the Karakoram Highway closely resembles the 
world described by Massey and Ingold. Ali’s visits to Kashgar’s bazaars is a 
tale of simultaneous multiplicities: talking prices, browsing commodities, 
engaging in virtual conversations over WeChat, and so on. Karim’s char-
acterisation of the history of Tashkurgan and his personal commitment to 
a life across national borders, reflect the specif ic pathways he grew into, 
a kind of “trail-following wayfaring” (Ingold 2011: 143). Thus, moving from 
this understanding of space, the f irst part of this book makes a case for the 
importance of proximity. As such, the concept might appear obvious – and 
yet, in the current corridor-isation of global trade, elaborating on this notion 
is more important than ever. To put it simply, the argument – explicitly 
echoing Tobler’s First Law of Geography – is the following: space is constituted 
by interrelations, but near things are more related than distant things and 
this proximity affords specific opportunities.
As mentioned above, proximity is both geographical and social. Let’s 
start with the former. Proximity is rooted in a particular terrain, not in 
cartographic vicinity. This is particularly important when it comes to places 
such as the Karakoram, where mountains, landslides, availability of water, 
and altitude influence the ways people move and the place they inhabit. 
Despite radical infrastructural interventions and technological innovations, 
this terrain still plays a fundamental role in the highlands of Asia. Movement, 
here, is still very much the work of wayfaring – and to locate it with related 
scholarship by Saxer (2016a), it takes place along specif ic pathways. On the 
other hand, proximity is social in the sense that it is not def ined simply 
InTeRlude — PRoXIMIT Y 71
by a passive geographical closeness, although it is rooted in a particular 
terrain that favours certain kinds of routes over others. Proximity also 
implies a degree of cultural familiarity, and an active effort to keep those 
connections alive. It is, in this sense, close to what Saxer and Zhang call 
neighbouring: a set of practices that “entails both a geographical reality of 
living in proximity, and a flexible construction of social relations that can be 
stretched across time, space, and distance” (2016: 23). As with neighbouring, 
what I call proximity implicates a certain effort, a “doing” that overcomes 
distance, political barriers, and generations.
The social and geographical components of these particular configura-
tions, I argue, afford specific opportunities to these dwelling in proximity. In 
other words, because of this shared history and the geographical closeness, 
locals are often able to f ind and exploit new opportunities triggered by 
external decisions, such as the construction of a road or the opening of 
the border. For instance, in the aftermath of the Attabad landslide, it was 
local “China traders,” as Pakistanis engaged in business with their powerful 
northern neighbour are called, who re-established the connection between 
Gojal – and therefore China – and the rest of Pakistan. At a moment of 
great economic diff iculty, when many Punjabi and Pashtun traders went 
elsewhere, traders from Gilgit-Baltistan kept travelling to Tashkurgan 
and Kashgar, purchasing cheap Chinese manufactured goods or selling 
gemstones and Afghan dry fruit – and quite often both. To be sure, in the 
aftermath of the landslide, traders from other parts of Pakistan did not, 
in many cases, interrupt their business relations with Xinjiang. They did, 
however, rely on traders from Gilgit-Baltistan to arrange and manage the 
transportation of goods between Kashgar and Gilgit. The disaster, in other 
words, created a situation of uncertainty within which only a combination of 
local knowledge, social networks, and territorial rootedness made it possible 
for business relations to persist. Or, as I will show in Chapter 5, the f irst 
group of people to take advantage of the opening of the KKH in the 1980s 
was the Kashgari families who had left Xinjiang only a few decades earlier. 
Many of those traders came from families of mixed background, rooted in 
trans-Karakoram trade. For them, the decision to invest in China-Pakistan 
trade in the early 1980s was triggered precisely by those experiences, and 
by the network of contacts and set of expertise that they entail.
To be sure, Ali and Karim make regular use of their particular posi-
tionality within the broader history of trans-Karakoram relations. Karim 
invests time and energy in cultivating his relations with his fellow Wakhis in 
Tashkurgan. Ali, on the other hand, has developed close connections with a 
number of actors across the region, with whom he entertains regular contacts 
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through online apps and personal encounters. The history of cross-regional 
trade along China’s peripheries, as recounted in the works of scholars such 
as Giersch (2006), Marsden (2015a), Van Spengen (2000), Rizvi (1999) and 
Saxer (forthcoming) among others, betrays countless examples of the role 
proximity plays in the activities of brokers, middlemen, caravan traders, and 
so on. Today, this history reverberates through the lives of traders such as 
Karim and Ali – and, as we will see in the next chapter, in places as distant 
and diverse as Tashkurgan and Tengchong.
2 Bridgehead
“In order to develop border areas, we will make use of these areas’ regional 
advantages and formulate and implement special “opening up” policies. We will 
speed up the construction of key ports, border cities, border (and cross-border) 
economic cooperation zones and key development and experimental zones. We 
will enhance the infrastructure and connection with the neighbouring countries 
and develop “special outward industries” and industrial bases. Heilongjiang, 
Jilin, Liaoning and Inner Mongolia will be key in our “opening up” to North East 
Asia; Xinjiang will serve as a base for our “opening up” up the West; Guangxi 
will be a new “highland” for cooperation with ASEAN; Yunnan will be built into a 
bridgehead for “opening up” to the South-West. We will also continuously improve 
the level of “opening up” along the coastal areas.”
— Twelfth Five-Year Programme (2011), Italics mine.
“The Chinese can be trusted to keep the mule-track between the frontier and 
Tengyueh [Tengchong] in repair and they are considering the construction of a 
motor road […]. The interest expressed by the Gov. of Burma in the maintenance of 
the road in good condition, seems in no danger of being neglected and indeed the 
Chinese in Yunnan appear at the moment to be bitten by a craze for communications”
— Telegram to the Governor of India from the Tengchong British consular 
mission, 14 November 1929 (IOR/L/PS/11/301), italics mine.
In a paper from 1934, Chinese demographer Hu Huanyong famously 
drew the “Heihe-Tengchong line.” The line stretches diagonally across 
China, from the city of Heihe on the border with Russia, to Tengchong, 
on China’s border with Burma. This imaginary line divides China into 
an eastern half – making up 43 per cent of the national territory yet 
containing around 94 per cent of the population – and a western half 
making up the remaining six per cent of the population (according to 
data from 2002; in 1934, these f igures were strikingly similar, 96 per 
cent and four per cent). Furthermore, while the overwhelming majority 
of the Han Chinese population live on the eastern side of the line, most 
ethnic minorities live in the western half. As Mao Zedong once put it: 
“We say China is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and large in 
population; as a matter of fact, it is the Han nationality whose population 
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is large and the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose 
resources are rich.”1
Within this particular geography, Tashkurgan and Tengchong occupy two 
different kinds of marginality. While the former lies at the westernmost edge 
of the People’s Republic, the latter is located at the intersection between 
the symbolic margin of the Han world and China’s territorial limits. The 
history of the town of Tengchong reflects this unique position. Founded as 
a military outpost, Tengchong grew in tandem with the Ming expansion 
in southwestern China. To this day, the majority of its population is Han 
Chinese and traces its roots to such military expeditions. Furthermore, 
Tengchong quickly developed as a trading outpost and became particularly 
famous in imperial times for its role in the trade of Burmese jade and amber. 
In the wake of the Communist Revolution, many Tengchong trading families 
migrated to Burma. Still today, in numerous overseas Chinese (huaqiao) 
communities from Myitkyina to Tachileik it is not unusual to hear Tengchong 
dialect spoken.
Tashkurgan and Tengchong represent two particular, yet complemen-
tary vantage points from which to observe cross-border interactions in 
present-day China. Unlike the historical cross-border cultural similarities 
that we have encountered in Xinjiang, with Karim for instance, the story 
of Tengchong is one of Han Chinese expansion and encounter with non-
Han groups on both sides of the border. Moreover, while in Xinjiang the 
particular terrain and sensitivity of the region channelled cross-Karakoram 
trade into one particular route, the KKH, the hills surrounding Tengchong 
are criss-crossed with trails and dirt roads that stretch all the way into 
Burma’s Kachin State. While it is an over-simplif ication to counterpose a 
rigid, closed border in the case of the KKH with an open, porous one in the 
case of Tengchong, the very geographies where such encounters take place 
have shaped, and still shape today, the quantity and quality of exchanges 
in very particular ways.
Tengchong, like Tashkurgan, is no longer a marginal place. Not simply 
because of the quality of newly built transport infrastructure, but also due 
to its imagined role within Yunnan’s development. Much of this narrative is 
encapsulated in the image of Yunnan as a “bridgehead (qiaotoubao)”, hence 
this chapter’s title. This image has become particularly popular since the 
early 2000s, when the province became the spearhead of China’s aggressive 
economic engagement with Southeast Asia. The image of the bridgehead thus 
1 Mao Zedong’s “On the ten great relationships” (25 April 1956), quoted in Kau and Leung 
(1986: 47).
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underpins a particular vision of connectivity, one that is, once again, rooted 
in a particular understanding of China’s history. Much like the Xinjiang 
case, the off icial version of this history, professed by Chinese academics and 
off icials, positions Yunnan along the “southwest Silk Road.” As such, they 
highlight the need to employ Yunnan’s geographical proximity and historical 
ties with Southeast Asia in order to promote economic development and 
cooperation. Yunnan, accordingly, “is no longer to be seen as a peripheral 
southwestern corner of China, but the centre of wider links between China 
and its Asian neighbourhood to the south” (Summers 2013: 60; see also Sigley 
2016). As Xiaobo Su summarises, China’s notion of qiaotoubao, “indicates 
that Yunnan’s border areas are not only a zone of contact for people living in 
different territories, but, more importantly, a new state space of development 
where capital can pursue profit as long as trade barriers are removed and 
infrastructure is enhanced” (2013: 1225).
Thus understood, the image of the “bridgehead” has been widely used in 
policy discussions and scholarly debates alike to illustrate the ways in which 
China envisions the future of its southwestern province. What this debate 
seems to assume, however, is that the Chinese state is the main driver of 
economic development in the region, and that it is exclusively responsible for 
the planning and execution of trans-border infrastructure. In this chapter, 
I tell a different story – one that shows how private interests in Tengchong 
were at the forefront of a process that led to the consolidation of the state’s 
presence in the borderlands. In order to do so, I will draw a historical picture 
of Tengchong’s role as a trading entrepôt, focusing in particular on the 
years following the fall of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1989. My 
purpose is threefold. First, I show how plans for transnational connectivity, 
now embedded within the Belt and Road framework, have a history that not 
only pre-dates Xi Jinping’s initiative, but also the formation of the PRC. I thus 
put current Silk Road fantasies in perspective and show the persistence of 
such images of global connections throughout different historical phases. 
Secondly, I will show how the state is embedded in processes of proximity, 
not just as a regulator or an investor. On the contrary, in Tengchong, state 
and private businesses are both responsible for a particular def inition and 
development of the borderlands. In particular, I detail this process through 
the example of the timber trade – my third aim in this chapter. I argue that 
the boom in Burmese timber imports in the late 1990s and 2000s, together 
with the particular materiality of timber, played a fundamental role in the 
processes of state territorialisation of the Tengchong borderlands. By doing 
so, this chapter will show how scholarly accounts of road development 
in the Yunnan borderlands often omit the role of non-state actors in the 
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planning and construction of particular border roads in the province. The 
Chinese state, in other words, is implicitly assumed to be the main – if not 
the only – agent of development in the region. Against this view, the case 
of Tengchong analysed in this chapter shows how private interests led to 
particular infrastructural formations at the China-Burma borderlands, 
which were only later incorporated into the national geography of border 
crossings.
Using Tengchong as an example, this chapter analyses the quantity and 
quality of such links. As in the case of Tashkurgan, what emerges is a history 
of connectivities that evades China’s off icial version and that involves a 
number of surprising actors in seemingly out-of-the-way places.
The quest for frictionless corridors
The quest for frictionless corridors is not a new one. The late nineteenth 
century was a period of great change, in Tengchong as much as elsewhere in 
the country. As the British expanded their colonial reach into Burma, Yunnan 
fell into almost two decades of turbulent civil war – what the British called 
the Panthay or Muslim rebellion between 1856 and 1873 (Atwill 2005). By 
that time, Tengchong was already an established trading centre, particularly 
famous for its jade manufacturing businesses. As the British gained control 
over northern Burma and established a permanent garrison post in the 
town of Bhamo, on the Irrawaddy, Tengchong became an important node 
for British interests in Yunnan.2 By then, the Bhamo-Tengchong Road, which 
could be covered by pack animals in seven days, was already a “well-known 
trade-route” (Johnson 1908: 294). Early British missions to Tengchong in the 
second half of the nineteenth century report f inding a formerly prosper-
ous town whose economy was severely hit by the civil war, with only a 
few businesses in place (Anderson 1876; Gill 1883).3 All of these missions, 
2 On Tengchong’s prominence in cross-border trade in this phase, see Li (2017: 23–53); Hill 
(1998: 22–27); and Giersch (2006). On the role of overseas Chinese in the Southeast Asia trade, 
see Chang (2009, 2011, 2014); Tagliacozzo and Chang (2011); and Tagliacozzo (2005).
3 During the second (1975) expedition documented by Anderson, the British diplomat Augustus 
Raymond Margary was killed near Manwyne (today’s Mang Yun 芒允). The murder sparked 
the so-called Margary Affair, leading to the Chefoo Convention, one of the unequal treaties 
signed by China with colonial powers in these decades. While Mang Yun town is today in the 
Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture, at the time of the assassination it was under 
administrative control of Tengchong, hence several reports state that Margary was killed in 
Tengchong.
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however, reported the potential for the opening up and development of 
trade with Yunnan, whose resources, particularly in the mining sector, 
seemed unlimited.4 In 1890, the Qing government signed the Yunnan-Burma 
Business Treaty (dian mian shangwu tiaoyue), and only a few years later, in 
1899, the British established a consulate (Figure 6) and customs house in 
Tengchong (Nield 2015: 234).5 In 1902, the Qing government established a 
customs house in Tengchong (Tengyue haiguan). The city, by all standards 
of the time, had become a fairly international trading hub. As Archibald 
Rose, then British consul at Tengchong, put it:
In spite of its far-away position, Teng-yüeh [Tengchong] is the great 
market of Western Yunnan [Yunnan], the distributing centre for foreign 
goods, the collecting centre for all the native produce coming down from 
4 Captain Gill reports an interesting conversation with the Qing garrison commander (Chen-tai, 
or zhentai) of Tengchong from his 1877 mission, in which he claims that “the governor-general 
of Yün-Nan [Yunnan] intended to raise three million taels to work the mines in the province, 
under the superintendence of Europeans” (Gill 1883: 281) Gill, however, notices quite poignantly, 
that “the mines of Yün-nan no doubt are exceedingly rich; but before they can be made to pay, 
communication must be improved, and the country better governed” (Gill 1883: 281; emphasis 
mine). On British mining interests in Yunnan, see also Fiskesjö (2010: 254–5).
5 On the construction and maintenance of a British consulate in Tengchong, see WORK 
10/633; IOR/L/PS/11/205; FO 369/3087.
Figure 6: Former British consulate in Tengchong (picture by the author, 2016)
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Ta-li Fu [Dali]. It is busy with Burma Caravans, its market thronged with 
tribesmen, and its streets gay with passing off icials and their picturesque 
retinues, for it is in Teng-yüeh that the political and commercial life of the 
Yun-nan frontier f inds its focus and its centre (Rose 1912: 1999).
Tengchong, as Rose summarises, was both “far-away” and “central” – a true 
frontier town with its diverse population, colourful visitors, and thriving 
markets. To be sure, despite its remoteness and location amidst notoriously 
dangerous hills and unruly tribes, at the turn of the century, Tengchong 
was a rather cosmopolitan place. Besides British off icers and Burmese 
traders, one could f ind international explorers, botanists (Mueggler 2011), 
and missionaries (Crossman, [1982] 2002: 68). By then, ambitious plans for 
transnational connectivity had already taken shape.
In 1898, a British mission was in charge of surveying the region for a 
potential railway line. The report, written up by Captain Ryder, states that 
the Bhamo-Tengchong line was “the only” possible way for rail transport 
between Burma and China (Ryder 1903: 112). At the time, the issue of railway 
lines in the region was a political one, owing much to the colonial rivalry 
between the British and the French. While an 1896 treaty between the 
two colonial powers stabilised the situation in mainland Southeast Asia, 
France’s construction of the Tonkin-Kunming line between 1898 and 1910 
(Rousseau 2014) became a major concern for British interests in the region. 
Years later, in 1906, as another British off icer passed through Tengchong on 
his way to Bhamo, talks of a railway were still very much alive. He noted 
rather poignantly, however, that while “the trade between Burma and China 
by this route requires some stimulus […] whether the railway will stimulate 
the trade to any very great extent is questionable” (Johnson 1908: 310–11).
Despite the fact that the railway was never built, at the end of the Qing 
Dynasty in 1911–12, Tengchong entered a positive period for trade, during 
which a number of multinational trading f irms were set up, dealing silk, 
tin, and other raw materials through networks spanning from Shanghai 
to Rangoon (Giersch 2010: 231–2). While off icial records show the total 
value of imports and exports as being hundreds of millions of two-level 
silver, both British and Chinese authorities frequently voiced great concern 
over issues of smuggling, banditry, and road maintenance.6 Of particular 
concern for the British was the issue of the taxation of mule caravans – the 
so-called mule tax7 – which was initially connected to the development and 
6 IOR/L/E/9/233; IOR/L/PS/10/337; IOR/L/PS/11/228; FO 228/3275.
7 see IOR/L/PS/10/208.
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securitisation of the Tengchong-Bhamo Road.8 In particular, as a British 
report from the time states, Chinese authorities revenues of the mule tax 
were initially supposed to be:
devoted by them to the maintenance of a Trade Protection Force and the 
repair of the road. In 1903 the amount of the Trade Protection Force was 
f ixed at Taels 9000 per annum and the remainder was handed over to a 
Road Committee, of which HM Consul at Tengyueh [Tengchong] was a 
member, for the maintenance of the road between the frontier and the 
Salween River.9
While plans for the construction of a motor road were frequently discussed in 
frontier meetings and conversations between British and Chinese authorities 
in Tengchong, the costs related to “the nature of the hills, which are of soft 
rock or sand and subject to frequent landslide” and the unstable political 
and f inancial situation in Yunnan, prevented such plans from taking a 
concrete turn.10
More ambitious plans for transnational connectivity were revived during 
World War Two and the Japanese invasion of Burma, when Tengchong was 
brought into the national spotlight. The town was conveniently located 
along the so-called Stilwell Road, built by Allied forces during World War 
Two as an attempt to by-pass Japanese-occupied territories in northern 
Burma and deliver supplies to KMT troops in Yunnan. The road was built 
under the supervision of American General Joseph Stilwell – hence the 
name – between 1942 and 1945, and once completed established a quick 
connection between the railway head in Ledo, then part of British India 
and today a sleepy town in Assam, and Kunming, where the KMT planned 
its moves against Japanese forces pushing from the south-west. The road, 
which has since fallen into disuse and has, for the most part, been swallowed 
up by the jungle, still represents a major symbolic reference for virtually 
any plan for cross-border connectivity in the region today (Zhou 2013). In 
Tengchong, where a key battle with the Japanese army was fought in 1944, 
a well-kept museum and a graveyard attract thousands of visitors every 
month, and the war of resistance has come to represent one of the most 
evocative moments in the city’s history.
8 see in particular IOR/L/PS/11/301.
9 IOR/L/PS/11/301.
10 IOR/L/PS/11/301.
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Integrating the frontier, exporting the revolution (1949–1989)
Despite the war effort and the consequent construction of roads and airports, 
in 1949, Yunnan remained internally fragmented and poorly linked to the 
rest of China. In other words, it posed a major headache for CCP authorities 
eager to usher in a programme of national integration. To address such 
challenges at a national scale, communist authorities introduced a system of 
“Great Administrative Regions” as part of which Yunnan was included in the 
Southwest area together with Guizhou, Sichuan, and Sikang.11 Several factors 
determined the division – “distrust of the provinces, disparities between 
different areas, a shortage of cadres, military deployment, an unexpectedly 
rapid takeover, and a divide-and-rule strategy” (Solinger 1977: 29) – which 
was thus undertaken with the goal of fostering greater integration and 
centralisation. In particular, the new – and temporary – regional system 
was to account for difference, while promoting unif ication; or, in Mao 
Zedong’s own words: “what can be made uniform and should be uniform 
are to be made uniform; what cannot or should not will not forcibly be made 
uniform” (quoted in Solinger 1977: 30). As a result, by 1952, the provinces, 
strengthened by material and ideological work, were considered ready to 
take over, paving the way for the dismantling of the regional system in 
1954. This progress, as Solinger summarises, was particularly evident “in 
the construction of new transport facilities and in the creation of nationally 
homogeneous units – Party branches, autonomous areas, and trade organs” 
(Solinger 1977: 252).
As part of this broader process, the Yunnan borderlands presented 
unique challenges for the CCP. Besides the rough terrain, lack of reliable 
infrastructure, and ethnic composition, they had become one of the last 
stands for Nationalist (KMT) troops attempting to topple the new regime. 
Several thousand KMT troops had escaped across the border into norther 
Burma, yet made frequent forays into Yunnan province. Led by General Li 
Mi and supported by the Nationalist government in Taiwan (as well as by 
the USA), KMT troops were based in the Wa hills of northern Burma and, 
at least initially, enjoyed the support of a number of local ethnic groups 
on both sides of the border (Moseley 1973: 35; Han 2019). On the Burmese 
side, the presence of Nationalist forces was repudiated by the newly formed 
11 Sikang would then be split into the TAR and Sichuan. Xinjiang, as part of the same process, 
was included in the Northwest Administrative Region together with Gansu, Ningxia, and 
Qinghai. Upon its invasion in 1951, Tibet was administered by a separate military administrative 
committee.
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Burmese government, despite it not having the military power to take any 
concrete measure for their actual removal. In China, on the other hand, 
the Nationalist threat was met with a dual approach. First, PLA troops 
were deployed to the frontier with the objective of eliminating “bandits.” 
Secondly, “pacif ication” was carried out in conjunction with land reform 
and other programmes intended to win over the trust and support of local 
ethnic groups.
Similarly to Xinjiang, where the bingtuan played a major role in the 
securitisation and opening up of frontier territories, across Yunnan’s 
mountainous regions the PLA was, at least initially, largely in charge of 
the development of basic infrastructure and of the distribution of staple 
goods to minority groups. PLA troops, in particular, were credited for the 
distribution of clothes, food, salt, for improving fresh water supplies, and 
for the construction of roads in remote parts of the province (Moseley 1973: 
107). To an extent this approach bore fruit and, by the mid-1950s, the CCP 
seemed to have won the support of some of the ethnic groups that were 
initially openly against communist rule.
Despite the deployment of PLA troops at the frontier regions, in this 
initial phase the communist takeover appeared to have had little impact 
on cross-border mobilities. In fact, as I was repeatedly told throughout my 
fieldwork in Tengchong, locals were free to move across national boundaries 
without too much hassle, while communities living in areas in proximity 
to the border were, for the most part, left alone. This particular freedom 
was remarked on in the course of off icial friendship celebrations between 
the two countries. For instance, in 1956, at a high-level meeting in Mangshi, 
on the China-Burma border, reminiscent of British-era “frontier meetings,” 
local participants reportedly “expressed the hope that the anticipated 
demarcation of the border would not prevent continued coming and going 
across the frontier” (Moseley 1973: 165). Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai, 
who was present at the meeting, “stated that the nationalists of Yunnan 
must make an even greater effort than those across the border in working 
toward closer relations between them” (Moseley 1973: 165).
As exemplified by these encounters, initial relations between the PRC and 
the newly independent Union of Burma were good, reaching a peak with the 
settlement of the boundary issue in 1960. The settlement was instrumental 
to China’s f ight against KMT troops based in northern Burma. By 1960, 
Nationalist troops had grown to approximately 9400, and were enjoying 
constant support from Taipei (Fravel 2008: 86–91). China was simultaneously 
facing problems in Eastern Tibet, as well as an uprising in Lhasa (1959) and 
a threat posed by CIA-trained Tibetan forces in Kalimpong (Conboy and 
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Morrison 2002; McGranahan 2010). The time was ripe for a compromise, 
and Zhou Enlai moved quickly in early 1960 to settle the border issue with 
Burmese Prime Minister Ne Win. Following the settlement, China and 
Burma joined forces to drive the remaining Nationalist forces out of the 
borderlands. Military operations throughout the winter of 1960–1961 thus 
succeeded in destroying the primary KMT base, forcing the remaining 
troops to f lee into Laos and Thailand. The frontier, as far as China was 
concerned, was pacif ied.
The phase of good neighbouring relations between China and Burma 
would not last long.12 China’s pragmatic approach in its foreign policy towards 
Burma began to shift in 1966, following internal political developments and 
the CCP’s efforts to export the Cultural Revolution through China’s overseas 
communities (Fan 2012). Anti-Chinese riots, resulting from Chinese students’ 
defiance of the Burmese government’s ban on wearing Mao badges in school, 
broke out in Rangoon in June 1967. The riots contributed to the deterioration 
of relations between Beijing and Rangoon, with Chinese off icials calling for 
the removal of Ne Win’s government and openly supporting the Communist 
Party of Burma’s (CPB) armed struggle against the Burmese government 
(Smith 1991: 224–227).
The situation worsened in early 1968, when the Communist Party of Burma 
occupied a long stretch of territory along the Chinese border. The attack, 
conducted from Yunnan with Chinese support, was to establish a communist 
enclave in the Burmese hills of Kachin and Shan State, extending from Banwa 
(across the Diantan border crossing in Tengchong county), to Mong La, next 
to the Laos border.13 Opposite Tengchong’s current main border crossing with 
Burma, Houqiao, two local commanders of the Kachin Independence Army 
(KIA), Ting Ying and Zalum, defected to the CPB in 1968 with their men. This 
area was to become “War Zone 101” – one of several “War Zones” in which 
the CPB divided the territory brought under its control (Lintner 1999: 252).
In the years following the 1968 invasion, as the CPB consolidated its 
control over northern Burma, a large influx of Chinese provisions made it 
12 for an overview of China-Burma relations, see Steinberg and Fan 2012; Holmes (1972)
13 China had been supporting the leadership of the Communist Party of Burma for quite some 
time. As Bertil Lintner reports in his (so far unmatched) history of the CPB, “the f irst batch of 
about thirty CPB cadres […] left for Yunnan in 1951. In May 1953, Thakin Ba Thein Tin, then vice 
Party chairman, reached Tengchong after an arduous year-long journey by elephant and on foot. 
[…] They were well received by the Chinese and allowed to remain in Sichuan province where 
they were given political training” (Lintner 1990: 19). In the coming years, particularly following 
Ne Win’s coup in 1962, China began to provide military aid and training to CPB cadres in China, 
and the CPB was allowed to print propaganda material in Beijing (Lintner 1990: 21).
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to the so-called liberated areas under communist administration. In these 
years, several accounts prove that local people were free to move across the 
national boundary (Lintner 1999, 1990). As a former member of the CPB, 
now in exile in China, once described to me: “there was no border, in fact, 
we could come and go as we pleased. There were Chinese everywhere in 
the liberated areas too.” Moreover, thousands of Chinese “volunteers” joined 
the ranks of the CPB. As Bertil Lintner, who visited the CPB headquarters 
in 1987, describes:
The CPBs base are formed a de facto buffer state between China and the 
government-held areas of Burma. It had its own administration and tax 
system, police force and prison, schools, hospitals, markers and roads 
where trucks and jeeps displaying number plates issued by the CPB plied. 
Hydroelectric power stations were built with Chinese assistance at Möng 
Ko and Panghsang [the CPB headquarter], and the party’s radio station 
continued to beam out daily broadcasts in a number of local languages. 
[…] A bridge has been built from Panghsang, across the Nam Hka River 
border to the Chinese side, and supplies were transported daily into the 
CPB’s area: arms and ammunition, uniforms, radio transmitters, army 
jeeps, petrol, military maps, and even rice, other foodstuff, cooking oil 
and kitchen utensils (1999: 282).
The CPB also had to face some local resistance in its march into northern 
Burma. Until 1968, the CPB had little experience and support in the northern 
hills, and its members were for the most part ethnically Baman. As it swiftly 
conquered and began to administer a territory extending over 20,000 square 
kilometres14 (roughly the size of Croatia) adjacent to the Chinese border, 
the CPB became a strongly multi-ethnic military body in which the top 
positions were occupied by Baman and Chinese, and many of the foot 
soldiers were local ethnic groups. In the early years, the CPB tactic was 
to build alliances with local warlords and chieftains, offering guns and 
ammunition in exchange for their support for its Marxist-Leninist policies. 
Initially, the plan was fairly successful, with the CPB winning the trust of 
a number of Wa, Shan, and Akhas leaders. The CPB, however, also had to 
face open armed resistance as they advanced through the hills of northern 
Burma. Pockets of KMT soldiers, mostly in charge of collecting intelligence, 
were also an early target of CPB military operations planned with Beijing’s 
support.
14 For precise maps and discussion of CPB territory, see Lintner (1990: 75–104).
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Despite China’s military help, the CPB failed in its primary objective 
to connect its forces in the north with pre-existent pockets of communist 
resistance in Central Burma and in the hills of Pegu Yoma, the old CPB base 
north of Rangoon. By the mid-1970s, the initial momentum had vanished, 
and CPB and Burmese armies entered a stand-off that would last for over 
a decade. The plan to take over the whole country by military means had 
failed.
Further developments on the Chinese side of the border did not help 
the CPB cause. With the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping’s 
subsequent ascent to power, China started to reduce its support for the 
CPB, already recalling its “volunteers” in 1978 and extending pressure on 
CPB leaders to reconsider their policies and “retire” in China (Lintner 1999: 
295). During these years, the People’s Republic of China was deepening 
its relations with the United States and setting itself on a path of reform 
and opening up. A Maoist insurgency at its doorsteps was something it 
did not really intend to deal with. However, it would still be over a decade 
until the combined lack of resources and growing tensions within the CPB 
leadership would lead to a breakdown in 1989. The f inal nail in the coff in 
of the CPB armed struggle in northern Burma was hammered in by the 
various ethnic groups that made up the most of its rank-and-f ile soldiers. 
Dissatisf ied with CPB policies, alienated by the Party’s strictly Maoist 
ideology, and allured by the prospect of handsome prof its in the narcotics 
business, which the CPB off icially condemned, led a number of ethnic 
leaders to mutiny in early 1989. The CPB’s ageing leadership was forced to 
f lee into China where they were given asylum by PRC authorities (Smith 
1991: 374–381; Lintner 1990: 39–46).
The four decades between the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China and the fall of the Communist Party of Burma were particularly 
eventful in Tengchong. Following the incorporation of Yunnan into the PRC, 
and the PLA’s efforts to integrate the borderlands into the national admin-
istration, many wealthy Tengchong traders fled to Burma. As I was told in a 
number of interviews, building upon their economic and trade connections 
and kinship ties, they permanently moved their businesses across the border, 
fearing repercussions due to their social status and (more often than not) 
sympathies for the KMT. Once in Burma, they joined a sizeable contingent 
of Tengchong families, scattered between Bhamo and Mandalay (Li Yi 2017; 
Hill 1998). While throughout this phase cross-border mobility and trade did 
not disappear, the borderlands were characterised by political struggles, 
rather than by developmental push. Plans for transnational connectivity 
developed by British and Yunnanese authorities prior to World War Two 
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were largely forgotten, while infrastructure built during the war, such as the 
Stilwell Road and the Burma Road, lay abandoned. With the CPB invasion of 
1968, cross-border exchanges became intrinsically political, and the nature 
of economic relations between the two sides were overshadowed by their 
ideological dimension.
With the fall of the CPB in 1989, however, such economic ties were to 
become prominent once again. The borderlands of Yunnan were, f inally, set 
to join the reform and opening up announced by Deng Xiaoping a decade 
earlier. Within a short period, China signed several trade agreements with 
the Burmese government, off icially opening up the border for business. 
While the era of communist revolution had ended, a new life for Tengchong 
trading families had begun – one characterised by ceasef ire deals, ethnic 
conflict, and infrastructure development connected to resource extraction 
in northern Burma.
Insurgency and ceasefire capitalism
Following Burma’s independence and largely in response to political exclu-
sion in the creation of the Union of Burma, insurgencies spread across the 
country’s frontiers in the early 1950s.15 In the north, along China’s borders, 
a number of warlords and local chieftains controlled large sections of the 
territory, which the independent Burmese government, much like the 
British colonialists before it, failed to bring under its administrative power. 
The verdant, hilly landscape of northern Burma was an ideal place for an 
insurgency. Throughout history, the area had remained largely peripheral 
to any state apparatus, and in different phases offered refuge to those 
escaping lowland centres of power (Scott 2009). Secondly, it was rich in 
valuable resources, such as timber, precious gemstones and minerals, which 
could be used to f inance an armed group. Thus, from the very beginning 
of its postcolonial history, the political economy of northern Burma was 
dominated by the extraction of natural resources to fuel ethnic armed 
struggles against the Burmese state.
15 The British, upon seizing control over Burma, had divided the colony into Ministerial Burma 
(the central area controlled from Rangoon) and the Frontier Areas (encompassing the hilly and 
mountainous regions that border China today). This particular administrative division was 
to signif icantly affect the way independence was achieved, and negotiations over the role of 
ethnic groups in the newly formed Union of Burma develop. British rule also had a signif icant 
impact in another way, that is, the def inition and consolidation of particular ethnic identities 
(see Walton 2008; Smith 1991; Selth 2002).
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In the border areas across Tengchong, the main force quickly became 
the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and its military wing 
the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), at present the country’s second 
largest remaining armed group. The KIA was founded in 1961 and was 
quick to take over large parts of Kachin State in the 1960s and 1970s. 
In November 1967, just a couple of months before the CPB invasion of 
northern Burma, CPB chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin and representatives 
of the KIA signed an agreement in Beijing according to which the Kachin 
rebels were promised arms and ammunition if they joined forces with 
the CPB (Lintner 1999: 252). The CPB attack on parts of Kachin State that 
the KIA considered belonged to its sphere of inf luence, however, was 
seen by the Kachin leaders as a betrayal of the alliance. Fighting broke 
out between the KIA and the CPB, and tense relations between the two 
armies would persist until 1976, when a new agreement was signed in 
Kunming (Smith 1991: 331). Following the agreement, strengthened by 
new Chinese weapons supplied by the CPB, the KIA took over important 
government outposts and consolidated its positions in Kachin State. By 
1989, when the CPB collapsed, the Kachin Independence Organisation 
and Kachin Independence Army (henceforth KIO/A) controlled most 
of the areas bordering Kachin State, with the exception of a stretch of 
territory under Ting Ying and Zalum – known under CPB as War Zone 101, 
and which, following 1989, became administered by the New Democratic 
Army-Kachin (NDA-K).
Thus, with the exception of the Cold War phase, in which the Chi-
na-backed CPB controlled large portions of the borderland areas, ethnic 
politics continues to dominate the political organisation of northern 
Burma to this very day, shaping what has become the longest running civil 
war in the world. The years following the collapse of the CPB in 1989 were 
particularly momentous in establishing a new configuration of power across 
Burma’s northern frontier. This was mostly achieved through a number of 
ceasef ires, in which ethnic armies (some of which were responsible for the 
CPB break-up), entered into agreements with the Burmese government 
that included a suspension of f ighting, while ethnic armies maintained 
administrative control of most of their territories. The f irst to sign up 
to such agreements were the four main armies that resulted from the 
disbanding of the CPB, namely the Kokang-based Myanmar National 
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the United Wa State Army (UWSA), 
the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) in the area of Mong 
La, close to the Laos border, and the New Democratic Army – Kachin 
(NDA-K) of Ting Ying and Zalum across the Tengchong border crossing 
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of Diantan. The KIO/A, on the other hand, did not agree a ceasef ire with 
the government until 1994, when an agreement to retain arms but refrain 
from violence was eventually signed. In general, there were two external 
factors driving the signing of ceasef ires by local ethnic armies. As Mandy 
Sadan summarises:
The f irst of these was the collapse of the Communist bloc, which saw also 
the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma or CPB. The CPB had long 
played a critical role in many of the conflict zones, especially along the 
eastern and northeastern borders of the country. The second factor was 
the changed orientation of Thailand and China in particular to negotiating 
with the Myanmar regime. Both nations increasingly sought to engage 
directly with the Myanmar Government to build political relations and 
to facilitate access to natural resources within the country. Previously, 
their concerns had been more with local security control in border areas, 
which had been effected through relying on ethnic nationality and op-
position groups in the borderlands to contain local conflict zones. Most 
non-national armed groups agreed to ceasefires following these changes, 
relinquishing some territory while keeping other areas ostensibly under 
their control (Sadan 2015).
China, once again, played a major role in this phase on several fronts. Firstly, 
many of the ethnic armies that signed ceasef ire agreements with the Bur-
mese government were headed by former CPB members with close ties to 
the CCP.16 Secondly, China became a fundamental factor in sustaining local 
ethnic armies through the trade in a number of resources that followed the 
signing of ceasef ire agreements. In Kachin State, for instance, the export 
of jade and timber boomed after 1989, while in Shan State the production 
and trade in narcotics became a major economic and social factor (Lintner 
1999; Sadan 2016).
16 Peng Jiasheng, for instance, the leader of Kokang and of Sichuanese descent, frequently 
visited Kunming in the years around the mutiny and ceasef ire. ⁠ In several interviews with 
former members of the CPB in China and Thailand, I was frequently told that the CCP was 
probably aware of the mutiny prior to its occurring and gave a tacit consent to Peng Jiasheng to 
overthrow the CPB (see also Lintner 1990; Smith 1991). Further to the south, in what under CPB 
rule was called 815 War Zone, the ceasef ire was brokered by Lin Mingxian. Lin Mingxian was 
born in Panghsai, where the Burma Road crosses the China-Burma border. Still a teenager, in 
1966, he became a Red Guard after the launch of the Cultural Revolution, joined the CPB, and 
quickly rose the ranks within the Party to become the leader of the CPB 815 War Zone in the 
eastern Shan State (Rippa and Saxer 2016).
88 BoRdeRlAnd InFRAsTRuC TuRes 
As has been convincingly argued by Kevin Woods (2011a), the ceasef ire 
years granted transnational actors and capital (in this case, Chinese) access 
to natural resources on an unprecedented scale. The timber and mining 
sectors, in particular, went through an extremely rapid expansion, a develop-
ment that, paired with a lack of regulations, led to dramatic environmental 
and social damage (Global Witness 2005; KDNG 2010; Kramer and Woods 
2011). Furthermore, the combination of military-state making, capital 
accumulation, and securitisation in ceasef ire areas, which Woods calls 
“ceasefire capitalism” (Woods 2011a, 2016), contributed to the consolidation 
of Burmese state power in the resource-rich peripheries of the country. 
Large-scale resource concessions and the taxing of resource f lows and 
trade, in other words, allowed for a new form of contested territorialisation 
in the borderlands, a process that eventually led to the resurrection of the 
conflict between the Burmese military and the KIO/A in 2011 (Sadan 2016).
The situation at the Tengchong borderlands after 1989 reflected much 
of the complexity resulting from the CPB break-up and the consolidation 
of ethnic armies in northern Burma. In the summer of 1989, a group of 
CPB loyalists travelled from the Wa areas facing Panghsang, the former 
CPB headquarters and now in the hands of the United Wa State Army, to 
Tengchong. From there, they made their way to Houqiao and crossed into 
Burma, setting up camp in the village of Kampaiti, where they entered into 
talks with Ting Ying and his newly formed New Democratic Army-Kachin. 
Their plan was to cross Ting Ying’s territory, re-connect with Burmese 
leftists in the urban centres, and continue the CPB armed struggle inside 
the country. In December of the same year, however, Ting Ying – who had 
initially agreed to let CPB troops cross his territory – signed a ceasef ire 
agreement with the Burmese government. As part of the agreement, he 
confiscated all weapons from CPB soldiers, yet offered them to stay in what, 
following the ceasefire, was to be called Special Region 1. This moment was 
to mark the end of the CPB’s armed struggle in northern Burma.17
The ceasef ire allowed Ting Ying to become “a major recipient of agri-
business and logging concessions in territory under his influence” (Woods 
2016: 130). As I shall describe later in this chapter, such concessions, and Ting 
Ying’s personal ties with Tengchong companies, led to massive exploitation 
of Burmese forests in Special Region 1. Furthermore, given his close ties to 
the Burmese government, Ting Ying was also involved in a number of larger 
infrastructural projects that saw the involvements of authorities on both 
17 This story was told to me by a number of CPB veterans now in exile in China. See also Lintner 
(1990, 1999).
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sides of the border. A similar argument could be made for the territories 
under KIO/A administration in the course of the ceasef ire years. As anal-
ysed by Kevin Woods (2011b; 2016), in particular, logging and agribusiness 
concessions to Chinese actors became a principal means for the KIO/A to 
f inance its armed political struggle. Yet, unlike the NDA-K, for which the 
ceasef ire brought further integration with the Burmese state – a process 
culminated in 2009 when the NDA-K became a “border guard force” under 
the Burmese Army – the KIO/A maintained its independence. Eventually, 
in 2011, renewed conflict between the KIA and the Burmese army led to 
an end of the ceasef ire.
Border roads
After over two years of frequent visits to Tengchong, in the summer of 2017, 
I still had many questions surrounding the history of cross-border trade 
in the area, the effects of the fall of the CPB, and the local government’s 
involvement with resource extraction in nearby Kachin State. Through 
conversations with local traders and government off icials, I gained a clear 
picture of what was happening in Tengchong at that particular time, but as 
long as the 1990s and early 2000s were concerned, I could hardly get anything 
more than broad comments about how “open” (kaifang) the border was, 
and how “easy” (rongyi) and unregulated the trade used to be back then. 
Few would go into more details, and my questions fell for the most part 
unanswered. Thus, when I managed to secure an interview with Chairman 
Zhou, my hopes were high.
Chairman Zhou used to be the head of the Tengchong Foreign Affairs 
off ice (waishi ban), until he retired only a few years before we met in 2017. As 
part of his tenure, he had overseen much of the development of cross-border 
trade since the 1990s, and was one of few Chinese off icials who could speak 
fluent Burmese. The meeting was arranged at the Tengchong Translators 
Association, of which Chairman Zhou was a member. The off ices of the 
Association were in a new residential area of Tengchong, a few kilometres 
from the city centre. Chairman Zhou was an affable man in his early sixties. 
Tall, with a broad forehead and thick, black hair, Chairman Zhou spoke in 
short, rapid sentences. He would often interrupt a sentence, as if he were 
thinking something over, and then begin it again right where he had left off. 
As he invited me to enter the Association’s off ice, we naturally got chatting 
about languages. How is it that I ended up learning Chinese, he wondered, 
before we began discussing the differences between Tengchong dialect 
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and standard putonghua. I was invited to sit on a large, black, fake-leather 
corner sofa, while Chairman Zhou busied himself making tea. As in most 
Tengchong off ices, hotels and restaurants, the tea was made on a large 
table carved out of Burmese tropical hardwood, complete with drainage 
and all traditional tea ceremony accoutrements: gaiwan, cups, tea scoop, 
tea tongs, tea needle, tea spatula, and tea sieve. Chairman Zhou grabbed 
a pu’er cake and broke it into bits, placing some of the dry leaves into the 
gaiwan. He gently poured hot water on it, applied the lid, and emptied the 
small bowl into the table’s pull-out. After f illing the gaiwan up a second time, 
Chairman Zhou poured the tea into a glass pot, repeating the operation a 
few times until it was full. From there, he poured it into two large glasses. 
After handing me one of the glasses, he f inally sat down on the sofa and 
asked me what he could help me with. Soon, we were talking about the road.
Roads occupy a very special place in the imaginaries of those who live in 
marginal, under-connected, out-of-the-way places. Not just for what they 
promise – connection, integration, development – but also for the ways 
such promises transform how a particular place is seen. Thus, the mere 
planning of a road might produce an image of disconnection, marginality, or 
remoteness that did not previously exist, and its opening might contribute 
to narratives of “exclusion”, rather than integration (cf. Mostowlanski 2017). 
In most cases, it quickly becomes diff icult to imagine what life was like 
and how it functioned before “the road came” (Rest and Rippa 2019). And 
when they come, roads are seldom alone. During World War Two, allied 
forces laid a pipeline along the Stilwell Road, connecting the oil f ields in 
Assam to Chinese forces in Yunnan. Today, Chinese road builders across 
the Gaoligong Mountains are accompanied by large bundles of f ibre-optic 
cables. Perhaps more importantly, the road is accompanied by trucks and 
cement, blue tin panels for roofs, and plastic tubes for sewage.
In Tengchong, the road in question is the one to the Houqiao border 
crossings and, from there, to Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State. This 
road is generally known in China as the “TengMi road”: short for Tengc-
hong-Myitkyina Road. Chairman Zhou tried to remember the exact date 
it was opened, and his best guess was 1992. “It’s actually diff icult to tell,” 
he elaborated, “we [the Tengchong government] started working on the 
road in 1990 or 1991, but even after that the road was in bad conditions. You 
see, the weather is often bad around here, and the road was washed out 
regularly.” Off icially, motorised traff ic between Tengchong and Myitkyina 
was inaugurated on 10 April 1991 (Che and Zhou 1992: 252) – barely a year and 
a half after the last failed attempt by CPB forces to regroup in Kampaiti, just 
across the Houqiao border – and launch an attack on northern Burma. The 
BRIdgeheAd 91
road changed everything. “Before that,” Chairman Zhou recalled, sipping 
his tea, “the trail to Burma would go along the old Stilwell road,” which, in 
the meantime, had been covered by thick jungle. All that was left was a trail 
for horses and mules. “After 1992,” he continued, “we built a motorable road 
all the way to Myitkyina. It followed the old trail, for the most part, and 
it was very narrow. Right after it opened, we took a big truck with our art 
troupe, and went to Myitkyina to perform. [While on the way] we got stuck 
behind a curve, the truck could not go further, nor back, we were stuck on 
both sides. So, we had to dig up with a hoe, dig in front, in the back, and 
then eventually we managed to get the truck moving.”
The opening of the road to Houqiao and Myitkyina was part of a broader 
process of opening up and geopolitical repositioning of Yunnan, in which 
foreign trade and the province’s historical ties with Southeast Asia played 
a major role.18 As early as 1985, the national government approved the 
establishment of border trade zones and began promoting the opening 
and development of port-of-entries (kou’an) with neighbouring countries. 
The State Council distinguished between two kinds of border crossings: 
f irst-class ports (yilei kou’an), directly authorised and controlled by the 
State Council, and second-class ports (erlei kou’an), which were placed 
under local management (State Council 1985). In the case of Yunnan, only 
f ive f irst-level ports were identif ied: Kunming, Wanding (Burma), Ruili 
(Burma), Hekou (Vietnam), and Mengla (Laos). The provincial government, 
however, following the establishment of the “Yunnan ports off ice (Yunnan 
sheng kou’an bangongshi),” divided all of Yunnan’s ports into three categories: 
national-level ports (guojiaji kou’an), provincial-level ports (shengji kou’an), 
and local-level border people and trade passages (difang bianmin hushi ton-
gdao). The law also stipulated that after the construction and development 
of the local-level trade passages, such border crossings could be upgraded 
to provincial-level ports. Similarly, provincial-level ports could, under the 
right circumstances, also be upgraded (Che and Zhou 1992: 246–7).
Geopolitical considerations played a role in this ongoing process of 
deepening economic relations with neighbouring countries. In the 1990s, 
as Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” prompted an acceleration in economic 
reforms, the collapse of the CPB in 1989 and the normalisation of China’s 
relations with Vietnam in 1991 led to broader opening policies across 
Yunnan’s borderlands. New transport infrastructure and investment in 
18 Tim Summers has documented the processes underpinning the emergence of dominant 
ideas among academics and off icials in Yunnan that the province should be repositioned as a 
bridgehead to Southeast and South Asia in the 1980s and 1990s (Summers 2012, 2013: 53–79).
92 BoRdeRlAnd InFRAsTRuC TuRes 
cross-border trade were soon promised by Yunnan off icials as the latest 
spearhead of development. As Summers summarises:
Ideas of developing regional cooperation, using Yunnan’s geographical 
proximity to and historical links with southeast Asia, and engaging across 
the province’s international borders to promote economic development 
form the basis for many of the subsequent narratives which emanate from 
Yunnan. The main concept which emerges is repositioning the province 
towards regions based around southeast and south Asia. Implicit – and 
sometimes explicit – in this is the idea that Yunnan is no longer to be 
seen as a peripheral southwestern corner of China, but the centre of 
wider links between China and its Asian neighbourhood to the south 
(Summers 2013: 60).
As part of its re-positioning, in August 1991 the Yunnan provincial govern-
ment approved Tengchong as one of twelve provincial-level ports. Given 
its location along the old Stilwell Road, and the fact that it marked the 
shortest – and easiest – route to Myitkyina, Houqiao was chosen as the 
main border crossing in the county and its only provincial-level port. The 
law, however, gave prefecture- and county-level authorities enough freedom 
to open and manage their own local-level passages (tongdao), and thus, 
in Tengchong alone, a number of tongdao were off icially opened in these 
years. In addition to Houqiao, the three main tongdao identif ied by local 
authorities were Diantan, Zizhi, and Danza. With the exception of Houqiao, 
however, the other border crossings existed only on paper as they did not 
feature any of the infrastructure and state paraphernalia typical of off icial 
points of entry and exit. As Chairman Zhou and other Tengchong off icials 
recalled, apart from Houqiao, there was no off icial immigration off ice or 
customs house at any of Tengchong’s other border crossings throughout the 
1990s. Back then, they were not even served by a road.
The case of Tengchong was reflective of the Yunnan government’s goals 
with regard to the implementation of its three-level division of international 
ports. On the one hand, it was expected that local authorities would mobilise 
resources to build and upgrade border facilities along the selected routes. 
In so doing, the provincial government could concentrate its resources on 
a few ambitious projects. In particular, since Yunnan was integrated into 
the centrally designed highway system in 1985, the provincial government 
concentrated its efforts “on a set of six paved, high-quality highways radiating 
out from the central axis of Kunming to three major border crossings (with 
Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam) and three other provincial capitals (Nanning, 
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Chengdu and Guiyang)” (Donaldson 2009: 427). The main route to Burma 
was national road number 320, which connected Kunming to Wanding 
(near Ruili) on the Burma border. The road via Tengchong to Houqiao and 
Myitkyina was considered a branch of this route, and was described as 
“relatively poor” by chronicles of the time (Che and Zhou 1992).
With the road in such conditions cross-border trade in Tengchong was 
slow to pick up, and it was mostly made of small, cheap items of everyday 
use. Light industrial products were sold into Burma, while medicinal herbs, 
animal parts, and opium were brought into China. Small quantities of 
Burmese jade would also make it to Tengchong from the infamous mines in 
Hpakant, but this did not seem to have any relevant impact, at least initially. 
There was one commodity, however, that would soon change the face of the 
China-Burma border: timber. Moreover, this particular commodity would 
re-design the geography of border-crossings in Tengchong County, and with it 
the infrastructural outlook of the Yunnan border region. To follow this story, 
it is necessary to move away from Houqiao and the Tengchong-Myitkyina 
Road. Other border crossings, particularly the two local-level passages at 
Diantan and Zizhi became relevant at this time. Both bordering Ting Ying’s 
forest-rich territory, both fairly remote and isolated, they presented the ideal 
conditions for illicit trade to blossom. The story that follows is one of the 
creation of a particular resource frontier – and with it, a national border.
How timber made the border
In the summer of 1998, China suffered the worst floods in decades. At about 
a thousand kilometres north-east of Tengchong, in Hubei and Hunan prov-
inces, the waters of the Yangtze River were pushed above cautionary levels 
by extreme rainfall, causing signif icant damage as it flowed into towns and 
villages. According to off icial estimates, over 3000 people lost their lives, 
and millions more were affected. Chinese meteorologists ascribed this 
excessive rainfall to the 1997–98 El Niño and subsequent La Niña events, 
while the high level of the Yangtze waters was also caused by the melting of 
the deep snow that had accumulated on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau. According 
to Chinese government off icials, the disaster was also due to rampant 
deforestation, which caused serious soil erosion. This analysis led to one 
of the most signif icant changes in China’s forest resource management. In 
the following two years, the government announced two major policies, 
funded as part of the xibu da kaifa: the Natural Forest Protection Program 
(NFPP, tianranlin baohu gongcheng), establishing a ban on all logging in 
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the upper reaches of the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers; and the Sloping Land 
Conversion Program (SLCP, tuigeng huanlin huancao zhengce), or Grain for 
Green, a program to prevent cultivation on all slopes over 25°.19
In Yunnan, the implementation of the NFPP and the SLCP brought to 
two major consequences for the rural population. As the next chapter will 
discuss, it drastically impacted communities whose livelihoods depended 
on the timber business or on the cultivation of steep land. Secondly, as 
this section elaborates, it radically changed Yunnan’s timber industry. 
In particular, China’s timber shortfall, following the implementation of 
the 1998 ban on logging, was met through imports. Bordering forest-rich 
Burma, Laos, and Vietnam, many border counties and municipalities in 
Yunnan soon became major hubs for the overland imports of tropical and 
sub-tropical timber (Figure 7). In Yunnan alone, between 1997 and 2002, 
imports in timber tripled (Kahrl et al. 2004). Helping this transition, in 1999, 
China reduced tariffs on roundwood and sawnwood imports to zero, and 
tariffs on plywood and veneer imports from 20 and 12-30 per cent to 15 and 
5–8 per cent, respectively (Kahrl et al. 2004, 2005: 3).
The year 1998 was a turning point for Tengchong’s timber industry. 
While the border had witnessed a growing timber industry since the late 
1980s, and in particular since the road to Houqiao was opened in 1991, the 
19 On the environmental impact of the NFPP and SLCP, see Weyerhaeuser et al. (2005).
Figure 7: Burmese timber at the China-Burma (picture by the author, 2015)
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intensity of logging and the number of Chinese companies active across the 
Burma border boomed after 1998 (Kahrl et al. 2005). Changes in Tengchong’s 
border towns of Houqiao, Diantan, and Zizhi, all major timber routes, were 
sudden and overwhelming. Kahrl et al. (2005) estimates that, following 
the boom in timber imports, in 2003, Diantan’s f ixed population of 20,000 
was amplif ied by a 40,000-strong floating population of seasonal migrant 
workers.20 Similar number were estimated for Houqiao. The same study 
claims that, in Tengchong, “50 percent of the county’s population has, at 
some point, participated in the timber business.” Unlike other contexts, 
moreover, “a signif icant portion of these are businesspeople rather than 
manual laborers” (Kahrl et al. 2005: 7).
Even today, in Tengchong, the early days of the timber trade are remem-
bered somewhat fondly. Places such as Diantan and Zizhi, until that point 
little more than remote, sleepy outposts, suddenly became very busy (mang) 
and lively (renao). Mr Zhang, a Tengchong official posted to Diantan between 
2000 and 2005 to oversee the trade in timber, described it as follows: “There 
were a lot of people there. Many would go out of the country to gamble. 
There is a big casino in Banwa [just across from Diantan]. We used to say 
that if a Chinese person wants to go to Burma, all he has to say is that he 
wants to play at the casino, and the Burmese border guards would let him 
through. There used to be so many people, so many.” Chairman Zhou also 
recalled these days very well:
For about ten years the border areas were very lively (renao), big trucks 
carrying timber, in Diantan, Houqiao, it was all very lively. It’s basically 
gone now. The liveliest times used to be the years of the timber trade. 
The timber industry drove many other industries and things [to these 
places], restaurants, services of all kinds. There used to be a lot of people 
working around the timber businesses. In Burma, the logging camps were 
like small towns, with a market and businesses, you would have hotels, 
massage places, restaurants, even KTVs.
With all these people and businesses rushing to the border to cash in on the 
timber boom, the turn of the millennium in Houqiao, Diantan, and Zizhi, 
also saw major infrastructural developments. After all, trucks full of timber 
require better and larger roads. The road to Houqiao, f irst built in 1992, was 
upgraded in 1997–98. Besides being the most convenient route between 
20 The timber trade season is generally between November and April and many seasonal 
workers used to leave the borderlands in the summer and only return again in the autumn.
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Tengchong and Myitkyina, the Houqiao Road was the main recipient of 
government spending in this phase due to the peculiar situation on the 
Burmese side of the border. While most of the territory bordering Tengchong 
county was in the hands of either the KIO/A or the NDA-K, the Houqiao/
Kampaiti border crossing, as well as the road to Myitkyina, was controlled 
by the Burmese government. It was no surprise, then, that Houqiao would be 
the f irst – and, to date, the only –Tengchong border crossing to be approved 
as a national-level border crossing (guojia yilei kou’an) by the State Council 
in 2000.
The situation was different for the Diantan and Zizhi border crossings, 
which, until the timber boom, were not served by any motorable road. To 
understand the development of these places, I spent a morning with Mr 
Zhang, the off icial formerly responsible for the Diantan customs station, 
and Mr Li, the current (2017) head of the Tengchong branch of the China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade (Zhongguo guoji maoyi 
cujin weiyuanhui). Mr Zhang recalled this part of history:
There had been timber coming in from Diantan since the 80s, early 90s. 
But later, it was not the government that paid for the road [to Diantan]. 
Because Diantan borders [the territory of] Ting Ying [of the NDA-K]. It was 
the timber businessmen (mucai shangren), they needed transportation 
(yunshu), and they built the road because of transportation [issues]. 
Houqiao is different, there it was the government that opened that trading 
passage (ba zhege maoyi tongdao dakai).
Mr Li chimed in, offering more details on the reasoning behind the govern-
ment’s decision to invest in Houqiao.
It’s like this, across the Zizhi port of entry it’s all mountains, with very 
little villages. Diantan is the same, not many villages [on the Burmese 
side]. These two passages (tongdao) were at that time built by the timber 
companies. Only after [the road to Diantan and Zizhi] were built by 
timber businessmen the army was sent to be stationed there and [the 
government] recognised them as off icial border crossings. But the regular 
one (zhenggui), the national level border crossing which is recognised and 
agreed upon by the Burmese government is Houqiao, that’s the regular 
border crossing.
As for the management of the various border crossings, Mr Li told me 
that, given Ting Ying’s close ties with the Burmese government, and in 
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particular following the recent (2010) inclusion of his NDA-K as a Border 
Guard Force under the supervision of the Burmese army, the border 
crossings of Diantan and Zizhi are essentially under government control. 
“They are all together, Ting Ying, the Burmese government, it’s the same 
(shi yijia).”
As these conversations clearly elucidate, while the road to Houqiao was 
the result of government spending, the roads to Diantan and Zizhi were 
the result of private initiatives. Timber traders, eager to log Ting Ying’s 
concessions and to avoid any possible issue and extra fees with either the 
Burmese army or the KIO/A at Houqiao/Kampaiti, took matters into their 
own hands. The Chinese government, however, was quick to respond to 
the private construction of these roads, establishing border facilities in 
both Diantan and Zizhi. New customs houses and border gates were built 
at all three border crossings. Chinese off icials were sent to the border, 
associations of timber businessmen were formed. As has been documented, 
everybody had a stake in the business.21 Large Chinese companies bought 
logging permits in Burma and import permits in China. Smaller companies 
purchased such permits from larger companies.22 Authorities, on both sides, 
would turn a blind eye after securing their bribe. Contracts were signed 
between the Chinese government and the NDA-K as well as the KIO/A. 
Off icers from the Tengchong foreign affairs off ice, such as Chairman Zhou, 
21 For a supply chain analysis of Burmese timber imports into Yunnan, see Dong and He 
(2018). Particularly relevant to the argument that I develop in the f irst part of this book is their 
discussion of middlemen and the role of historical ties in the context of cross-border timber 
trade: “Different to the trade that emerged from other regions such as Africa and the Amazon 
Basin [….] the Sino-Burmese timber trade is based on a traditional border trade and it boomed 
following the change in Chinese policy and economic growth in the country. As also found 
with the cross-border trade of forest products elsewhere […] the global value chain of the 
Sino-Burmese timber trade is typically inf luenced by historical, economic and social factors 
more so than political, institutional and international trade factors. As a result, the middlemen 
who have a particularly good understanding of both countries’ cultures play a key facilitator 
role in the trade. These actors have also established strong social networks with both Chinese 
businessman and Burmese government authorities that have enabled their access to the value 
chain” (18).
22 In 2006, Yunnan authorities published the “Notif ication of Interim Measures on Using 
and Managing Burmese Timber and Minerals of Yunnan Province.” According to this system, 
negotiated with Burmese authorities, Chinese companies need to gain authorization for and 
record all imports of timber in cooperation with the Burmese central government. To this end, 
border counties in China (such as Tengchong) are entitled to give permits every year to only f ive 
companies to conduct such business. In particular, these companies must apply for a “Timber 
Export Licence” from the Forestry Department of the Burma government and provide trade 
contracts with Burmese companies. In practice, however, such contracts were renegotiated 
and sold to smaller companies.
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were often dispatched to Myitkyina to oversee the smooth operation of the 
business. Problems were frequent. Logging concessions were often sold to 
two or more companies – the NDA-K would do this regularly, the KIO/A less 
so – and conflict would invariably arise. Should any such problems involve 
Chinese companies or Chinese loggers, off icials like Zhou would take care 
of them. At that time, some Tengchong Chinese Communist Party off icers 
were permanently stationed in Myitkyina, where the county administration 
maintains an off ice for liaison with both the Burmese government and the 
KIO/A. The Burmese government, which off icially banned the overland 
export of timber, was complicit. Even in places such as Houqiao/Kampaiti, 
where the Burmese army was in control, timber went one way, money the 
other. Even after 2006, when China and Burma signed a bilateral agreement 
to strictly regulate exports over their shared land border, the trade declined 
in volume for a few years, only to pick up again in 2009 and reach record 
levels in 2013 (Woods 2013).23
Other infrastructures followed. In order to regulate the exit and entry of 
loggers and businessmen, in 1999 China introduced the China-Burma border 
area exit and entry pass (Zhong mian bianjing diqu chu rujin tongxingzheng) 
– generally referred to simply as the border pass. Like in Xinjiang, the border 
pass is envisioned for border residents, namely those living within 20km 
of the border line. In fact, it did not take long for outsiders involved in the 
logging business to obtain border passes in Tengchong – whether they were 
from Yunnan, Sichuan, or Fujian, provenance mattered little. In fact, as Mr 
Li candidly admitted to me, border crossings were hardly controlled at all 
until at least 2004. All Chinese loggers had to do was sign an exit document 
at the border post, and they would generally be let into Burma unhindered. 
As he put it: “they like that we Chinese go to Burma and spend money. We 
have money, they welcome us.” Since 2004, on the other hand, the border 
pass has become necessary in order to cross into and out of China. Yet, 
the pass, which is also available for Burmese border residents, was easily 
purchased by migrant workers and traders alike.
On at least some level, then, the opening of roads to Tengchong’s three 
off icial border crossings led to the enforcement of certain rules over others. 
While, until very recently, timber was regularly imported despite Burma’s 
overland export ban, Chinese authorities cracked down on other goods, 
23 The bilateral agreement, “Interim measures to manage timber and mineral cooperation 
between Myanmar and Yunnan Province,” was issued by the Off ice of Yunnan Provincial 
People’s Government on 11 May 2006 (Policy reference number: Policy Off ice, Yunnan [2006] 
91). See also Xinhua (2006).
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most notably narcotics. As mentioned, opium was a rather common trading 
item in the 1980s and 1990s. With the boom in timber trade, there seems 
to have been a surge in opium imports from Burma. As Mr Li recalled, 
“many people in the timber industry used to smoke opium, the loggers, 
the big bosses.” Mr Zhang told me that in Diantan, at the time he was 
stationed there in the 90s, there was a small room just by the border gate, 
on the Chinese side, where people would go and smoke. Then, at around 
the turn of the millennium, local off icials began enforcing stricter controls 
on opium imports and consumption, under pressure from the prefectural 
and provincial government. Today, while it is diff icult to gauge the extent to 
which the trade in narcotics still plays a role in the Tengchong area, opium 
use has all but been eliminated on the Chinese side of the border.
Timber has made the border in Tengchong county what it is today. As 
Chairman Zhou summarised, “if you look at the Tengchong borderlands, in 
terms of volume, the timber trade is certainly the most important one. The 
f irst reason is that there is abundance of timber in Burma, and demand of 
timber in China. The other reason is that since the 90s China has restricted 
the exploitation of our local timber.” With the wealth brought by Burmese 
timber, roads were built, people moved in, locals leased their land, and houses 
and sawmills popped up in the most unexpected of places. While the rhythm 
of booms and busts has left many ruins behind, the material, highly visible 
presence of the state in this once remote, inaccessible periphery, remains a 
legacy of the glorious days of the timber trade. At the time of our first meeting 
in Tengchong, Chairman Zhou kept a sign of this legacy in the backyard 
of the off ice of the Tengchong Translators Association. Placed in a dusty 
corner, behind his car and a few old planks, he showed me a border marker. 
Similar stone markers, across the Chinese borderlands, have become sites 
of frequent visits by Chinese tourists eager to take a photo at the edge of the 
nation – and to step, if only for a few metres, into foreign territory. While 
I had seen many such scenes over my years of research, the appearance of 
a border marker in the backyard of the Tengchong Translators Association 
still caught me by surprise. Chairman Zhou, laughing, felt compelled to 
explain. With the spate of investment that reached the border areas in the 
early 2000s, he told me, the local government decided to replace all the 
old border stones with new ones. The one Chairman Zhou showed me had 
been placed in 1960, soon after the China-Burma boundary line was settled 
upon. As he was leading the mission to replace the markers in Tengchong 
county, Chairman Zhou took one of them home with him – a defining piece 
of his nation. As he showed it to me, however, his thoughts turned back to 
the timber. The timber that made the border. “It used to be,” he pauses, in 
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the manner that I had become accustomed to, “It used to be our forests, in 
China, that were bad, and the forests were nice in Burma. But now, we have 
good forests, Burma doesn’t have any left.”
Material bordering
If the boom in timber affected Houqiao, Diantan, and Zizhi in similar 
ways, its recent and sharp decline is contributing to drawing a different 
geography of cross-border exchanges in the county (this will be discussed 
further in Chapter 6). Both the boom and the bust, however, focus atten-
tion on the relationship between the materiality of a particular entity and 
the production of a specif ic regime of bordering. What I am interested in 
here is the when, how, and why of a particular border regime. The trade in 
timber has played a fundamental role in the material constitution of border 
infrastructures in Tengchong county in the 1990s and 2000s. These, in turn, 
came to def ine the border itself – both in terms of its material appearance 
but also in the practices of crossing it. While the boundary line remained the 
same, practices of bordering were radically changed in Tengchong county 
by one particular commodity – timber – and would later be re-defined by 
the decline of this particular trade.
As I pointed out in the f irst chapter, social scientists have consistently 
shown that borders – “that most paradoxical of human creations” (Gellner 
2013: 2) – should not be taken for granted. Rather, borders should be ana-
lysed as social, cultural, and historical processes and as contested spaces 
of negotiation and imagination. If borders were to be represented as lines 
they should probably be regarded as “lines of becoming” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987; Ingold 2007). Recent contributions to this body of literature 
increasingly look at the material components of such processes of bordering. 
For instance, passports (Burrell 2008), border gates, and checkpoints (Ngo 
and Hung 2019) have become objects of scholarly exploration. My interest 
here, though, is slightly different. The argument I wish to make is that 
the very materiality of timber, its volume, weight, and the infrastructural 
bases that it requires (roads, trucks, oil, etc.) have real consequences for 
specif ic political processes. In other words, the infrastructures that define 
Tengchong’s border crossings today are a direct consequence of the trade 
in timber – and of its particular material components. As this chapter 
has shown, while the China-Burma border line has not moved since it 
was established in 1960, the legal status and management of the border in 
Tengchong, as well as the practices of crossing it, have radically changed. 
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Access to the border was dictated, in particular, by the construction of 
roads whose principal aim was to support and foster the growing trade in 
timber products. What followed – border gates, army posts, customs houses, 
border passes, and so on – is a typical expression of certain practices of state 
territorialisation that are informed by pre-existing geographies. B/ordering 
practices, in Tengchong, are as much the result of government initiative, as 
that of private ventures.
To be sure, the turn of the millennium saw a number of road projects all 
across China’s borderlands. By 1990, benefitting from the central government 
funds as part of Yunnan’s integration into the highway system plan, Yunnan 
was able to boost its road network to 56,536 km – a 28 per cent increase 
since the beginning of the reform period (Che and Zhou 1992). By 1996, the 
road network had extended to over 70,000 km (Donaldson 2011: 70), and 
by the turn of the millennium it had surpassed the 100,000 km mark (Niu 
2001). The xibu da kaifa further fuelled road development across China’s 
western region, Yunnan included, particularly through the construction of 
a national trunk highway system. Yunnan’s annual investments in roads, as 
part of the xibu da kaifa, went from 10.1 billion RMB in 2000 to 26.2 billion 
in 2005: more than f ifteen times the total investment in roads from 1950 to 
1985. By 2008, “the total length of highways was 203,753 km, double that in 
1999” (Summers 2013: 132).
Nevertheless, while the xibu da kaifa provided the ideological and 
f inancial means for fast-paced road development in Tengchong, it does 
not account for the reason certain routes were chosen over others, and the 
particular timing of their construction. The Yunnan-Burma borderlands 
provide countless examples of border roads that were developed only at a 
later stage, in the late 2000s or 2010s. Yet, the roads to Houqiao, Diantan, and 
Zizhi, as well as similar road projects to the timber-rich regions of Burma 
built further south, in Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Prefecture, or 
north, in Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture, were built concurrently 
with the development of the timber industry. Tengchong is a particular 
case in point, as the roads to Diantan and Zizhi were not, at least initially, 
built with public money, but were entirely the result of private initiatives.
What is interesting here is how illicit practices, i.e. the trade in timber, 
inform processes of state territorialisation. Or, to put it differently, how the 
making of a resource-extraction frontier coincided with the making of a 
modern border. Kevin Woods, in his excellent work on resource extraction 
and state territorialisation in northern Burma, argues with regard to the 
timber trade that the “merging of Chinese national and provincial policy 
with private business interests provided a crucial state-sponsored incentive 
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for the logging boom, while at the same time, like many resource-extraction 
frontiers in the world, created a space of scant government regulation” 
(2011b: 487). Woods uses the case of the border town of Pianma, in the 
Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture, which, in 1991, was designed as a 
Special Economic Zone and a “provincial level open port,” paving the way for 
massive timber imports. Scant government regulations are, however, only 
part of the story. As I have shown in this chapter, the construction of roads 
and border facilities along Yunnan’s border with Burma also created the 
possibility for a particular kind of state territorialisation through timber-led 
infrastructures. Furthermore, as I will argue in the third part of this book, 
while such infrastructure initially facilitated the exploitation of Burmese 
forests, they most recently contributed to bringing the timber trade to an end.
Conclusion
In 1992, as Chairman Zhou was travelling to Myitkyina on a truck for the first 
time after the completion of the road through Houqiao, a group of Chinese 
researchers published a book on Yunnan’s international linkages. Edited by 
Che Zhimin, a Yunnan native, the book made a case for Yunnan’s need to 
take advantage of its historical familiarity, geographical advantages, and 
cultural ties with nearby countries and develop a state-of-the-art network 
of cross-border infrastructure in order to increase economic relations and 
development (Che and Zhou 1992). At the time of writing, on the other 
hand, the authors argued that Yunnan has become a “dead end” in dire 
need of investment in cross-border transport infrastructure. Many such 
publications have appeared since, in which scholars and off icials repeatedly 
stress the need for Yunnan to take advantage of its location and historical 
origins, often pointing to the presence in the province of many minzu with 
close ties to similar groups in Southeast Asia.24 And yet, as this chapter has 
explicated, the story of the timber trade that has developed in the years 
following the publication of Che Zhimin’s volume, together with an expan-
sion of cross-border infrastructure, is one in which the main protagonists 
and beneficiaries are Han Chinese. Inhabiting a different kind of “locality” 
from that described in the case of the KKH and Karim, Tengchong trading 
families, make use of a different kind of “proximal capital” in their business 
practices.
24 For an overview and an analysis of Che Zhimin’s volume in the context of Yunnan’s re-
positioning as a bridgehead over the past three decades, see Summers 2012.
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The state, in particular, emerges as a fundamental player in the processes 
of proximity, but not merely in the sense that traders need the state’s support, 
or protection, for the success of their businesses. While state off icials like 
Chairman Zhou or Mr Zhang have been crucial for the exploitation of 
Burmese forests by Chinese logging companies through securing permits, 
distributing licences, and taking care of conf licts among the various 
stakeholders, the trade itself has been fundamental to the creation of a 
particular border regime. In other words, the illegality of the timber trade 
did not succeed “in spite” of the state, or by keeping the state out. Rather, it 
brought the state in – through transport infrastructure – and took advantage 
of its regulatory power.
Today, the quest for frictionless corridors is more alive than ever. More 
than a century since the original British plans, Tengchong is still waiting for 
its railway. This time, however, China’s infrastructural hubris is leaving little 
doubt that this task will soon be accomplished. The projected Kunming-Ruili 
railway has already reached Baoshan. From there, plans have been sketched 
out for the construction of the line’s extension towards Tengchong. Officials 
in the city told me in 2017 that they were hopeful of securing funding by 
2020. This, however, would only be one piece of a much larger plan for 
the development of the area. As Chapter 6 will show, such plans include 
a brand-new border trade zone in Houqiao, an international airport, and 
much-upgraded roads and border facilities. What I have shown in this 
chapter is that this story, from British imperial formulas to Belt and Road 
fantasies, has not followed a f ixed developmental trajectory. Rather, by 
focusing on the post-ceasefire and post-opening up years, I have pointed out 
how Tengchong authorities have connived with local businesses to transform 
China’s national boundaries into a resource frontier. This transformation, 
in turn, became a def initive moment in the current border infrastructure, 
upon which Belt and Road projects are based. While in this chapter I have 
focused on the materiality of border infrastructure, in Chapter 6 I return 
to the case of Tengchong – and, in particular, the new Houqiao border 
crossing – to discuss the issue of illicitness more specif ically. In so doing, I 
will also detail what has happened in Tengchong since the mid-2010s, when 
the timber trade came to a close.
The history of how the roads to Diantan and Zizhi came to be built is 
absent from the current push for transnational connections within which 
Tengchong authorities envision the future prosperity of the city. As in the 
case of the KKH described in the previous chapter, the current develop-
ment of cross-border infrastructure in Tengchong implies a particular 
form of erasure. Pre-existing forms of connectivity, or what I have defined 
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through the notion of proximity, which in this case produced the particular 
geography of border-crossings in the county, are not accounted for by the 
current proponents of Belt and Road corridors. More generally, erasure is 
a fundamental process underpinning the ideology of development along 
the Chinese borderlands. The next section expands upon this discussion 
by engaging with a theme that has so far remained conspicuously absent 
from my analysis: the role of ethnic minorities in the phase of borderland 
development that this book addresses. In the third section, I will eventually 
return to the issue of connectivity that I have thus far sought to highlight. 
The last chapter, in particular, brings us back to Tengchong to show how 
the end of the trade in timber in the mid-2010s and the promotion of the 
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor through Houqiao 
led to new forms of marginalisation.
 Coda
In the early summer of 2009, after a few months of study and research 
in Urumqi, I took the long train journey to Kashgar for the second time 
that year. This time, my planned itinerary included a brief visit to the 
Pamir mountains around Tashkurgan, followed by a longer journey to 
Qinghai through southern Xinjiang. Little did I know, at the time, that 
the Karakoram Highway that I was travelling along for the f irst time, and 
the China-Pakistan border to which I made a short visit together with 
another group of tourists, would become the focal object of my doctoral 
work within a few years. The f irst part of the trip went rather smoothly. 
I spent a few nights camping and trekking around Karakul Lake, before 
continuing on my journey to Tashkurgan. The two checkpoints along 
the way represented minimal hassle: by early 2009 foreigners were not 
required to have any special permit to visit the region, so the checkpoints 
were little more than a chance to take a little stroll and acclimatise to 
the altitude. At the Khunjerab Pass, on the other hand, I was seen taking 
pictures of army facilities in proximity to the border, which I was later 
forced to delete. Even this little incident, however, did not make any 
lasting impression on me. On the contrary, the scenery along the drive 
up to the Pass at more than 4600 metres, would remain with me for much 
longer. Upon my return to Kashgar, I spent a couple of days resting, in 
preparation for what I was expecting to be a ten-day long trip to Xining, 
Qinghai province, through Khotan (Hetian), Charkliq (Ruoqiang), and 
Golmud. Then on the evening of 5 July, as I was walking to Kashgar’s bus 
station to take a night bus to Khotan, a friend I was particularly close 
with called from Urumqi.
“They are shooting people, killing people,” a scared voice cried as I 
picked up the phone. “There was a demonstration today, then the police 
began to kill Uyghurs.” What followed, over that f irst, frightening night 
and the next few days, is widely known. According to the off icial version, 
violent Uyghur mobs, angered by the news that Chinese authorities had 
failed to address the case of two Uyghur factory workers killed in an 
ethnic brawl in a Guangdong factory, took to the street and attacked 
Han people, resulting in 197 deaths. Yet, what my friend was telling me 
over the phone, and as has been consequently been reported by several 
international news outlets, was that the demonstration was peaceful, 
and that it was the police who started to beat and then shoot Uyghurs. 
In one video that was circulated online soon after, I could see a person 
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being shot near the intersection of Jiefang South road and Longquan 
Street, where I had lived for the previous four months. Had I still been in 
Urumqi, I would have seen that from my living room window.
While on the bus to Khotan that night, I did not get much sleep. I caught 
a few of my fellow passengers, virtually all of them Uyghurs,1 talking on 
the phone, clearly alarmed. Nobody, however, seemed to be in the mood 
to talk about what was at the moment unfolding in Xinjiang’s capital. We 
arrived in Khotan at dusk, to f ind the bus station surrounded by heavily 
armed police vehicles. As I made my way to my intended hotel, both police 
and army vehicles were making the rounds of the empty street. I tried to 
ring a friend in Urumqi, but his phone was off. After a quick breakfast, 
I headed for Khotan’s main bazaar, eager to f ind out more about what 
was happening. More police cars were patrolling the street. At the main 
bazaar, I only saw few people at what would have otherwise been a rather 
busy time. Still, some of the shops were open. At one point, a police car 
stopped about a dozen metres ahead of me. Four heavily armed off icers 
exited the vehicle and approached a group of f ive or six Uyghur men who 
were chatting on the sidewalk. A brief discussion ensued, which I could not 
hear a word of. Then, suddenly, more policemen came from another vehicle 
parked nearby, and all the Uyghur men were taken into custody. Over the 
next few days, I would witness dozens of arrests, carried out in a similar 
fashion, for what to me seemed to be with no reason. I decided to walk 
to Tuanjie Square, a large space dominated by a statue of Chairman Mao 
shaking his hands with an old Uyghur man – Uncle Kurban, a recurrent 
propaganda trope on ethnic unity in Xinjiang.2 Yet, on that particular 
day, both the socialist grandeur of Tuanjie Square, and the prominence 
of the statue contained within it, were overshadowed by an impressive 
parade of nearly two dozen military tanks slowly moving along Beijing 
Road. People were rushing from the street in various directions, and I 
decided to head back to the hotel as well.
Over the next days, after considering the idea of a return to Urumqi, 
I decided to stick to my original plan, following the southern edge of the 
Taklamakan desert, and make my way into Qinghai. During the afternoon 
of 6 July, the internet service within Xinjiang was cut off. International 
calls were restricted, though it was still possible to call within China. 
As the picture of what was happening in Urumqi became clearer, more 
1 On how the politics of mobility in Xinjiang are def ined by ethnicity, see Joniak-Lüthi (2015).
2 On the story of Mao and Uncle Kurban, and how it came to be representative of the PRC 
ethnic policy in Xinjiang, see Chen (2016).
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and more armed police vehicles were patrolling the streets of every city, 
town, and small village I passed through. It took me twice as long as I 
had planned to get out of Xinjiang. Regular armed checkpoints made 
every bus trip slow and painful. My bags and I, along with those of my 
fellow travellers, were thoroughly checked several times every day. All 
the places where I had planned visits to archaeological sites or museums 
were closed. Private traff ic, it seemed, had completely stopped. Streets 
and restaurants were largely empty, and a surreal quietness reigned over 
the small towns I was passing through. During my last visit to Xinjiang in 
2017, almost ten years after this f irst trip, the pervasiveness of checkpoints 
had once again become a fact of life for millions of Uyghurs. Then, as now, 
Han Chinese were largely unaffected by the security measures put in 
place to, allegedly, “protect” them. Uyghurs, on the other hand, were and 
are stopped, their bags and phones checked, and their houses searched.
Connections in Xinjiang are a fragile matter.
Connections are dictated as much by the quality of infrastructure as they 
are by ethnicity and the security concerns of the day. While the second and 
third part of this book will deal with each of these aspects, respectively, 
my experience following the violence that unfolded in Urumqi in 2009 
shows how tenuous and unstable promises of connectivity can be. Internet 
in Xinjiang was restricted for almost a year following the violence. Many 
checkpoints established in July 2009 became permanent. New restrictions 
on the mobility of Uyghurs were introduced, making it harder for people to 
obtain a passport, or even to travel within the region.




Figure 8: A new Village in the dulong Valley (picture by the author, 2016)

3 Dependency
“When drinking water, do not forget who dug the well. 
Be forever grateful to the Party”
— Poster in the Dulong Valley.
“The idea of solving the problems of the countryside by replacing village housing 
with model villages had been promoted by a new generation of sociologists, 
educators, medical experts, and architects”
— Timothy Mitchell (2002: 188), 
writing about Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s.
I f irst visited Tengchong in the summer of 2015, at the beginning of my 
postdoctoral f ieldwork in Yunnan. As part of the same trip, I was looking for 
another field site that might offer a counterexample to those of Tengchong and 
Kashgar, with their historically established cross-border ties and ambitious 
plans for future development. I was looking for a remote periphery, a border 
area where echoes of Belt and Road fantasies had not yet materialised. From 
Tengchong, I thus travelled north, into the Nujiang Valley. My first stop was 
Liuku, the seat of the Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture. Squeezed in on 
two sides by steep mountains, Liuku is situated along the Nu (or Salween) River 
around small clusters of strikingly tall buildings. To the south, a new part of the 
city had just been built – its ten-storey apartment blocks were still standing 
largely empty. The bus station had just been moved there, and the new town 
was expected to attract people from the nearby villages and valleys. The new 
highway, one that would eventually connect Liuku to the Baoshan-Tengchong 
Highway, was under construction, and expected to open in a few years.
In Liuku, I inquired about my intended destination: the Dulong Valley. 
Some ten hours away by car to the north of Liuku across the Gaoligong 
Mountains, the Dulong Valley had only recently been connected by an 
all-weather road to Gongshan, seat of the Gongshan Dulong and Nu Auton-
omous County. The old road, inaugurated only in 1999, was opened solely 
during the summer months, when waterfalls would still make the journey 
treacherous. Until the completion of a tunnel in 2015, at around the time 
of my f irst visit, traff ic in and out of the valley was blocked during the 
winter. To the other side of the tunnel, until then cut off from the rest of 
China during the winter months, the majority of the people living in the 
Dulong Valley are Drung, or Dulong, one of China’s smallest ethnic minority 
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groups (shaoshu minzu). In Liuku, many locals reinforced a particular view 
of remoteness connected to the Dulong Valley and its people. It is far (yuan), 
people pointed out, and the road is not safe (bu anquan). While none of the 
people I talked to had ever been to the valley, most would say that they 
had heard of its beauty (meili), but that the Drung were still very backward 
(luohou). Many suggested I go to Binzhongluo instead, a Tibetan settlement 
north of Gongshan were tourism has boomed in recent years.
Such answers were not surprising – if anything, they were echoing 
mainstream narratives of the Dulong Valley and the Drung produced both 
inside and outside of China, generally lingering around images of marginality 
and untouched beauty. As Ralph Litzinger noted, “remoteness” (pianpi) 
encompasses two particular meanings in the Chinese imagination: on the 
one hand, it denotes a degree of geographical distance, but also mystical 
beauty. On the other hand, the remote is stigmatised as a “site of lack, of 
uncivilized vulgarity, a land of economic and social malaise” (in Schein 2000: 
5). A 2016 New York Times report seems to echo such double signif icance, 
describing the Dulong Valley as “one of the most remote and pristine in 
China” with its “rain-soaked forests above a river the color of jade” (Wong 
2016). In the report, Chinese interventions bring modernity, but also new 
forms of exclusion. 4G internet, hydropower stations, tourism: these are 
the indicators of the rapid changes that the Dulong Valley and its people 
have only recently undergone after the new road and tunnel to Gongshan 
and the Nujiang Valley were completed. Before that, the article points out, 
the Drung were largely “cut off” from nearby valleys by the high peaks of 
the Gaoligong mountains.1
To an extent, my own interest in the valley was connected to this par-
ticular image. While my training as an anthropologist made me sceptical 
of any claim of the valley hosting an “original” and “untouched” form of 
culture, I was indeed looking for some degree of remoteness – or, at least, 
disconnectedness – that I had not encountered in previous research settings 
across China. Over three long-term visits to the Dulong Valley, between 2015 
and 2017, this view would change. The Dulong Valley is, by many standards, 
still a faraway place. If one were to travel overland from Kunming, the 
provincial capital, it would take three days to arrive in Dulong. The nearest 
airport, in Baoshan, is a couple of days away. Should a landslide block the 
narrow road connecting the valley to Gongshan, Dulong would be cut off 
1 For another recent example, see Aviram (2017), particularly the following quote: “As a 
traveler, visiting remote villages, and meeting people who have received little influence from 
our modern world is a mesmerizing experience.”
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once again. And yet, through state-led development projects and govern-
ment subsidies, the Drung of the Dulong Valley are intimately involved 
with larger processes of nation building. The valley itself, its f ields, forests, 
non-human population, and villages, have been radically changed by the 
impact of national policies.2
This chapter addresses this particular tension, between remoteness 
and modernity, in the Dulong Valley. It does so by tracing the history of 
the valley’s integration into the People’s Republic of China and analysing 
the impact of a recent state-led programme, “Building a New Socialist 
Countryside”, following which all inhabitants of the valley have been 
moved into newly built houses in larger settlements. In particular, I show 
how such intervention has generated increased dependency among the 
Drung on the Chinese state, while re-designing the valley as a showcase 
for ethnic unity and rural development. The Drung, in particular, have 
been mobilised to produce a particular narrative of national identity based 
on loyalty to the Communist Party, which is perceived and performs as 
a giving entity. To understand the premise of such programme and its 
implicit outcome, in this part of the book I develop the notion of curation. 
I argue that the state, by def ining the Drung as primitive and the Dulong 
Valley as a wasteland, sees a particular form of development as a “healing” 
process through which ethnic minorities and the space they inhabit can be 
lifted out of poverty and into modernity. The same notion will be used in 
the following chapter to return to Xinjiang, and to describe the renewal of 
Kashgar’s old town. Thus, unlike Part One, in which I analysed the impact 
of state-led development on local forms of trade, Part Two attends to the 
particular place assigned to ethnic minorities within larger processes of 
modernisation in the borderlands. In so doing, I show how development 
policies are embedded into particular ideological views of what ethnic 
minorities should be, and thus underpin particular programmes of “social 
engineering.” The ideological component of such projects is what the notion 
of curation attempts to capture.
A birthday party
22 October 2016. My f ingers were sticky with the fat of the barbecued 
porkchop I had just eaten. A number of chewed bones f illed a plastic cup 
2 Anthropologist Stéphane Gros has written extensively about these various issues. See, in 
particular, Gros (2010, 2014, 2017).
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on the table. On the floor, sunflower seed shells piled up between the legs 
of the f ive of us, sitting around the small table on plastic stools. I couldn’t 
remember how many rounds of cards we had already played. But I was 
winning – for a change. I counted the banknotes, arranged in an orderly 
fashion on the edge of the table in front of me. There had to be almost 
two hundred RMB. Axiang was visibly drunk, yet she kept f illing up beer 
glasses and insisted I down one more. I tried to resist, then inevitably gave 
in. The warm Lancang beer was getting worse with every sip. Another 
round, then I’m out, I told myself as I was handed a new stack of cards. 
Fortunately, one of the players stood up to go to the toilet. It was as good 
an excuse as any, so I decided to follow him outside, where a few kids were 
playing around the small barbecue, teasing Jiang Yi, the improvised cook. 
The occasion was the third birthday of one of Axiang’s nieces. Axiang, 
with whose family I had been staying for the previous month, had asked 
me if I wanted to join the party the previous night. We drove to the village 
of Bapo, where the party was taking place before lunch, yet when night 
fell, we were still busy playing cards and eating. It would be quite a while 
before we could return to Qinlangdang village, some 20km down the road. 
I found a quiet spot just outside the house, on the side that looked towards 
the Dulong River – invisible in the darkness but a vivid presence due to 
the noise of its restless waters. I sat on a little concrete wall between two 
houses, beside a tiny vegetable garden, jotting down some notes about the 
conversations I had been part of. Despite the occasional light bulb, the new 
villages were still rather dark at night, and I made use of the light coming 
from the house to write. From where I sat, I could look inside one of the 
rooms of the house. Kids were playing, joyously unattended. The walls of the 
room were covered with colourful posters. One depicted the “ten supreme 
generals (shi da yuanshuai)”3 riding horses, complete with small captions 
listing their names, and places and dates of birth and death. Patriotic posters, 
most often depicting Mao Zedong or Xi Jinping, were a ubiquitous object 
of decoration in Drung houses, yet that was the f irst time I noticed one 
with the ten supreme generals. I spent some time looking at it, trying to 
read the names and the dates. Beside it, in sharp contrast, another poster 
represented two small babies wearing an odd, f luffy blue costume. On top 
of it, four capital letters: BABY. The posters were placed behind a new TV 
screen, aptly placed on a blue cabinet adorned with small red hearts. On 
3 The rank of da yuan shuai was awarded to ten veteran generals of the PRC in 1995, namely: 
Zhu De; Peng Dehuai; Lin Biao; Liu Bocheng; He Long; Chen Yi; Luo ronghuan; Xu Xiangqian; 
Nie Rongzhen; Ye Jianying.
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top of it was a small vase with some plastic flowers. In rural China, this was 
as kitsch as it gets. Yet, as in many other rural parts of the country, in the 
Dulong Valley posters, shiny cheap furniture, colourful plastic flowers, and 
framed wedding pictures were a marker of modernity.
The birthday party itself was, after all, an eccentricity of the modern 
times people like Axiang struggled, but strived, to inhabit. As she had 
explained just a few hours before, on the way to the party, birthdays were 
not celebrated in the valley until two, maybe three years ago. I could not 
help but think that this was around the time when most Drung families were 
moved into new houses. And a good birthday party, of course, cannot be 
complete without a proper cake. But where, I wondered, could you possibly 
get a cake in the Dulong Valley? Despite the roads, the new villages, the 
mobile phones, Dulong was still a fairly long drive from Gongshan, and I 
could not recall seeing any bakery in the valley. Axiang was generous in her 
explanation. Just a couple of years before, a bakery had opened in Dulong 
Township, the main village in the valley and the seat of the local government. 
Perhaps, she wondered, people only began celebrating birthdays once the 
bakery had opened.
As I sat outside the small house, I struggled to reconcile that day, and 
indeed almost each day I had spent in the valley, with the image I had 
constructed from the literature on the Drung that I had become familiar 
with. Before my f irst visit, in May 2015, I was expecting a community 
struggling with China’s new conservation policies, such as the ban on 
logging and swidden agriculture that had been implemented in the valley 
a decade earlier. I was curious to see the impact of the new road to the valley 
on the local population. I was wondering if tourism would (already) be a 
factor in such remote area. Yet, as so often appears to be the case around 
China’s borderlands, I was not ready for what I eventually found. The pace 
of development, the scale of change, was something I had not foreseen. Nor 
was birthday cake, for that matter.
Sometimes, it takes an outsider’s story to better understand some of the 
local dynamics. In Dulong, I found my conversations with Axiang’s husband 
to be particularly enlightening. As we drove back to Qinlandang after the 
birthday party, with Axiang sleeping and her cousin Alisong throwing up 
in a small plastic bag in the back of the car, we talked about how he came 
to live here. Our driver, husband to Axiang and the only sober person in the 
car, had spent the entire day playing Mahjong with friends and relatives. 
Mr Bu, as I call him, was originally from a small town outside of Kunming. 
He f irst arrived in Dulong a decade earlier, working on the valley road. 
With his savings he bought a small van – what is known in China as a 
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mianbaoche – and worked for a few years as a driver, shuttling passengers 
up and down the valley, and more often than not to Gongshan and back. He 
met Axiang, married her, and moved together with her family from their 
native village of Maku to the new village of Qinlandang, where all Maku 
residents were relocated. Always fond of cooking, once settled in the new 
village, Mr Bu opened a restaurant, and has since given up his job as a driver. 
He seemed to hope that the new road, the same road that brought him here 
in the f irst place, would bring tourists to his restaurant. In the meantime, 
as everyone else had fallen asleep in the back of the car, he lit up another 
cigarette before we f inally reached home.
Road to paradise on earth
The history of the winding road (Figure 9) that leads to the Dulong Valley 
where Mr Bu used to work, tells a lot about the valley itself. First opened in 
1999, it put an end to the use of China’s last state-owned caravan, which used 
to connect Gongshan, in the valley of the Nu River, to Bapo, former seat of 
the local government. The caravan trail through the Gaoligong Mountains 
was rough business. Leeches, snakes, rain and snow – those who used to 
shuttle goods along the three-day route remember it today with a mixture of 
awe and longing. In a rare testimony from this recent, yet seemingly distant 
past, a Chinese documentary from 1997, called “The last caravan (zuihou de 
mabang),” shows one of the last caravans travelling from Gongshan, through 
Figure 9: Construction work on the road between gongshan and the dulong Valley  
(picture by the author, 2016)
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the Gaoligong Mountains, into the Dulong Valley. Through a number of 
dramatic and spectacular scenes, the documentary details the perils of 
crossing the Gaoligong Mountains, as well as the immaculate beauty of 
the landscape. The caravan is def ined as a “lifeline (shengmingxian)” for 
the Drung – one that the new road is bound to replace. While following 
the crossing of the Gaoligong Mountains by foot and on horseback, the 
documentary juxtaposes scenes from government off ices in Gongshan, in 
which local off icials discuss the need for a road to bring development to 
the remote valley. As a local government off icial points out, the situation 
in the Dulong Valley becomes more diff icult (kunnan) every year, and the 
road is necessary to bring stability (anding) and unity (tuanjie) to the people 
of the valley. The new road, then, seems to entail a project that is markedly 
economic, but also social and moral. It is not just that the road is expected 
to bring modernity to one of China’s most remote and underdeveloped 
people, but that its construction will also include the Drung in a project of 
national unity and solidarity.
Once the road was completed, the old caravan route was abandoned. 
The overgrown path is now largely indiscernible from the surrounding 
forests, and only the most experienced guide would agree to take an out-
sider along this route. As trucks, buses, and the occasional car replaced the 
role of horses, the project of national integration of the valley sped up. So 
momentous was the construction of the road that the valley is dotted with 
posters celebrating it. “The construction of the Dulong valley road brings 
benef it to the Drung,” reads one. A small memorial placed in the main 
square of the newly built Dulong Township, on the other hand, celebrates 
it with the words of former CCP secretary Jiang Zemin: “Building the road 
to the Dulong River, promoting the economic development of Nujiang.” The 
square, signif icantly, lies in front of the newly built Museum of the “Dulong 
nationality (Dulongzu bowuguan).” All around it, is the Dulong Township: 
a newly built village, neatly designed with shops, hotels, and off ices that 
nevertheless maintain an unshakeable air of out-of-placeness. Unlike other 
villages in the valley – about which I shall say more later on – houses in 
Dulong Township are four or f ive storeys high. Painted in orange, they are 
embellished with geometric patterns evoking the colours and symmetries 
of local textiles. The roofs are covered with narrow strips of brown tin, 
resembling the thatched roofs traditionally used in the valley. Every house, 
moreover, as well as all of the lampposts in the village, is branded with a 
stylised image of the head of a Dulong cattle (Figure 10).
In today’s China, road construction is part of an effort to build both 
a “material civilization” (wuzhi wenming) and a “spiritual civilization” 
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( jingshen wenming) (Flower 2004). By uplifting the material conditions 
of living, roads also bring rural, remote, and backward peasants into the 
embrace of modernity. Roads, as such, are not only economically beneficial, 
they are “civilizing” technologies. Thus, by establishing a connection, roads 
also reinforce a boundary – between the rural and the urban, the remote 
and the cosmopolitan, the backward and the modern. In so doing, as this 
chapter argues, roads also fuel an economy of dependence in the borderlands 
of the nation state, where a combination of strategic interests (often framed 
in terms of bianjing wending, or border stability), minority policy, conserva-
tion policies, and economic hardship single out the state as the exclusive 
“provider of goods.”
Yet, while both the road and the new Dulong Township village project an 
image of modernity and connectivity, “remoteness” remains a powerful trope 
in both the way the Dulong Valley is described by outsiders and in how it is 
depicted by those living there. Visitors are struck by the natural beauty of 
the valley’s seemingly immaculate forests, the pure waters of its rivers, and 
the peculiarity of the Drung people. Echoing such feelings, a promotional 
booklet by the Dulong Township CCP Committee and government, calls the 
valley renjian tiantang – literally, “paradise on earth.” This definition, widely 
used for a number of tourist sites inside and outside of China, is quite f itting 
for the Dulong case. Not necessarily because of the paradisiacal quality of 
the valley, well represented by the word tiantang (“paradise, heaven”), but 
Figure 10: dulong Township (picture by the author, 2015)
dePendenCY 119
rather for the human character implicit in the word renjian, which explicitly 
refers to the human world – ren is the character for “person”. The valley’s 
landscape, in fact, while projecting an image of untouched wilderness, is the 
result of what I shall call a process of “curation.” A brief history of the valley 
since 1949 is now necessary to shed light on how such processes unfolded.
The benevolent state: From marginalisation to dependency
Before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, north-western 
Yunnan was a place where several political legitimacies coexisted (Gros 
2016). Tibetans, Naxi, and Chinese projected multiple and often overlapping 
claims over territory and population – a system of aspirational sovereignty 
from which the Drung were mostly excluded. In particular, the Drung were 
obliged to pay heavy taxes to Tibetan chiefs and to the Chinese empire. 
When unable to do so, they became dehumanised and devalued. As Gros has 
put it, “Drung women, men, and children were indeed at times exchanges 
for oxen or taken away to become slaves in an alien land” (Gros 2010: 31). 
Such deprivations, still a vivid part of local oral histories, def ine a phase 
of signif icant marginalisation for the Drung. They also def ine their ethnic 
identity vis-à-vis their powerful neighbours and the uneven political rela-
tions they entertained with them, thus influencing their sense of locality 
and belonging (Gros 2010).
With 1949 and the communist victory in China, this system radically 
changed, ending centuries of exploitation and re-defining political hierar-
chies in the area. The Drung, while liberated from their feudal obligations, 
were integrated into the PRC system of ethnic minority, and provided 
assistance according to their “backward” status.4 The PRC authorities’ choice 
of name – Dulong – seems to reflect a recognition of local identity policy. 
Until then, the Drung were known in China as “Qiuzi” and by the British as 
“Nung.” While the name Qiuzi was considered as a possible off icial name 
for the Drung, following the Sino-Burmese agreement over the location of 
the border between the two countries in 1960, the name Dulong – a Chinese 
4 The nationalities identif ication project, or minzu shibie, was carried out according to 
both “ethnographic” and political concerns. The stated aim of the project was to classify each 
minority group according to Marx’s schema as either primitive, slave, feudal, bourgeois-capitalist, 
socialist, or communist. The criteria according to which different ethnic group were identif ied 
and classif ied were borrowed from Stalin, and centred around the so-called four commonalities: 
common territory; common language; common mode of subsistence; and common psychological 
make-up. In practice, it was much more politically charged (cf. Harrell 1995; Mullaney 2010).
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transcription of their vernacular – was chosen (Gros 2004; 2010). In this 
way, the Drung were included in China’s civilising project (Anagnost 1997; 
Mackerrass 1994; Harrell 1995; Gladney 2004), classif ied as a “primitive 
society” and identif ied as a primary target for socio-economic development. 
Thus, beginning in the early years of communist rule, the Party donated 
oxen, clothing, allowances, and work clothes to most inhabitants of the 
valley (Gros 2010: 40). Assistance was provided through the state-owned 
caravan mentioned above, which was in charge of transporting cereals to 
the valley until the road was opened in 1999. As Gros (2010) shows, this led 
to the characterisation of the party-state by local Drung as “the provider of 
goods” – a situation in which the party-state’s legitimacy is valued against 
its generosity.
As part of communist China’s interventions in the valley, the Drung’s 
agriculture system, based on swidden cultivation, was identif ied as a major 
obstacle to economic development and, as a consequence, has been the 
target of a number of reforms. While initial reforms were simply aimed 
at improving agricultural techniques and increasing outputs, in the late 
20th century the focus shifted to conservation as the main policy driver in 
the valley. The Dulong Valley has been incorporated into the “Gaoligong 
Mountains National Nature Reserve,” and, as part of the “Three Parallel 
Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas,” it has been a UNESCO World Heritage 
Site since 2000. While early protection policies were not strictly implemented 
(Gros 2014), with the Open Up the West Campaign of the early 2000s, new 
government interventions brought the issue of environmental degradation to 
the forefront. The Dulong Valley thus found itself part of a broader ecological 
movement (Hathaway 2013) that, over the past several decades, led to a 
number of “ecological construction” programmes intended to conserve 
and rehabilitate spaces like forests and grasslands (Yeh 2009a, 2009b). In 
particular, the implementation of the Sloping Land Conversion Programme 
mentioned in the previous chapter was fundamental in re-shaping the 
ecological outlook of the valley, as well as the livelihoods of its inhabitants. 
As most cultivable land in the valley is located on slopes with a gradient of 
over 30 degrees, “the program implied a massive conversion of nearly all 
cultivated land” (Gros 2014: 88). In return for reforesting their f ields, locals 
have received government help in the form of cash and rice for sustenance 
– thus leading to dramatic changes in land use, a reduction of biodiversity 
and livestock numbers, and the erosion of traditional culture (Gros 2010; Shen 
et al 2010; Xiao 2005; Li 2008). Over the years, different attempts at growing 
cash crops have been introduced in the valley, including golden bamboo, 
medicinal herbs, and most recently black cardamom, with differing degrees 
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of success. Yet, none of these attempts have managed to fully guarantee a 
sustainable livelihood in the valley, to the extent that most families in the 
Dulong Valley remain highly dependent on state subsidies.
Environmental conservation policies that exclude local modes of 
production are hardly a new and solely Chinese experience. Already in 
19th-century Europe, at the outset of modern forest management practices, 
mountain populations were deemed “guilty” of mismanaging mountain 
resources, leading to environmental degradation (Debarbieux and Rudaz 
2015: 96–7). Furthermore, in the following decades, in both Europe and 
the United States, the disqualif ication of local communities was further 
highlighted by the movement to preserve mountain environments through 
the institution of national parks or scenic areas (Debarbieux and Rudaz 2015: 
106) – a pattern strikingly similar to what has been happening in the Dulong 
Valley. Such conceptions of the natural mountain environment led to two 
main consequences: “it cast doubt on the validity of [the mountaineers’] 
environmental practices and on their modes of production. But it also 
placed the inhabitants in a state of inferiority compared to those who were 
producing the naturalist and protectionist discourse.” (Debarbieux and 
Rudaz 2015: 107) As this chapter elucidates, both consequences hold true 
for the Drung. However, what is different in the case at hand is that such 
policies took place within a paternalistic discourse of care for a small, 
marginal, and “primitive” ethnic group. What such polices accomplish, then, 
is not only an ecological goal, but an eminently political one: to re-aff irm 
the Party’s legitimacy through the act of giving. Yet, this very act, in turn, 
reproduces dynamics of dependencies that are at the root of the Drung’s 
projected under-development.
The role of the state as a benefactor is extremely visible in the latest, and 
perhaps most striking development project that has affected the valley over 
the past decade, part of a nationwide policy called “Building a New Socialist 
Countryside” (shehui zhuyi xin nongcun jianshe). In the Dulong Valley, the 
implementation of this new policy led to a new phase of dependency, but 
also to a renewed sense of modernity in this remote borderland.
New socialist villages
During my f irst visit to the Dulong Valley, I was invited into the house 
of Ade, located in a new village near Bapo, where the old caravan trail to 
Gongshan used to depart and the location of the former administrative 
centre for the Dulong Valley until it was moved to Dulong Township (or 
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Kongdang) with the opening of the road in 1999. The new village was made 
up of about three dozen houses built in an orderly fashion on the slope 
between the new road and the Dulong River. The houses, all made out of 
concrete but equipped with ornamental bamboo panels on the outside 
walls, followed the same structure: a small outside patio, a living room, 
and three bedrooms in each. A smaller building, separate from the main 
house, served as the kitchen. Toilets were shared, and placed in a few small 
buildings at the edge of the village. Like in all other villages in the valley, a 
small building for communal activities and a basketball court completed 
the settlement (Figure 11). As I arrived at Ade’s house, a few children were 
riding bicycles in the concrete alleys between the houses. While some of 
the houses seemed empty, others were clearly lived in. Chickens roamed the 
small spaces between the cramped houses. A motorbike was parked on one 
corner, beside a little vegetable garden next to one of the houses. Laundry 
was hanging out to dry on most balconies, and a red flag was flapping on 
each roof. Ade offered me tea, as I sat on a small wooden stool in the kitchen. 
Ade was an energetic man in his mid-thirties. Short, like most Drung, he 
always seemed to keep himself occupied: checking his phone, chatting with 
friends, checking in with neighbours. The life in the new village seemed to 
suit him, and it was odd to see him sitting still, for once, as we had tea. “These 
houses, you see,” he said making a broad gesture with his right arm, pointing 
to the surrounding houses as much as to his house, “were all given to us for 
Figure 11: Inside one of the new villages in the dulong Valley (picture by the author, 2016)
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free by the state (guojia). The only thing we had to do was to help with the 
construction.” So-called voluntary labour (yiwugong) was, in fact, an issue 
that would recur constantly during my f ieldwork in the Dulong Valley. It 
was required during the construction of the new villages, of the schools, 
but also of the road and during the construction of hydropower stations in 
the 1990s (Gros 2010: 43). While other people would complain about it, Ade 
saw it as a fair price to pay for the generosity of the Party (dang) towards 
the Drung. “Now this house belongs to us,” he told me, “this is how much 
the country cares for the ethnic minorities. We are a very small minority, 
you see, but the government (zhengfu) really cares for us.”
Ade’s new house was off icially provided as part of the “Building a New 
Socialist Countryside” programme. The programme, off icially launched in 
2006, should be understood as a policy framework – or “macro-policy” – 
whereby the central government provides slogans and rough guidelines to 
then be implemented independently at the local level. As such, “Building a 
New Socialist Countryside” is more of an ecosystem of initiatives broadly 
sharing a similar underlying logic, rather than a fully unified and integrated 
machine for rural development. As a policy framework, the initiative aims 
at tackling the “three rural issues” (sannong wenti): agriculture (nongye), 
villages (nongcun), and farmers (nongmin). At the local level, this “is primarily 
understood as infrastructural and agricultural modernisation linked to 
ecological sustainability and the provision of public goods such as social 
welfare and basic education at the rural level” (Ahlers and Schubert 2009: 
36). To be sure, this results in a general promotion of urbanisation and a 
gradual reduction of the rural population, as farmers are moved into larger 
villages with schools, hospitals, and administrative facilities (see also Perry 
2011; Ahlers and Schubert 2013; Harwood 2013; Rogers 2014; Looney 2015; 
Rosenberg 2015). Since 2013, these types of village infrastructure projects 
have been largely repackaged under the “Beautiful Countryside” programme 
(meili xiangcun), which places more emphasis on tourism development and 
ecological protection – two key elements in the case of the Dulong Valley.
For the people of the Dulong Valley, the “Building a New Socialist Coun-
tryside” programme meant the construction of a number of new villages 
where all families have been given a house. The f irst villages were built 
already in the late 2000s, but the project picked up momentum only once 
the valley road was f inished in 2013–14 and, by 2016, all Drung families had a 
new home. With the exception of the above-described Dulong Township, all 
other villages are quite similar to Ade’s. Houses are single-storey structures, 
with a living room and two to three bedrooms. In some of the villages, 
houses have a small veranda; in others there is a small adjoining garden. So 
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far, families have not actually been forced to move into the new houses and, 
in fact, many elderly Drung still reside in their old dwellings, which have 
the benefit of being closer to the little farmland that they are still allowed 
to cultivate. While the new villages are mostly placed along the new valley 
road, and generally run along the river, the old villages are further up the 
mountain slopes.5 To get there, villagers still need to walk for up to two hours. 
Despite this, many of the elderly Drung I met preferred the old houses for 
various reasons: they were warmer, quieter and closer to the f ields. Perhaps 
most importantly, this was just what they were used to.
For young Drung men and women, such as Axiang and Ade, however, the 
new houses reflected a certain vision of modernity, which they increasingly 
have access to via their subsidised televisions and smartphones – given to 
them for free by China Mobile, a state-owned telecommunication company, 
together with a very cheap data plan.6 Since 2015, phone network coverage 
has reached almost every corner of the valley, projecting – if not delivering 
– a sense of integration within the fabric of a modern nation. Much like 
anywhere else in the country, young Drung spend hours watching videos, 
chatting with friends on WeChat, live-streaming their quotidian experiences 
on multiple online platforms. They are, in a sense, “plugged into” a certain 
vision of modernity that, as a result of the friction of the terrain and the 
burden of remoteness, has not yet come to full fruition in the valley. The 
birthday party described at the beginning of this chapter is an example of 
local attempts to accommodate this vision of modernity into the lives of 
individuals, families, and communities. Likewise, the flat-screen TVs, flashy 
furniture, and the colourful posters and plastic f lowers that newlywed 
couples furnish their houses with all represent a materialisation of a certain 
modern aesthetic pervasive in the Chinese countryside.
The issue of new villages in the Dulong Valley also speaks to a larger trend 
within China’s current war on poverty – a major hallmark of Xi Jinping’s 
tenure. Resettlement, in particular, has been addressed in the context 
of infrastructure development, particularly hydropower (Tilt 2015; Tilt 
and Gerkey 2016), to foster the sedentarisation of herding communities 
(Ptackova 2016; Du 2012), and in response to environmental degradation 
(Heggelund 2003; Rogers and Wang 2006; Tan, Zuo, and Hugo 2013; Fan, Li, 
and Li 2015). On the other hand, the growing use of resettlement as a tool 
5 When speaking Mandarin, people in Dulong usually refer to the movement to the new 
villages as “coming down” (xia lai).
6 Starting in 2015, each Drung has been entitled to an all-inclusive, unlimited data plan for 
200 RMB per year.
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for poverty alleviation has become a prominent yet less-documented issue 
(Merkle 2003; Xue, Wang, and Xue 2013). This is particularly signif icant as 
it is estimated that between 2016 and 2020, up to 16 million people were 
resettled for poverty alleviation purposes (Rogers et al. 2019). While such 
resettlement generally includes some level of subsidies to contribute to the 
cost of the new house, the case of the Dulong Valley is exceptional in that 
the entirety of the expenses were covered by the government. Moreover, 
households receive individual subsidies.
Moving out, cashing in
Since the implementation of the “Building a New Socialist Countryside” 
programme, life in the Dulong Valley seems to be characterised by more 
dependency on the perceived benevolence of the Party. In the course of my 
fieldwork in the valley, I spent most of my time in the southernmost village of 
Qinlandang, living with Axiang, Mr Bu, and their newborn son. Qinlandang 
is also known as Maku, or “new Maku,” as this is the new village to which 
families who used to live in Maku were moved to. Old Maku, where some 
families still have f ields and, in some cases, still reside for at least part of 
the year, is located some 10 km to the north, along the new road towards 
Dulong Township. My choice of Qinlandang was dictated by its location, 
as the village lies only a few kilometres away from the Burmese border. 
Unlike other parts of the valley, where, in order to reach Burma, one must 
climb steep mountain paths for several hours, here, the f irst settlements 
on the Burmese side of the border were a comfortable two-hour walk along 
a small path following the Dulong River. My idea, initially at least, was to 
work with local traders to analyse cross-border relations in a place where 
the Chinese government had yet to enforce a strict border regime. In fact, 
during my time in Qinlandang, I followed traders and porters into Burma 
on several occasions, without much bother from Chinese authorities. Over 
time, however, I came to realise that such forms of trade – which involved, 
for the most part, medicinal plants, items of daily use, and the occasional 
wildlife – had very little impact on local livelihoods. While many families 
in Qinlandang had relatives among the Rawang7 living on the Burmese side, 
they considered themselves different. This difference, I came to understand, 
was not a matter of language, ethnicity, or culture – all of which, villagers 
in Qinlandang were eager to point out, they shared with Burmese Rawang. 
7 On the relations between Chinese Drung and Burmese Rawang, see Gros (2004).
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Rather, it was the material conditions of their living, provided by the Party, 
that set them apart. I realised that they perceived themselves to be a small, 
yet integral part of the Chinese world because of what was given to them in 
the forms of infrastructure and services: housing, roads, schools, hospitals, 
subsidies, and so on. Conversely, I came to appreciate how this dependency 
on government generosity is what binds the Drung to a particular national 
identity. As Gros puts it, “the Drung assume that claims to power must be 
validated by generosity. From this perspective, the various forms of aid 
coming from the state are an integral part of its legitimacy. Without these 
distributions, the state would lose its legitimacy” (2010: 42).
In Qinlandang, as in the rest of the valley, such relations of giving have 
raised a new problem in terms of dependency, albeit, this time, in the name 
of development. According to off icial documents I was given access to, the 
total population of Qinlandang was 288 villagers, comprising 79 households 
(hu), almost entirely of Drung ethnicity. Of these, 161 were recorded as being 
engaged in agriculture (nongye renkou). According to the same statistics, 
in 2015, the annual income per capita of a farmer in Qinlandang was 4000 
RMB. Subsidies play a major role in this regard. Villagers in Qinlandang 
are entitled to a subsistence allowance (dibao) that varies between 133 and 
163 RMB per month (for a total of 1596 to 1956 RMB per year). To this, one 
must add the subsidies as part of the SLCP, which in Dulong are divided 
equally among farming households, and amount to around 180kg of rice per 
year/person. Unlike the northern parts of the valley, where medicinal plant 
collecting has become a very prof itable activity, in Qinlandang the main 
source of income beside subsidies are small black cardamom plantations. 
Some families, like Axiang’s, still keep f ields in old Maku, and Axiang’s 
younger brother spent most of his time in the old house. Limited farming, 
however, did not seem to provide any signif icant income, and most villagers 
simply relied on government subsidies.
At the same time, some outsiders had come to the valley – and to Qinlan-
dang itself – to set up small businesses. As Rigg pointed out, “roads not only 
give opportunities for local people to get out and access new opportunities, 
but also for outsiders to get in” (2002: 625). In Qinlandang, there were three 
small eateries and two convenience stores, selling packaged food, alcohol, 
cigarettes, and basic kitchen utensils. Of the three restaurants, only one 
was owned by two local sisters. Another was opened by Axiang and her 
husband, who, as mentioned earlier, f irst came to the valley as a road worker. 
The third restaurant (with annexed hotel), on the other hand, belonged to 
a family from Hunan, who had spent a decade in Gongshan before moving 
to the Dulong Valley in 2014. The same Hunanese family also own and run 
dePendenCY 127
two small convenience stores. A similar pattern can be found in Dulong 
Township, where a half dozen hotels have been opened between 2015 and 
2017, mostly by outsiders.
As tourism is slow to pick up, and most of its revenue seems to fall into 
the hands of entrepreneurs from outside the valley, many Drung have moved 
out (cf. Harwood 2013). Stories of migrants are often told in the valley. In 
Qinlandang, I became particularly close to Aguo, a relative of Axiang. Then 
in her mid-20s, Aguo met her former husband while studying at a vocational 
school near Dali. A Han Chinese from Shandong, she married him and they 
had a child. Things did not work out, however, and they soon divorced. The 
case for the custody of the child went to court and the man – wealthier and 
well-connected – won it easily. Aguo had not seen her child in two years, 
and soon after I met her, she moved to Gongshan where she found a job 
in a mobile phone shop. Jiang Yi, the boy in charge of the barbecue at the 
birthday party I described at the beginning of this chapter, had just turned 
eighteen. Uninterested in continuing his studies, he kept himself busy with 
odd jobs on constructions sites and cardamom plantations. Soon after the 
birthday party, he also moved to Gongshan, working as an electrician and 
spending most of his evenings at a new internet café, playing video games. 
Like Aguo, he did not seem to care much about his current job, and he was 
not worrying about the possibility of losing it. Subsidies and a new house 
were waiting back home.
Education is also largely in the hands of outsiders. While the preservation 
of “Dulong culture” plays an important role in the rhetoric behind many 
development projects implemented in the valley, at the time of my last 
visit in 2017 none of the new schools in the valley were teaching the Drung 
language. In Qinlandang, the newly built primary school had only seventeen 
students, twelve of whom were from nearby Burma. After completing their 
f irst two years of primary education, at least some of the students from the 
village were expected to be sent to Dulong Township, where construction 
on a larger boarding school had recently been completed. The Qinlandang 
primary school had four teachers, none of whom were from the valley. Over 
the course of a number of visits, I became particularly close to two of them, 
Teacher Xu, originally from Dali, and Teacher Yang, who grew up in Fugong, 
in the nearby Nujiang Valley and speaks some Lisu. Teacher Xu, who, at 
the time, was new to the Dulong Valley and the school in Qinlandang, was 
particularly critical of the situation in the village. A tall guy in his early 
twenties, he spoke of his pupils with a detectable sense of hopelessness. 
“The learning environment is not good here, parents don’t really care about 
their children’s education,” he told me, as he showed me one of the textbooks 
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he was using. In it, he pointed to a brief text describing Beijing and the 
capital’s main attractions. It was a rather easy and short text, he said, but 
it took him three classes to get the students to understand it. Teacher Xu 
also complained about his life in the village, where there is “nothing to do.” 
Often bored, he always seemed pleased to have me over to the school for 
a chat – a much-needed distraction in otherwise monotonous and boring 
days. On one occasion, Teacher Xu invited me to join the teachers and the 
students for lunch at the school canteen. While he and I cut some garlic and 
potatoes, Teacher Yang fried some tomatoes and eggs and some beef with 
cabbage. Next, she put the shredded and green pepper that I had helped 
to cut into the wok with some vinegar, salt, and MSG. Teacher Xu, in the 
meantime, took the rice from the steamer into a large aluminium bowl, 
and started gathering the children who were playing in the courtyard. As 
we sat down in blue chairs around a small, plastic table, he pointed out the 
kids that were from Burma. “They barely speak Mandarin,” he told me, “it’s 
very diff icult to teach these kids.” I nod – this was certainly no easy task, 
particularly as none of the four teachers understood any Drung language. 
Teacher Xu went on. “You see, people here lack quality (suzhi), that’s the 
problem. The government (zhengfu) gives them a lot, but the quality is 
still low (suzhi di).” He provided an example. “Yesterday,” he told me, “a 
delegation came down from Dulong Township. They gave clothes to the 
children, and 100 RMB each.” He nodded, thoughtfully, then added: “but 
you know what’s funny, my salary hasn’t yet arrived!” We all broke out in 
loud laughter as we went on eating, comparing salaries and conditions in 
different schools across Yunnan.
Dependency, however, is only one part of the story. The Dulong Valley 
has also become a showcase for the party-state efforts to modernise its 
borderlands. A measure of this success, however, might not be found in 
economic development; rather, one has to look at beauty and loyalty to 
understand the Party’s vision for its minority-populated regions.
The Dulong showcase: Beautiful and loyal
24 October 2016. I was sitting in the small CCP building of Qinlandang, 
chatting with the village shuji,8 another local Party member, and a young 
Chinese graduate student conducting research on Drung kinship networks. 
8 On the role of village committees and village-level Party leaders in post-reform China, see 
Pieke (2004); Alpermann (2001); Bernstein and Lü (2000); O’Brien & Li (1999).
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The conversation, over a number of cups of tea, moved from the price of 
black cardamom to old marriage relations between different clans and 
families. While, for the most part, the gathering remained comfortably 
informal, the atmosphere changed for a moment when I asked about the 
persistent trade in wildlife with nearby Burma. The recent imprisonment of 
the former village shuji for his active role in the trade was too fresh a memory 
to leave the two men unaffected by the topic. The register switched, and I 
suddenly felt as if it were the voice of the party-state speaking through its 
two off icers. “Burma is a mess (hen luan),” the shuji told me, “but here in the 
Dulong Valley is different.” The other Party member took over, lecturing 
us that it was everyone’s duty to protect the pristine nature of the Dulong 
Valley and to make sure that “our home remains beautiful.” The shuji nodded, 
severely. I drank some tea, feeling a bit uncomfortable for having asked 
the question. After a moment of silence, the small lecture ended with the 
following sentence: “if you don’t take care of your house, how can you be 
a patriot?”
Beside the slightly Confucian tone of the exchange, the insistence on 
keeping the Dulong Valley beautiful (mei) was particularly striking to me. 
It had been, in many ways, a recurrent theme throughout my time in the 
valley. Not only for the reference to the indisputable beauty of the valley, 
but for the human effort that this beauty clearly seems to entail. For many 
of the local CCP off icials, as for many other Drung I had met, nature and its 
beauty was the result of human intervention. The consequence of curation, 
as I call it. In other words, the valley was to remain beautiful for only as 
long as it was looked after. Without care (zhuyi), your house (the family, 
the Drung community, the nation) would fall apart. Beauty, to be sure, was 
not an end in itself. For my Drung interlocutors, beauty was certainly not 
enough. Beauty was an asset, certainly, but one that needed to be developed, 
branded, and sold. But what story is this beauty supposed to tell?
A hint at the answer to this question lies in the shuji’s explicit connection 
between keeping the beauty of the valley intact and being a patriot (aiguo, 
literally “loving your country”). In the Dulong Valley, the new villages display 
red flags on each rooftop, and posters of Mao and Xi Jinping are hanging 
on most walls. They are not empty symbols; rather, they reflect the feelings 
of gratefulness that many Drung have towards the party-state. While this 
loyalty might have been incentivised by subsidies and free services, it is 
nonetheless sincere. The state (guojia), here, seems to be fully merged 
with the Party (dang). As Xiang Biao reminds us, “guojia is a much broader 
concept that the state, and also encompasses the government, the country, 
and the nation. Guojia represents a totalizing order and an all-embracing 
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framework for making sense of public life. It carries strong normative and 
moral meanings” (2015: 132). Yet, in the Dulong Valley, unlike other contexts 
analysed in this book, guojia and dang were often used interchangeably. 
More than anywhere else, then, the state is the Party as much as the Party 
is the state – there cannot be one without the other.
At the same time, the reforestation of the valley expresses the rediscovered 
environmental consciousness of the Chinese state. The seemingly immacu-
late beauty of the Dulong Valley’s forests speaks to a larger commitment in 
which ecological sustainability is given primacy over economic development. 
Beauty and patriotism thus go hand in hand, showcasing the party-state’s 
care for both the land and the people. Culture is not forgotten either. All new 
houses are branded with some symbol of ethnic identity, whether this is in 
the bamboo decorations or in the coloured patterns that adorn buildings 
in Dulong Township. This form of branding extended, most recently, to the 
new bridges that are being built across the valley, all painted in coloured 
stripes resembling the patterns of Drung textiles.
In the Dulong Valley, bridges, and infrastructure in general, are clear 
reflections of state power. As Gao Derong, the former county governor and 
celebrated Drung leader pompously declared in 2018, “The Dulong valley 
today longs for hopes of development and welcomes the dawn of a dream. 
Various undertakings are prosperous, infrastructure construction is in full 
swing, and the masses are in high spirit” (Xinhua 2018a). Here, the dreams 
and expectations of the Drung are connected to the successful development 
of material infrastructure. Funded by the state, such material endeavours 
reinforce the Party’s legitimacy. Yet, if infrastructure construction is central 
to the livelihood of the valley, this most recent effort to brand them according 
to the aesthetic motives of Dulong craft, can be clearly interpreted as an 
attempt to ethnicise – or at least, localise – development. In so doing, the 
Dulong Valley becomes a perfect showcase for the party-state’s vision of 
rural development in the borderlands. It is a showcase of a loyal, patriotic 
ethnic minority. Of a pristine valley where China’s conservation policies are 
strictly enforced. Of an emerging local economy, perhaps. Of the benevolent 
role of the party-state, certainly.
Suzhi, state, and market
While the impact of subsidies and increased mobility on local communities 
goes well beyond mere economic considerations – high suicide rate, alcohol-
ism, drastic changes in kinship patterns, increasing marginalisation, to 
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mention just a few – the issue resonates with other contexts along China’s 
borderlands, and speaks to the larger problem of politics of distribution in 
rural China. The problem with subsidies, to be sure, is not a new one for 
the People’s Republic of China.9 Overly subsidised development policies in 
China’s western regions have been criticised by Chinese economists since at 
least the 1980s; yet, since the launch of the xibu da kaifa, dependence on state 
investments and subsidies has been exacerbated (Fischer 2015). Yunnan, in 
particular, has seen major public funding for agricultural projects that have 
proven profitable only for as long as subsidies lasted, leading some scholars 
to point out that such endeavours serve state policy priorities rather than 
economic development per se (cf. Rousseau 2018).
One of the main consequences of these economic strategies, and one 
that is clearly visible in the Dulong Valley, is the consolidation of state 
control through externalised patterns of ownership and state-led economic 
integration of these remote, peripheral regions, into the rest of China (Fischer 
2015). In Dulong, this is evident through the role played by SOEs, with China 
Mobile, China Telecom, and China Southern Power Grid at the forefront 
of several projects in the valley. This pattern displays a contradiction that 
lies at the heart of China’s development of its borderlands since the xibu da 
kaifa: the conflict between the prominent role of state investment and the 
discursive shift towards personal responsibility – in China, usually framed 
in terms of quality (suzhi)10 as one of the teachers in Qinlandang, Teacher 
Xu, explicitly referred to.
The recent fortune of the term suzhi is inextricably linked to the issue of 
rural poverty in China. As Ann Anagnost (2004: 190) pointed out, the term 
acquired a “new discursive power” once discussion over population quality 
(renkou suzhi) began to appear in the 1980s, targeting the low quality (suzhi 
di) end of China’s population. As she elaborates:
By the early 1990s, population quality had become a key term in the 
party-state’s policy statements and directives to cadres, even as it began 
to circulate more broadly as a general explanation for everything that 
held the Chinese nation back from achieving its rightful place in the 
world. At the same time, as economic reforms increased privatization 
9 The issue of subsidies for the borderlands precedes, in fact, the PRC. The Qing dynasty, 
for instance, subsidised Xinjiang for a long time, and a true f inancial crisis (leading to, among 
other things, the creation of a number of local currencies) ensued once these subsidies ended 
(cf. Millward 2000: 124–125)
10 There is no shortage of studies of suzhi in China, see for instance Anagnost (2004); Kipnis 
(2006, 2007); Judd (2002); Bakken (2000); Yan (2003).
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and dismantled the institutions and entitlements of state socialism, 
suzhi appeared in new discourses of social distinction and the discursive 
production of middle classness. Suzhi’s sense has been extended from a 
discourse of backwardness and development (the quality of the masses) 
to encompass the minute social distinctions defining a “person of quality” 
in practices of consumption and the incitement of a middle-class desire 
for social mobility (Anagnost 2004: 190).
In producing new forms of social distinctions, suzhi replaced class as a 
major discursive tool for the implementation of economic reforms. While, 
in pre-reform China, emphasis was put on one’s relation to the means of 
production, suzhi has been interpreted by many scholars as a distinctively 
neoliberal concept, through which responsibility has shifted to the individual 
(Murphy 2004; Anagnost 1997; 2004; Kipnis 2007; Yan 2003; Pun 2003).11 
In the Dulong Valley, as elsewhere across the country, discussions about 
suzhi have become ubiquitous, as has mention of the term itself in both 
off icial and popular discourse. At the same time, in the Dulong Valley, state 
policies still seem to be aimed at changing the material infrastructure as a 
pre-condition for individual development. In the Chinese context, there is no 
contradiction between the two. If suzhi is, at least partly, innate, individuals 
can be transformed. Just as the wrong environment can be corrupting, 
the right one can lead to improvement. The approach appears to follow a 
Marxist understanding in which the only way to change the ideological 
super-structure is by addressing structural inequalities in the material 
process of production. Chinese authorities, in other words, seem to assume, 
borrowing from Lefebvre, that “spatiality is not only a product but also a 
producer and reproducer of the relations of production and domination, 
an instrument of both allocative and authoritative power” (Shields 1999: 
153, from Soja 1985: 110). In the case of the new socialist villages in Dulong, 
however, the productive element seems to be solely ideological. Here lies, I 
f ind, the primary inherent contradiction of the Drung’s development. How 
is it possible that reforms aiming at producing entrepreneurial subjects 
led to more dependency upon the state’s generosity? Or, to put it the other 
way around, how should years of unconditioned aid and support foster the 
development of self-suff icient competing subjectivities?
11 For a critique of the use of neoliberalism in the suzhi discourse in China see Kipnis 2007. 
In this section, the term neoliberalism does not refer to the overall system of governance, but 
rather to the specif ic policies targeting individual responsibility that are embedded in the term 
suzhi.
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This particular discussion of suzhi thus echoes a larger debate about the 
relationship between state and market in China, and between an authoritar-
ian mode of rule and a seemingly neoliberal discourse of entrepreneurship 
and self-reliance (Kipnis 2011). In the off icial rhetoric, with the reform 
period, China has entered a phase of economic growth and individual 
accumulation famously baptised as “socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics.” Still, the question of whether China is a capitalist society 
looms large in many debates over the past three decades. Such debates often 
tend “to see a zero-sum game between the state and the market” (Osburg 
2013: 2), in which both “state” and “market” are nevertheless understood in 
overly simplistic terms. Osburg’s (2013) work with entrepreneurs in Chengdu 
shows, on the other hand, that moral economies of personal networks, as 
well as bureaucratic hierarchies and closeness to the CCP are at the core 
of China’s current capitalist development. Hence the very notion of a free 
market is, for Osburg, rather questionable: capitalism, in China as elsewhere, 
is inevitably embedded in power structures and personal networks.
David Harvey (2005: 120) famously described China’s political economy 
in the reform-era as “a particular kind of market economy that increasingly 
incorporate neoliberal elements interdigitated with authoritarian centralized 
control.” While this might be the case in Beijing, Shanghai, or Shenzhen, in 
the Dulong Valley elements of pre-reform economic ideas go well beyond 
mere authoritarianism. Furthermore, far from being “nonpolitical and non-
ideological problems that need technical solutions,” (Ong 2006: 3) as Aihwa 
Ong characterises neoliberal governance strategies, issues of development 
in Dulong are essentially political. The aim, in Dulong, is not to “optimise,” 
but rather to claim, perform, and showcase control over the well-being of a 
minority population and a protected area. Governing, here, is a technology 
of care, not a calculation of the state influence over the market.
This over-encompassing role of the state is inextricably linked, in the 
party-state ideology at least, to the projected primitiveness of the Drung. 
In ethnic minority areas the discourse on suzhi is still tied in with the idea 
of an inherent physical quality of the population, rather than pointing to an 
abstract, acquired quality. As such, “poverty has come to be understood as 
related not just to the changing historical conditions of market reform but to 
the ‘tangible physical quality’ of minority nationalities” (Zukosky 2012: 241). 
Quality, then, in minority areas become both an ordering and a disciplinary 
strategy through which under-developed ethnic minorities such as the Drung 
are re-imagined as modern subjects. Only, in Dulong, this specif ic vision of 
modernity well exemplif ied by the birthday party described above comes at 
the price of increased dependency on government support. Modernity and 
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dependency, in the Dulong Valley, are two faces of the same coin. What, then, 
does the case of the Dulong Valley tell us about the party-state’s engagement 
with its minority areas? Is there a specif ic modality of power that is at work 
here? What is the objective of development in the Dulong Valley? How do 
conservation, dependency, and quality relate to one another?
Conclusion
Following the f irst part of the book, in which I addressed an initial tension 
between two distinct yet interconnected forms of connectivity, in this 
chapter I have highlighted another underlying characteristic of China’s 
borderlands: the implementation of a particular vision of modernity and 
the construction of remoteness. I introduced this second tension through 
a vignette describing a birthday party, in which I laid bare the struggle 
of many Drung to inhabit a modern nation in their self-characterised 
“faraway” homeland. Here, in an example striking even for the Chinese 
context, modernity is a temporal condition that seems to coincide with 
the recent construction of the road to the valley. Blurring the boundaries 
between the technical, the infrastructural, and the moral, the road to the 
valley becomes a civilising device that radically alters both the “material” 
and the “spiritual” conditions of the valley and its people.
Yet, even before the road was completed, as I described in the second 
part of the chapter, the Dulong Valley has been characterised by a history 
of aid since its incorporation into the People’s Republic of China. Through 
a number of programmes designed to “modernise” the Drung, the Chinese 
state made the Dulong Valley into a national space by cultivating particular 
forms of dependency among the local population. The most recent project 
that I detailed in the chapter, the “Building a New Socialist Countryside” 
programme, can be seen as the apex of such efforts.
As I have further argued, however, what emerges from the Drung case 
is the political, rather than economic rationale behind programmes to 
“develop” ethnic groups in the borderlands. The state, by performing the 
role of a giving entity, assumes a fundamentally pedagogical role in which 
the Drung are relegated to passive recipients of the CCP’s generosity and 
wisdom. The valley, then, is transformed into a particular showcase of ethnic 
policies in today’s China. Yet what it showcases, I have argued, is not just 
loyalty. Rather, it brings to the fore the contradictions inherent in China’s 
development model in minority regions, as reflected in the suzhi discourse 
as an ordering and disciplinary strategy.
dePendenCY 135
More broadly, I have argued that the Drung case clearly shows that market 
vs. state dichotomies are of little help for understanding rural development 
in minority regions. The combination of state investment, calls for increasing 
quality, market tourism, ecological conservation – all within the benevolent 
embrace of the state – requires a different conceptualisation of power. 
As shown in the f irst part of this book, socio-cultural and geographical 
specif icities of China’s borderlands require a different spatialisation of such 
relations (or what I call proximity); the nexus of interests and goals that 
the Drung case exemplif ies requires a different approach to the way we 
understand power relations in this context. In particular, while the Drung 
case makes little sense when understood from the perspective of economic 
development, if approached as a showcase of a particular political will 
and discourse, new relationalities emerge. Economic development is not 
what is at stake in the Dulong Valley. It is, rather, only a part of a broader 
and eminently ideological discourse of sovereignty and control – or what I 
conceptualise as the notion of curation in the next section.
While, in the Dulong Valley, the role of the state as a benefactor is accepted 
and actively re-produced by the Drung, the effects of curation are far from 
even. To show this, after def ining “curation” in the Interlude, I return to 
Xinjiang to examine the case of the reconstruction of Kashgar’s old town. 
Curation, as a particular modality of power, acts by separation and exclusion. 
It is a violent performance – one that, in the case of Xinjiang, is bearing 
particularly tragic consequences.

 Interlude — curation
In The Will to Improve, Tania Li (2007) analyses how different development 
programmes overlap, producing unexpected and ultimately negative conse-
quences for the communities they were designed to help. In particular, she 
describes the effects of relocation in the highlands of Sulawesi, Indonesia, 
starting from an early phase of development in the Dutch colonial period. 
Here, villagers were resettled from the highlands to lower areas in order to 
bring them closer to infrastructure such as roads, but also to take advantage 
of new farming techniques. While the resettlement programme was never 
particularly successful, it hit a notable barrier when bio-conservation became 
a national agenda item in the 1990s. Eventually, a park was established and 
access to land restricted. Farming techniques that were supposed to improve 
these communities’ livelihood were banned, with, as a consequence, ongoing 
poverty and landlessness for the villagers. To add insult to injury, villagers 
were criticised for these very farming practices and held responsible for the 
ecological decline of the area. In recounting this story, Li’s broader intention 
is to think about how power operates in relation to development. In order 
to do so, she conceptually builds on Foucault’s concept of governmentality, 
Marxian political economy and Gramsci’s conceptualisation of hegemony. 
By taking aim at neoliberal agendas of economic betterment through a 
Marxist framework, Li shows how growth and impoverishment are always 
intertwined.
In looking at the rationale behind such interventions, Li’s use of the 
concept of governmentality is particularly useful in thinking relations of 
power in today’s Chinese borderlands. Famously coined by Michel Foucault 
(1979a, 1991), governmentality defines any means of directing how subjects 
behave and act, and how specif ic forms of “truth” are invoked in the gov-
ernment of human conduct. The concept generated a prolif ic scholarship 
with regard to China (for a review, see Jeffreys and Sigley 2009), particularly 
in the analysis of the relations between the government and the everyday 
management of citizens through a number of technologies and practices.1 
Governmentality has also been used in the analysis of particular forms of 
state territorialisation, in which “modern states divide their territories into 
complex and overlapping political and economic zones, rearrange people 
and resources within these units, and create regulations delineating how 
and by whom these areas can be used” (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995: 387). 
1 cf. Farquhar (2002, 2005); Greenhalgh and Winckler (2005); Kohrman (2004); Sigley (1996).
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Signif icantly, in this context, state territorialisation is understood as a 
deliberate strategy to transform both subjectivity and the landscape and 
in so doing establish state authority as an effect of power, rather than as a 
direct imposition (Yeh, 2013; Wang and Li 2016).
The concept of governmentality offers numerous opportunities to think 
about the case of the Dulong Valley described in the previous chapter. The 
re-making of the Chinese countryside more generally is also reminiscent 
of another analytical lens frequently used in the analysis of large-scale, 
encompassing development projects – what James Scott (1998), in his land-
mark book Seeing Like a State, calls authoritarian high modernism. With 
this notion, Scott combines the commitment to a high-modernist ideology, 
the administrative ordering of society and the state’s willingness to employ 
coercion to realise such projects, which is typical of several modernising 
projects carried out by authoritarian regimes throughout the 20th century. 
High modernism, in other words, represents an attempt to make spaces 
and populations legible to state-authorities while putting into practice a 
specif ic vision of modernity. Fundamentally aesthetic in their own rights, 
such projects, Scott argues, are not just generally ineff icient, but also by 
disregarding local conditions and local knowledge are a recipe for disaster. 
This latter point is clearly illustrated by the cases of collectivisation in the 
Soviet Union and resettlement into villages in Tanzania and Ethiopia that 
he chose.
At f irst blush, the Dulong case would seem to f it quite soundly with 
Scott’s analysis. The villages where Drung families have been resettled, one 
the one hand, certainly serve the purpose of disrupting social relations and 
traditional practices that remained inevitably illegible to state authorities. 
On the other hand, they represent the materialisation of a specif ic vision of 
modernity and an ideologically charged attempt to implement it. A similar 
argument could be made for previous interventions: from the Sloping Land 
Conversion Programme to the attempts at transforming Dulong’s forest 
into economic forests via the introduction of various cash crops. Unlike 
the cases analysed by Scott, however, marginality and dependence are not 
necessarily charged with the negative attribute one might expect. Rather, 
the benevolent state, the “provider of goods,” is seen as a caring entity. 
Here, once again, we are reminded of the complex nature of power in China 
and of the shortcoming of simplistic power-resistance frameworks in the 
analysis of government authority. Hathaway, for instance, in conversation 
with Scott’s works on the topic (1985; 1990) talks of “art of engagement”, 
showing that “in fact many villagers exerted a good deal of effort trying to 
connect with and attract powerful outsiders” (Hathaway 2013: 79). Thus, 
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writing against the “narrow view” of many “resistance models,” Hathaway 
effectively shows how, in rural China, very often the biggest complaint is 
“the lack of state presence,” rather than its contrary (2013: 114). Tim Oakes 
(2012) argues along similar lines while discussing the role of heritage and 
preservation in processes of modernisation and development. In particular, 
against models of hegemony and resistance, he shows how villagers are 
often embracing “the apparatus of improvement” (402) projected by local 
elites and off icials.
Building upon this literature, and tracing the ways development, state 
control, and heritage-making affect China’s minority-populated border-
lands uncovers the contingent forces of what I call curation. This notion 
encompasses a rather intricate interplay between a particular ideology of 
development and its implementation in particular contexts. As such, it 
encapsulates particular forms of power relations that are at play at China’s 
borderlands today. To be clear, curation here does not refer to the work of a 
museum or exhibition curator; rather, it takes the original (Latin) meaning 
of curare. On the one hand, curare means to heal, to cure, to make remedy. 
On the other hand, it also refers to the act of preservation, to make sure 
that something does not infect its surroundings.2
According to the f irst meaning, the aim of curation is not only that of 
building a different future – one that, in the eyes of the authorities, is clearly 
better. Curation also points to an erasure of the past. It implies a projection 
of backwardness, as much as a strive for “quality.” Unlike improvement, 
curation as a “healing” process implicitly presupposes a disease – backward-
ness. Curation thus entails much of the CCP’s effort to “lift” the Drung out 
of poverty and the ways this is implemented at the local level. Not, as high 
modernism implies, as a merely ideological implementation, but one that 
is rather embedded in a moral discourse resonating as much in Kunming’s 
Party off ices as in the borderlands themselves. The wording is interesting 
here. While the verb “lifting” is reserved exclusively for the state media’s 
English-language publications (Schmitz 2017), Chinese off icial sources 
generally refer to tuopin, “shaking off poverty,” jianpin, “reducing poverty,” 
or xiaochu pinkun, “eliminating impoverishment.” In the word tuo 脱, “to 
shed” or “to take off，” 月 “meat” is a meaning component, referring to the 
original meaning of the word: to remove the skin and bones from meat. As 
such, it echoes another connotation of the word curare: to “cure” something 
2 The development of this particular idea of curation owes much to the “Connecting Materiali-
ties / Material Connectivities” series of workshops organised by Martin Saxer and Philipp Schorch 
at LMU Munich between 2015 and 2017. See also Saxer (2016; forthcoming).
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by careful processes of cleansing, selection and preservation. The issue of 
cleansing is particularly evident in the word xiaochu, “to eliminate, remove, 
dispel.” Xiao, in particular, refers to disappearing, or dying out, and it is used 
in a number of words indicating disinfection and decontamination. Thus, 
while healing, curational interventions attempt to prevent such disease from 
spreading, i.e. the second meaning of the word curare highlighted above. 
As the next chapter will show, curation thus implies a severe disciplinary 
regime with the aim to “preserve.” Yet, preservation, tied with the language 
and practice of heritage-making in today’s China, is always embedded in a 
selective process in which certain elements are chosen over others. Thus, in 
the case of Xinjiang, to which I will turn the discussion in the next chapter, 
Uyghur crafts, songs, and dances are promoted for tourist consumption, pious 
Islamic behaviour is persecuted. Curating particular subjects, then, implies 
the enforcement of a selective process that pathologises any behaviour that 
might pose a political threat (cf. Grose 2019).
In both meanings of the term, “curation” refers to an attempt to attend to 
particular material environments, which is both ideologically and morally 
charged and driven. As such, it also implies an effort that is both future- and 
past-oriented. Allow me to elaborate. High modernist planning, as Scott 
makes clear in his work, does not consider the cultural values, traditional 
practices, and aesthetic sensibilities of the local populations. More often 
than not, high modernist spaces are designed for “abstract” subjects: subjects 
that are emptied of any cultural specif icity. While Scott’s analysis addresses 
the fundamental question of the planning and its consequences, what is 
mostly left out of the discussion is how this “emptying” occurs. The concept 
of curation, on the other hand, helps to shed light on this process of erasure, 
where the focus on “healing” implies a projection of backwardness that has 
a disease-like quality to it, i.e. as something that needs to be eradicated. 
In other words, unlike high modernism, “curation” accounts for two kinds 
of temporalities: the construction of an imagined future, and the erasure 
and reconstruction of the past. In the case of the Dulong Valley, and in 
many other contexts around China’s border regions, from Tibet to Xinjiang 
(Cliff 2013), dreams of modernity reflected in the new villages are always 
paired with a projection of backwardness onto the ethnic minority groups’ 
traditional ways of living. And not only that: the very spaces that used to 
provide them with a living – the forest or the grassland – are re-defined as 
wastelands, unproductive, and stubbornly unmodern (cf. Yeh 2009b). They 
are, in other words, “emptied” of both meanings and history.
Lastly, curation is ultimately tied to a culture of display, of performance, 
of exhibition. This is particularly important in the Chinese borderlands, 
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where ethnic minorities need to be not only loyal, but also commodifiable. 
Yet, unlike cases in which the commodification of culture is understood as 
part of a capitalistic logic of accumulation (Comaroff and Comaroff 2009), 
along China’s borderlands “improvement” is tied to ideology more than 
anything else – even if this comes at an economic cost. There are interesting 
historical parallels to this particular example. Discussing Soviet Russia, 
Pedersen argues that “[I]nvestment in infrastructure was […] not rational 
in any narrow economic sense; instead building ‘miniature metropolises’ 
was understood as investing in a new being, a new humanity, a new cosmos” 
(2011: 45). The example of Soviet Russia is particularly insightful in discuss-
ing the role of infrastructural aesthetics for the construction of “modern” 
subjects. As art historian Vladimir Todorov claimed, “Communism created 
ultimately effective aesthetic structures and defective economic ones” (1994). 
Here the systemic building of spectacular infrastructures and systems of 
provisions (Saxer 2016) became the material and ideological foundations 
for the production of new social forms, values, and persons (Dalakoglou 
2012; Humphrey 2005: 39–40; Schwenkel 2015).
Similarly, the rationale for the construction of new villages in the Dulong 
village, or the re-construction of old Kashgar, is not to be found in economic 
growth indicators. Pointing precisely to this aspect, curation describes a 
particular modality of power driven by ideological and moral instances. 
While co-existing and overlapping with other modalities of power, such 
as surveillance, control, or calculation, curation points to the processes of 
healing, selection, and preservation that ethnic minorities are the target 
of in today’s China. By underpinning a disciplinary – and not economic – 
objective, such expression of state power complicates established views of 
Chinese development in the borderlands. To show how the issue of ethnic 
subjectivity is embedded in such relations, in the next chapter I address the 
case of the Kashgar’s old town and the Uyghurs of Xinjiang.

4 Heritage
“(Social) space is a (social) product […] the space thus produced 
also serves as a tool of thought and of action […] 
in addition to being a means of production it is also a means 
of control, and hence of domination, of power.”
— Henri Lefebvre (1991: 26)
“Break their lineage, break their roots, 
break their connections, and break their origins”
— Chinese government document on how to turn Uyghurs 
into better citizens, Al Jazeera (2018b)
While the previous chapter detailed the party-state’s attempts to attend 
to a particular environment through ideologically and morally charged 
interventions, this chapter employs the conceptual lenses of “curation” to 
address the question of subjectivity within these larger projects. As Emily 
Yeh described in the case of the Tibet Autonomous Region, development 
in the Chinese context is a form of territorialisation understood as both a 
material and embodied process; that is, one that aims at the transforma-
tion of both landscapes and subjectivities. Thus, both in Yunnan and in 
Kashgar, as I will describe throughout this chapter, my argument is that 
curational interventions in the borderlands not only aim at the introduction 
of modern housing, cash economy, and conservation policies to improve 
the material living conditions of ethnic subjects, but most importantly 
represent an attempt at developing a new kind of subjectivity. As part of 
this project, renewed state presence in terms of both bureaucratic and social 
control consolidates what philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1981) has called 
the “colonisation of everyday life,” while state-led attempts at developing 
new tourist sites assure discursive control over minority culture.
In order to make this argument, this chapter addresses the case of the 
reconstruction of Kashgar’s old town. As mentioned in the f irst chapter, 
Kashgar has a long history as a major cultural and trading hub along the leg-
endary Silk Road: an image that defines much of the region’s past as well as its 
current touristic brand. Among a number of development projects connected 
to this imaginary, that of the reconstruction – or renewal (gaizao), to use 
the off icial parlance – of Kashgar’s old town (Uyghur: kona shähär, Chinese: 
laocheng) has drawn signif icant media attention. My argument is that the 
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implementation of such heritage preservation project in Kashgar cannot 
be understood outside of a larger plan to transform Kashgar into a modern 
hub on China’s Belt and Road. By highlighting this particular connection, I 
further show that heritage in Kashgar is a project less concerned with the 
preservation of the past than it is about development and modernisation, 
or what Tim Oakes, following Tania Li, calls “improvement” (2012).
The case is not unique to Xinjiang. Martin Saxer (2012), for instance, 
shows an interesting policy shift in the Chinese off icial discourse on the 
TAR. Saxer argues that “while earlier positions predominantly highlighted 
development and progress in order to legitimize the Party State’s policies, 
the Party State has recently begun to emphasize its efforts to promote and 
protect the ‘f ine traditional Tibetan culture’ as heritage” (Saxer 2012: 67). 
Chinese efforts to modernise Tibet, in other words, are now increasingly 
framed within a narrative of heritage preservation, thus legitimising the 
party-state’s role in Tibet as the true protector of traditional culture and 
highlighting the fundamental role of tourism in the development of the 
region. Significantly, in the eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), the same in 
which the “Building a New Socialist Countryside” policy was first mentioned, 
“the Chinese government adopted UNESCO’s language of the protection 
of “cultural heritage” as part of its strategy to develop tourism and f ight 
the deleterious effects of environmental degradation, urbanization, and 
economic development” (Pieke 2014: 130).
As part of this larger policy shift, Xinjiang has witnessed something similar 
to the case described by Saxer. As in Tibet, history in Xinjiang has been 
instrumental to justifying the CCP’s rule since the time of the liberation, 
and accordingly manipulated for nationalistic purposes (Bovingdon and 
Tursun 2004; Bovingdon 2001; Rippa 2014a, 2015). In 2003, for instance, a 
government White Paper entitled “History and Development of Xinjiang” 
insists precisely on Xinjiang’s role in the history of China, its deep linkages 
with the motherland, and the role of the Party in the development of the 
region (State Council 2003). The White Paper, however, does not reflect on 
those issues in terms of contemporary cultural policies; instead the focus 
is on countering the separatist discourse in the wake of the September 11 
attacks and the subsequent American-led “war on terror”. By contrast, the 
focus of a 2009 White Paper, entitled “Development and Progress in Xinjiang” 
is development (State Council 2009). A section of the White Paper is specif-
ically dedicated to the “Preservation of Ethnic Cultures”, highlighting the 
importance of “the inheritance and development of the fine cultural heritage 
of all ethnic groups”. A more recent White Paper on Xinjiang (State Council 
2015), entitled “Historical Witness to Ethnic Equality, Unity and Development 
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in Xinjiang”, goes even further in this direction, highlighting the importance 
of “promoting cultural prosperity” for the overall development of the region. 
As in the Tibetan case described by Saxer, then, Chinese authorities in 
Xinjiang seem to be framing their argument for the development of the 
region within a narrative of heritage preservation, insisting on the role of 
the Party in the management of local ethnic cultures.
More generally, as anthropologist Stevan Harrell (2013) pointed out, 
“China is in the middle of a cultural heritage preservation fever” (287). 
In Kashgar, as in several other places, this “fever” took a rather radical 
turn, leading to the almost complete reconstruction of Kashgar’s old town, 
which used to be “the best-preserved example of traditional Islamic city 
to be found anywhere in central Asia” (Michell et al. 2008). According to 
off icial estimates, since 2009, the programme, launched within the “Uyghur 
Historical and Cultural Preservation Project”, has received RMB 3 billion in 
funding and has already involved 31,000 households (State Council 2015). 
Off icially, the project aims at “renovating dilapidated houses” and making 
the structures in an earthquake-prone area such as Kashgar safe. In fact, 
with the exception of two small sections, entrusted to the Beijing-based 
Zhongkun Group to be managed as touristic scenic areas, Kashgar’s old 
town has been entirely demolished and re-built in what authorities label 
“ancient Islamic architecture”. However, as this chapter will describe, there 
are signif icant differences in the architecture and the layout of the old and 
the “new-old” Kashgar town.
This chapter builds upon a growing literature that sees heritage as both 
a means of authoritarian state power that alienates locals from their own 
socio-cultural resources (cf. Bendix et al. 2012; Bellocq 2006; Dicks 2000; 
Shepherd 2006) and as a particular function of development (Oakes 2012). In 
particular, I shift the analytical gaze to an examination of how the systemic 
efforts to redefine Uyghur-ness are integral to the reconstruction of Kashgar’s 
old town and lay bare the material and ideological foundations for producing 
new Uyghur subjects. This chapter will argue that heritage has become a 
disciplinary tool in minority-populated Chinese borderlands. In particular, 
through the case of the renovation of Kashgar’s old town – a particular kind 
of curational intervention – the party-state is aiming at the construction of 
new Uyghur selves. Here, Uyghur ethnicity is reduced to a culture of display 
that is made readily available for tourist consumption. While framed in the 
language of economic development, in this chapter I show how this attempt, 
accompanied by stricter disciplinary policies, led to the marginalisation 
and impoverishment of large portions of Kashgar’s Uyghurs. I argue that 
this outcome is the logical consequence of the particular ways in which 
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Uyghurs are portrayed in today’s China. In other words, curation as a culture 
of display becomes a disciplining technology through which Uyghurs are 
reduced to a lesser kind of citizen.
The new Kashgar old town: Renewing Uyghur identity
1 November 2012. It was already quite late, but I felt like having some kewab 
before going to bed. I headed to my new favourite place, on Östengboyi Road 
(ch: Wusitang Boyi). It was a small kewab shop newly opened in a renovated 
house. It was small, but it offered the best kewabs in the area – I was particu-
larly keen on the addition of a piece of liver and the smaller portion of fat. On 
that particular night, only two people were in the shop: the owner, Perhat, 
whom I had spoken to a number of times over the past weeks and another 
man I had never met before. I shall call him Ahmedjan. Ahmedjan turned out 
to be originally from Uzbekistan, born to a Uyghur family who moved back to 
Kashgar in the 1990s. I wanted to ask him some questions, but this time I was 
the one being interrogated. First about Italy, Europe, my studies. Then about 
Xinjiang and Kashgar. He asked me if I liked it here. I most certainly did. “The 
place or the people?”, they both asked me, at the same time. I said that I liked 
the people, and that I used to like the place, but not that much anymore. I 
said that I saw the place changing since my first visit. They started laughing, 
saying that all these new houses (pointing their f ingers around) were very 
good – “yaxshi yaxshi,” they kept saying, parroting the Mandarin pronunciation 
of the words (yakexi, yakexi) that had become somewhat popular since they 
appeared in a song in the CCTV spring festival gala (chunwan) in 2010.1 Then, 
Perhat looked at me, seriously, and pointing at his mouth said, “here we say it 
is good,” and then pointing at his heart “but here it is not good.”2
Due to its proximity to the desert and the dry climate, Kashgar has always 
been a rather dusty place. In the early hours of the day, as men sit on carpeted 
1 In the programme, singers and dancers, dressed in what the PRC deems as “traditional” 
Uyghur dresses, praise their happy life. The chorus line goes as follow: “What is yakesi, what 
is yakesi? The Chinese Communist Party’s policies are yakesi.” The programme was notori-
ously mocked by many netizens. See also Figure 12 to see how the expression has been used in 
propaganda posters and murals.
2 Upon returning to Kashgar in 2016 I learned that Perhat (a pseudonym), like many other 
Uyghur friends in Kashgar, had disappeared and was in prison. His family didn’t know where 
he was, for what reason he was detained, and for how long he would be away. In the years to 
come, stories like Perhat’s would make headlines in the international press. To this day, I don’t 
know what has happened to him.
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benches lined outside cramped teahouses, dunking old pieces of naan bread 
into chipped porcelain teacups, women sweep the fronts of shops and houses 
with short straw brooms. They would repeat this activity several times over 
a single day, often pairing it with the watering of the same streets during the 
hot season. Dust, in Kashgar, clings onto your clothes, your hair, it silently 
and ceaselessly accumulates on every surface it can f ind. Dust and sand 
is what you wash off your face before praying, it is what makes your eyes 
shut while walking the streets. Yet, in Kashgar’s old town, dust was not 
just a natural phenomenon due to the city’s proximity to the desert. Dust, 
in Kashgar’s old town, was also a major indication of ongoing destruction.
My f irst visit, in the spring of 2009, was one f illed with excitement. Upon 
checking into my hotel, at the end of a 24-hour train journey from Urumqi, 
where I was based at the time for a semester at Xinjiang Normal University, 
I did not waste any time and went out roaming the narrow alleys of the old 
town. Most sections were strangely quiet, with life seemingly carrying on 
behind mud walls, in hidden courtyards, from where I could only hear the 
occasional voice emerge. The streets, on the other hand, were traversed 
by the occasional electric scooter, and mostly by groups of kids playing 
and asking tourists for a picture. Larger intersections, and the occasional 
square, were more crowded, with shops, restaurants, street pedlars. Just as 
I was starting to get a sense of the place, of its smells, its sounds, the faces 
traversing it, a cloud of dust hit me, behind a corner that looked just like 
Figure 12: “CCP yakexi” on a school mural along the KKh (picture by the author, 2017)
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any other. Sounds, here, were different, and so were the smells – what I 
was just starting to get used to was now completely erased by the powdery 
dust entering my nostrils, drying my mouth, clouding my view. Through 
the dust, I saw a scene that would become painfully familiar. A group of 
Uyghur men, equipped with shovels, hammers, and wheelbarrows, were 
clearing the fractured skeleton of an old house. I remember, vividly, that 
f irst encounter. A man bent over a pile of debris, in what must have been 
the main room of the house, two of its walls still standing. On one of the 
walls, a painted floral motif on a white background was still visible.
While the renewal (gaizao) of Kashgar’s old town began in 2001, the 
project only gained momentum in the years following my f irst visit in 2009, 
and reached its apex when I was conducting my doctoral f ieldwork in the 
region, during 2012–13. The timeline for the project sees its f inal completion 
only in 2020; yet, during short visits in the summers of 2016 and 2017, I could 
already appreciate how most sections of the old town had been renovated, 
with families who had already moved in. While some parts of the old town 
have been replaced by new multi-storey buildings, the focus of this chapter 
is on those sections that have been renovated and maintained in a seemingly 
“traditional” style. Or, to put it in the language used in a panel describing the 
old town’s renewal standing at the intersection of Areya and Tuman Road, to 
those sections where “Uyghur style and flavour” had been “enhanced”. Yet, the 
differences between the old town, and the new-old town, are quite striking.
Kashgar’s old city is – or rather, was – a labyrinth of narrow, dark alleys 
squeezed between the walls of mud-brick houses (Figure 13). Over time, 
many houses were built over and across those alleys, generating intricate 
pathways without any apparent coherence. The houses themselves were 
generally accessible through a small door, and thus remained largely hidden 
from the outside. Once inside, on the other hand, one was often surprised 
by a green courtyard and carefully decorated rooms with bright carpets 
and pictures. The new-old Kashgar, on the other hand, has been carefully 
planned. Its roads are wide, bright, and paved, lined with trees, the houses 
built in tidy rows (Figure 14). In the new-old-Kashgar, the material of choice 
is concrete, which was virtually absent in the old buildings. The elements 
of “ancient Islamic architecture” are visible in the wooden decorations 
around doors and windows, and in the mud-hay mixture used to cover 
the concrete-brick walls. The most striking difference with the old town 
is, perhaps, the structure of the houses. Whereas in the old town the core 
of the house was the courtyard, generally invisible from the outside, in the 
new-old Kashgar the facades of the houses have large windows and terraces. 
They are in full view. In fact, it seems that one of the main characteristics 
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of the newly planned new-old town is to put the beauty of Uyghur houses 
on show, to move ornamental elements out of the hidden courtyards and 
eliminate the outside walls. Furthermore, houses facing the main streets 
have their ground floors converted into shops-to-be: larger rooms opened 
towards the street. Along many of those roads, such rooms have already 
been converted into restaurants, off ices, and shops of various kinds with 
signs in Uyghur, Mandarin, and English.
Figure 13: A typical section of old Kashgar, before the renewal (picture by the author, 2013)
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The stated rationale behind this reconstruction is an attempt to foster 
tourism in Xinjiang. Although this might sound counter-intuitive – why 
would one destroy one of Kashgar’s main historical attractions to bring more 
tourism to the region? – there are several examples in China of cities that 
have experienced major tourist influxes after important renovation plans. 
Perhaps the most striking example – and one that has served as a model 
since its construction – is Lijiang, in Yunnan province. Lijiang’s famous old 
city receives over eight million visitors every year, and it has emerged as one 
of China’s most popular destinations. Its popularity increased signif icantly 
after it was designed as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1997, following 
efforts to restore traditional buildings in the aftermath of a devastating 
earthquake in 1996. Today, Lijiang’s old town is a maze of streets crowded 
with tourists, souvenir shops, bars and guesthouses, surrounded by the “new 
city,” a modern town almost indistinguishable from any other provincial 
Chinese city. Lijiang, in short, became a major touristic destination due 
to at least three concurrent factors: careful planning and reconstruction 
of the old town, the international recognition of it as a heritage site, and 
the commodif ication of local culture in the form of traditional spectacles, 
souvenirs, and guesthouses and bars with “ethnic” elements. A similar 
process is currently unfolding in Kashgar – its reconstruction does not 
appear exceptional if analysed within the discourse of heritage preservation 
in China.
Figure 14: A section of the newly built Kashgar “old” town (picture by the author, 2017)
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“If you haven’t visited Kashgar you haven’t been to Xinjiang”
Preservation and reconstruction are often strictly interconnected in China. 
In recent decades new “old towns” and “ethnic parks” have appeared through-
out the country, leading to what Oakes (1998) called a “manufacturing” of 
minzu culture. As part of this process, not only cities and villages, but also 
traditional practices such as dances (Xie 2003), festivals (Saxer 2012), and 
even old trade routes (Sigley 2013) have been re-branded and commodif ied 
(Gladney 2004). Within this context, Kashgar’s attempts to attract more 
tourists from central China is evident. Since the early 2010s, the slogan “if you 
haven’t visited Kashgar you haven’t been to Xinjiang (bu dao Kashi bu suan 
dao Xinjiang)” has become ubiquitous, not only on posters and brochures 
in the city itself, but also on provincial guides and with tour groups visiting 
the region. Several sections of the new-old town, in particular, have been 
thoroughly re-branded, and, at a few tourist information booths, free maps 
with an overview of the renewed old town and suggested itineraries to 
visit it are freely available. It is also possible to tour the new-old town on 
an electric mini-bus, which leaves at regular intervals from the vicinity of 
“youth square (qingnian guangchang).”
An introductory panel in Uyghur, Mandarin, and English, called “Intro-
duction of Kashgar old town,” placed along a small section of newly re-built 
city walls, in proximity to the newly re-built Shamen, a city gate, and at the 
entrance of fully renovated Atush Lane, provides the following overview:
Located in the center of Kashgar City, Kashgar old town starts from 
Renmin Road in the south to Seman Road and Yarbagh Road in the north. 
YumlaqSheher Road is to the west of it and Tumen River sight-seeing 
area is to the east. The place covers an area of 1.57 square kilometres, 
and 26,575 households including 64,308 residents are living here. The old 
town is the soul place of Kashgar which has over 2,100 years of history 
as the most renowned historic and cultural city in Xinjiang. It is the 
only living ancient city among the 36 countries in the Western Regions, 
and is known as the “hometown of cate” [meishi], “hometown of fruits”, 
“hometown of songs and dances”, “hometown of bazzar” and “hometown 
of jade”. As a place with the richest styles of Xinjiang folk-custom, if not 
in all of China, it is an “ecological museum” and “big natural stage” for 
travelers to experience the original folk customs here. Kashgar old town 
is one of the biggest raw soil buildings existing in the world, streets and 
lanes of which are as complicated as the buildings. It is the only labyrinth 
urban block that has been preserved completely in China. With a long 
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history, abundant culture and unique style, Kashgar old town earns the 
reputation that “Kashgar is a must-go place for Xinjiang, just as the old 
town is a must-go place for Kashgar”.
The panel, together with the new-old city maps placed alongside it, neatly 
indicates the limits of the old city, def ining its exact size and number of 
inhabitants. Implicitly, by claiming that the old town has 2100 years of 
history, it links Kashgar with the Han dynasty conquest of Xinjiang, which, 
according to Chinese scholars, represents the moment the region was 
incorporated into the Chinese world (Rippa 2014a, 2015a). The references 
to fruits, songs and dances, “bazzar” [sic], and jade, on the other hand, are 
a clear attempt at tourist branding. None of these names – perhaps with 
the exception of the bazaar – would sound familiar to any Uyghur resident 
of Kashgar. Yet fruits, songs and dances, jade, and bazaars are frequently 
identif ied with Xinjiang and Uyghur culture by Han tourists and Chinese 
media alike. The renewed old city of Kashgar, then, with its branded alleys, 
tourist shops, organised cultural performances, becomes a “must-go” – a 
place of tourist consumption par excellence.
Furthermore, the reconstruction of Kashgar and the particular visions of 
Xinjiang history and Uyghur culture that it is embedded with, points towards 
a more productive aspect of projects of preservation in China. As Harrell 
(2013) argues, “the effort to preserve is not simply a feeble, rear-guard reaction 
to the effort to modernise. It is very much a part of the modernizing effort, 
which in turn is a part of China’s continuing process of nation-building” 
(287). This point applies particularly well to the case of Kashgar and the 
Uyghurs, where, through an active process of heritage-making, the Chinese 
government is attempting to modernise not only Kashgar as a town and 
tourist destination, but also an entire ethnic group. As Jenny Chio noticed in 
the contexts of tourism in rural China, there is a tight connection between 
Chinese policies of rural development and the promotion of tourist sites. 
In particular, they are both part of “an effort to increase rural incomes and 
also to raise the suzhi [quality] of ethnic minorities by modernizing them” 
(Chio 2014: 98) In Kashgar, too, the re-development of the old city cannot 
be analysed outside of a particular attempt to transform Uyghurs.
The reconstruction of Kashgar represents an important step in the 
materialisation of the CCP vision for the future of Uyghur ethnicity, and 
reflects a particular view of a “modern” ethnic subjectivity. Heritage, in 
other words, becomes a technology of government. As Tim Oakes put it, 
“To baohu something in rural China these days is not so much to “preserve” 
it, but to prepare it for development, to turn it into a visitable attraction, 
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a display of itself” (Oakes 2012: 389). As such, projects of heritage-making 
must be tightly connected to wider discussions about rural development in 
China. In Kashgar, as much as in the Dulong Valley, the creation of a culture 
of display and the commodif ication of a particularly curated minority 
culture, is a major feature of modernisation. Uyghurs and Drung can be 
modern only to the extent that they embrace such visions of their own 
culture, and with it their particular place within the Chinese nation state. 
Furthermore, in the case of Kashgar, what clearly emerges is how processes 
of heritage-making, development, and control are closely intertwined. As a 
technology of government, heritage, here, is not simply aimed at a specif ic 
form of development, but even most importantly it sets up a particular 
regime of control over Uyghur subjectivities and landscape. By re-designing 
Kashgar, a symbol of Uyghur identity, and defining what Uyghur culture is 
and how it should be performed, Chinese authorities are claiming control 
over a particular space and people as well as over their past and future.
Before detailing how this process takes place, let me briefly introduce the 
broader context of the development of Kashgar within which the discussion 
of Uyghur subjectivity needs to be understood.
Shenzhen of the West
Around the old town, within the limits of the Special Economic Zone, 
another form of development has strongly emerged over the last decade. 
Here, Kashgar resembles many other Chinese provincial towns, with large 
roads, apartment blocks, and even a lake with an amusement park and a 
few bars along its shore. The Beijing Zhongkun Investment Group, a major 
real estate developer, is also in charge of building a 160-metre-high tower 
with a youth hostel, “minority culture street”, and bars, alongside a new 
golf course and a tourist resort. Not far from the town centre, moreover, 
a new “Economic Development Zone ( jingji kaifa qu)” is currently under 
construction, extending over an area of 50 square kilometres. The Zone 
is divided into three main areas: a Finance and Trade district (chengdong 
jinrong maoyi qu) in the east, an area under bingtuan administration in the 
north, and a logistics centre by the newly expanded international airport. For 
anyone familiar with China, those plans are all but originals. Golf courses 
and exclusive shopping malls have been mushrooming in most 2nd and 3rd 
tier cities, the “Development Twin Towers” plan follows similar projects in 
other provincial cities, while “minority culture streets” can now be found 
in most touristic destinations across the country. In other words, Kashgar’s 
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development is following the familiar “zone frenzy” that took over China in 
the 1990s and then later in the early 2000s (Cartier 2001; Hsing 2010), only 
this time with a markedly “ethnic” element imbued into it. As the posters 
and models at the Kashgar Central & South Asia Commodity Fair that I 
described in Chapter 1 show, such plans were embedded within an imaginary 
of transnational connectivity brought to the fore by Xi Jinping’s Belt and 
Road Initiative. As far as Kashgar’s Finance and Trade district goes, I was 
keen to see how such dreams materialise in concrete forms.
Thinking back to the images I saw at the Kashgar Central & South Asia 
Commodity Fair, as well as to what I had been reading about the Kashgar 
SEZ, my expectations were rather high as I made my way towards the Finance 
and Trade district in the summer of 2013. I knew that construction had 
just begun, but I was curious to see the size of the site and perhaps talk 
with some of the engineers and construction workers. Overall plans for 
the development of the SEZ were not, in fact, particularly old. The most 
recent part of the plan was f irst laid out during a high-level Xinjiang Work 
Conference held in Beijing in late March 2010. The Conference outlined 
a new approach for the Party’s administration of Xinjiang, a particularly 
signif icant development given the Urumqi incidents of the previous year 
(Bovingdon 2010, 167–170; Millward 2009). The new approach abandoned the 
“stability above all else” formula that has def ined the era of Wang Lequan 
as governor f irst and then CCP secretary of Xinjiang, and moved to one of 
“expedite development” (Shan and Weng 2013: 73; Li 2018). Furthermore, the 
Xinjiang Work Conference arranged a “pairing assistance” model according 
to which nineteen affluent provinces and municipalities were “each required 
to help support the development of different areas in Xinjiang by providing 
human resources, technology, management and funds” (Shan and Weng 2013: 
73). Similar schemes have been employed throughout other border regions 
such as Yunnan and the TAR. In the case of Xinjiang, Kashgar was paired 
with Shenzhen, China’s most successful Special Economic Zone (SEZ). This 
new policy was eventually defined during a second conference in May 2010, 
attended signif icantly by then President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, 
as well as the future President and Premier Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. The 
conference once again highlighted that in order to solve Xinjiang’s problems 
it would be necessary to focus on economic development. The objective was 
then termed “leapfrog development”, with the aim to eventually achieve 
“long-term stability” in the region. As part of it, “the 19 provinces and cities 
that joined the “pairing assistance” program were required to grant 0.3% to 
0.6% of their annual budget to Xinjiang every year” (Shan and Weng 2013: 
75). Two other important measures resulted in a favourable tax system 
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and the establishment of a new Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Kashgar, 
expected to be fully operational by 2020 (Cappelletti 2014: 16).
Given the scale of investments and commitment, what I saw in the 
summer of 2013 was rather disappointing. As I moved away from the city 
centre, I found myself surrounded by cluster after cluster of apartment 
blocks. Roads appeared to become wider as traff ic became sparser. The bike 
lanes and sidewalks remained largely empty under the scorching sun. When 
I f inally reached the site of the area where the Finance and Trade district 
was supposed to be, I was out of the city, surrounded by poplar trees and 
f ields. Along some of the dirt roads, kids were playing outside of mud-brick 
houses – their walls covered with the ubiquitous character 拆 (chai: to tear 
down), an indicator that the building was set to be demolished. The new 
district, while seemingly still far in the future, was a lived presence for 
Uyghur families in this part of Kashgar. I was told that they were about to 
move into new apartment blocks. Some in a week, some in a few months, 
some were hoping to stay until the winter. All, however, willingly or not, 
had to make room for the development to arrive. In the following months, 
I continually returned to this part of Kashgar, noticing that construction 
works were slow. By the time I left Kashgar, in September of the same year, 
none of the families I had talked to had yet moved out of their old houses. 
It would be nearly three years before I visited the same area again. Yet, in 
August 2016, I was to be disappointed once again. Instead of high towers 
and duty-free shops, all I could see were more, mostly empty apartment 
blocks and two large highways running through the small neighbourhoods 
I had become familiar with. At a short distance, a new, large boarding 
school, surrounded by barbered wire and cameras, seemed to be the only 
building in use.
The next chapter will address in more detail the interconnection between 
infrastructural development, technologies of control, and the apparent 
failure that the emptiness of many SEZ projects in Kashgar seem to reflect. 
For now, it is important to notice that even while remaining empty and 
underdeveloped, many development projects within the Kashgar SEZ, 
together with the re-making of the old town into an Islamic Disneyland 
for mainland tourists, accomplished a different goal from that of economic 
development: they materialised a particular vision of the future for both 
Kashgar and the Uyghurs.3 Ildikó Bellér-Hann (2013) employs the metaphor 
3 Another well-established argument posits that SEZs and large-scale development projects 
in China have often become powerful assets to fuel real estate booms, foster GDP numbers and 
thus benef it the careers of local off icials (Cartier 2001; Ong 2011). “Prof it” here is not just for the 
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of the “bulldozer state” to describe the large-scale irresistible destruction of 
old structures that seems to accompany development projects in Xinjiang. 
The bulldozer state, here, refers simultaneously to a process of erasure and 
to one of (re)construction and selective preservation. It “[reinforces] the 
self-image of the Chinese state as carrier of a mission civilisatrice in frontier 
regions inhabited by backward minorities” (188). From a modernisation 
perspective, the “bulldozer state” is thus more about active construction 
than mere destruction. Bellér-Hann, drawing on Schumpeter (1934), terms 
this “socialist creative destruction”: the tearing down of houses is done 
in order to create something new. In Kashgar, both the new-old-town, 
the Special Economic Zone, and the ambitious Finance and Trade district 
represent a materialisation of such efforts to create a new kind of future. 
In this particular vision, the city of Kashgar, in order to exist, needs to be 
turned into a “development zone,” while the old town, renovated as it is, 
has reasons to exist only as a scenic spot ( jingqu). This, together with the 
disciplinary measures at work in the region define the future of the Uyghurs.
Curating Uyghur subjects
One of the immediate results of the reconstruction of Kashgar is that of 
making the city more “legible” to Chinese authorities. The purpose for such 
an operation is generally twofold. First, “Historically, the relative illegibility 
to outsiders of some urban neighborhoods (or of their rural analogues, such 
as hills, marshes, and forests) has provided a vital margin of political safety 
from control by outside elites” (Scott 1998: 54). By re-designing Kashgar, 
transforming its narrow and dark lanes into wider, well-structured roads 
with a carefully planned system that allocates housing only to certain 
families, Chinese authorities have attempted to eliminate this element of 
illegibility that provided shelter for groups and individuals that might oppose 
Chinese rule in the region. Furthermore, as anthropologist Jay Dautcher 
(2009) has demonstrated, Uyghur residential neighbourhoods – known as 
mähälla – are critical units of social identity, and thus serve an important 
function in the creation and strengthening of community bonds and mutual 
solidarity among Uyghur families. By re-designing those mähälla, Chinese 
benef it of “market”, but also serves political objectives. While this holds true for Kashgar as 
well, what I am interested here is how the “spectacularity” of development plans embodied by 
projects such as the Kashgar SEZ is productive of particular forms of hegemony, as Emily Yeh 
has argued in the case of the TAR (Yeh 2013: 236).
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policymakers thus probably envisioned the possibility to re-arrange, and 
in certain cases indeed destroy, those networks.4 The second objective is 
transformational. The objective of making its domains and subjects more 
legible is for the state the precondition to another, more important task: 
to create a terrain and a population with precisely these standardised 
characteristics, easier to monitor and manage. Legibility thus becomes 
“a condition of manipulation” (Scott 1998: 183), an active attempt to foster 
change in the community, beside the environment which they inhabit. It 
is to this objective that I now turn my attention.
Besides Shamen, and in front of the panel introducing the history of 
Kashgar’s old town quoted above, is a ten-metre long bronze bas-relief 
depicting scenes of daily life in the old town. On the left-hand side of the 
relief an electric cart is parked in front of a butcher’s shop, where half a dozen 
sheep carcasses are hanging. Moving to the right, an elderly Uyghur man is 
selling what appears to be f igs, while another man looks at the products on 
display. In the background is the typical layout of Kashgar’s old town, with 
its cramped houses, small balconies, and wooden-framed windows. Further 
to the right, a Uyghur man is sitting on his e-bike, while three other young 
Uyghur men are busy baking naan bread. In front of them, sitting on one 
knee, wearing a cowboy hat and a backpack, a tourist is taking a picture of 
4 Such destruction occurred, more often than not, along class divides. While wealthy Uyghurs 
were able to afford renewal of their old house and thus remain in the same neighbourhood, 
poorer families were left without choice (Steenberg and Rippa 2019). Madlen Kobi also discusses 
this issue at length. For instance: “Some parts of the old town have been completely replaced 
by new multi-story buildings, while others are being renovated and maintained. In both cases, 
house owners affected by renewal plans can choose between f inancial compensation and a new 
apartment in a residential compound on the outskirts of Kaxgar. Residents who decide to stay 
must renovate their houses, either with their own money or with subsidies from the government. 
The lack of f inancial means is the main reason why many residents move out of the old town 
areas. On one of my walks through the old town, I met a group of men who were renovating 
a house. They told me that, since homeowners have to cover most of the costs themselves, 
many of their former neighbors could not afford to renovate their inherited or rented houses. 
Of course, they can apply for a government subsidy – but this money only covers the costs of a 
building’s exterior, while the interior renovations are the owner’s sole responsibility. When a 
friend later mentioned that renovation could cost up to 7,000 or 8,000 Yuan [RMB] per square 
meter, I understood why the lower- and lower-middle-class inhabitants can barely afford it and 
prefer to obtain an apartment on the outskirts of town. Middle- and upper-class residents, in 
contrast, can afford to renovate their houses and thus remain living in the centrally located 
old town. Some of them even add additional stories or build balconies, terraces, glass houses, 
or other previously unknown architectural elements. Moreover, as well as having the f inancial 
means to renovate their old town houses, they can also afford to buy an apartment (or even 
several apartments) in the newly built residential compounds replacing the old town areas” 
(Kobi 2016: 156).
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them with a big camera. In the relief, not one of the Uyghur men has facial 
hair. All, however, are performing some kind of craft: baking naan, f illing 
manta (a type of dumpling), welding metal, or decorating teapots.
The relief depicts a familiar scene. In the new-old Kashgar, a few sections 
are dedicated to traditional crafts, mostly catering for the tourist crowd. 
Its main protagonist, however, seems to be the tourist taking pictures. 
The bas-relief thus appears to imply that traditional crafts are not good in 
themselves, but only insofar as they are available for tourist consumption. 
Implicitly, this scene seems to indicate what Uyghurs in the new-old town 
are supposed to be and do: a display or traditional craft for the benefit of 
outsiders. A showcase of culture – or at least, of what the party-state defines 
as Uyghur culture.
If this bas-relief clearly exemplif ies what the party-state dictates Uyghurs 
and Uyghur culture to be, the city of Kashgar is f illed with other normative 
explanations of what Uyghurs are not supposed to be – and implicitly, of 
what Uyghur culture itself is not. While certain crafts and aesthetics can 
and should be put on display, other elements that some might consider 
an integral part of what it means to be Uyghur must be removed. Take, 
for instance, a list of several signs of “religious extremism” that has been 
widely circulated in Xinjiang since early 2017, and that appeared on posters 
all around Kashgar.5 These instructions warn against men who grow long 
beards or women who cover their faces, but also against people who abstain 
from drinking alcohol, boycotting non-halal food, or avoiding singing and 
dancing during wedding ceremonies. While f illing up manta and welding 
kewab sticks are integral parts of Uyghur culture, this list seems to imply, 
a certain form of religious piety is not.
These examples show that two normative discourses are at play in Xin-
jiang. On the one hand, the heritage discourse points to a specif ic vision of 
Uyghur culture that people in Kashgar are supposed to embody, mostly for 
tourist consumption. On the other hand, there is a disciplinary apparatus set 
to identify and correct all kinds of behaviours that do not f it the party-state 
vision of what it means to be Uyghur in 21st-century Xinjiang. These are not, 
I argue, two separate, contrasting discourses. Rather, I see them as integral 
to a particular vision of society, and of the role of ethnic minorities in it. 
5 The list followed remarks by Xi Jinping made in 2017, when he urged to build a “great wall of 
iron” to protect Xinjiang. Shortly after, the CCP announced the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region’s Articles on Eliminating Extremism, as part of which f ifteen unlawful manifestation 
of extremism were identif ied (available here: http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2017/03/30/128831.
html.). See also Klimesh (2018).
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Here, Uyghurs, like Drung, can exist only insofar as they are both loyal to the 
party-state and its vision of modernity, and “ethnic” to the extent that their 
minzu-ness can be easily commodif ied for tourist consumption. Heritage 
becomes a tool of control – any behaviour that does not f it China’s normative 
discourse on Uyghur-ness is neither acceptable, nor it is considered ethnic. 
Rather, it represents a betrayal of minzu custom.
In order to build this particular form of Uyghur subjectivity, both discourses 
– heritage and control – are at play in Xinjiang. This mission is akin to one of 
social (or human) engineering: “projects to create new kinds of subjects for 
political and economic transformation” (Anagnost 2013: 8). This particular 
notion has recently gained some traction among Xinjiang scholars trying to 
grapple with the party-state’s attempts to re-define Uyghur identity in the re-
gion and beyond (Zenz 2018; Byler 2017; Byler and Grose 2018). Darren Byler, for 
instance, builds on this notion to describe how the state in southern Xinjiang is 
attempting to project and impose an image of secular Uyghur-ness struggling 
against the tyranny of religious dogmatism. This idea of engineering seems 
implicitly based on a Foucauldian view of the subject. Specifically, Foucault 
identif ies two different meanings attached to the word subject: “subject to 
someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a 
conscience of self-knowledge” (Foucault 1982: 781). In every human encounter, 
therefore, there is a tension and an oscillation between being an actor and 
being acted upon. Yet, what is even more interesting for Foucault is the problem 
of the constitution of the subject, that is, how human beings are made into 
subjects. (Foucault 1996 [1984]: 452). According to this line of thinking the 
subject does not pre-exist history or the social processes it is embedded in. 
Individuals are rather constituted by power relations (practices of subjection), 
which eventually define their “conscience of self-knowledge”. Accordingly, 
human beings are made into subjects through a complex network of power 
relations (the microphysics of power), which act primarily on the living body 
as the site of subjectivity (biopolitics). It is through those techniques of control 
that, according to Foucault, specif ic types of knowledge (truth) about the 
subjects are produced, generating the “normative” aspect of power relations 
(Rabinow 1984; Hoffman 2006; Kipnis 2011). In the case of Xinjiang, as with 
the case of Dulong, by resorting to over-encompassing aesthetic projects of 
renovation, as well as to an over-production of symbolic meanings connected 
to minzu identity, the party-state is clearly trying to re-frame what it means 
to be a minority subject in the People’s Republic. As Byler bitterly concludes, 
“the current engineering project seems so totalizing, so extreme, that it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to imagine a way out. It is becoming difficult 
to think beyond the state’s imagination of Uyghur Muslims” (2017).
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While “social engineering” captures an important aspect of the processes 
through which the state projects and develops certain ideas of subjectivities in 
China, the notion of curation refers to a selective process, one that is productive 
only to the extent that it is also simplifying. As in the Dulong Valley, in Kashgar 
a process of curation is also one of erasure. As described above, while certain 
aspects of Uyghur identities are put on display, others are criticised. Uyghurs 
can sing and dance, a characteristic of most minority cultures in China (Glad-
ney 1994; Schein 1997), but should not pray, fast, or refuse alcohol. Yet, even 
the former should not be confined to the privacy of the courtyard, or limited 
to particular ceremonial times like weddings. Rather, as the architecture of 
the new Kashgar implies, the sociability of Uyghur custom should be openly 
shown to tourists and visitors alike. Conversely, mosques, when they are not 
destroyed (Kuo 2019) have become spaces of secular education and tourist 
consumption.6 Starting in 2016, all mosques in Kashgar and southern Xinjiang 
display a red flag, together with a banner saying “aidang aiguo” – love the 
Party, love the Country (note the order). Islamic teachers or mollas and their 
followers are being imprisoned and placed in indefinite detention. The Party’s 
definition of what Uyghur culture is includes specif ic views over the ways 
Uyghurs should dress. Ethnic costumes, such as colourful textiles or doppa 
hats are encouraged, while for women to fully veil their heads is considered 
a “betrayal of ethnic culture” (Byler 2017). For young men, the simple fact of 
having a beard might spell trouble, while moustaches are accepted as an 
expression of local culture. Furthermore, a number of programmes have 
been launched in order to prevent individuals from joining or supporting 
“extremist” groups. Such programmes include a “beauty project,” directed at 
discouraging Uyghur women from wearing veils (Zhou 2017), and a “becoming 
kin” programme according to which a Han cadre is “adopted” by a Uyghur 
family.7 Paired with an increasingly intrusive system of surveillance, these 
and other programmes play a fundamental role in Uyghurs’ everyday lives.
The language used in the renewal of Kashgar’s old town is itself embedded 
within that of curation. Gaizao can be translated as transform, modify, 
remould. What it refers to, however, is to a radical change, one that replaces 
something old with something that can meet the needs of a new situation. 
6 Recent reporting from Kashgar showed that at least one mosque had been re-converted 
into a bar (Wen and Auyezov 2018).
7 The off icial is supposed to visit the adoptive family regularly, and even to live with them 
for short periods – at the same time collecting information and reporting on them. As per The 
Economist, “1.1m off icials have been paired with 1.6m families. That means roughly half of Uighur 
households have had a Han-Chinese spy/indoctrinator assigned to them” (The Economist 2018). 
⁠See also Byler (2018).
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One can remould ideology (gaizao sixiang), nature (gaizao ziran) but also 
“reform” a criminal into a new man. As such, gaizao itself seems to point 
to the second meaning of “curation” that I have detailed in the Interlude: 
to cleanse, to prevent something bad from spreading an infecting its 
surrounding. Accordingly, Uyghur identity is not fully erased. Rather, it is 
cleansed of the elements that do not meet the Party’s vision of modernity and 
secularisation. In this regard, Islamic faith, or any behaviour that reflects 
an ideology in contrast to that of the CCP, is described in seemingly clinical 
terms. Islam, in particular, is characterised as having “infected (ganran)” 
(Grose 2019) and “sickened” (Samuel 2018) the Uyghurs. This aspect has 
become even more pronounced in the course of China’s ongoing “war on 
terror,” yet it is by no means limited to “terrorists.” As Sean Roberts argues:
[T]he “terrorist” label evokes the presence of a biological threat to society, 
akin to a virus that must be eradicated, quarantined, or cleansed from 
those it infects. If such attitudes were not immediately apparent in the 
PRC’s transition from its 1990s anti-separatist campaigns in the XUAR to 
its counter-terrorism ones in the early 2000s, they have become increas-
ingly pronounced in PRC policies combating “Uyghur terrorism” over 
time, resulting in a situation in which Uyghurs as an ethnic group are 
increasingly excluded from PRC society as a biological threat to the social 
order, quarantined so as to not infect the population of the country as a 
whole. (Roberts 2018: 234).
Thus, Islamic extremism, and by extension, Muslim Uyghurs, can “infect” 
people like a “virus” and terrorists are “rats” (Reuters 2014) that spread 
diseases. They represent a threat to the entire community and should be 
transformed – cur(at)ed into new subjects.8
Heritage, control, and the culture of display
One evening at the beginning of November 2012, I went to the Pakistan Café 
for dinner. The small establishment had become a routine visit for me, and 
8 On the CCP use of the language of pathology to approach minority cultures, see Grose 
(2019). In a recent (November 2019) and astonishing set of leaked documents obtained by the 
New York Times, off icial directives clearly frame the state’s distrust of Muslim minorities in 
Xinjiang in chilling clinical terms, explicitly identifying religious extremism with a virus to 
be treated through “transformation through education” in Xinjiang’s prison camps, so that it 
will not infect one’s family (see Ramzy and Buckley 2019).
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on that particular day I was hoping to catch some of the Pakistani traders I 
had befriended in the previous months. Once I arrived, however, the small 
restaurant was empty, except for a table where a middle-aged man and a boy, 
probably about ten years old, sat together. After ordering my usual meal – a 
plate of beef keema and a couple of chapatis – I looked at the man, trying to 
f igure out where he was from. His features were clearly Central Asian, but 
somehow, he didn’t strike me as a Uyghur. All of his front teeth were made 
of gold, his face darker and more sun-burned than most people in Kashgar. 
My guess was that he was Tajik, probably a truck driver, coming to Kashgar 
from Dushanbe through the Kulma Pass. Over the previous weeks I had seen 
more and more Tajik drivers and, in order to cater to them, the Pakistan 
Café had recently changed its name to “Pakistan Café – Tajikistan Café.” 
While most of the clientele remained Pakistani, on a couple of occasions I 
had encountered groups of Tajik men eating shurbo – a sheep meat-based 
soup – with Uyghur naan. Perhaps my glances had become too evident, 
and the man started to make insistent eye contact. Uncertain on whether 
I should greet him in Uyghur, English, or perhaps Russian, I decided to go 
for a more international “As-salāmu ʿalaykum.” “Waʿalaykumu as-salām,” 
the man promptly replied, then adding, in Uyghur: “Amerika-lik?” – are 
you American? I replied, in Uyghur, that I was not American, but Italian. 
“Do you speak Uyghur?” he asked. “Not much, my Mandarin is better.” 
The man – whose name I was soon to discover was Dolkun – switched to 
Mandarin, with which we stuck to for the rest of our conversation. Dolkun, 
it turned out, was not Tajik, but a Uyghur originally from Kashgar. My guess, 
however, was not too misplaced, as I realised when he began to tell me his 
story. Dolkun spent several years as a truck driver and in the 1990s he was 
often travelling to Pakistan. Since the Karasu port of entry opened in 2004, 
Dolkun crossed the Kulma Pass into Tajikistan several times a year, operating 
his own business in cars and spare parts. His fortune was made with what 
in Tajikistan is generally known as tangen (or marshrutka): small Chinese 
minivans, which were imported from China in the mid-2000s and which 
now serve as taxis in towns around the country. Dolkun and I remained in 
touch throughout my time in Kashgar, in 2012 and 2013. I visited his house 
and a couple of his new properties in the new apartment blocks where many 
former old town residents were being re-settled. For him, it was just another 
real estate deal. As he once put it to me, we were in the “era of money (qian 
shidai),” in which all that matters was to get rich. “If you have money any 
place is good, if you don’t have money any place is bad.” For him, Kashgar 
was good, only insofar as it provided new opportunities to get rich. At the 
time of our f irst meeting, these opportunities were plentiful. With the scale 
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of investment connected to the renewal of the old town, new properties in 
the outskirts of Kashgar became available for low prices, and many people 
like Dolkun invested in them.
More generally, between 2012 and 2013, I saw expectations about the 
high number of tourists that would visit Kashgar as the new-old town was 
completed unfolding in very concrete ways. Several Uyghur friends invested 
in shops and hotels, renting and renewing properties within the new-old 
town. My favourite carpet shop moved to a new and larger venue, an old 
teahouse went through important works of renovation to lure tourists with 
a cleaner setting and a trilingual menu (and a completely new name: “100 
years old teahouse”), souvenir shops started to replace local businesses in the 
most central parts of the new-old town, while restaurants popped up at every 
corner. Others, wealthy Uyghur friends such as Dolkun, invested in the real 
estate market in the new parts of town, buying up apartments in residential 
complexes with the hope that prices would keep rising. Investment in 
tourism promised new revenue, and despite the ongoing crackdown on 
so-called religious extremism and a very visible ethnic discrimination, 
many of my contacts were optimistic about their economic situation.
These stories are important in that they show that what was happening 
in Kashgar at the time could not be dismissed as a simple consequence of 
ethnic discrimination. While an element of that is undeniable, the political 
economy surrounding the renovation in Kashgar went, at least initially, 
beyond the minzu divide. The story, in many ways, was a common one of 
gentrif ication. Wealthy Uyghurs benefited from the renovation, oftentimes 
f inding themselves living in larger houses partly paid for by the government, 
and with the resources to invest in the real estate boom ongoing in new parts 
of town where apartment blocks were being built at incredible speed. Poor 
Uyghur families, on the other hand, who could not afford to contribute to 
the renovation of their old-town house, were forced out of their traditional 
neighbourhood and into poor-quality apartments in faraway parts of town 
(for a more detailed analysis of these processes, see Steenberg and Rippa 
2019; Cappelletti 2015).
This particular situation did not last, however. Following what the par-
ty-state perceived as a renewed threat from Uyghur extremist groups in the 
region, in 2014 Xinjiang authorities launched a new “strike hard” campaign, 
this time in the form of a “People’s War on Terror” (Byler and Zolin 2017). 
During the same year, the number of police and military checkposts in 
southern Xinjiang increased dramatically, street controls of mobile phones 
and bags became common place and house searches were conducted on a 
regular basis, often at night. Uyghur residents of southern Xinjiang were 
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required to carry an extra type of ID card, popularly known as the Green Card, 
in order to travel between the region’s towns. Restrictions on mobility made 
it particularly diff icult for Uyghur traders to maintain their businesses. The 
tensions, checkpoints, and heavy military presence on the streets was partic-
ularly detrimental to the tourism industry. Tourists both from Inner China 
(neidi) and from abroad largely abandoned their plans to visit to Kashgar. The 
trend is demonstrated by government statistics too, which indicate a decline 
for 2014 in both the number of tourists and tourism revenue of about 20 per 
cent after years of steady growth.9 Restaurants closed and souvenir shops 
were left empty. The large tourist infrastructure that had been built up was 
left void. Not only did tourists stay away, but local people burdened by the 
difficulty of travelling amidst slumping incomes, government restrictions on 
movement and a generally bleak and suspicious atmosphere were now much 
less likely to go out to eat or travel locally. Local incomes fell for all but gov-
ernment employees. Consumption halted, business suffered. The real estate 
prices stagnated or fell (Zenz and Leibold 2017). Furthermore, the renewed 
focus on policing and surveillance killed off economic momentum, curbing 
investments and severely limiting opportunities for Uyghur businessmen to 
make a profit. As recently calculated by AFP using government statistics, the 
economic gap between Xinjiang and the rest of the country grew significantly 
after 2014. Despite higher growth in 2010–2014, the per capita GDP was 
estimated to have expanded about eighteen per cent more slowly than the 
nation as a whole since 2010 (AFP 2017; Zenz and Leibold 2017). Many of the 
development project infrastructures stood empty and seemingly abandoned 
in the outskirts of town. The situation worsened in 2016 and 2017. The scale 
of the crackdown had signif icantly expanded, and so did the surveillance 
infrastructure throughout southern Xinjiang. In Kashgar, business was not 
going well. Dolkun was nowhere to be found, his mobile turned off, his house 
locked. My questions around the neighbourhood did not lead anywhere, and 
I soon gave up on the idea of re-connecting with him. If he were not already 
in trouble, my questions might harm him, I thought. Other friends who had 
heavily invested in the real estate market during the previous years were 
lamenting losses. Many of the restaurants I came to like, such as Perhat’s 
kewab place, were closed. Many of their owners, my friends, gone.
There seems to be a contradiction at the heart of such policies. For years, 
the party-state had funded the renovation of Kashgar with the explicit aim 
of opening it up to mass tourism. This, the off icial rhetoric implied, would 
9 Data is available on the Kashgar government website, kashi.gov.cn. For the year 2014, see 
in particular: http://www.kashi.gov.cn/Item/24263.aspx (accessed May 2019).
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bring benefits and opportunity to the Uyghur population of Kashgar. Yet, 
since 2014, due to the state’s renewed focus on security, such opportunities 
dwindled, and the small but growing tourist economy collapsed. This, 
however, is a contradiction only insofar as we accept the premise that the 
aim of the renovation of Kashgar was that of the economic development of 
the region. What this chapter has shown, on the other hand, is that this par-
ticular form of curational intervention in Kashgar has a mainly disciplinary 
goal: that of turning Uyghurs into loyal, ethnic subjects. The principal aim 
of Kashgar’s renovation is not economic development. As the only form of 
subjectivity that is deemed acceptable is one that complies with China’s 
paternalistic view of its ethnic minorities, Uyghur-ness is turned into a 
mere culture of display in which crafts, traditional clothes, songs and dances 
become exclusive markers of minzu identity. The normative aspect of power 
relations in Xinjiang, through which Uyghur subjects need to navigate on a 
daily basis, is ubiquitously visible and audible through banners, paintings, 
TV ads, and propaganda slogans played by loudspeakers or moving police 
vehicles. By showcasing, in detail, what Uyghurs should do and should not 
do, the party-state is clearly def ining how Uyghurs should behave – what 
kind of subjects they are supposed to be. As Uyghur culture is reduced to 
such aesthetic elements, the Uyghur subject is constrained by this particular 
culture of display. The outcome, then, is disciplinary, not economic, despite 
the fact that it is often framed in the language of development.
This particular outcome, in which planned interventions turn into a tight 
system of control, echoes a number of works associated with the thinking 
of Foucault, and particularly his famous account of the genealogy of the 
prison (1979b). While, Foucault shows, the aim of the prison system was 
that of “rehabilitating” individuals, its actual outcome seems to reinforce 
and reproduce a discourse of criminality. In so doing, however, the prison 
system does not simply fail. Rather, it reaches a different kind of target, 
“in so far as it gives rise to one particular form of illegality on the midst of 
others, which it is able to isolate, to place in full light and to organize as 
relatively enclosed” (1979b: 276). The point here is that while some kind of 
planned interventions might, seemingly, produce unintended outcomes, 
they remain integral to larger constellations of control bearing concrete 
political effects. In Kashgar, too, the reconstruction of the old town might 
have not achieved economic development through the expansion of the 
tourist industry to the benef it of the city’s population. What it achieved, 
however, is the expansion of a particular kind of state power into the lives 
of Uyghur subjects. This, in turn, reinforced the views of ethnic minorities 
as lesser kinds of citizens.
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Conclusion
In a section of The Rule of Experts (2002), Timothy Mitchell addresses the 
forms of violence that underlie the making of the modern nation. Here, 
Mitchell follows many historians of nationalism in showing how the project 
of building a new nation state is tied to an active attempt at producing a 
past. Mitchell’s argument, however, differs in that he suggests that the 
nation emerges not out of the growing self-awareness of a particular com-
munity, but rather from violent encounters and interventions (Mitchell 
2002: 183). In particular, he describes the case of the reconstruction of 
Gurna, a village near Luxor, in which the creative process of heritage-making 
and the definition of the nation’s past is based upon an act of destruction. 
In 1945, it was decided to move the village to a new location as villagers 
were accused of plundering nearby archaeological sites and harassing the 
tourists visiting it. The project of relocation was in the hand of a “visionary” 
architect, Hassan Fathy, who strongly advocated for the use of “vernacular” 
architectural techniques and material. This appeal for tradition, Mitchell 
recounts, was made for the sake of progress, aiming at restoring sanitary 
condition and ensure a more rational form of energy consumption and food 
distribution. In particular, “this approach to social problems was founded 
on the belief that the recovery of a vernacular national heritage – a heritage 
that was pure and undebased, and thus clean and sanitary – would provide 
a means to the recovery of social energy, health, and purpose.” (Mitchell 
2002: 189). Fathy’s project largely failed due to the villagers’ resistance to 
the economic and practical shortcomings of his vision, yet this experience 
did not dissuade Egyptian authorities from re-launching the relocation 
project in 1998. The rationale, once again, was found in the attempt to 
protect the archaeological heritage from plundering peasants, but also to 
improve their “unhygienic” living conditions. The new project, moreover, 
was closely tied to the tourism industry and the government’s plan to turn 
Gurna into an “open-air museum,” according to which its population were 
to move out and its houses destroyed, with the exception of a few houses 
that were to stand as examples of local architectures and used by artisans 
and craftsmen producing tourist artefacts (Mitchell 2002: 200).
In both cases, Mitchell strongly posits that the attempted evictions of 
Gurna villagers were justif ied as a project of producing the nation: “to 
preserve the heritage of the nation, and to turn those portrayed as lawless 
and uneducated into honest citizens of the state, they must be expelled 
from their homes.” (Mitchell 2002: 205). More specif ically, through this 
particular project of spatial re-territorialisation the nation creates itself 
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by making a particular other: “the performing of the nation required that 
every one of its rural inhabitants be declared outside the nation, uncivilized 
and unhygienic, so that in rendering them civilized and clean, the nation 
could be made” (Mitchell 2002: 192). The village of Gurna, in other words, 
was to be destroyed in order to be preserved. Its people had to be cast as 
others – “ignorant, uncivilized, and incapable of preserving their own 
architectural heritage” (Mitchell 2002: 191) – in order for them to enter the 
national politics. This act of violence that lies at the core of the modern 
nation, Mitchell argues, is tightly connected to one of destruction, in which 
the past needs to be rebuilt in order to become heritage.
As in Mitchell’s Gurna, in the case of the re-construction of Kashgar and 
of the new villages in Dulong, “planning and rebuilding would […] lead to 
the construction of new peasant selves” (Mitchell 2002: 189). Here, too, the 
violence implicit in such an attempt is evident. Much like the old city of 
Kashgar, Uyghur culture needs to be destroyed in order to be preserved. 
The state, through such acts of destruction, presents itself as the protector 
of local heritage, without whose support locals would not know how to 
recognise or to value. Yet, what is protected (or invented) as Uyghur heritage 
is only what can be put on display for tourist consumption. Everything else 
f inds itself in an ever-expanding list of forbidden behaviours. The case of 
Kashgar thus presents, in a nutshell, how future-oriented nation-state politics 
create real everyday grievances in the here and now: in order to promote 
an ideologically charged future harmony, a particular culture of display in 
which ethnic differences are reduced to mere aesthetic choices, a violent 
regime of control is imposed on borderland populations. In so doing, ethnic 
minorities are not only marginalised, imprisoned, or violently killed, but 
they are also clearly marked as a lesser kind of citizen in what is supposed to 
be a multi-ethnic nation state. In Xinjiang, to be sure, ethnicity has become 
a driver of discrimination and a tourist destination.
Furthermore, as I show in the next chapter, practices of heritage-making 
and the transformation of Uyghur-ness into a culture of display are part 
and parcel of China’s attempts vision of transnational connectivity. To do 
so, I return to the issue of connectivity that I introduced in the f irst part of 
the book, and use the image of the corridor to conceptualise the ideology 
underpinning such vision. In particular, I show how the securitisation of 
Xinjiang impacted cross-border relations and practices of proximity. In 
so doing, I place the plight of the Uyghurs – and other Turkic groups in 
Xinjiang – within the broader context of cross-border development now 
framed in the language of the Belt and Road Initiative.

 Coda
Autumn 2016. After my second and longest stay in the Dulong Valley, it 
was time to leave. The driver of the mianbaoche headed to Gongshan and 
that I was sharing with f ive other people, Jiang He, was a local Drung man 
whom I had grown to like throughout the previous weeks for his honesty 
and kindness. A short, hardworking, red-faced fellow, Jiang He always 
had a smile and a good word for all of the people – mostly construction 
workers and the occasional shepherd – that we met on the four-hour 
drive to Gongshan. The sun had yet to rise and the air was crisp as we 
wound up the western side of the Gaoligong Mountains. We had to stop 
our car for a few minutes at a little construction site, and most passengers 
got off for a smoke, shivering in the cold and chatting with the friendly 
road worker handing out cigarettes to his Sichuanese colleagues. Jiang 
He did not smoke, but the short stop did not seem to bother him and he 
joined the rest of the group outside. “This road,” he told me, “was paved 
only three years ago. Before, it was one pothole after the other, it would 
take us a day to reach Gongshan, it was very dangerous.” I looked down 
the steep mountain slope along which the road was built and nodded, 
grievously. Besides myself, there were two other outsiders making the 
trip to Gongshan today, two middle-aged men from Taiwan. One of them 
approached Jiang He with a question: “now that the road is good, why 
don’t you get into the tourism business? You are smart, you speak good 
Mandarin, you know people, why don’t you open a hotel? It sure is better 
than driving a mianbaoche.” Jiang He listened with the attitude of someone 
who had been thinking through that very question more than once. “I 
know,” he said. “What I think would be a good business,” he said pointing 
up-road, towards Gongshan, “is a hotel near the new tunnel. From there 
you can hike in the Gaoligong Mountains, it’s beautiful. Foreigners like to 
hike, and now it’s diff icult to f ind someone to go with. I know this place, 
I could bring people up there (dai ren qu).” For a moment, we all seemed 
to think that Jiang He had a plan, that he was about to tell us where the 
hotel will be, how big it should be, how much it would cost him. However, 
he uttered none of this. Instead, he shrugged and walked off, towards the 
car. “We can go on now.” A few turns up the road, as we got closer to the 
tunnel, I returned to the topic. “Why don’t you open such hotel?” I asked. 
He seemed to think about it for a second, but then replied with the voice 
of someone who is stating the obvious. Maybe he was just annoyed by the 
question. “It’s not easy (bu rongyi), you need money, contacts (guanxi), 
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it’s not easy.” “But sure,” I insisted, “the government is investing a lot in 
Dulong, I am sure they would help.” He nodded, then said: “yes yes that’s 
correct. But we Drung are not good at business.” Another sentence I had 
heard a number of times before. It was time for a different conversation.
In Give a Man a Fish (2015), anthropologist James Ferguson focuses on the 
extension of state social welfare programmes, forms of social protection, and 
cash transfers within a move to a Basic Income Grant in South Africa and 
the Global South more broadly. He makes a case for conceptualising such 
transfers not as gifts, charity, or market exchange. Rather, he argues, they 
should be understood as a rightful share – parts of a broader distributive 
turn recognising that distribution has overtaken production as the most 
significant economic practice of our time. As part of this discussion, Ferguson 
argues that the claim that cash transfers are de-mobilising is “unproven at 
best.” Further, he contends that programs of direct distribution may give “the 
poor” a positive relation to the state, turning them into rightful claimants, 
providing new grounds for mobilisation and thinking new kind of politics 
(2015: 207). This, in turn, can challenge the structural inequalities inherit 
to the current system based on production. What is missing in Ferguson’s 
analysis of distributive politics in the Global South is the People’s Republic 
of China – a country that, in many ways, has been at the forefront of such 
distributive efforts. Like in Dulong, poverty-stricken households across the 
Chinese countryside are the recipients of various kinds of subsidies, often 
framed simply as dibao. Yet, unlike Ferguson’s argument, the Dulong case 
shows the strengthening of the role of the state as the almighty distributors 
of goods. As Jiang He’s dismissive comment that “we Drung are not good 
at business” highlights, this particular relation to the state is paralysing, 
rather than empowering.
In this regard, Dulong is not an isolated example within the Chinese 
context. Take, for instance, Andrew Fischer’s (2009) insightful work on the 
effects of highly subsidised development on Tibetan communities in the 
Tibet Autonomous Region. Fischer shows how state investments (in the 
forms of both government subsidies and subsidised investments by private 
Chinese companies from outside of the region) “accentuated the already 
highly externalised orientation of wealth flows in the economy, resulting 
in a socio-economic structure that rewards a small upper stratum, which 
includes a small minority of Tibetans and a large proportion of non-Tibet-
an migrants, mostly concentrated in urban areas and well positioned to 
access the flows of wealth as they pass through the region with increasing 
velocity” (Fischer 2009: 38). Thus, in contrast to Ferguson’s argument, in 
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China’s ethnic minority-populated peripheries, cash transfers, and other 
forms of subsidised help accentuate, rather than reduce, pre-existing social 
and economic inequalities within particular groups. The environment of 
“extreme dependence” thus emerging from China’s development model in 
the region leads to Tibetans’ exclusion from economic opportunities that 
favour Han Chinese migrants (Fischer 2014: 180–183). For them, this form 
of aid is, in essence, “disempowering” (Fischer 2014) rather than mobilising.
Why, then, does the Chinese case so clearly indicate a conclusion anti-
thetical to Ferguson’s analysis? One answer, as it emerges from the last two 
chapters, lies in the position of ethnic minorities in the Chinese context. 
Here, the minzu system’s hierarchical structure coupled with policies based 
on an inherent understanding of suzhi underpin a patronising approach 
to development and modernisation. This approach, as I have described it 
through the conceptual lenses of curation, empties ethnic places and subjects 
of any cultural and social meaning, thus making the state the only possible 
“provider of goods.” This, in turn, makes any localised form of mobilisation 




Figure 15: suspension bridges on the new KKh in the gez Canyon (picture by the author, 2016)

5 Control
“Development is the foundation of security, 
and security the precondition for development”
— Xi Jinping, May 21, 2014
“Routes may be seen most abstractly as a form of regulation”
— Mahnaz Ispahani (1989: 2).
In February 2013, I met Ali – the dry fruit trader from Nagar that I introduced 
in the first interlude – while we both were in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, on rather 
different missions. He had only recently returned from a month-long stay in 
Xinjiang, during which he was trying to f ind interested buyers for a cargo of 
Afghan walnuts. Now, he was in Rawalpindi securing the shipment, and was 
considering a quick trip to Peshawar to meet the main supplier in person. I, 
on the other hand, was spending two months conducting interviews with 
the Uyghur community of Rawalpindi – the largest in Pakistan with over 
2000 members. Some Pakistani Uyghurs – or Kashgari, as they were generally 
known in Pakistan – were involved in trading businesses with China, and 
thus owned shops in the so-called China market. For Ali, the China market 
was a mandatory stop during his visits to Rawalpindi, as traders and logistics 
companies dealing with China were generally based in this area. The name 
itself – China market – leads to little speculation. This cluster of busy alleys 
and malls around Gordon College Road, close to downtown Rawalpindi, 
was the go-to place for anyone interested in the China business. Street-front 
shops displayed a vast array of made-in-China goods, imported either via the 
KKH or via Karachi and the sea route, while many of the higher floors were 
occupied by small off ices of logistics companies. The names of the malls 
make the China Market rather unique: “China town”, “China shopping center”, 
“China store”, “New China market”, “Beijing shopping center”, “Uromqi Plaza”, 
and so on. Activities around Gordon College Road were always frenetic. 
Cars and motorbikes would drive dangerously through the crowds, while 
young boys carried trays with half a dozen chai cups. Heated conversations 
among traders, in several languages, could be heard while costumers lined 
up at a restaurant famous for its pulau. On the sidewalk, boxes of goods were 
continuously loaded and unloaded to and from trucks, cars, and rickshaws.
Ali and I decided to meet at the “China Restaurant” beside the Beijing 
Shopping Center. While the name might inspire sweet and sour chicken and 
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Sichuanese hot pot, the “China Restaurant” was, in fact, the only Uyghur 
restaurant in the area. The restaurant was located on a rooftop, offering 
a beautiful view of Gordon College Road and the nearby neighbourhood. 
Owned by a family of Kashgari who moved to Pakistan in the 1980s and that 
used to be in the clothing business, the restaurant had become an important 
meeting point for the Uyghur community of the China market. Ali and I 
sat down and ordered two portions of laghmen and a few kewabs. After 
some catching up regarding my research and his business, our conversation 
moved to the current situation in Xinjiang. Ali told me that in Kashgar and 
Urumqi he exclusively dealt with Uyghur traders. While he was free to 
travel to Xinjiang, however, it was more diff icult for his Uyghur partners to 
obtain a passport and a Pakistani visa. He showed me a letter of invitation 
that he had written for one of them to visit Pakistan, with which Ali hoped 
his partner could obtain a passport. Things, he pointed out, were not easy 
for Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Soon after, however, as we discussed how security 
measures have become stricter at the Khunjerab Pass, Ali elaborated a 
different view. As he put it: “China is a free country, you can pray there. 
There are mosques everywhere in China. Uyghurs should stop creating 
problems. They live in a developed country, and they complain, they riot. 
It’s not good.”
This conversation conveniently sums up a particular contradiction that 
lies at the heart of how many Pakistani traders view Xinjiang Uyghurs. On 
the one hand, Uyghurs are fellow Muslims living in a non-Muslim state. 
While Ali pointed out that Uyghurs are free to pray, Pakistani traders (and 
Ali himself, on different occasions) often recognised that there are severe 
restrictions to Uyghurs’ religious lives. On the other hand, I have heard 
Pakistani traders blaming Uyghurs countless times for the dire security 
situation in the region – something that directly affects their business 
interests. “They should thank the Chinese [government],” one went as far 
as saying, “instead all they can do is rioting.”
Such multiple and mutually incongruent views of the Uyghurs seem to 
also be mirrored by China’s policies in Xinjiang. On the one hand, develop-
ment initiatives, from the xibu da kaifa to the Belt and Road are promoted 
according to the objectives to foster cross-border ties and generate economic 
opportunities for local ethnic minorities. On the other hand, regimes of 
control and securitisation concurrently implemented are designed to target 
specif ic groups, resulting, as the previous chapters already documented, 
in increased dependency, economic marginalisation, and social exclusion. 
Part Three addresses the particular connection between infrastructure 
development and the disciplinary measures that are put in place for the 
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management of ethnic subjects, focusing in particular on the consequences 
on cross-border trade. While as I have argued, curational interventions are 
particular relations of power, here I ask what these relations tells us about 
power in China more broadly, and what their impact is on cross-border 
relations. In so doing, I address the contradiction between the promises 
of speed and development – which I articulate through the f igure of the 
corridor – embedded in many infrastructural projects such as the renewal 
and expansion of the KKH, and the emergent technologies of surveillance 
and control that seem to curb such promises.
In this chapter, I show that China’s focus on security pre-dates Chen 
Quanguo’s term as Party Secretary of Xinjiang, and rather def ines Chi-
na’s approach to its western regions more broadly. In order to do so, 
I begin with my research among the Uyghur community of Pakistan, 
before addressing the impact of Xinjiang’s recent securitisation drive on 
cross-border trade. I then theorise this particular modality of power in 
the Interlude, moving from the notion of curation as well as the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari, and I describe its particular spatialisation with 
the image of the corridor.
The Uyghurs of Pakistan
On Gordon College Road, in Rawalpindi, only a f ive-minute walk from 
the restaurant where I had lunch with Ali, is the Khotan House. Together 
with the nearby Kashgar House, the Khotan House had become a major 
landmark in the history of the Kashgari community, since the opening 
of the Karakoram Highway in the mid-1980s.1 Both houses were donated 
1 I refer to the Uyghurs of Pakistan as “Kashgaris”. As I have discussed elsewhere (Rippa 
2014b), not all of them refer to themselves as Kashgaris. Some use the word “Turki”, others 
“Uyghurs”, others “ex-Chinese” or, even, “Chinese.” In this chapter, I refer to them, however, as 
Kashgaris, partly because it is the most used, and partly because the other ethnonyms carry 
a specif ic political meaning. “Turki”, for instance, is generally connected with separatist and 
pan-turkic movements in Xinjiang, and the expressions “Turkestan” and “East-Turkestan” 
have been banned by the PRC. Echoes of this have reached Pakistan as well. In a Kashgari 
neighbourhood in Westridge, Rawalpindi, the local mosque used to be called “Turkestani”, in 
their honour, until the local authorities, under pressure from the Chinese government, decided 
to change the name. The Kashgaris, then, are not only well aware of how politically charged 
those expressions are, but also sensitive to the inf luence Chinese authorities seem to have 
over the local, Pakistani government. Both the expressions “ex-Chinese” and “Chinese”, on the 
other hand, seem to be a recent development connected with the institution, in Pakistan, of an 
Overseas Chinese Association. As it will become clear throughout the chapter, the Overseas 
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to the Kashgari community by wealthy Uyghurs residing in Saudi Arabia, 
and soon became important transit points for Uyghur pilgrims directed to 
Mecca. Xinjiang Uyghurs would cross the Khunjerab Pass into Pakistan, and 
with the help of the Kashgari they would apply for Saudi visas and travel 
permissions. In these years, the Khotan House and Kashgar House used to 
serve as hostels in which Uyghur pilgrims could stay for free. Oftentimes, 
I was told, pilgrims were so numerous that many had to sleep on the bare 
floor in the courtyard – yet none of them were ever charged a single Rupee 
for staying there.
Before the opening of the Karakoram Highway, connections between 
Xinjiang Uyghurs and Pakistani Kashgari were much more tenuous. The 
history of the community can shed some light on this particular relation. 
As Abdulaziz, a Kashgari trader from Gilgit, told me while sitting in his 
shop where he sold made-in-China blankets and cushions, “There are four 
kinds of us [Kashgaris]: those who are originally Pathan [Pashtun], those 
who are originally from Baltistan and those who are originally from [Indian] 
Kashmir. And there are those […] who are 100 per cent Uyghurs.” However, 
the composition of the Kashgari community, I would discover, was even 
more complex than that. In the course of my research, I also heard stories of 
families who lied about their South Asian origins and still managed to enter 
Pakistan, as well as stories of Kashgari families of mixed Uyghur-Afghan 
background who ended up in Pakistan following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.
As I have described elsewhere (Rippa 2014b), the earlier Kashgari migrants 
I interviewed moved to Pakistan just before the partition of the subcontinent 
(1947) and the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (1949). Many 
simply left Xinjiang for the hajj, or on business, and could not go back because 
the border was sealed, while others decided to move to Pakistan for their 
faith or for fear of persecution from the communists. I was, for instance, 
told that in 1948–9 about 500 people moved to Pakistan from Yarkand, 
apparently afraid of the People’s Liberation Army’s advance in Xinjiang. 
Some of them were rich families of traders with an established network of 
contacts in the region, others were farmers with little or no experience of 
the world outside of their native villages. For exactly these reasons, many 
moved in the years following the establishment of the PRC, when the new 
government did not thoroughly control Xinjiang’s border and crossing was 
Chinese Association has contributed to the redef inition of Kashgari identity, and to its division 
along political lines. Most Kashgaris who refer to themselves as “ex-Chinese”, in this sense, are 
very close to the activities of the Association, and thus to the Chinese embassy in Islamabad.
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still relatively easy. Frequently mentioned in the course of my interviews was 
an uprising that took place in Khotan in 1954 (Dillon 2004: 54), after which 
many Uyghurs involved decided to leave Xinjiang fearing repercussions for 
them and their families (see also Rahman 2005).2
Most Kashgaris, moreover, seem to have moved to Pakistan during the 
eleven years of Ayub Khan’s presidency, between 1958 and 1969. Ayub Khan, 
the second president of Pakistan, facilitated their transfer to Pakistan, 
a movement that many considered a return rather than a migration. As 
Abdulaziz pointed out, many Kashgaris have South Asian origins, as before 
the 1940s it was quite common for Kashmiri or Pashtun traders to marry 
Uyghur women and move to south Xinjiang (cf. Warikoo 1996; Rizvi 1996, 
1999; Thampi 2010).
 
In most cases, the fact that those migrants carried a 
British passport – or other documents proving their family’s South Asian 
lineage – allowed them to move back to Pakistan during Ayub Khan’s govern-
ment. A few elderly Kashgaris I interviewed in Rawalpindi still remembered 
their journey through the Karakoram, each giving me similar accounts not 
only of the long and tiring route, but also of the reasons why they decided 
to leave Xinjiang: their family’s properties nationalised by the Maoist state, 
the famine brought by the failure of the Great Leap Forward, restrictions to 
their religious practices. They were all fleeing a communist state for a Muslim 
country and, according to Ayub Khan’s policy, they were immediately given 
Pakistani citizenship and 500 Rupees each upon their arrival.
The opening of the Karakoram Highway in the early 1980s was a major 
turning point for the Kashgari community. For many, it represented the 
f irst opportunity in over three decades to travel to their homeland.3 Most 
chose to take their families with them on the journey. Furthermore, as the 
Highway opened up new possibilities for mobility across the Karakoram, 
many Xinjiang Uyghurs took advantage of the political relaxation in the 
PRC and travelled to Pakistan for different purposes. Although only a few 
2 According to Chinese sources, in 1952 around 3000 Afghan and Pakistani nationals living 
in Xinjiang voluntarily became Chinese citizen so that by 1953 there were virtually no Pakistani 
citizens living in Xinjiang. According to the same account, in the following years, many of these 
people demanded to withdraw from their newly acquired Chinese nationality and applied for a 
return to Pakistan (Li 2013: 59). While this information is consistent with my own f indings with 
regard to the time many Uyghurs moved to Pakistan, I could not verify whether any of those 
who moved in the 1960s had previously received Chinese citizenship. The Chinese article in 
which this information appears, moreover, is characterised by a highly propagandistic tone and 
should be taken with a fair degree of scepticism. In any case, the issue is unlikely to be solved 
until scholars are granted access to off icial documents in both Xinjiang and Pakistan.
3 Chinese sources record 1473 visits by Pakistani Uyghurs to Xinjiang between 1980 and 1987, 
at around the time of the opening of the KKH (Li 2013: 60).
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of such travellers have settled in Pakistan, they have generally interacted 
with the Kashgaris and have had a signif icant impact on this community. 
In particular, as with much of the history of interactions between Central 
and South Asia, the opening of the KKH saw traders and pilgrims once 
again becoming the main force of cross-border mobility in the area. In the 
aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and, particularly, of Mao’s death (1976), 
the Chinese Communist Party moved towards more tolerant policies in an 
attempt to regain support among the non-Han people of Xinjiang. Together 
with a return to a non-assimilationist policy, the early 1980s marked a period 
of relative religious and cultural freedom for the Uyghurs. As a consequence, 
thousands of mosques and madrassas were reopened or constructed, and 
many took advantage of this situation to conduct the hajj pilgrimage, which 
had resumed in 1979 after f ifteen years of interruption (Shichor 2005: 122; 
Waite 2006: 254-5). Pakistan then became a major transit point for Uyghur 
pilgrims as it had in the 1930s. In 1985, about 1200 pilgrims crossed into 
Pakistan in order to reach Saudi Arabia for the hajj. As in the past, they also 
brought various (Chinese) goods with them, and thus through this informal, 
individual form of trade covered part of their costs (Kreutzmann 1991: 725).
Once in Pakistan, those pilgrims usually had to wait a few weeks for 
their Saudi visas to be processed in Islamabad, and thus the local Kashgari 
community developed an important network of support. Haider (2005), in 
an article on the Karakoram Highway partly based on f ieldwork among 
Pakistani traders in Xinjiang, claims that “most of the Uighur settlements 
that can be found in Pakistan today were established in the 1980s as tran-
sit points on the way to Mecca” (525). According to my own interviews 
in Pakistan, most Uyghur pilgrims ended up staying either in Kashgari 
neighbourhoods, or in specif ic “houses” set up with the help of the Kashgari 
community. The pilgrims, in other words, were helped and supported by 
an established network of Kashgaris in settlements that existed since well 
before the opening of the KKH.
Particularly significant in this regard were the Khotan House and Kashgar 
House. Opened in 1986, Khotan House is a three-floor building with a few 
dozen rooms overlooking a small courtyard. At the time of my visit in 2013, 
each room was equipped with two bunk beds and a small table, while half of 
the courtyard was occupied by a prayer hall covered with a few small rugs. The 
only piece of decoration was an old picture showing General Zia-ul-Haq and the 
Chinese consul welcoming a group of Uyghur pilgrims. Already then, however, 
both the Khotan and Kashgar house remained empty of pilgrims. In 2006, the 
Chinese and Saudi governments signed an agreement that allowed pilgrims to 
fly directly from Beijing, and thereafter most Uyghurs from Xinjiang stopped 
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going to Pakistan on their way to the hajj. Largely as a result of this change, 
Kashgar House and Khotan House closed after 20 years, and the buildings are 
now used by Kashgari traders as warehouses. As the next section describes, this 
was only one of several measures implemented after 9/11 that would radically 
impact the quantity and quality of cross-Karakoram exchanges – and the 
internal politics of the Kashgari community more specifically.
The making of an overseas ethnic minority
Since the Kashgaris settled in Pakistan in the second half of the 20th century, 
most have had virtually nothing to do with the Chinese government. Many 
obtained Pakistani citizenship as they arrived in their new country, and 
did not seek any relation with PRC authorities. During the course of my 
interviews, I was repeatedly told that, until recently, the Uyghur community 
of Pakistan seemed of little or no concern to China. It was only in 1988 
that the Chinese government sent its f irst Uyghur off icial to its Islamabad 
embassy, with the specif ic purpose of dealing “with affairs related to Uighur 
expatriates” (Rahman 2005: 1).4 Most Kashgaris I interviewed, moreover, 
agreed that Beijing began to actively interact with their community only 
after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, when Pakistan suddenly found 
itself once again deeply involved with a war in nearby Afghanistan, and 
the Kashgaris became one of the main concerns in China’s own “War on 
Terror”. China’s interests in the Kashgaris became particularly evident in 
the months that preceded the 2008 Beijing Olympics, when rumours of 
Pakistan-based Uyghur terrorists ready to target the Games were rampant.5
In this context, Pakistan’s strategic importance for China increased 
signif icantly (Yang and Siddiqi 2011; Small 2015); yet, at the same time, the 
instability of the country and China’s concern with the situation in Xinjiang 
redef ined China’s policies towards its “all weather” ally. Duchâtel (2011), 
for instance, individuates two main adjustments: sustaining a pro-China 
“United Front,” and reassessing Pakistan’s strategic value. If the second 
“adjustment” is of little concern here, the pro-China “United Front” consists 
4 This decision did not end well for the Chinese authorities, as the young Uyghur diplomat 
left his post after only thirteen months, going into hiding as an Afghan refugee in Peshawar 
and eventually obtaining asylum in Switzerland (Rahman 2005).
5 In 2008, several bombs were detonated on buses in Urumqi and Kunming, with the Turkestan 
Islamic Party (TIP) claiming responsibility, while in March 2008 a Uyghur woman travelling on 
a Pakistani passport was stopped from lighting a container f illed with petrol on a f light from 
Urumqi to Beijing. For an analysis of those incidents see Pantucci and Schwarck (2014: 10).
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essentially of cultivating relations with a wide range of actors, from civilian 
parties to the military, to religious groups and important members of civil 
society. This is generally accomplished through the Chinese embassy in 
Islamabad, and builds upon the principle of “neutrality,” which means that 
when an internal conflict emerges China refrains from taking sides and thus 
avoids making enemies (Duchâtel 2011: 551-3). In other words, it consists of 
a network of relationships cultivated through time and skilful diplomacy 
that the Chinese government can use in times of need. As part of this effort, 
China has since the early 2000s sought to influence the Uyghur community 
of Pakistan through the institution of the “Overseas Chinese Association”.
Virtually all the Kashgaris I talked with in Pakistan were involved with 
the activities of the Overseas Chinese Association, which many, particularly 
in Rawalpindi, called “ex- Chinese Association.”6 The “Association” does not 
have an off ice, but it has two presidents and two chairmen, for Gilgit and 
Rawalpindi, respectively, who manage the money provided by the Chinese 
embassy and distribute it to the community.7 When I interviewed him in 
February 2013, Sultan Khan, chairman of the Association for Gilgit-Baltistan, 
told me that it was the “Chinese High Commission in Pakistan” which asked 
them to form “an association of ex-Chinese.” The embassy, Sultan Khan 
explained, wanted to know the strength of the community so that they 
could economically support it. I was told, in particular, that between 2003 
and 2013 the Association had received about sixteen million Rupees from 
the Chinese embassy. Sultan Khan also confirmed that in 2013 alone the 
Chinese High Commission in Pakistan released the amount of four million 
Rupees, which in Gilgit was distributed in the following way: 5,000 for each 
student and 10,000 each to about 30 Kashgari widows. Although there is 
not a signif icant community of Kashgaris living outside of Rawalpindi and 
Gilgit, various members of the Association told me that they were in contact 
with families in Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, and even Chitral. I was once 
shown a list with the names of about two dozen Kashgari children from 
Chitral, who were also receiving some f inancial help for their school fees.
6 The Association is known in Chinese as huaren xiehui, or “Overseas Chinese Association.” 
Pakistan is also home to a small diaspora of Han and Hakka groups from Eastern China (Lin 2017). 
They are not, however, involved with the Overseas Chinese Association but mostly involved with 
another Association that was formed at around the same time, the so-called “China-Pakistan 
Overseas Chinese Association.” For a discussion of the Han diaspora in Pakistan see Lin (2017).
7 The founder of the Association was Raza Khan, the most successful businessman within 
the Kashgari community and owner of a steel mill in Rawalpindi. Raza Khan, whom I only 
brief ly talked to on the phone, passed away at the time of my research in Pakistan. For more 
information see Rippa (2014b).
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While the creation of the Association can be understood within the 
framework of China’s attempts to secure Xinjiang’s borderlands and the 
ongoing expansion of its diplomatic influence abroad, it also needs to be 
addressed within the wider context of the PRC’s relations with its overseas 
communities. Traditionally, the overseas Chinese (generally huaqiao or 
huaren)8
 
have been seen as China’s “f ifth column,” particularly in Southeast 
Asia where their number and economic influence is more signif icant.9 In 
1978, the “Overseas Chinese Affairs Off ice” (qiaoban) was set up under the 
State Council, stressing the importance of Overseas Chinese affairs for 
the PRC’s national interest. With it, as it has been pointed out, the Chinese 
government implicitly claims that the Overseas Chinese belong to China, 
thus legitimising “the work aimed at enhancing the symbolic aff iliation 
and material contribution of the overseas Chinese to their homeland” 
(Barabantseva 2005: 4). To this end, a significant effort was made toward the 
creation of organisations for Chinese migrants in their country of residence 
in order to assist and promote the unification of those communities (Zhuang 
1997; Cheng 1999; Barabantseva 2005; Nyíri 2002).10
If the establishment of the Overseas Chinese Association in Pakistan 
perhaps f its the aims of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office’s project, it also 
8 “There is a certain degree of confusion in the West over how the Chinese terms huaqiao, 
huaren, and huayi should be translated into English. While there are important differences 
in the status of these groups and their relations to China – huaqiao denotes citizens of China 
living abroad, huaren and huayi refer to foreign nationals of Chinese descent – it seems that in 
the PRC’s policy-making realm these distinctions are rarely drawn. In fact, most of the Chinese 
literature uses the generic term of huaqiao huaren signifying that both groups fall within the 
scope of the overseas Chinese policies of the PRC’s government. Therefore, as used in this article, 
overseas Chinese is equivalent to the Chinese term huaqiao huaren and loosely refers to the 
Chinese people outside the PRC” (Barabantseva 2005: 1).
9 Particularly since the reform period, the Chinese diaspora has played a major role in terms 
of investment and know-how for the development of the mainland. There is no shortage of 
scholarship on the economic success of Chinese diasporic communities (cf. Seagrave 1995; 
Hodder 1996; Tagliacozzo and Chang 2011; Nyíri 1999).
10 Barabantseva (2005) refers to a programme called “Developing Motherland and Benef iting-
Assisting Overseas Chinese” initiated 2002 by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Off ice. “This plan” 
she argues, “has a two-fold strategy. Firstly, it seeks to promote the interaction between old 
overseas Chinese communities, and new Chinese migrants. The second component of the plan 
involves work on enhancing connections between overseas Chinese communities and China. 
This plan is one example of a series of strategies employed by the Chinese nation-state to attach 
the overseas Chinese to the modernisation project in China. Another side of these strategies is to 
export the PRC’s ideological presence in the Chinese communities abroad” (Barabantseva 2005: 
16). As part of the latter strategy, as Nyíri (1999) pointed out, the most recent Chinese overseas 
organisations have been either set up through PRC direct involvement, or are strongly oriented 
towards it.
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seems at the same time very distinct from them. In particular, unlike the 
dynamic described by Barabantseva, in the case of the Uyghur community 
of Pakistan there is not any apparent economic interest on the part of the 
Chinese government, and nothing to gain in terms of the “modernisation 
project in China.” Furthermore, the fact that the Uyghurs are a minority in 
China adds another layer of complexity. In fact, the PRC’s policy toward the 
overseas Chinese is “tailored” for the Han (Barabantseva 2005: 29) despite 
recent attempts by Chinese scholars to highlight the multi-national nature 
of the Chinese communities abroad, claiming their identities remains a 
“taboo zone” for the Chinese government. Barabantseva thus argues that 
although “these groups are not completely absent from the vocabulary of 
the PRC’s off icialdom,” China seems to silently recognise the fact that “it 
does not have enough legitimacy to seek the loyalty of the Chinese ethnic 
minorities overseas” (Barabantseva 2005: 31).
The case of the Overseas Chinese Association in Pakistan seems to 
represent an exception. Although the language is not always clear, and 
members of the association seem, at times, to be ambiguous about it, the 
goals of the Association are mostly political. Like other (Han) overseas 
communities, in the case of the Uyghurs of Pakistan, the Chinese gov-
ernment seems to make a considerable effort in winning the loyalty of 
this community, aligning it to its nationalist agenda. In order to do so, the 
Pakistani Overseas Chinese Association is not directly connected to Beijing 
and the central government, but rather to the Xinjiang government. Here, 
the main actor is the “Xinjiang Overseas Exchange Association” (Xinjiang 
haiwai jiaoliu xiehui), which was set up in 1992 in order to create a link 
between the “Overseas Chinese from Xinjiang” (Xinjiang huaqiao huaren) 
living in countries like Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Australia, and Canada (China News 2013).
 
In 2013, the “Xinjiang 
Overseas Exchange Association” held its second General Conference, in 
Urumqi, while a few years before it briefly made the (Chinese) news for 
donating 200,000 RMB to the Pakistani community (Sina 2008; Xinhua 
2008).
 
As part of the Association’s attempt to draw the overseas Xinjiang 
groups closer to the homeland, I was told in Pakistan that annual visits to 
Xinjiang were organised for various members of the community. In one case, 
in 2012, a small delegation was invited to Beijing as part of the “Delegation 
of Overseas Chinese minorities from Xinjiang” (Xinjiang shaoshu minzu 
huaren huaqiao kaocha tuan). In a picture I was shown in a Kashgari shop 
in Gilgit, a group of about 30 people were gathered in one of Beijing’s largest 
Xinjiang restaurants, were they held a conference followed by a traditional 
Uyghur meal and dances.
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China’s attempt to redefine the Kashgari as an overseas community seems 
largely based on geopolitical and security concerns (see also Small 2015).11 
As such, it comes as a little surprise that the Association’s f irst task was 
that of obtaining a comprehensive database of the location, composition, 
and socio-economic conditions of all Uyghur families in Pakistan. In the 
process, Chinese authorities in Islamabad have been extremely successful 
in co-opting some of the Kashgari elites, particularly those families involved 
in cross-border trade. Over the course of my research among the Kashgari in 
Pakistan, I became particularly acquainted with Sultan Khan, the chairman 
of the Association for Gilgit-Baltistan, and his family. Sultan Khan saw the 
Kashgaris as an in-between community, with its roots as much in China 
as in Pakistan. As he once put it to me, “our fathers are from Pakistan and 
our mothers from China, we belong to both countries and we represent an 
important bridge between them.” In the 1990s, for instance, he stressed that 
many Kashgaris used to work as interpreters and facilitators for the Uyghur 
pilgrims coming from Xinjiang. Others, like Sultan Khan himself, were 
doing business between the two countries. In the spirit of what Marsden, 
Ibañez-Tirado and Henig call “everyday diplomacy” (2016), Sultan Khan held 
his activities as part of the Association in high regards. “We are an important 
messenger between China and Pakistan,” he explained once while sitting 
in the back of one of his Swiss watch shops in Rawalpindi. With reference 
to these criticising China and its treatments of the Uyghurs, he further 
added that “the Chinese government is working for the public welfare and is 
giving religious freedom. In my view the policy of the Chinese government 
is very good particularly for the Uyghur people.” In Xinjiang, he went on to 
explain, people receive unemployment benef its, and they are given land 
for free. “Those who say that Muslims are being suppressed in China are 
listening to some wrong propaganda. There is religious freedom in China, 
it all depends upon the individual whether he or she wants to go to a bar, 
a mosque or to church.”
Move north, young man
In June 2013, during a few weeks of research among the Kashgaris of Gilgit, 
I met the man in charge of distributing school fees to Kashgari children on 
11 Pakistan, in this regard, is not an exception. China has been increasingly monitored and 
engaged Uyghur communities abroad, from Central Asia to Turkey and Egypt (cf. Roberts 2004; 
Vanderklippe 2017).
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behalf of the Association, Akbarjan. Over several cups of tea in his shop in 
Gilgit’s main bazaar, Akbarjan told me his story, and how he came to work 
for the Association. Akbarjan had an honest smile and spoke English slowly 
and thoughtfully. He told me that his father was born in Khotan, and moved 
to Pakistan in 1958, along with other Uyghur families. His family used to 
run a silk business in Khotan, purchasing and selling silk between Xinjiang 
and British India. It was only because his grandfather was originally from 
Peshawar, and thus held British documents, that Akbarjan’s father was able 
to migrate to Pakistan in 1958. Akbarjan himself used to go to Xinjiang quite 
often after the Karakoram Highway opened in the early 1980s, “on business.” 
Yet, since a massive landslide hit Attabad and blocked the road in 2010, trade 
has become unprofitable, and Akbarjan had been mostly staying in Gilgit. 
“Once the tunnel [across the Attabad lake] is f inished,” he told me, “I will 
go back to China, do some business.” What he told me next was even more 
interesting. As a member of the Overseas Chinese Association he had very 
good relations with Chinese off icials in Islamabad. While some Kashgari 
families were known for taking advantage of it, he claimed that the money 
provided by the Association was doing a lot of good. “After the association 
was established, Kashgari people are much more educated and can f ind 
better jobs here in Pakistan.” In business, too, China has promised help. 
He elaborated:
The Chinese government offered us [the Kashgari in Gilgit] to move back 
to China saying that they will support our business and the education of 
our children. […] You know, recently the Chinese government built a big 
market in Kashgar. They offered us to go, saying that we can do business 
there free of any cost.
Only two weeks after this conversation, I was strolling through the “big 
market” Akbarjan was referring to, in Kashgar. I had returned to Xinjiang in 
order to join the Ninth Kashgar Central & South Asia Commodity Fair – the 
biggest trade fair in town, to which over a hundred Pakistani traders were 
invited. As I described in the f irst chapter, the main venue of the fair was 
the impressive Kashgar International Convention and Exhibition Centre. A 
second, smaller venue, was at the Guangzhou new City – a 1.5 million square 
metre “urban centre” located in the south-western outskirts of Kashgar, along 
the Karakoram Highway, that had just been inaugurated. For the occasion 
of the fair, the Guangzhou New City was quite full. An entire f loor, the 
fourth, was occupied by at least three dozen Pakistani stands, with traders 
from Gilgit-Baltistan, Punjab, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa selling their goods. 
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For me, it was a chance to catch up with a number of friends that I had not 
seen in months and check how business was going for Pakistani traders in 
Xinjiang. Karim, the trader from Gilgit-Baltistan whose family ran three 
shops in Kashgar and Tashkurgan also had a little stand at the Guangzhou 
New City. I asked him about Akbarjan’s story that the Chinese government 
was offering business incentives in Kashgar for Pakistani Uyghurs. He 
confirmed that the story was true, and that it was not only about Pakistani 
Uyghurs, but Pakistani traders in general. “If I want,” Karim told me then, “I 
could move my shop here, to the Guangzhou New City. They [the Kashgar 
government] are giving off ice and retail space for free to us, if we want to, 
we don’t have any rent to pay.”
Karim was not interested in the offer – his family had just opened a third 
shop in Xinjiang, right in the Kashgar’s city centre where he was hoping to 
cash in from the growing number of Han Chinese tourists. Others, however, 
did take advantage of the Kashgar government’s offer, and over the next two 
years I heard several rumours about Pakistani traders in the Guangzhou 
New City. I was able to conf irm these rumours only three years later, in 
the summer of 2016, when I returned to Xinjiang for the f irst time after the 
end of my doctoral research. In the meantime, a lot had happened. The 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was making headlines, and China had 
committed the stunning f igure of US$62 billion to it. The China Road and 
Bridge Corporation had completed the tunnels around the Attabad Lake, 
and the Karakoram Highway was in very good conditions all the way to 
Gilgit. Not all, however, was going so well.
After spending a few days in Kashgar, in August 2016, I went to Tash-
kurgan. There, together with some old friends, I met a Hunza trader who 
had tried his luck at the Guangzhou New City. Like a dozen other traders 
from Gilgit-Baltistan, Haf iz had a small shop in Tashkurgan in which 
he sold gemstones, brass vases, and other handicrafts imported from 
Pakistan. Haf iz co-owned the shop together with two other partners, 
who took turns going back and forth across the Khunjerab Pass. While 
Haf iz’s shop in Tashkurgan opened only in 2015, he told me that he had 
been doing business in Xinjiang since 2013. Back then, he opened a shop at 
the Guangzhou New City. Like him, a few other Pakistani traders opened 
small businesses there, all rent and tax-free. Things, however, did not go 
particularly well. As he put it to me: “you see, you can have all the space 
in the world, no rent, no taxes. But if there’s no people, no customers, 
you still don’t make any money.” The Guangzhou New City, far from the 
city centre, never managed to attract any customers. Pakistani traders 
who opened businesses there all left, after a year or two. As I could see 
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for myself on the way back from Tashkurgan, the place laid virtually 
abandoned.12
To be sure, Kashgari traders are today strikingly missing from the Guang-
zhou New City and similar projects across Kashgar. None of the Kashgari 
seemed to have taken advantage of the offer that Chinese authorities 
in Pakistan had made to members of the community, as per Akbarjan’s 
explanation. Why is that? Why, despite the diff icult f inancial situation 
in which many Kashgari families are, had nobody been eager to return to 
Xinjiang? The following section, discussing the history of the Kashgari’s 
involvement in cross-border trade, as well as some of the un-expected 
outcomes of China’s recent engagement with the community, will shed 
some light on this question. In doing so, it will also introduce the issue of 
the recent securitization of Xinjiang. As many analysts, journalists, and 
human rights groups have observed the level of securitisation is Xinjiang has 
reached since 2017 unprecedented scope. Rather than an exception, however, 
in this Chapter I show that what is currently taking place in Kashgar is the 
logical consequence of a particular modality of development that privileges 
control over economic growth.
China’s wars on terror
According to Sultan Khan, the f irst time China invited Kashgari traders 
to visit Xinjiang and “do business there” was shortly after the opening of 
the KKH, in the early 1980s. This move needs to be understood as part of 
a larger strategy, as since the beginning of the reform period the Chinese 
government has encouraged minorities to develop trade relations with 
neighbouring countries (Haider 2005: 525). Deng Xiaoping notably viewed 
this as a process that may help the minorities’ modernisation, as well as 
a way to develop more friendly relations with the neighbouring Muslim 
countries (Dreyer 1993: 377). Many Uyghurs in Xinjiang took advantage of 
the new policies and re-established lucrative trade on the routes connecting 
Xinjiang with its neighbourhoods in the north and in the west (Roberts 
2004: 218-225; Millward 2007: 288-93). Others – a minority when compared 
12 Miller (2017: 71) quotes a local estimate that 150 Pakistani traders moved into the Guangzhou 
New City. By my own estimates, this f igure is far too generous. According to my own contacts 
in Xinjiang, no more than two dozen shops were opened by Pakistani traders in the Guangzhou 
New City. While some of the shops changed hands a few times between 2013 and 2016, the f igure 
of 150 traders involved in these initiatives seems unlikely.
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to those who went to post-Soviet Central Asia – went to Pakistan. Yet, at 
this time, as my interviews among Uyghurs in both Pakistan and Xinjiang 
attest, an important part of the Xinjiang-Pakistan trade volume rested in the 
hands of the Kashgaris. Making skilful use of their kinship ties with Xinjiang 
Uyghurs, as well as of their linguistic abilities and knowledge of Pakistan, 
the Kashgaris found themselves well equipped for the new opportunities 
presented by the opening of a road connection with China.
Similarly to what happens today, in the 1980s the bulk of the trade con-
sisted of Chinese consumer goods, crockery, shoes and garments produced 
in Eastern China and often brought to the Xinjiang bazaars by itinerant 
Uyghur traders. Furthermore, of particular interest for many Kashgari 
traders I interviewed was silk. In Rawalpindi’s China Market, a few silk 
shops are still owned by Kashgaris, but I was regularly told that due to the 
depreciation of the Pakistani Rupee and the growing number of Pashtun 
traders, this business was not as prof itable as it used to be. In fact, since 
the late 1990s, Uyghurs and Kashgaris both lost their respective advantages 
in the Karakoram Highway trade, and were soon replaced by Han Chinese 
companies and other Pakistani traders. Today, only a minority of Kashgaris 
are still involved with cross-border trade, while only a handful of Uyghurs 
from Xinjiang still manage to visit Pakistan regularly for business purposes.
A number of factors contributed to the exclusion of most Kashgari from 
the prof its of cross-border trade. As I pointed out earlier in this Chapter, 
9/11 and China’s participation in the US-led “war on terror” led to increasing 
concerns among authorities in Beijing and Urumqi about a Uyghur presence 
in Pakistan. In November 2001, in particular, the PRC government released 
a document entitled “Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by ‘Eastern Turkistan’ 
Organizations and their Ties with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban” (Per-
manent Mission of the PRC to the UN 2001). The document describes the 
existence of an international network of Uyghur terrorists posing an urgent 
threat to China. Uyghur human rights groups, the document claimed, were 
also part of such a network funded by Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida. Shortly 
after the appearance of this document, the PRC issued a more detailed 
“White Paper” on the terrorist activities Uyghur terrorist groups, entitled 
““East Turkistan” Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity” (People’s 
Daily 2002). Eventually, despite the lack of evidence provided to support such 
claims, China’s efforts convinced the United Nations and the United States 
to off icially recognise the existence of a militant Uyghur group, the Eastern 
Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) – which, until then, was unknown to 
most Xinjiang experts and residents of the region. As per China’s version, 
however, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement was not only a major threat 
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to peace stability, but it was also operating out of bases in the north of 
Pakistan, in the “lawless” areas which border Afghanistan, enjoying the 
support of many Islamist groups in the region.13 In fact, as Sean Roberts has 
compellingly shown, most of the information we currently have regarding 
Uyghur militant organisations abroad is based “exclusively on biased Chinese 
and Central Asian intelligence” (Roberts 2012: 3), thus leaving ample room 
for scepticism. Nevertheless, as he further argues, the off icial recognition of 
a Uyghur threat “provided the justif ication for the production of a long chain 
of knowledge about ETIM produced by think-tank experts, policy analysts, 
security experts, and academics” (Roberts 2012, 3). Most importantly, it also 
led to the implementation of specif ic security policies within Xinjiang, as 
well as Pakistan and among other Uyghur communities outside of China.
The creation of the Overseas Chinese Association in Pakistan in 2003 
must be understood within this broader approach to security. Because 
of its creation, business relations have become more politicised, and the 
Kashgari community fragmented according to different views over Chinese 
influence. A Kashgari man whose family moved from Yarkand in 1952 and 
who preferred to stay anonymous, told me his opinion – which I have since 
then found to be shared by many others – in the following words. “The 
Chinese government isn’t really doing anything for us,” he whispered as 
we chatted in a small teahouse in the centre of Gilgit, “they give money 
to some people, but then these people use the money for themselves and 
the others don’t get anything.” The Association, in fact, operates with little 
transparency. No one was either able or willing to tell me how this money 
was distributed, or based on which criteria some people received scholarships 
13 The Soviet war in Afghanistan, when China joined the anti-Russian coalition, was another 
factor that seemingly contributed to the movement of Xinjiang’s Uyghurs to, and through, 
Pakistan. As reported by Fuller and Lipman (2004), it has been estimated by Chinese sources 
that “as many as 10,000 Uyghurs had travelled to Pakistan for religious schooling and “military 
training”” (342). What the Chinese government did not mention is that during the time of 
the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, Beijing provided over US$ 400 million in military aid 
to the mujāhidīn in the form of arms and advisors, all f lowing into Afghanistan through the 
established network of the refugee camps in Peshawar, Pakistan (Cooley 2002: 60). Moreover, in 
1985, training camps were opened near Kashgar and Khotan, where militants learned the use of 
“Chinese weapons, explosives and PLA [People’s Liberation Army] combat tactics” (Cooley 2002: 
59). Other analysts (Rashid 2002: 204, Christoffersen 2007: 52), have highlighted the presence of 
Uyghur militants in Pakistan since the 1980s, often adding that many were enrolled as students 
in local madrassas. Unfortunately, we do not seem to have enough information to either sustain 
or dismiss those claims, particularly when it comes to the current capability of those groups, 
and the assertive language of Rashid and others has thus been criticised by several Xinjiang 
experts (Bovingdon 2010: 135–6). For a thoughtful critique of the existing literature on Uyghur 
terrorist groups see Roberts (2012).
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or benef its. More importantly, nobody was entirely clear about what the 
political motivations were behind China’s efforts to engage the Kashgari 
community.
At the time of my research, the Association’s most severe critic was Umer, 
who told me his story over the course of several meetings at his house 
in Rawalpindi. Umer’s family was originally from Kashgar and moved to 
Pakistan in 1948. Born in Rawalpindi, he worked in Saudi Arabia with his 
brother for a few years, as many Pakistani did in the 1970s and 1980s. When 
he returned to Pakistan, he was in charge of Khotan House and Kashgar 
House between 1986 and 2006. In 2008, Umer and his brother, together with 
four other people, founded the Umer Uyghur Trust with the aim of teaching 
Uyghur language and culture to the youngest generations of Kashgaris in 
Rawalpindi. Now a hefty man of mild manners in his mid-50s, Umer talked 
with confidence as he offered me tea and sweets. “Education,” Umer said, 
“is the basic right of every person. We just want to teach our culture and 
our language to our children.” With this purpose, Umer opened a small 
school near his house, in the Westridge neighbourhood of Rawalpindi where 
most Kashgaris live. Soon after the school was opened, he received several 
visits from different “Pakistani agencies” pressuring him to close it, as, 
according to them, it was endangering the good relations between China 
and Pakistan. He told me that the agencies made him an offer in lieu of the 
Chinese embassy, that he would be given “f inancial aid” and benefits if he 
stopped his activities. He did not. Eventually, Umer claimed, under Chinese 
pressure a group of (Pakistani) men from some (Pakistani) agency came to 
the school and destroyed everything, while his name and that of his brother 
were put on the Exit Control List, thus preventing them from leaving the 
country (Radio Free Asia 2010, 2011; NBC News 2010).
At the time Umer’s school was forced to close, a new “Montessori school” 
opened in the neighbourhood – only a f ive-minute walk from Umer’s house. 
The principal of the school – a Punjabi man with little interest in political 
feuds within the community of Kashgaris – told me that he was f irst contact-
ed by the Overseas Chinese Association in 2010. They were interested, he told 
me, in opening a school in the area for the children of the Kashgari families. 
They eventually found a way to collaborate, and with the financial assistance 
of the Association the school moved into a new, four-floor building. The 
Chinese ambassador visited the school on more than one occasion, and 
donated sixteen computers and books for the school’s library. At the time 
we spoke, the principal told me that about 150 “Ex-Chinese” children – as 
he called the Kashgaris – were currently enrolled in the school, all their 
fees and expenses paid by the Association. “We also have a plan to teach 
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their language [Uyghur],” he told me, “but the Association is in charge of 
that and I honestly don’t know [when we will begin].” A few years later – as 
of late 2019, that is – Uyghur is still not taught at the Montessori school in 
Rawalpindi. The school nevertheless became a symbol of China-Pakistan 
friendship. Around the new building several posters displayed the Pakistani 
and Chinese flags one beside the other, and in the principal’s off ice I noticed 
several pictures taken when the works on the new section of the school 
began. They showed the principal shaking hands with the former Chinese 
ambassador Liu Jian, with prominent member of the Kashgari community 
in the background. On one occasion the principal took me on a little tour of 
the various classes, where he asked the small pupils “Who is an ex-Chinese?,” 
to which a group of kids responded by raising their hands, telling me their 
names and confirming that they were, in fact, “ex-Chinese.”
For some of the Kashgaris living in Westridge, however, the school was 
not only a symbol of friendship. As I was told by a few elder members of the 
community, through the school the Chinese were simply trying to “bribe” the 
Kashgaris, so that they would not think about the various injustices the CCP 
was committing in Xinjiang. Umer, obviously, was particularly critical of the 
new school – but his attacks were reserved for the Association more broadly. 
According to him, the Chinese embassy was “using” the Association. But 
why would Pakistani Uyghurs get along with it, I asked. Umer named some 
of the leaders of the Association, pointing out that they were businessmen 
“with lots of contacts with Chinese companies.” Like Sultan Khan, they had 
much to gain from friendly ties with Chinese authorities.
Umer had a point. Businessmen such as Sultan Khan have prof ited 
handsomely from their proximity to the Chinese embassy. Not only have 
their businesses have expanded, but they have successfully managed to 
send their children to some of China’s top universities under generous 
China-funded scholarship programmes. Sultan Khan’s two eldest sons 
both studied in Shanghai, while his youngest son was in 2013 f inishing 
up a Master’s degree in a prestigious university in Beijing. Sultan Khan’s 
brother, another wealthy member of the Kashgari community, had two sons 
in China, studying at Chinese universities through scholarships provided 
by the Association. As one of them, Salman, put it when I met him in his 
dorm room at Tsinghua University, in Beijing:
The scholarship has no name […] it’s just the government that gives it. 
And it’s for Xinjiang people from all over the world. This year, at Minzu 
university, there are students from Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkey, Australia, Saudi Arabia. All of them Xinjiang people. 
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[…] First, I also studied at Minzu University, on a scholarship as well. 
When I went back to Pakistan [after my BA] my father applied for me 
to go to Tsinghua University. The people at the [Chinese] embassy and 
his friends [in Beijing] helped him so that I could have a scholarship in 
Tsinghua. I’m the f irst from Pakistan to get a degree at Tsinghua. I’m the 
f irst and my cousin is the second, he is getting ready.
Salman’s dorm was close to the north-east gate of Tsinghua University. At 
the time I met him he was sharing it with a Mongolian student. A very tidy 
room, the only decoration was made up of a few pictures hanging on the 
wall. An alpine landscape. Dunes in the desert. Salman and a few friends 
in a Beijing club particularly popular among foreign students. In one corner 
of his room Salman kept a small stove, where he would “cook Pakistani 
biryani every week.” A small desk with a computer and a small pile of books, 
beside Salman’s own bed, completed the room. “You see,” he continued, “the 
Association was made by Chinese off icials – but they made it for the Uyghur 
community [of Pakistan].” I asked him what the Association was supposed 
to do. “They give us some funds and with those funds my dad is supposed 
to make some schools or community work, or when [Kashgari] people need 
to travel to China they go through a process with my father and they can 
get very easily a visa. Or if there is some problem [with Chinese people] in 
Pakistan […] my dad helps the embassy.” Terrorism, Salman pointed out, 
was one such problem. Echoing PRC language on the subject, he mentioned 
“a few, very few” Uyghur terrorists in Pakistan. “Most of us are peaceful, we 
are not extremists,” he contended, “and the Association is trying to help the 
[Chinese] embassy f ind the terrorists.”
As it emerged from this brief exchange, and as many Kashgari pointed 
out during several conversations in Pakistan, the leaders of the Association 
had the power not only to distribute subsidies and scholarships, but also to 
facilitate one’s application for a Chinese visa. Proximity to the Association thus 
became paramount to the Kashgari’s ability to travel, and therefore conduct 
business, in Xinjiang. For Umer, conversely, his opposition to the Association 
led to his – and his family’s – inability to travel, and thus to the end of his 
business dealings with China. In general, with the exception of a few wealthy 
traders, such as Sultan Khan and his brother, most Kashgari have over the 
past decade abandoned their cross-border businesses. The main reason, many 
pointed out, was the increasingly diff icult economic situation in Pakistan, 
with the devaluation of the Rupees and the growing cost of RMB. Secondly, 
many former traders complained about the diff iculties in obtaining a visa 
for China. As Abdulaziz told me once while chatting in his Gilgit shop: “they 
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[the Chinese] say that we are always welcome, but then when we go to China 
they treat us as terrorists.” In this regard, most of my interviewees agreed that 
the creation of the Association has not changed this situation – benefitting 
those in power, but with little impact on other Kashgari.
The effects of securitization on most Kashgaris’ business was well visible 
at the China Market, in Rawalpindi. After several visits and interviews with 
various businessmen there, I was able to conclude that not only was the 
overwhelming majority of the goods was imported via Karachi, but also 
that Kashgari represented only a minority of the “China traders” there. 
Most traders, in fact, were either Pashtun, Punjabi, and to a lesser degree 
from Gilgit-Baltistan. Ali, as we talked over a number of meetings around 
the China Market, recognised that not many Kashgari were in the business 
anymore. He did not know why, particularly as he seemed pretty content 
with his business. 2013 was promising to be a good year. He was hoping to 
ship two full containers of walnuts to Kashgar – he had already bargained 
a good price, found interested buyers in Kashgar, and was ready to collect 
the walnuts once the Khunjerab Pass would open, in May. Unfortunately 
for Ali, and many like him, such expectations would not fully materialise. 
Security measures in Xinjiang increased over 2013 and 2014, making it more 
complicated for small-scale traders to f ind reliable Uyghur partners and 
get their goods through customs. Furthermore, over a decade after joining 
the US’s war on terror, China launched in 2014 a “people’s war on terror” in 
Xinjiang. The objective, as Xi Jinping explained, was to erect a “Great Wall 
of Steel” around Xinjiang, to ensure stability and peace.
As in the early 2000s, increased security impacted cross-border trade in 
particular ways. This time, however, it was not only the Kashgaris who were 
affected. The next section, after describing some of the security measures 
introduced in 2017, focuses on the KKH as a unique point of entry from 
which to look at how control was given primacy over trade, immobility 
over mobility, security over development. In so doing, I return to Karim 
and Ali, before addressing the particular configuration of power displayed 
at China’s borderlands.
Driving (slowly) through the core hub
Already one of the most heavily policed places on earth, Xinjiang’s security 
spendings increased 10-fold in the years since 2009, totalling more than 58 
billion RMB in 2017 (The Strait Times 2018). The most recent increase – of 
almost 100 per cent between 2016 and 2017 – coincided with the f irst year 
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of Chen Quanguo as Party Secretary of the XUAR. Before being named to 
this new position, Chen Quanguo had gained a reputation for his work in 
the TAR, which he governed through a combination of intense securitiza-
tion and penetrating social control mechanisms (Zenz and Leibold 2017). 
While initially implementing similar policies in Xinjiang, such as launching 
massive police recruitment, Chen soon introduced drastic measures that 
had not been part of his tenure in the TAR. What has received most media 
attention since mid-2017 is, in particular, the opening of “re-education” 
camps throughout Xinjiang, in which over a million Uyghurs are estimated 
to have been held (Zenz 2018; Humans Rights Watch 2018). Other measures 
include the construction of tight network of “convenience police stations,” the 
installation of cameras on lampposts and at all main roads and intersections, 
and the upgrading of facilities at roadside checkpoints across the region.14
In Kashgar, the surveillance landscape had changed dramatically between 
my visit in the summer of 2016 and in August 2017. In the course of that year, 
as the few friends I managed to meet and talk to described, convenience 
police stations were built at all major intersections. Cameras dotted most 
corners, and high fences and barbered wire secured the perimeter of all 
public off ices, schools, and even kindergartens (Figure 16). All main en-
trances to the newly f inished “old town” were by then equipped with a body 
scanner manned by at least two police off icers. Uyghur men, women, and 
children had their bodies and possessions thoroughly checked, their ID cards 
electronically read, while Han Chinese tourists and the occasional westerner 
were led through without hassle. Business owners were forced to hold regular 
drills, during which they would parade the neighbourhood marching with 
sticks and military helmets. Virtually all shops and restaurants had metal 
gates. To order a polo (Uyghur lamb pilaf), one now had to ring a bell.
14 As brief ly discussed in the previous chapter, to complement the dystopian panorama of 
digital surveillance, several programmes of human surveillance have been introduced in the 
region. One such programme, called “becoming kin,” assigns a (mostly Han) off icial to a local 
family as an adoptive family member. The cadre is expected to regularly visit the host family and 
provide regular reports. Such reports are also regularly compiled as part of the fanghuiju system, 
in which a small team visits houses on a regular basis to assess and report the socio-economic 
and well as ideological status of Uyghur families. As the Global Times wrote in November 2018, in 
response to mounting interests on the subject from international news outlets, “some 1.1 million 
civil servants have paired up with more than 1.69 million ethnic minority citizens,” while “various 
administrative departments […] have made over 49 million visits to local residents. The number 
of activities themed “ethnics unite as a family,” held by these departments, reached more than 
11 million” (Global Times 2018). Combining big data resulting from digital surveillance with the 
work of fanghuiju and forced homestays, the Party has established a ranking system according 
to which Uyghurs are classif ied. Being labelled “untrustworthy” can lead to a camp (Zenz 2018).
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It is important to notice that in Xinjiang, the establishment of a surveillance 
network occurred simultaneously with two major developments. First, the 
renewal of Kashgar’s old town according to an aesthetic model that is now 
being replicated throughout smaller cities in south Xinjiang. Yarkand’s 
city centre, for instance, as I could witness during a brief visit in 2017, went 
through a similar project of renovation. The same happened in Aksu (Kobi 
2016). Secondly, securitisation in Xinjiang coincided with its definition, in the 
off icial parlance, as a “core hub” within Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative. 
While the rhetoric behind the project frequently refers to people-to-people 
interaction and increased mobilities, Xinjiang is captured in a thick net 
of checkpoints, prison camps, and police stations. To understand how 
this impacted cross-border ties, I now move to an analysis of how security 
changed the ways in which people travel along the KKH.
At the time of my first trip from Kashgar to Tashkurgan and the Khunjerab 
Pass, in 2009, the Karakoram Highway on the Chinese side had only recently 
been remade.15 A single-lane line of dark tarmac connected the busy, dusty 
15 In Kashgar the Karakoram Highway is rarely addressed with this name (or its Chinese 
equivalent, kalakunlun gonglu). The KKH in China is generally known as the “China- Pakistan 
Friendship Highway” (zhongba youyi gonglu), a formula which is generally reduced to “China-
Pakistan Highway” (zhongba gonglu) or, less frequently, “Friendship Highway” (youyi gonglu). 
The Chinese side of the Highway, moreover, is part of the almost 2000 km long China National 
Highway 314 (known as G314 or guodao 314), which runs from Urumqi to the Khunjerab Pass 
Figure 16: Fences along a road in Kashgar (picture by the author, 2017)
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outskirts of Kashgar to the snowy and imposing heights of the Karakoram 
range. While in a few sections the road was already showing signs of decay, 
particularly around the Gez canyon where small landslides are rather 
frequent, the composition of the road was rather uniform. The drive, as I 
recall it, went smoothly. While the old public bus struggled on some of the 
steeper sections, and trucks would occasionally slow us down, the trip from 
Kashgar to Tashkurgan was completed in less than eight hours – including 
an hour-long breakfast break in Opal and the permanent checkpoint in Gez 
which took at least some 30 minutes.
In the years that followed, I travelled along the same road more than a 
dozen times, back and forth between Kashgar and Tashkurgan. The road, 
renovated in 2008, went through another round of widening in 2012–13. At 
the time of my doctoral f ieldwork, several sections of the road remained 
under construction, and cars were redirected onto improvised, unpaved 
sections of the road that could last several kilometres. Still, drivers would 
take such setbacks with optimism. “With the new road,” I was often told, “we 
will drive to Kashgar in four hours and will be back to go back and forth on 
the same day.” By the end of my f ieldwork, in the summer of 2013, the new 
road had been completed. A Tajik driver in Tashkurgan, with whom I had 
become acquainted months before, boasted that now he could, indeed, drive 
me to Kashgar in less than four hours. In the end, the trip took four and a 
half hours, though to his credit, if it hadn’t been for the Gez checkpoint and 
a new permanent checkpoint that had been recently established outside of 
Tashkurgan, we probably would have made it within his estimate.
On my next trip to the region, in the summer of 2016, I was surprised to 
see the KKH going through yet another round of renovations. This time, 
more ambitiously, the most challenging section of the road leading up 
the Gez canyon was to be made into a series of suspended bridges cutting 
through the valley (Figure 15). While still a construction site, the two-way 
highway looked rather impressive, as did its embodied promises of speed and 
development. The road, however, was already dotted with more checkpoints 
than I had ever experienced (Figure 17). The first one, by the Guangzhou New 
City, was a rather impressive building. An English-speaking official, singling 
me out, made sure to tell me not to take pictures of anybody engaging in 
religious activities. To my request for explanations, she simply replied that 
I was not supposed to “disturb the locals.” Two more checkpoints had also 
– and it is occasionally referred to as guodao by drivers and local off icials alike. For the sake of 
simplicity and uniformity, however, in this book I refer to the road as KKH regardless of whether 
I am talking about the Pakistani or Chinese side.
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been established between the Kashgar New City and the Gez canyon, where 
the oldest permanent checkpoint was going through some renovations. 
All the various checkpoints were particularly tedious on the way back to 
Kashgar, when it took me the entire day to reach the city. The reason I was 
given for those increased security measures is the simultaneity of the G20 
meeting in Hangzhou and the upcoming Eid Qurban festivities. Everybody, 
it seemed, was on high alert.
In the summer of 2017, I travelled up the Karakoram Highway once again. 
I had heard that the new road had already been f inished, and I was curious 
to see how fast we would reach Tashkurgan this time. Upon leaving Kashgar 
it became already clear that the KKH had f inally become a proper highway. 
What I had not foreseen, however, were speed trap cameras placed every 
few hundred metres along the road. Our driver, a Uyghur man in his 50s 
whom I had never met before, but who had been recommended by a friend, 
seemed very wary of them. While the speed limit for cars was 60 km/h (and 
40 km/h for trucks), he would rarely drive over 50 km/h. When I asked him 
if he could drive faster, he told me that his vehicle was monitored through 
the satellite – pointing to a small beeping device on the dashboard. This, 
he told me, was mandatory for all tourist vehicles. It soon became clear 
that our driver not only would not drive at more than 50km/h, but that he 
would also avoid stopping at any place that was not considered appropriate 
for tourists. In fact, when I asked him to stop at the village of Balankul, a 
Figure 17: A new permanent checkpoint along the KKh near Tashkurgan (picture by the author, 2017)
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new village that I had visited the year before, the tracking device started 
beeping as soon as we left the main Highway. Visibly scared, the driver 
turned around telling me that we were not allowed to visit that specif ic 
place. No further explanation was given. On the way back, as we drove 
through the Gez checkpoint our driver received a phone call. The local 
police representative on the other end of the line was informing him that, 
according to a new regulation, all passenger cars travelling to Kashgar could 
not exceed 40 km/h. He promptly complied, without showing any sign of 
annoyance. At the end, the trip to Tashkurgan took longer than it did in 
2009, or at any given time during my doctoral f ieldwork in 2012–13. Dreams 
of fast connections had indeed not materialised along the KKH.
Speed trap cameras, car-tracking devices, and imposing checkpoints are 
only three example of the massive surveillance technology apparatus that 
began appearing in southern Xinjiang in 2016. Such measures had an effect 
on both Uyghurs and Pakistani traders. Many complained to me about new, 
stricter visa regulations. Other recounted daily visits by local police off icers, 
who installed security cameras inside their shops and would interrogate 
them about each and every customer who paid them a visit. Higher import 
tariffs were also a major concern, to the extent that very few things were 
brought in from Pakistan at that particular moment. In general, all Pakistani 
traders I talked to lamented that the number of checkpoints, the burden on 
mobilities that new regulations brought upon themselves and their business 
partners, and the low number of tourists visiting southern Xinjiang were 
detrimental to their businesses.
Sometimes, stories would get personal. Karim, for instance, as we were 
having dinner in Tashkurgan in August 2017 told me of Nisagul – a Uyghur 
woman who he had employed in his Kashgar shop for the past few years. I 
remembered meeting her a few times. Nisagul’s husband, Karim told me, 
was recently put in jail and sentenced to seventeen years. No reason was 
given, yet Karim had no doubts: “they put him there because he was in 
contact with us, with people from Pakistan, because his wife works for us. 
Now this is enough: if a Uyghur talks to us, they put him in jail.” Karim was 
not exaggerating. In the months to come the world was to become aware of 
the systematic imprisonment of Uyghurs. Entertaining any kind of relation 
with a foreigner, especially if from a Muslim country, was a major reason for 
imprisonment. “It all changed in April [2017],” Karim pointed out. “I was in 
Pakistan for the winter, and when I came back everything was different.” 
As we talked, he did not see any reason for optimism. “Things now change 
every day, there is always something new. In Kashgar it used to be easy 
and possible to visit people in their houses. Uyghurs would invite me over; 
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this does not happen anymore. Nobody wants to talk to us.” Business, too, 
was not going very well. Since the Khunjerab Pass opened in May, customs 
operations had moved from Tashkurgan to the Khunjerab Pass. On the 
Chinese side, Karim described a new facility, only a few hundred metres 
from the border, equipped with state-of-the-art scans and x-rays machines. 
“Controls are extremely thorough, last time I came it took six hours to get 
through,” Karim told me. At 4,600 metres, I found myself saying, this is 
not just absurd – it is reckless. Karim nodded, and told me that recently 
Pakistani traders went on strike. The bone of contention, apparently, was 
the treatment reserved to them at the China border. In protest, they stopped 
coming to China for a week, until they were given some reassurances. Still, 
he went on, “all luggage taken on buses now goes through customs. We are 
not allowed a small amount of goods for free as it used to be.” This, as I 
recounted in Chapter 1, had happened before. Now, however, the situation 
was so dire that Karim thought it was unlikely, after all, to return to normal 
any time soon.
As we met for breakfast the following day, Karim and I talked about the 
future. “I might need to f ind another business,” he told me. “Last summer 
I went to Guilin and Guangzhou, these are good places,” he reasoned. “I’m 
looking for partners there, maybe next time we’ll meet it will not be in 
Tashkurgan.” Like Karim, a few other Pakistani friends with over a decade 
of experience in the Xinjiang trade were ready to pack their bags and f ind 
new business venues. Xinjiang, they all told me, was not a good place for 
business anymore.
Such assessment of Kashgar as a “bad” place for business produce a 
stark contrast with the Belt and Road rhetoric that, since the launch of the 
Initiative in 2013, has incessantly grown. Xinjiang, a “core hub” of the Silk 
Road Economic Belt, features prominently it the Belt and Road imaginary 
showcased in maps and renderings of future projects. Southern Xinjiang is 
dotted now with propaganda posters referring to the Belt and Road Initiative 
– often in surprising ways. In 2017, In Tashkurgan, for instance, yi dai yi lu 
appeared on a large poster promoting a poverty alleviation programme. 
Along the KKH, between Tashkurgan and Kashgar, on the other hand, large 
red posters with yellow Chinese characters and Uyghur script promoted the 
plans for transnational connectivity in the area. “One county neighbours 
three countries, two entrances leading to two Asias (yi xian lin san guo, 
liang kou tong liang ya),” read one, referring to Tashkurgan county’s strategic 
location at the convergence of China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan and to the 
two routes to the Khunjerab and Kulma passes into South and Central 
Asia (Figure 18). “Build the China-Pakistan international logistics complex, 
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create the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor nodal city ( jiangshe Zhongba 
guoji wuliu zongheti, dazao Zhongba jingji zoulang jiedian chengshi)” read 
another, referring to Tashkurgan’s role as the gateway to Pakistan in the 
CPEC imaginary.
If one looks at the recent history of cross-border trade along the KKH, 
however, it is hardly surprising that security is given primacy over the free 
circulation of people and goods. Already at the time of my doctoral f ieldwork, 
in 2012–13, the Khunjerab Pass was regularly closed for a few days around 
major Chinese political events, such as national-level Party meetings, and 
even holidays. In 2013, for instance, the border remained closed between 
28 September and 7 October, ahead of celebrations for China’s National Day, 
in an attempt “to guard the country against anti-state elements involved in 
subversive activities in the Xinjiang autonomous region” (The Express Tribune 
2013). As Haider had pointed out already in 2005, “Beijing’s primary concern 
has been how it facilitates the spread of Islamic ideology into Xinjiang and 
the movement of radical Uighur militants,” as well as the KKH’s role in the 
drug trade that led to high HIV/AIDS rates in Xinjiang – factors that led to 
the closure of the Highway for brief periods (Haider 2005: 523). Therefore, 
despite the “Silk Road” rhetoric often employed by Pakistani and Chinese 
authorities alike (Haines 2012), the Karakoram Highway remains, at least 
on the Chinese side, a very ambiguous infrastructure, in which security is 
Figure 18: sign along the KKh near Tashkurgan saying “one county neighbours three countries, 
two entrances leading to two Asia” (picture by the author, 2017)
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given primacy over trade, immobility over mobility, and regulations over 
exchanges. While larger roads and SEZs are built at an unprecedented pace, 
it is the “hidden mobilities” (Van Assche and Hornidge 2014) of transnational 
connectivities and the forces of proximity that I have outlined that remain 
the main target of China’s attention. The quest for frictionless corridors 
seems to pass through their elimination.
Conclusion
“Why don’t you move to Xinjiang?” I once asked Sultan Khan, as we were talk-
ing about the offer of rent-free shops and off ices that the Chinese embassy 
made to a number of Kashgari. “You see,” he replied, diplomatically, “China 
is a good friend.” He paused for a moment. “But Pakistan is home for us. Even 
if it’s not [as] developed [as China], here we can practice our religion.” That 
last remark was something that I had heard repeatedly while in Pakistan, 
from Kashgari and “China traders” alike. “China is not a Muslim country,” 
I was once lectured by an old Kashgari man while sitting at his house in 
Rawalpindi. “But there is freedom of religion,” added the man’s nephew, a 
software engineer in his early 30s who had been to China only once. The 
old man nodded, then added: “yes, but it’s not like here.”
This ambiguity towards China has become a def ining feature of the 
Kashgaris’ lives. To be sure, China’s direct intervention into the lives of the 
Kashgaris has produced a significant divide not only within the community, 
but within individuals themselves. While, on the one hand, the opening 
of the KKH and the flow of Uyghur pilgrims into Pakistan produced a new 
awareness and a re-def inition of a specif ic Kashgari identity, the 9/11 at-
tacks, Beijing’s own war on terror, and the creation of the Overseas Chinese 
Association led to a widening political divide within the community. As 
one young Kashgari summed it up: “Now it feels like there are two separate 
communities [of Kashgaris], […] before the community was united, but 
without any awareness about our culture. Now – on the other hand – we 
know we are different from the Pakistani, we have this awareness.”
In 2018, as news of China’s prison camps in Xinjiang began to make 
headlines around the world, Pakistan and the Kashgari community made 
a few appearances. First, as reported by several outlets, a number of traders 
from Gilgit-Baltistan raised off icial complains with local authorities about 
the fate of their Uyghur wives in Kashgar (Barker 2018). According to them, at 
least 50 women married to Pakistani men were in detention, their children 
stripped away from them and unable to reunite with their Pakistani father. 
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As I read such reports, Karim’s words came to mind – “if a Uyghur talks to us, 
they put him in jail.” Only a few weeks later, the South China Morning Post 
(Elmer 2018, see also Aamir 2018) reported of a meeting between Chinese 
diplomats and a group of “Uygur Chinese people” at the PRC embassy in 
Islamabad. The meeting was set up by Chinese authorities to provide details 
about the situation in Xinjiang. Deemed as “the most high-profile evidence 
of Beijing stepping up its new narrative outside China,” the meeting featured 
consul general Shen Zicheng, who reportedly said that “the Uygur Chinese 
citizens in Pakistan had a role to play in promoting friendly relations between 
the two countries, and supporting the work in Xinjiang.” In the picture of 
the meeting that accompanied the story I could recognise Sultan Khan’s 
brother, and two other prominent members of the Association.
If the Kashgari’s attitude towards China can be defined as ambiguous and 
fragmented, that of Chinese state representatives towards Pakistan is just 
as puzzling. Take, for instance, the following examples. On 15 October 2013, 
during an off icial visit to Urumqi, the Chinese Defence Minister “called for 
a strengthened border and national defence in northwest China’s Xinjiang,” 
and “asked military units to further consolidate border defence and cast ‘a 
wall of copper and steel’ in the frontier” (Xinhua 2013). The same day, the 
Chinese ambassador in Pakistan during a visit to Gulmit, in the upper Hunza 
region, “emphasized the importance of developing communities in the border 
region, terming it to be in the interest of both the Chinese and Pakistani 
governments” (Pamir Times 2013a). The day before, during a gathering in 
Karimabad, the ambassador also remarked that “the development of the 
Xinjiang autonomous region will have positive impact on the socio-economic 
uplift of the Hunza Valley in particular and Gilgit-Baltsitan, in general” 
(Pamir Times 2013b). Reading through such contrasting news only a month 
after returning from a year of f ield research in the region, I remember my 
puzzlement at the meaning of it all. Was the ambiguity the result of poor 
communications between different segments of the government, or was it 
a skilful tactic to attract investments and claim inclusiveness, yet continue 
undertaking repressive policies towards ethnic minorities in the borderlands?
What is certain is that these different statements show the mix of con-
f idence and concern with which the Chinese government is looking at its 
westernmost borders. On the one hand, borders have to be strictly controlled, 
preventing any destabilising factor from entering the XUAR.16
 
On the other, 
16 There is very little access and information about the People’s Liberation Army border patrol 
in the area. A recent AsiaOne report, however, shed some light on the daily routine of Chinese 
soldiers along Xinjiang’s border with Pakistan and Afghanistan (AsiaOne 2014).
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Chinese officials in Beijing and Islamabad stress friendly collaborations with 
authorities and communities on the other side of the border. The promoters 
of such approach seem to promise that the pacif ication of Xinjiang can only 
be achieved not only through the securitisation of the province (Becquelin 
2004; Dreyer 2000; Tian 2004; Wiemer 2004), but also, and perhaps most 
importantly, through the development of nearby regions.17 Yet development 
along China’s borderlands, as this chapter has shown, is as much a tool of 
control as it is one of improvement. Most specif ically, the focus on control 
that underlies the CCP’s Xinjiang policies have become detrimental to 
the kind of economic ties that development initiatives such as the BRI are 
supposed to foster. Furthermore, as the case of the Kashgari community 
demonstrated, security is given primacy over people-to-people ties and the 
inclusiveness that the BRI rhetoric embraces. Rather than embodying the 
spirit of cross-border relations, or the “bridge” that Sultan Khan depicted, 
Uyghurs and Kashgari are the ultimate targets of surveillance measures 
that curb their mobility and economic activities.
To understand how such relations are spatialised I resort to the image of 
the corridor.
17 Some analysts have expressed similar views. As Laruelle and Peyrouse put it in their work 
on China and Central Asia: “The Karakoram Highway between the Pakistani port of Gwadar 
and Chinese Xinjiang does not at all modify trans-Eurasian commerce, since the f lows remain 
minimal, but it facilitates access to the products of remote Pakistani mountain regions. The 
pattern of development is similar for the Sino-Tajik trade, as well as some border connections 
between Central Asia and Xinjiang. The aim is not to influence large international trade f lows, 
which would be unrealistic, but to provide isolated populations with tools for development” 
(2012: 62).
 Interlude — corridor
3 November 2018. It’s early morning in Boulder, Colorado, as I received 
a message from Ali. “Hi, how are you friend?” he asked, via Facebook 
Messenger. “Hi, I’m good,” I quickly replied, then continued. “I recently 
moved to the USA, I’m not sure if I told you already. How are you?” I 
expected him to be in Pakistan, possibly in Gilgit. Since we last met, in 
2013, we have remained in touch, sending each other regular messages 
via either Facebook Messenger, Skype, or WeChat. In 2015, he told me, 
he had given up trading and started a small business in Gilgit. Chinese 
import tariffs for Afghan dry fruit had become too high to make his 
business prof itable. I found it ironic that his decision to stop trading 
coincided with the opening of the tunnels around the KKH, and with 
the rhetoric surrounding CPEC and the BRI reaching its climax. His was 
not the only story of this kind I was hearing at around that time. Other 
small-scale Pakistani traders – in dry fruit as well as other items – had 
stopped travelling to Kashgar, frustrated either by growing tariffs, the 
treatment of border guards, and the securitisation of the region. I checked 
in with him the following year, in November 2016, as I was reading about 
the f irst off icial CPEC convoy to Gwadar: when, amidst much fanfare, over 
100 containers carrying Chinese goods were escorted by armed police all 
the way from Sost to the Indian Ocean (Zafar 2016). Ali, he told me then, 
did not yet see a reason to restore his old business – “the conditions,” he 
simply put it, “are not good.” In November 2018, as I was working on some 
much-needed morning coffee, I was thus very surprised to see Ali’s reply 
to my question. “I am in Kashi [Kashgar]” – he wrote, then asked: “So you 
are not in China?” I was not, but I was interested in hearing about what 
he was doing there. Apparently, while Chinese import tariffs were still 
very high, in 2018 Chinese dry fruit was cheaper than in Pakistan, and 
Pakistani import tariffs were low. Ali’s business had changed direction: 
he was now buying in China, and selling in Pakistan. Almonds were still 
too expensive (20 RMB/kg), but walnuts were cheap. At 11.8 RMB/kg, they 
made for a sure deal in Rawalpindi. Ali, who was going back to Pakistan 
the following day, was planning on selling the whole cargo within a week, 
and then perhaps make another trip to Kashgar before the seasonal closure 
of the Khunjerab Pass in December. “Money is good,” he told me. Yet, as 
we chatted about his business, I could not help but thinking about the 
ongoing situation in Xinjiang, trying to picture him busily travelling from 
one market to the other while dealing with endless checkpoints. Reports 
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on Xinjiang’s prison camps were by then featured almost daily on major 
newspapers outside of China. Reports on the missing wives of Pakistani 
traders had recently appeared in Pakistani newspapers. Only a few days 
after our conversation, a new UN panel would examine evidences of 
China’s human rights abuses in the region. When I asked how Kashgar 
was, his reply was the following:
Kashgar is not good, everywhere we face strong security. At the entrance 
of hotels and markets everybody is scanned, and only then is allowed to 
enter. All [Uyghur] traders who trade with us are arrested and put in jail. 
No Uyghur person is receiving our phone call. If we call them they will 
be arrested and investigated.
Building upon Foucault’s notion of discipline, in a short essay, Postscript 
on the Societies of Control, Gilles Deleuze (1992) outlines a new theory of 
power. In particular, Deleuze shows how we are moving away from what 
Foucault articulated as disciplinary societies toward a society of control. 
Societies of control, according to Deleuze, are no longer characterised by 
sites of enclosure, such as schools and factories, hospitals and prisons. It is 
to such spaces that Foucault dedicated much of its intellectual project to, 
particularly looking at the ways in which they function as particular regime 
of discipline. Deleuze, on the other hand, argues that contemporary societies 
are rather def ined by control, which, in contrast to discipline, operates 
as a modulation. Spaces of enclosure are no longer relevant. We can work 
from home, pursue an online education, and so on. In such new societies, 
freedom has seemingly increased, yet control has expanded in signif icant 
other ways – from algorithms to regimes of self-control that are central 
to “independent” work. At the same time, surveillance is normalised: we 
know our online activities are monitored, for instance, but we should not 
pay too much attention to it.
Curation, as a particular modality of power, can be seen as bridging 
the gap between disciplinary societies and societies of control. While 
Chinese development efforts in its borderlands enforce enclosure with 
a disciplinary aim, as emerges from the case of Kashgar’s old town, they 
also aim at transforming the overall environment thus enabling constant 
monitoring. As new villages, cameras, checkpoints, police stations and 
IT technologies provide the infrastructural basis for China’s surveillance 
efforts in Xinjiang and elsewhere, a “serpent of control” (Hankins 2014) 
is inevitably nestled in ethnic minority subjects’ self-monitoring and 
self-censoring attitudes.
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To build on this discussion, it is now important to focus on how such forms 
of control are spatialised. To do so, I resort to the image of the corridor with 
the aim to capture the intertwined nature of discipline and control that is 
shaping the Chinese borderlands today. I conceptualise the corridor as a 
space that is discursively and materially produced with the aim of enabling 
the movement of people, goods, and capital, but that is also productive of a 
particular kind of channelled control. Along many of China’s borders new and 
imagined corridors often follow old pathways (Saxer 2016) carved through 
difficult terrains. Yet, corridors, unlike pathways, are exclusive – they remove, 
block and leave out what is outside of them with the aim of channelizing 
movement and increase speed. A pathway is, on the contrary, inclusive: it 
brings in, through its hinterland, as I shall argue shortly. A corridor implies 
linearity: it connects two or more places. A pathway, on the other hand, is 
rhizomatic (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Rippa 2015b): it has no clear beginning 
or end, and it expands and shrinks through its hinterlands. A corridor is 
highly visible, a pathway can be elusive. As such, corridors are technologies 
not only of connection, but also of containment. To echo Elizabeth Dunn’s 
(forthcoming) characterisation of the tunnel, corridors, too, serve the state 
purpose of controlling “volumetric space by flattening it.” As such, through 
corridors the state can “monitor” movement and “f ilter” who is allowed to 
move across and who is not – often through the installation of particular 
chokepoints (Carse, Cons, and Middleton 2018). Accordingly, on the one 
hand, I conceptualise corridors as particular technologies of enclosure. On 
the other hand, through them, control over particular forms of mobilities 
become normalised. Let me analyse these two aspects in more details.
Etymologically, the word “corridor” comes from the Latin currere: to 
run. In 16th-century French, the word corridor was used to indicate the 
outer edge of a fortif ication, a hallway protected by a parapet in military 
forts or installations. Similar to infrastructure and logistics, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, the word corridor goes back to French military vocabulary 
of the 16th–18th centuries. Today, as a major feature of BRI endeavours, 
corridors are envisioned to connect China’s landlocked regions with the 
ocean in Gwadar, Bangladesh, Burma, but also to Singapore and Vietnam. 
Goods and people are expected to move along them at great speed, across 
formerly remote and reportedly inaccessible terrain. The etymology of 
the word itself seems to reveal corridor’s disposition to privilege speed 
by neglecting local frictions. It also implies the creation of a fenced-off 
thoroughfare connecting specific nodes, while excluding everything else – or 
what could be understood as a technology of enclosure. As such, corridors are 
detrimental to what anthropologist Martin Saxer has called “hinterlands”: 
208 BoRdeRlAnd InFRAsTRuC TuRes 
particular economies that, in seemingly remote regions, are centred around 
particular pathways of exchange. The Himalayas are, Saxer argues, full of 
such pathway-hinterlands connections. There,
Pathways create their own ‘hinterlands’ and thereby structure Himalayan 
borderlands. ‘Hinterlands’ often orient themselves rather towards a 
pathway than a larger urban center of a state. In a certain sense, the 
nodes that form along major pathways become centers themselves, and 
a center-periphery dynamic between these nodes and the hinterlands is 
again at play here, although on a smaller scale (Saxer 2016: 113).1
These hinterlands, it might be argued, profit from the particular “friction of 
terrain” (Scott 2009), through which pathways are carved out. This friction, 
which according to Scott guaranteed safety and distance from the state for 
upland communities, was also an opportunity for highland communities to 
prosper from long-distance trade in which they were not directly involved. 
Along Himalayan trading routes, for instance, animals’ need for fodder 
and traders’ need for food and rest, created numerous pathway economies 
centred around specif ic nodes. Today’s economic corridors, such as the 
CPEC, have been drawn following some old trading routes – at least in part. 
While pointing to the relative resilience of pathways, economic corridors 
also reflect a very different approach to terrain and hinterlands. By trying 
to do away with the “friction of terrain” both discursively and through the 
implementation of major transport infrastructure, a signif icant element 
that differentiates modern corridors from pathways is that they shrink 
hinterlands rather than create them.
Strictly intertwined with this f irst aspect of the corridor as a technology 
of enclosure is the normalisation of control that it underpins. The example 
of travelling along the KKH described in the previous chapter is emblematic. 
As promises of f lawless and speedy transnational exchange embedded by 
CPEC were hyped by both Chinese and Pakistani off icials, a thick network 
of speed-trap cameras limited the pace of travel to 40 km/h on a broad and 
smooth four-lane highway. The impact goes beyond a few extra hours on 
the road. Speed limitations and the constant police monitoring through 
phone calls and GPS tracking represent an act of violence, an exercise of 
disciplinary power aiming at creating normative subjects. As such, cameras 
and car-tracking devices do not even need to work in order to be effective.
1 For a discussion of Saxer’s notion of pathways in the context of today’s BRI Economic 
Corridors see Rippa (2020).
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More broadly, with the implementation of CPEC, chokepoints in the 
form of “inspection stations ( jincha zhan)” have become the norm, tariffs 
favour Chinese exports over imports, and only some people are allowed to 
“freely” move along it. Dreams of frictionless corridors are not for everyone. 
The image of the corridor, intended both as its discursive articulation as 
well as its material implementation, “purif ied” (Latour 1993) the mess-
iness and illegibility of proximity. Placed on the level of “the market,” 
set aside from local encounters, the term “corridor” is used to designate 
frictionless connections represented by broad and smooth arrows on 
maps and investments brochures. Through its material implementation, 
however, mobilities along the KKH have become selective. For many 
Kashgari, for instance, the upgrading of the road did not coincide with 
more opportunities to visit their relatives in Xinjiang and conduct business 
in the region. As in the case of Umer, strained relations with the Chinese 
Overseas Association meant, rather, forced immobility. Corridors, then, 
while embedded in promises of connectivity and development, often bring 
about particular modulations of power that are inherently asymmetrical 
and exclusive.
3 November 2018. After Ali told me about Kashgar – the checkpoints, the 
prisons, Uyghur traders avoiding his phone calls – I wondered how he 
could possibly conduct his business. During my time in Kashgar, I spent 
several days with him, sitting in restaurants with some of his partners, 
checking the local dry fruit bazaars, talking about prices, and calling deal-
ers in Rawalpindi and Peshawar. His business, as I came to know it, was 
deeply embedded in a network of close relationships for which personal 
contact and the trust resulting from years of deals was fundamental. As 
we exchanged messages in 2018, while he was in Kashgar, the situation 
was different. “Now I have to go to the wholesale market – it’s new, 4km 
from the Seman hotel.” I had never been to that place, I wondered how 
it must look like. I pictured another fruit wholesale market I visited in 
Tengchong, that opened only in 2016. Ready-made, 2-f loor buildings 
with blue tin-roofs. In each building the second floor would function as 
a deposit, while the f irst f loor as off ice space, kitchen, playground for 
kids, and parking for cars and motorbikes. Traders would come by taxi, or 
on their own e-bike. They would check the merchandise, discuss a price, 
perhaps place an order. Nearby, boxes full of bananas were uploaded on 
an electric cart. I asked Ali what was different from the bazaars he used 
to work in. “They only accept cash payment here, no money transfer or 
bank transfer. We have to pay cash when we place the order.”
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Trust, in Ali’s business, no longer appears to be crucial. The exchanges he is 
now taking part in, based on immediate cash payments, are of a different 
nature. He does not entertain any personal relation with the dealers – “95 
per cent Uyghur,” he says – who work out of the newly opened wholesale 
market in dry fruit. The forces of proximity are not relevant as before. His 
experience still plays a role – his knowledge of the language, the product, 
as well of dealers in Pakistan. The social relations that used to def ine his 
business, however, have largely been cut off.
The experiences of traders along the Karakoram Highway reflect the 
changes implicit in the re-configuration of space conjured up by the image 
of the corridor. With the development of transport infrastructure and the 
scaling up of the security and surveillance apparatuses, Pakistani traders 
have struggled to keep their businesses afloat. Social relations carefully built 
over years of engagement, particularly with their Uyghur counterparts, have 
been eroded by the pervasiveness of security measures. For the same reasons, 
their ability to move has been curbed, while the stricter implementations of 
new regulations at the border have complicated the movement of goods. At 
the same time, spaces designed by state authorities for the development of 
new trading practices, such as the Guangzhou New City, have so far largely 
failed to provide the same opportunities that Pakistani traders used to 
enjoy. What we see here are the limits of a particular vision of transnational 
connectivity which ignores – or purposely tries to eliminate – previous 
forms of exchange.
As particular modes of transport become dominant, the old business of 
proximity needs to f ind new venues. It is, however, important to highlight 
that these two forms of mobility and the particular spaces that they attempt 
to create are not mutually exclusive. Proximity still plays a role. Even the 
smoothest highway does not eliminate local encounters. Traders in Pakistan 
and Xinjiang are still navigating through customs facilities, bazaars and 
warehouses in which language skills and personal relations affect the 
success of particular transactions. Corridors, then, do not fully eliminate 
the importance of proximity. From an ethnographic perspective, corridors 
are, in this sense, “multiply imagined and enacted” (Murton and Lord 2020): 
they are far from being stable and frictionless (Carse 2014; Barry 2013). And 
yet, the corridor as a “dream zone” (Cross 2014) continues to drive the political 
agendas of elites in China and elsewhere, producing significant consequences 
on the ground. This section, and this book more broadly, represents an 
attempt to investigate what happens when dreams and reality meet, when 
the corridor as it is drawn by policymakers in Beijing and Islamabad is lived 
through daily crossings of the Khunjerab Pass.
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In doing so, it is important to note that the interests of the state and those 
of traders are not always on opposite ends of the spectrum. Corridors and 
proximity are not mutually exclusive. Thus, in the case that I describe in the 
following chapter, that of Houqiao and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myan-
mar Economic Corridor, the state is complicit in the forms of transnational 
connectivity that do not necessarily adhere to the principles expressed by the 
regulations that the state is supposed to uphold. The new re-configuration 
of space introduced with the development of this economic corridor, and 
in particular of a border trade zone, however, in this case also contributes 
to particular forms of exclusion and marginalisation.
It is time now for one f inal change of scenery.

6 (Il)Licitness
“The common Yunnanese proverb qiong zou yifang ji zou chang 窮走夷方急走厰 
best describes the situation: when one needed money, one joined the caravan trade 
and went to areas occupied by “barbarians” (other ethnic groups), or alternatively 
tried one’s luck in jade or other mineral mines in Burma. Those who were hesitant to 
take up such ventures were considered timid and often teased by fellow Yunnanese”
— Wen-Chin Chang (2011: 460).
“In our experience, the quality of roads bears 
direct correlation to the speed of development”
— Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao at the opening ceremony 
of the third China-South Asia Expo in Kunming, June 12, 2015.
The music is insistent, epic. The scene begins with drone footages of a 
prosperous, modern city. The camera pans across golden skyscrapers and 
multi-lane highways. “It is Shenzhen,” the voiceover informs the viewer. 
“Thirty years ago,” the voice goes on, “Shenzhen was a little f ishing village. 
Today, Shenzhen has become China’s most successful Special Economic 
Zone, with GDP surpassing 1.5 trillion RMB.” Shenzhen, the video underlines, 
showcases the success of thirty years of Chinese economic reforms, and 
speaks to the recovered wealth of the Chinese people. But this is not the 
end of the story. “New global challenges (tiaozhan) have led CCP General 
Secretary Xi Jinping to launch a new initiative: the Belt and Road.” Mov-
ing from images of Shenzhen to images of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, the 
video f inally opens up to Houqiao’s new, massive border gate – its towering 
marble-like colour and neat features offering a stark contrast with the 
surrounding forest (Figure 19). It seems to reflect an image of order in the 
midst of a hilly, remote, perhaps unruly frontier. We are in Tengchong 
county, at the China-Burma border, where a new Border Trade Zone is taking 
shape. Thanks to the BRI and the BCIM, the video insists, Houqiao is set to 
become another Shenzhen along China’s borders – a node of development 
along the country’s peripheries.1
The video I just described is featured on the website of the Hong Yi Da 
company, the firm in charge of the construction and development of the Hou-
qiao International Trade City – a major component of what local authorities 
1 On Shenzhen as a “model” in post-reform China, see O’Donnell, Wong and Bach 2017.
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promote at the new Border Trade Zone that will rival Ruili as China’s main 
gateway to Burma. The video provides, in a nutshell, a wonderful example 
of Chinese Public Relations efforts in the age of the BRI.2 In particular, it 
encapsulates some of the motives that have become ubiquitous across a 
number of development projects along China’s borderlands. The trope of 
“the next Shenzhen,” but also the idea that global trade is key to prosperity. 
In so doing, it also reiterates something fundamentally incorrect: that the 
Belt and Road initiative somehow invented modern Asian connectivity. 
And that it was China, and Xi Jinping in particular, who draw the ambitious 
vision of a continent criss-crossed by economic corridors and speckled with 
Special Economic Zones.
This motive is particularly evident if we look at some of Xi Jinping’s 
speeches on the topic over the past few years. From his speech in 2013 at 
Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev’s University, in which he launched the idea of the 
Silk Road Economic Belt, to his speech at the Indonesian Parliament, during 
the same year, in which he defined the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, to 
the opening of the Belt and Road Forum, the pattern is similar. First, Xi would 
refer to historical ties between China and its neighbouring countries, citing 
Chinese envoy Zhang Qian to Central Asia, and Zheng He’s missions to the 
2 The video is available at: www.hyd99.cn (accessed May 2019).
Figure 19: The houqiao border gate as seen from inside the new International Trade City  
(picture by the author, 2016)
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“Western Seas.” This history of friendship, Xi elaborated, needs to be revived 
today in the spirit of the old Silk Road: peace and cooperation, openness 
and inclusiveness, mutual learning, and mutual benefit. In Xi’s vision, this 
is what the Belt and Road is set to do. However, between the Han dynasty 
and Xi Jinping’s China, a number of development projects took shape across 
the region, many of which quite recent. Japan, for instance, funded several 
infrastructure projects in India and Southeast Asia. In the region, a number 
of sub-regional projects emerged in the 1990s in the form of growth triangles 
(Ong 2000: 66) and economic quadrangles (Walker 1999). In Central Asia, 
where China plays today an increasingly important role (cf. Laruelle and 
Peyrouse 2012), the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program 
(CAREC), established in 1997 by the Asian Development Bank, had its own 
economic corridors. More examples – such as the United States’ own “Silk 
Road” project following the Afghan war – could be mentioned. As the f irst 
part of this chapter will show, moreover, the Belt and Road Initiative appears 
to replicate many of the discursive frameworks created as part of these 
projects, such as the idea of economic corridors as development tools.
This chapter moves from this particular discussion by returning to the 
case of cross-border trade in Tengchong. More specif ically, I show what 
happened in Tengchong after the end of the timber trade, in the mid-2010s, 
when a new transnational geography dominated by the Bangladesh-Chi-
na-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor was imposed upon the 
existent timber-driven infrastructure of border crossings that I have analysed 
in the second chapter. My purpose is twofold. First, through a discussion over 
the persistence of illegal trade in Tengchong and the local government’s par-
ticipation in such transactions I will show how the two forms of connectivity 
that I have outlined in the f irst part of the book – one informed by long-term 
localised exchanges and one inspired by contemporary state-led visions 
of transnational trade – while incompatible at the level of ideology, are in 
fact deeply intertwined at the level of practice. Secondly, I show how the 
corridor-isation of trade does not necessarily imply the end of illicit practices. 
Rather, as I discuss through the case of Burmese amber, it institutionalises 
them while fostering the marginalisation of small-scale traders. In so doing, 
I go back to my discussion of proximity and show how closeness to the state 
remains a powerful asset for traders in the age of the BRI.
In order to do so, the chapter is organised as follows. First, I discuss 
some of the literature on legality and licitness that underpins my argument 
in this chapter. Secondly, I place the development of the BCIM corridor 
within the broader history of economic corridors as devices of economic 
growth and development. In it, I show that the BCIM has its roots in the 
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1999 Kunming Initiative, and thus predates the launch of the Belt and 
Road Initiative by over a decade. Thirdly, I move to an analysis of how the 
promises embedded in the BCIM project take shape in Houqiao through the 
development of a border trade zone. I show how personal connection and 
government support are fundamental to the success of seemingly “private” 
initiatives. In the remaining part of the chapter, I show what are effects 
of the corridor-isation of trade on local businesses, particularly those who 
used to be involved with timber. I use the case of Burmese amber – whose 
imports boomed at around the time when timber imports stopped – to 
show how government off icials are intimately involved in the persistence 
of illicit traff ics across the Tengchong borderlands. Lastly, I discuss the 
notions of legality and licitness to highlight their co-constructed nature 
along China’s borderlands.
Licit, illicit
Inquiries into illicit economies have often looked at borderlands as promi-
nent spaces of lawlessness and shadowy exchanges (Galemba 2013; Bruns 
and Miggelbrink 2012; Abraham and Van Schendel 2005; Chouvy 2013). Far 
removed from the centres of power, borders seem to carry the burden of 
remoteness that allows for such unlawful economies to prosper. Borders, 
even when strictly enforced, seem to remain ultimately unmanageable 
and uncontrollable. Borders, moreover, are often characterised by marked 
economic differentials which, in turn, afford those involved in both licit 
and illicit trade countless opportunities (Saxer 2009, 2016a; Alff 2016b). One 
of the main contributions that anthropologists have made to this body of 
literature in recent years lies in the realisation that, however illicit or illegal 
such economies might be defined, they can be extremely formalised, often 
operating along kinship networks (Steenberg 2014; Van Spengen 2000) and 
ethnic identities (Eilenberg and Wadley 2009; Schoenberger and Turner 
2008) that span across national boundaries. As Nordstrom (2010) reminds us, 
“shadow networks” are not just often formalised through specific hierarchies, 
but also follow specif ic rules of conduct. This clearly brings into question 
the idea that shadow exchanges are primarily motivated by the desire to 
escape regulation – in most cases dictated by nation states. Anthropologists 
and other social scientists, moreover, have invited scholars to look beyond 
the state in the analysis of such practices (Abraham and Van Schendel 2005; 
Gootenberg 2005), showing how the state is often directly involved with 
such traff ic on different levels and scales (To, Mahanty, and Dressler 2014).
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Within this context, the Tengchong case discussed in this Chapter is 
interesting for at least two reasons. First, it shows how the state is complicit in 
the creation and maintenance of these (shadow) networks. In both the cases 
of Burmese timber (analysed in Chapter 2) and amber (discussed below), 
Chinese authorities in Tengchong were aware from the very beginning of the 
illicit aspect of the trade. Yet, understanding the potentiality for the further 
development of the trade and its positive impact on the overall economy 
of Tengchong, they consciously decided not to intervene – a situation that 
clearly contradicts views of the shadow economy as harmful to the formal 
economy and mostly due to weak regulatory institutions (Schneider and 
Enste 2002). Thus, following Abraham and Van Schendel’s (2005) distinction, 
the trades in timber and amber might have been illegal from the perspective 
of the law, but were certainly considered licit by those involved – state 
off icials included. In fact, local authorities’ push for cross-border infrastruc-
tural development and increased ties with nearby Kachin State impacted 
positively the development of both the timber and the amber trade, rather 
than jeopardise them.3
Secondly, the Tengchong case shows how an illegal market comes to be 
regulated in China. Against simplistic views of the state as the sole maker 
of rules, the amber case that I will discuss in this chapter highlights the 
contextual nature of processes of regulation, involving not only government 
off icials but also private entrepreneurs. Going back to Nordstrom’s point, 
this case is particularly interesting, as the call for off icial recognition and 
regulation emerged initially from the traders themselves – the same ones 
who, for a number of years, enjoyed the benef its of an unregulated f low 
of amber. Not unlike the timber trade, in which traders f irst invested into 
roads to the border that later allowed for the consolidation of state presence 
there, with amber it emerges clearly how the interest of private businesses 
and public off icials intersect. If we then follow Baud and Van Schendel’s 
(1997) urging to adopt a view from the peripheries to look at borderland 
communities and cross-border exchanges, the Tengchong case adds another 
layer of complexity to the ongoing debate on state and market in China. As 
Osburg (2013) argued, not only do Chinese entrepreneurs work deliberately 
to enmesh business activities into powerful political and social relations, but 
3 In a similar vein, Eilenberg (2014) shows in the case of the Kalimantan how increased state 
presence does not necessarily imply the end of illicit economies, in this case Malaysian logging 
companies, but rather can shield and protect them. Kevin Woods makes a similar point in the case 
of northern Burma, arguing that illicit economies flourish not because these remote frontiers are 
ungoverned and anarchic spaces, but rather because they are embedded in “ordering” processes 
where both state and non-state actors play important roles (Woods 2016).
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they also – through those very relations – play an active role in shaping the 
overall regulatory framework. Furthermore, it is not only states that have the 
need to perform a double act through which they “pursue their neoliberal 
dream of a borderless economy and at the same time barricade their borders” 
(Abraham and Van Schendel 2005: 23). Traders, often the same f igures who 
benef ited from the lack of regulations in the f irst place, are also actively 
involved in the “barricading” of borders within a new markedly neoliberal 
border regime. As this chapter describes, in fact, traders involved in the 
“illegal” import of Burmese amber – and timber in previous years – came 
to see the state as an asset, rather than as a threat, and actively worked to 
bring it into the picture through the institution of the Tengchong Amber 
Association. Building on the quoted literature on cross-border exchanges, 
this example further complicates the simplistic notion that contrasts illicit 
markets and the regulatory efforts of the state.
In such complexity, how does one draw the lines of legality and licitness? 
It is certainly diff icult to draw categories to describe and discuss a situation 
in which the (Chinese) state regulates and at the same time provides the 
means for the illegal exploitation of timber products, or the imports of 
amber, and where the illicit trade in a particular commodity dictates the 
geography of national bordering as I have remarked in Chapter 2. One 
would be tempted to ascribe this exceptionality to a particular moment in 
time, a combination of causes that made possible for exceptional measures 
and responses to take place: ceasef ire capitalism, war economy, China’s 
open up and reform era, large funds available as part of the xibu da kaifa 
f irst and the Belt and Road Initiative later. Yet, a focus on exceptionality 
can obscure some of the contradictions that lie at the heart of the way we 
categorise, discuss, and understand, issues of legality and illegality, licitness 
and illicitness, and even morality and immorality.
The problem, in other words, might be that we tend to identify illegal 
traff icking or immoral behaviour as exceptional in the f irst place. In 
anthropology, on the other hand, recent inquiries into the workings of 
corruption have shown it to be integral to business transaction – or what 
Chabal and Daloz call an “instrument of disorder” (1999). What, then, if we 
were to take corruption – or illegality more broadly – as an obvious fact 
of life? As Christopher Gregory points out in a recent preface to his classic 
study Gifts and Commodities: “How different would political economy, 
economic anthropology, and cultural economy look if we all made such 
an assumption?” (2015: l). The questions we would be dealing with, would 
be rather different. Not: what sort of socio-economic system allows for the 
existence of corrupt behaviour? But instead: How do specif ic practices of 
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illegality inform the ways in which capital is accumulated? In the case 
described in this chapter, I follow this advice and show how the state is 
embedded in such practices and how the corridor-isation of trade did not put 
an end to illegal cross-border practices – but rather institutionalised them. 
To tell this story, let us begin with a discussion of the economic corridor.
A brief history of the economic corridor
The protagonist of this chapter is the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
Economic Corridor. The project has its roots in the so-called Kunming 
Initiative in 1999, when the idea of a network of infrastructure tying together 
the four countries, and with them, South, Southeast, and East Asia emerged. 
In the last few years, the project has become retroactively enrolled in official 
BRI discourse by virtue of being part of the “six major land transport cor-
ridors” that seek to “follow the ancient Silk Roads” via a series of economic 
corridors (Liu and Dunford, 2016: 336). What interests me here, beside 
tracing the history of the BCIM, is also to stress how economic corridors 
became such a prominent part of the BRI rhetoric – to understand what 
they are, how have they come to be envisioned as particular instruments 
of development, and what they are expected to achieve. To do so I must 
begin not in Beijing, Kunming, or Tengchong, but rather with prominent 
international donors which have shaped much of the discourse around 
economic corridors and development more generally.
In a similar vein to Xi Jinping’s BRI speeches, the literature on develop-
ment often stresses the fact that economic corridors have a long history with 
its roots in the Silk Road and other trans-regional trading routes4. As one 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) report put it, “Economic corridors connect 
4 Take, for instance, the following extract: “Transport corridors have been around for a long 
time. Trans-Saharan trade routes across the Wadi Hammamat can be traced back to at least 
4000BC from the Nile to the Red Sea. Around 200BC, Hammamat became an important part of 
the Silk Route (Silk Road). The Silk Route was a network of trade and cultural transmission routes 
that were central to cultural interaction through regions of the Asian continent connecting the 
West to the East by linking traders, merchants, nomads and urban dwellers from China and India 
to the Mediterranean Sea. Extending some four thousand miles, the Silk Road derived its name 
from the lucrative trade in Chinese silk. Trade on the Silk Road was signif icant in the development 
of the civilisations of China, the Indian sub-continent, Persia, Europe and Arabia, opening up 
long-distance political, economic and social interaction between civilisations. Although silk 
was the main trade item from China, many other goods were traded in both directions along 
the route, religions were expanded and technologies transferred and developed. The transport 
route evolved into a development corridor” (Hope and Cox 2015).
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economic agents along a def ined geography” by providing “important 
connections between economic nodes or hubs that are usually centered 
in urban landscapes” (Brunner 2013). Moreover, economic corridors “do 
not stand alone, as their role in regional economic development can be 
comprehended only in terms of the network effects that they induce.” Eco-
nomic corridors are, in other words, embedded and integrated into specif ic 
networks with peculiar characteristics and their impact varies signif icantly 
across different regions. In another ADB report Srivastava (2011), for instance, 
posits that “Corridor development does not create economic strength so 
much as it channels, focuses, and amplif ies the potential for economic 
growth.” Accordingly, in order to be successful, a corridor needs not only 
to link two or more nodes, but particular nodes with potential for growth 
in between. Corridors, then, whilst having been around for a long time, 
still seem to require some form of “management” (Kunaka and Carruthers 
2014; Arnold, Ollivier and Arvis 2007). In their multiple forms – a topology 
of corridors would identify trade corridors, freight corridors, industrial 
corridors, among others – corridors seem to be ambiguous creatures. They 
emerge naturally – they have always been there! – yet need investments, 
cooperation, and strategic partnerships in order to succeed.
As development tools, however, the history of economic corridors is a 
rather short one. The concept itself gained popularity only in the 1990s due 
to the Asian Development Bank (ABD), most notably through its launch of 
the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). The GMS, an imagined geography of 
regional cooperation centred around the Mekong River, focused on a set of 
economic corridors connecting Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
as well as southern Yunnan and Guangxi. The corridors were initially en-
visioned as road networks which would encourage mobility, integration, 
cross-border trade, and thus foster economic development in the region. 
Yet. according to the ABD an “economic corridor is not simply a connection 
between points A and B” (ADB 2016), rather, transport infrastructure is 
only the f irst step towards the implementation of an economic corridor. 
Economic corridors were thus envisioned to link centres of production 
with centres of demand, such as major urban settlements. Furthermore, 
they were set to involve the crafting of laws and regulations – or “soft” 
infrastructures – in order to encourage business, access to markets, and 
development in a comprehensive and transparent manner.
While the GMS largely failed to deliver on the terms its proponents set out 
(cf. Shi 2009; Lyttleton 2009; Dwyer and Vongvisouk 2019), by the early 2010s 
economic corridors had become a mainstream development tool and were 
soon to be incorporated as major features of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
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Speaking at the opening of the Belt and Road forum in Beijing, in May 2017, Xi 
Jinping referred to economic corridors as underpinning “a multi-dimensional 
infrastructure network […] featuring land-sea-air transportation routes and 
information expressway and supported by major railway, port and pipeline 
projects.” Economic corridors should, according to Xi’s words, contribute 
to the BRI’s overall goal of “opening up,” and in so doing “establish a fair, 
equitable and transparent system of international trade” (Xinhua 2017). In 
Xi’s vision, then, economic corridors seem to be defined by the same logic 
underpinning ABD and the World Bank’s approaches to the region: as “bun-
dles” of transport infrastructures facilitating interactions and connections 
between large centres of activity.5 More than simple infrastructure systems, 
economic corridors as engines of development are also expected to boost 
transparency, fairness, as well as “rules and standards.”
The BRI, as Xi Jinping remarked in the course of the same speech, is in fact 
centred around six main corridors. These are: the China-Mongolia-Russia 
Economic Corridor, the New Eurasian Land Bridge, the China-Central 
Asia-Western Asia Corridor, the China-Indochina Peninsula, the China-Pa-
kistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
Economic Corridor.6 Remarkably, none of these projects is original to the 
BRI, but rather builds upon years of bilateral and multi-lateral relations 
and growing economic and political ties between China and its neighbours 
(Saxer and Zhang 2016).
As a key example, the BCIM has its roots in a conference on Regional 
Economic Cooperation and Development among China, India, Burma 
and Bangladesh organised by the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences in 
Kunming in August 1999. The conference, attended by 134 delegates from the 
four countries, led to the establishment of a Forum for Regional Economic 
Cooperation through which officials could gain assistance from international 
organisations and institutions and work together towards their common 
goals. For China, as described in Chapter 2, these were the promotion of 
trans-border infrastructure to access markets and resources.7 In the f inal 
report of the conference, the word economic corridor was not mentioned, 
5 A World Bank paper def ines BRI corridors as “coordinated bundles of transport and logistics 
infrastructures and services that facilitate interaction between major centers of economic 
activity.” (Derudder, Liu and Kunaka 2018). This def inition echoes the one provided by the ABD 
and quoted above.
6 for a detailed description of the six projects see Derudder, Liu and Kunaka (2018).
7 Che Zhimin, whose work had been discussed in Chapter 2 in connection to the promotion 
of Yunnan as a major land bridge towards Southeast Asia, was involved in this early phase. For 
a summary of the history of the BCIM, see Uberoi (2013).
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yet among the topics of discussion were “the construction of communica-
tion channels and networks among China, India, Bangladesh and Burma 
(including the opening and reconstructing roads, air lines, water routes 
and railways).”8 As economic corridors became mainstream development 
tools in the course of the 2000, the Kunming Initiative developed into the 
less-partisan denomination of the annual BCIM Forum, from which the 
idea of the BCIM economic corridor emerged.
Two decades and over a dozen high-profile meetings on, the BCIM has 
yet to produce most of its intended objectives. The four countries are still 
largely under-connected, and a viable direct link between China and India 
through northern Burma remains hindered by the of renewal conflict 
between the Burmese army and the KIA since 2011. There is, however, at least 
one place in which BCIM dreams and promises have taken concrete shape, 
driving both f inancial speculations as well as concrete infrastructure. To 
understand how such grand schemes materialise on the ground, it is now 
time to pay a visit to Houqiao, in Tengchong county, at the point where the 
BCIM crosses the China-Burma border.
Sitting on the bridge(head)
Strategically placed at 64km from Tengchong, and only 140km from Myit-
kyina, the capital of Burma’s Kachin State, Houqiao has in recent years been 
chosen as the main port of entry for the county. Plans for its development are 
strictly connected with the history of the Stilwell (or Ledo) Road, and dreams 
of future connectivity reflected in the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
Economic Corridor. History, in Tengchong, has not been forgotten. On the 
contrary, as anthropologist Zhou Yongming has compellingly shown, history 
is used by local authorities in order to make active claims over future visions 
of transnational connectivity. He puts it in pugilistic terms, with Tengchong 
trying to “box out” rival counties or municipalities in order to attract funding 
and investments from the central and provincial government. Instead of f ists, 
history is selectively used to strengthen the argument in favour of Tengchong 
as a 21st-trade hub (Zhou 2013).9 The vision local authorities are pushing 
8 The report is available at: http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/reg.burma/archives/199908/msg00946.
html (accessed May 2019).
9 On the ways in which Yunnan has been in recent years re-imagined and re-branded as a 
major hub for regional connections see also Summers (2012); Su (2013); Rippa (2017, 2020); Sigley 
(2016).
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forward is, in many regards, similar to the Tashkurgan case discussed in the 
f irst Chapter. The reasoning goes as follow: strategic location, proximity to 
the border, long-lasting trading ties with Burma, the possibility to access a 
resource-rich market – these are all characteristics that prove, and therefore 
ensure, that Tengchong can be once again a major “bridgehead (qiaotoubao)” 
in cross-border exchange.
In Houqiao, in early 2016, these ambitions took the shape of a major 
construction site by the impressive border gate. Across it, as a small group 
of Chinese tourists was busy taking pictures, empty trucks were waiting 
to cross into Burma in a long line, heading for Chinese-owned banana 
plantations. They would return full within a day or two. The construction 
site covered an area of 143,000 square metres and the three-storey building 
was set to become the new Houqiao International Trade City, part of the 
Houqiao Border Economic Cooperation Zone and International Trade City 
(Houqiao bianjing jingji hezuo qu kou’an guoji shangmao cheng) – or what 
is locally known as the Border Trade Zone. On the other side of the road 
from the main construction site a small building hosted the off ices of the 
company in charge of its construction: the Hong Yi Da trading company. By 
the main entrance, two large posters showed the vision behind the project. 
In the one at the bottom the four countries of China, Burma, India and 
Bangladesh were brought together by four forearms, one emerging from 
each country, forming a square of sorts. The large caption read: “Houqiao 
Border Crossing – the centre of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
golden corridor.” The other poster showed a rendering of the new “Houqiao 
International Trade City,” with the contact information of the Hong Yi Da 
company in both Mandarin and Burmese.
The off ice of the Hong Yi Da company in Houqiao was not nearly as 
impressive. A large redwood table with some investment brochures, two 
smaller tables on the side, and a couple of posters with maps of the area 
and BCIM routes is all there was to it. The only person inside was Mr Yu, 
sitting at one of the small tables in front of his laptop, a small electric heater 
on his side. He got up as I walked in, and greeted me with a smile. Over 
the following two years, I visited him in this off ice several times. He never 
seemed to be busy, and I had never met anybody else in the off ice. During 
each visit, I would be served local Wulong tea in small paper cups he kept 
refilling with hot water, the green leaves laying at the bottom of the cup. Over 
such meetings we would smoke endless cigarettes, alternatively handing 
one out of our own box to one another as we talked about the Hong Yi Da 
company, the Houqiao International Trade City, the future plans for the 
BCIM, and about how Mr Yu, then in his mid-20s, ended up working here.
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His story is not uncommon across the Chinese borderlands. Born and 
raised in Tengchong, Mr Yu went to college in Kunming – a phase of his 
life he often talked about: the big city, daily life in the large dormitories, 
early morning exercises, and afternoons spent sleeping in the library. Once 
graduated, he was faced with the choice of moving back home, or pursuing 
a career in Kunming or elsewhere. Many of his friends remained in Yunnan, 
yet some headed off to the coastal cities and are now back only once a 
year for New Year. “That was never for me,” Mr Yu told me once, “I like it 
here, in Yunnan.” Mr Yu, however, was not necessarily looking for a job in 
Tengchong when an opportunity with Hong Yi Da came up. A new, ambitious 
company was hiring in Tengchong county, promising a decent pay and 
an international working environment. As he explained, the company 
had already put RMB 320 million (US$ 50 million) in the construction of 
the International Trade City and the development of the Houqiao Border 
Special Economic Zone. According to the company’s vision, Houqiao was 
set to become the largest import/export trading centre in Western Yunnan 
relying on innovative logistics system and business models. At the time I 
f irst spoke to Mr Yu, the project envisioned the construction of six areas 
with different purposes: an integrated commercial city, a logistics district, 
a central plaza, a wholesale market, a recreational and tourist area, and 
public f itness facilities. Additionally, the company was also in the process 
of developing a nearby Lisu village into a tourist attraction. Mr Yu once told 
me that growing up in Tengchong he had often heard stories about Houqiao 
and about Burma. The idea of being part of such an ambitious, transnational 
project excited him – and that is how he decided to take the job.
The small off ice in Houqiao hardly f it such ambitious vision. Mr Yu, 
however, remained hopeful and optimistic. With enthusiasm, he walked me 
through the Houqiao International Trade City brochure, and illustrated the 
plans for the development of the area. Houqiao, he explained, was upgraded 
to a national-level border crossing (guojia yilei kou’an) in 2000. Yet, in practice, 
he told me, the change was not implemented until 2004. Nevertheless, its 
location made it China’s major gateway for trade with India. While Mr Yu 
admitted that distance was a negative factor, and he was well aware that 
north-east India was certainly not the most developed part of the country, 
potentials, according to him, outweighed the risks by a signif icant margin. 
“You see,” he told me earnestly once, “there is a potential market of over one 
billion people that we can serve through here, western China, Southeast 
Asia, South Asia – it’s huge!”
Despite the promises of development and connectivity that it carries, 
the history of Houqiao as a major gateway for China-Burma trade is a fairly 
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recent one. As shown in Chapter 2, until the late 2000s a signif icant volume 
of trade was in fact going through smaller border crossings further north 
along the border. In particular Diantan, as well as the smaller and most 
remote border crossing of Zizhi, became major entryways for Burmese 
timber throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In Chapter 2, I discussed the ways 
in which the timber trade affected the geography of border crossings and 
border infrastructure in Tengchong, pointing out how an illicit economy led 
to the consolidation of state presence at the borderlands. In this Chapter, 
on the other hand, I describe what happened in Tengchong since the end of 
the timber trade, in the mid-2010s, counterposing the situation in Diantan 
and Zizhi to the increasing importance of Houqiao. In particular, I will 
show how the visions expressed by Mr Yu in Houqiao, while pointing to a 
particular image of development, trade, and global exchanges, grounded 
in legality and transparency, also hides some of the fundamental dynamics 
that have shaped and still shape the lives and fortune of Tengchong’s trading 
families. First, however, let us discuss what happened in Tengchong in 
recent years, and why.
Life after timber: Illicit no more?
After showing me the border marker that he kept in the Tengchong Transla-
tors Association’s backyard, Chairman Zhou told me that Burma did not 
have any forest left. This reminded me of a passage from Archibald Rose’s 
description of the China-Burma frontier in his 1912 report. Rose noted that 
there was “a physical reality about the frontier” impressing the travellers 
crossing that particular boundary:
On the one side lies Burma, green and forest-clad as far as the eye can 
reach, the hills raising their wooded summits from a sea of white and 
billowing mists, whilst on the other side China stretches away to the 
sunrise, with hills that are bare of trees, rugged and weather-worn, with 
every crevice standing clear in the still sparkling air of the winter morning 
(Rose 1912: 197).
As Chairman Zhou’s words made clear, by the late 2000s, the outlook of 
the China-Burma border had turned. Thanks to Chinese loggers, where 
there once were trees, now lies a maze of logging roads and bare hills. On 
the Chinese side, on the other hand, the hills are covered by thick vegeta-
tion – the result of the Sloping Land Conversion Programme and Yunnan’s 
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ban on logging. Yet, according to Chinese and Burmese business people in 
Tengchong, the situation of Burma’s forests was bound to turn once again.
Since 2015/2016, as I could witness myself, very little timber has been 
coming into Tengchong county. Both Chairman Zhou and Mr Zhang, as well 
as several other Tengchong off icials I interviewed, ascribed the end of the 
timber trade to a change of policy in Beijing. Facing Burma’s discontent over 
the trade and increasing international scrutiny, I was repeatedly told, China 
decided to put an end to the illegal export of Burmese timber to instead 
establish good relation with the newly elected government in Naypyidaw for 
the development of large-scale cross-border infrastructure and agribusiness 
concessions within the country.10
In general, what emerged from my interviews in Tengchong is that the 
decision to put an end to the illegal import of timber from Burma did not 
come from the local government in Tengchong or from the provincial 
government in Kunming, but rather from Beijing. At such, it can be seen 
as an integral part of broader foreign policy changes towards Burma that 
have taken place in recent years. The major driver of such changes can be 
identif ied as a more “assertive” Chinese approach aiming at protecting 
its own interests in Burma, fearing Naypyidaw’s growing ties with the 
United States since the beginning of political reforms in 2011 (cf. Han 2017). 
According to this model, Beijing is seemingly applying a carrot-and-stick 
policy in which investment in infrastructure projects that would deepen 
China’s influence in Burma are held against Beijing’s ability to interfere 
in Burma’s civil war through its connections with rebel armies along the 
Yunnan borders. By enforcing a ban on timber imports, and de facto halting 
Chinese logging operations in northern Burma, Beijing is making a strategic 
concession – one that does not represent a big sacrif ice, but that nonetheless 
displays China’s willingness to conduct its business in Burma in a fair and 
transparent manner.
In this regard, the fact that a major BRI corridor is set to transit through 
Tengchong is likely to have played a role in the strict enforcement of the 
ban in the area. In 2016 and 2017, throughout a number of visits to major 
points of entry for Burmese timber such as Diantan, Zizhi, and Pianma 
(in the Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture, only a few kilometres from 
the northern limits of Tengchong county), I could confirm that very little 
timber had entered China in this phase. Zizhi and Diantan, which were 
next to totally dependent on the timber trade, have become semi-deserted. 
In Zizhi, what used to be a busy trading hub with restaurants, hotels, KTVs 
10 See also Han (2016, 2017); Sun (2012); Hameiri, Jones and Zou (2018).
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and massage parlours, it had become difficult to f ind a place open for lunch.11 
During a visit in 2016, the only open businesses were a few sawmills working 
on long-built reserves of timber. As the manager of one such place told me, 
their days were numbered, the future was bleak. Timber traders in the area 
conf irmed that it was a Chinese decision to put a stop to the trade. “The 
Burmese,” one such traders told me in Zizhi, “would love to do business 
with us. They make money with timber, but the [Chinese] government 
(zhengfu) doesn’t let us.”
The trader, whom I shall call Mr Wang, was one of many Sichuanese mi-
grants who had come to the Yunnan-Burma borderlands in the early 2000s 
to work in the timber trade. As he proudly pointed out, he had been “all along 
the border, in all places where there is timber,” before eventually settling down 
in Zizhi where he purchased a lot of land and opened his own sawmill. As we 
talked, he walked me through the main showroom, a large open space where he 
kept some of its best products – mostly large tables carved out of rare tropical 
redwood. “The tables,” he told me, “we usually carve here, but we also send raw 
timber to Fujian and other places where they make high-quality furniture.” 
He seemed very proud of what he had built, and did not seem too concerned 
about the uncertain future that his business was going to face with the end 
of timber imports. I asked him what he thought about it. “Obviously I am not 
happy with it,” he said. Yet, after a moment of silence, he added: “but we knew it 
was not going to last forever – there is almost no timber left in Burma anyway.” 
As his wife served us some dinner – a couple of dishes of fried vegetables and a 
Yunnan favourite, minced pork with spicy pickled greens – Mr Wang opened 
a bottle of liquor. We toasted to our friendship and to his business, then talked 
more about the timber trade. Like many of his fellow traders, Mr Wang was 
very aware of the destructive impact of his business on Burmese forests. Yet 
he, unlike many other traders I had spoken to over the years, did not try to 
justify it by mentioning Burma’s “backwardness,” or the conflicts that were 
still breaking the country apart. “Our business,” he pointed out, “was good 
for China.” He continued: “who do you think made more money? We did, 
our government did. The local Party leaders, everybody.” I could sense some 
uneasiness in his voice. “And what changed now?,” I asked. “Policies changed, 
in Beijing,” he replied without hesitation, “it’s because of the anti-corruption 
campaign, the Belt and Road Initiative, they don’t care about us now.”
11 There are ongoing plans for the re-development of cross-border facilities in Zizhi to foster 
the development of the area (Ming 2016: 44). What is interesting here is how development is 
identif ied as consequence of state investment, whereas timber – what brought fortune and 
infrastructure to Zizhi in the f irst place – does not f igure.
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Houqiao is a good place from which to observe how a new discourse over 
legality, in combination with BRI-led development, is affecting cross-border 
interactions. Here, as trucks line up every day in front of Mr Yu’s little off ice, 
waiting to clear customs and enter Burma, the timber trade is clearly a 
thing of the past – something that nobody seems to be particularly proud 
of. Yu spelled it out clearly. “You see,” he said once, “the timber business 
was not a good business. A lot of forests were destroyed, people made a lot 
of money, but it was not good.” Mr Zhang, back in Tengchong, held similar 
views. As we sat down for dinner at his house, facing the ancestors’ altar 
in the central room (tangwu), he gave me his view on the end of the timber 
trade. “I used to work in Diantan, you know, I saw so much timber coming 
in, so much you cannot even imagine. But it was all unregulated. We would 
go in, and log an entire mountain. That’s not good, you need regulations 
(guiding).” To the immorality of the timber trade, Tengchong off icials and 
traders alike tend to counterpose today’s approach. Thus Mr Yu, from his 
Houqiao off ice, did not shy away from an analysis of what has changed, 
and of what is to come:
This [the Houqiao Trade City] is not about imports. The timber trade 
is over. The companies investing here are all exporting – construction 
materials, agricultural products, utensils and electronics. This is what 
we focus on. […] In order to succeed, this business needs good relations 
between China and Burma, China and India. The timber trade was bad 
for these relations, that’s why it’s now illegal (weifa).
Scratching the shiny surface of off icial speeches and company brochures, 
however, a more complicated situation emerges. It is an open secret among 
Tengchong’s well-to-dos that the Houqiao Trade City is the result of local-
level Party policies and favours.12 Initially, the story goes, the Hong Yi Da 
company was contracted to build the Trade City, which would have then 
been run by the Baoshan city government.13 The company itself is run by a 
businessman originally from Qujing, a city in eastern Yunnan from where 
the current major of Baoshan was transferred from – leading to speculations 
over the major’s personal stake in the project. Nevertheless, the Baoshan 
government was rumoured to have soon run out of money. Unable to pay 
for the construction, which had been in the meantime almost completed, 
12 The following story was conf irmed in a long conversation with one of the members of the 
Management committee of the Houqiao Border Trade Zone.
13 Baoshan is the prefecture-level city with jurisdiction over Tengchong county.
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the government negotiated the transfer of ownership of the Trade City to 
the Hong Yi Da company, which agreed to take over as the offer included 
preferential policies over taxes. Mr Zhang, knowing more than he could – or 
would – let on, told me in 2017 that the bargain did not quite pay off for the 
Hong Yi Da management. The Trade City was about to open, but most of 
the space up for lease was still empty. “Nobody wants to go and do business 
in Houqiao when you can do the same business here in Tengchong, we also 
have a Special Economic Zone. That’s why the Hong Yi Da made such good 
website with all the reference to the Belt and Road Initiative. They hope they 
can sell some space, but they can’t.” I pointed out that despite everything the 
company was still running, the Trade City was almost f inished, and more 
projects were popping up in Houqiao. Mr Zhang nodded, then exclaimed: “but 
of course!” He continued: “you see, this is Belt and Road now, the government 
needs to invest in it even if they have no money. They [Hong Yi Da] still get 
money from Baoshan.”
What to make of a situation in which, on the one hand, the trade in timber 
that was for years not only tolerated, but also encouraged by Tengchong 
authorities, is now vehemently condemned as immoral and shameful, 
while new Belt and Road deals seem to be embedded in shadowy dynamics 
despite emphatic calls for transparency and accountability. One might be 
tempted to dismiss Tengchong off icials’ rhetoric as simply hypocritical, 
or to altogether question their integrity and honesty. On the other hand, a 
growing literature in the social sciences have pointed out that distinctions 
between what is legal and what is illegal, licit and illicit, and even moral 
and immoral, are inherently fluid and unstable. In the next section, I build 
upon this literature and touch upon the case of the amber business which 
has boomed at around the same time that the trade in timber was being 
shut down. By addressing Tengchong’s off icials and business community’s 
different approaches to the two commodities, I show how legality and 
illegality are intimately bound with each other at the level of practice, 
while remaining powerfully – and conveniently – separated at the level of 
off icial discourse.
From timber to amber
In their introduction to Illicit flows and criminal things, Abraham and Van 
Schendel point to the f luid interface between what is considered illegal 
and illicit in the context of national borders. In particular, they identify the 
borderlands as particular spaces where activities that are legally banned but 
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socially accepted take place. They term such activities “licit” and counterpose 
them to what states consider to be legitimate – what they refer to as “legal.” 
In the borderlands, they argue, there are many instances in which the 
transnational movement of particular people and goods is considered illegal, 
as it defies the rules of the state(s). Such movement, however, can be seen as 
acceptable, and therefore sanctioned and protected, by those who actively 
participate in such transactions and that consider the trade to be a licit one. 
Recent works on everyday life at the borderlands of China and Southeast 
Asia have indeed showed the fluidity of such categories in the context of 
cross-border exchanges.14 Particular emphasis had been put on the role of 
the state in such processes, showing how local traders are able to negotiate 
and collaborate with it even in the context of “illegal” transactions. Here, I 
explicitly build on Van Schendel’s (2005) argument about the fluid interface 
between illegality and illicitness in the borderlands to explore how what 
is considered “licit” and “illicit” changes in conjunction to state-driven 
discursive and policy shifts. In Tengchong, this shift took place at around 
the mid-2010s.
As timber imports faced closure, the mid-2010s witnessed the explosion of 
another form of cross-border trade, this time in Burmese amber (Figure 20). 
As I have discussed elsewhere in detail (Rippa and Yang 2017),15 Burmese 
amber – also known as Burmite – has been a renowned trading item for 
Tengchong families since at least the Ming dynasty. The main amber mines 
are located in northern Kachin State, close to the town of Danai through 
which the Stilwell Road used to run and now a contested piece of territory 
between the KIO/A and the Burmese army. Due to a number of factors, 
from political instability in the region to the prominence of trade in jade 
and timber as well as lack of demand, the trade in amber did not play an 
important role in the local economy until recently. Starting in the late 
2000s, a few Tengchong traders began to import more Burmese amber, 
slowly building up a market for it. Less than a decade later, Tengchong had 
become China’s amber capital, overseeing a trade that in 2015 included 
around 100 tons of amber being imported into Tengchong county, according 
to local estimate.
Despite the size of the business the bulk of the amber trade occurs outside 
of the regulatory regime, as amber rarely, if ever, goes through either Chinese 
or Burmese customs at the border. As a Tengchong amber trader put it: “If 
14 See for instance Walker (1999); Kusakabe (2009); Sturgeon (2005); Schoenberger and Turner 
(2008); Hinton (1998, 2000: 22-23); Ford, Lyons and Van Schendel (2012); Nyíri and Tan (2016).
15 This section is largely based on this article.
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amber were to go through customs it would not be profitable. We sell amber 
by the gram. I heard that customs tax is around 40 RMB/gram, more than the 
price of a gram of most amber you f ind in Tengchong!” Furthermore, given 
the success of the trade, the Tengchong government recently listed amber 
as one of the city’s main eight industries, and put its management under 
the responsibility of the Tengchong Cultural Industry Off ice. Authorities 
in Tengchong are well aware that Burmese amber reaches Tengchong via 
illicit channels, without going through customs at Houqiao or any other port 
of entry. The trade, however, has largely been tolerated, although stories of 
amber being seized along the Houqiao-Tengchong route circulate in the main 
gemstone market in Tengchong. The same trader put it in the following way: 
“Customs off icials can confiscate [amber], they carry out inspections and 
can also set up mobile check-points. But it doesn’t happen very often. […] 
The majority of the vehicles carrying amber make it to Tengchong, more 
than 90 per cent; very few are seized.” According to many traders, moreover, 
seized amber can be easily bought back from corrupt customs off icials, and 
thus ends up at the Tengchong market anyway. Once there, I was repeatedly 
told, the amber is considered legal, and nobody can seize it. All the risks, 
then, are limited to the few kilometres between Houqiao and Tengchong.
This does not mean, however, that there are no attempts, in Tengchong, 
to regulate the amber market. Quite signif icantly, however, it was not local 
off icials but the amber dealers themselves who initially pushed for a more 
Figure 20: Amber dealers in Myitkyina, Kachin state (picture by the author, 2015)
232 BoRdeRlAnd InFRAsTRuC TuRes 
regulated market and increased collaboration with authorities. Those 
efforts culminated with the creation of the Tengchong Amber Association 
(Tengchong shi hupo xiehui) in January 2016, at a meeting in a f ive-star 
hotel in Tengchong.16 It was the apparent ambiguity between the illicit 
means through which amber was brought into China, and the legal ways 
through which it was traded once in Tengchong, that represented one 
of the main reasons behind the traders’ effort to set up the Tengchong 
Amber Association. Virtually all of the traders I talked to were hopeful that 
through the Association, amber traders and government off icials would 
come to an agreement over the taxation of amber that would be favourable 
for business, and ensure that no further seizures would occur and more 
investments would be made – and most importantly, that the government 
would represent their interests to the Association’s counterpart(s) in Burma. 
In the language of much economic discourse in today’s China, traders in 
Tengchong were thus hoping for a mutually beneficial (gongying) outcome.
The report of the f irst meeting of the Association contained a f irst draft 
of the Association’s constitution, an outline of the voting system for the 
members, and a list of its current members. The document established the 
Association as a non-profit entity, whose purpose was to foster unity (tuan-
jie), communication ( jiaoliu), trust (chengxin), and development ( fazhan) 
between the government and members of the Association, thus acting as an 
intermediary between off icials and traders. Accordingly, the Association 
was in charge of delivering and discussing new government policies with the 
members, keeping the price of amber stable, ensuring the absence of fake 
amber from the market (as part of the Association’s regulations, if a member 
sells fake amber he or she would have to compensate the cheated costumers 
for ten times the price spent), representing the members’ interests at the 
government level, mediating disputes among members, and guaranteeing 
the fairness of the trade (gongping jiaoyi). Members, on the other hand, must 
subscribe to the Association’s rules and pay membership fees according to 
their rank.
Despite its only recent appearance and the vagueness of certain critical 
points, none of the traders I interviewed in Tengchong underestimated the 
impact that the Association would have on the amber trade. The general 
impression among those involved with the Association was that, with 
time, traders and the government would reach an agreement based on the 
following two pillars: a low customs tax on amber which traders would 
16 For an overview of small- and medium-sized associations in China see Weyerhaeuser, Wen 
and Kharl (2006).
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commit to paying in exchange for government support and investments. No 
one, however, ventured into providing more details, insisting that the actual 
content of the accord was to be worked out within the Association over the 
following months and years. The overall impression, moreover, was that for 
Tengchong traders the Association was less about regulating the imports of 
amber in order to avoid its seizure by border patrol forces, and more about 
providing them with a way to shape how government policies regarding 
amber were drafted and carried out. To be sure, traders were confident that 
having the government on their side would be of signif icant help in cases 
of conflicts with their Burmese counterparts or Burmese authorities. The 
creation of the Association was then a way, for traders, to bring the state 
in, but also to ensure that the amber trade would be dealt with according 
to their own interests.
Thus far, the creation of the Association does not seem to have had any 
significant impact on the way amber is brought into Tengchong. For the most 
part, the actual import of amber through Houqiao remains in the hands of 
individuals or small groups of Burmese dealers who generally take all of the 
risks. Many Tengchong traders pointed out to that there is so much amber 
coming into Tengchong via these channels, that they generally only have 
to sit tight and wait for somebody with a good deal to walk through their 
doors. Paired with the mining operations in Kachin State, which remain 
in Burmese hands, the case of the amber trade in Tengchong thus seems 
to resemble what Anna Tsing (2015) has called “supply chain capitalism.” 
Miners around Danai and small-scale Burmese dealers bringing amber to 
Tengchong, in other words, whilst being an integral part of this specif ic 
supply chain, remain largely outside of any form of capitalist accumulation. 
Tengchong-based traders, on the other hand, work from within a system 
of accumulation bounded by state regulations they themselves collaborate 
in creating. As Tsing asserted, there is salvage accumulation on the one 
hand – illegal, risky, and unrepresented – and capitalist accumulation 
on the other – in which the state and traders come together to def ine the 
market for a particular commodity (Tsing 2005; 2015).
The Tengchong Amber Association, moreover, seems to have been created 
with the implicit goal of promoting the interests of a specif ic group of Teng-
chong amber traders: the wealthiest ones. Each member of the Association 
is required to pay a fee in order to be part of it. While the fee for a regular 
membership is not high, the president of the Association (currently Yang 
Chenguang, a major trader from Fujian) paid 200,000 RMB (US$ 29,000), and 
the vice-President (Lin Shengyao, a local businessman) 100,000 RMB (US$ 
14,500) for the f irst year. When asked about why someone would pay such 
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a high fee for these positions, the answer was “fame and wealth (mingli),” 
particularly the chance to establish closer ties with the government.
As mentioned above, there is a growing literature on small-scale cross-bor-
der trade in the Chinese context that shows how the state is embedded in 
flourishing illicit economies (cf. Ngo and Hung 2019). Building upon this 
literature this Chapter has underlined the coexistence of such processes with 
the establishment and development of large-scale cross-border infrastructure 
as part of the BRI. While much of the rhetoric behind such projects stresses 
transparency and inclusiveness, then, they are ultimately tied into pre-existing 
networks that blur commonly established lines between what is considered 
legal and illegal, licit and illicit. This is not to say, however, that the super-im-
position of Belt and Road transnational connectivity projects has not affected 
local forms of trade. To the contrary, while illicit practices are institutionalised, 
some benefit from such investments while others excluded from them. In this 
context the creation of the Tengchong Amber Association reflects a larger trend 
as part of which large-scale traders take advantage of close ties with the local 
government, while small to mid-size trading enterprises suffer as their interests 
remain unrepresented. Burmese dealers, despite their fundamental role in the 
amber supply chain, are ultimately replaceable and thus stand at the lowest 
end of the spectrum, and are not even allowed to join the Association. To put 
it differently, the corridor-isation of the border regime at the China-Burma 
borderlands operates unevenly across different groups of traders. As a result, 
some have been further marginalised, while others have been included in the 
regulating process while, at the same time, profiting from the illicit practices 
they are supposedly regulating. Contrary to repeated claims of open borders 
and free markets so embedded within the BRI vision, what the case of the 
Tengchong Amber Association shows is that proximity to the state seems to 
be, still, the main guarantee of success in China’s borderlands.
Conclusion
Today, in Tengchong, the trade in timber is seen with a sense of shame by local 
officials and traders alike. Deemed immoral, it is something most people – 
particularly those who used to be involved with it – prefer not to talk about. In 
its place, what is promoted is a different kind of connectivity. Not one based on 
informality, shadowy exchanges, and lawless frontier-like imaginaries. Instead, 
the projected modernity of spaces like the new Houqiao Border Trade Zone 
displays transparency, accountability, and mutual respect. Yet, as this chapter 
has shown, while these two visions of connectivity might be incompatible at 
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the level of ideology, they are deeply intertwined at the level of practices. As 
such, as the case of the Tengchong Amber Association exemplifies, a degree 
of illegality remains institutionalised even in the Belt and Road era.
In this chapter, by looking at borderlands as historical processes, rather 
than as taken-for-granted realities, I have described how legality and illegal-
ity can make one another. As Chapter 2 argued, the illegal trade in timber 
in Tengchong county brought about one of the most visible symbols of the 
state’s lawful national sovereignty: immigration and customs facilities in 
two of the county’s most remote border towns. The “legality” of such facil-
ities, however, facilitated the unlawful exploitation of Burmese forests for 
almost two decades. Today, the legality of the Tengchong Amber Association 
oversees what remains, essentially, an illegal trade. As part of this process 
of formalisation, moreover, small-scale and Burmese traders have been 
excluded, further increasing their risks and lowering their potential gains.
To generalise, as cross-border trade is channelled through a smaller 
number of border crossings for political and economic reasons (Harris 2017), 
customs inspections and security checks are expected to become more 
severe, but also fairer and more transparent (Alff 2016b; 2016c).17 When 
observed on the ground, however, these same regulations produce an uneven 
impact across different groups. The corridor-isation of trade brought about 
17 One study in particular is worth mentioning here, that of Economic Quadrangle at the 
borderlands of Laos, Thailand, China and Burma which Andrew Walker addresses in his 
monograph The Legend of the Golden Boat (1999). Offering a detailed regional history of trade 
in the borderlands of north-western Laos, spanning from the eighteenth century to the present 
day, Walker shows that this seemingly peripheral hinterland was, in fact, a dynamic commercial 
crossroads. He then describes recent attempts to “liberalise” these borderlands taking place 
since 1986, and materialised in particular in the Economic Quadrangle of Thailand, China, 
Laos, and Burma. Not unlike contemporary dreams of transnational connectivity in Houqiao, 
the vision behind the Economic Quadrangle was one of rapid growth fuelled by infrastructural 
development, trade liberalisation, tourism schemes, and foreign investment. Here is Walker’s 
most compelling argument: “as trading and transport conditions become more liberalised, 
opportunities and incentives for regulation flourish” (1999: 5). This, Walker shows, is the paradox 
of liberalisation: what is usually taken to mean free trade and deregulation leads, in fact, to more 
opportunities for local off icials, traders and entrepreneurs to profit from the remunerative rights 
to trade regulations. ⁠ Geometrical simplif ications such as economic quadrangles, triangles, and 
economic corridors seem to produce more, not fewer state regulations. And, in turn, more, not 
less, state presence. What is interesting about this argument is that, in both the cases of CPEC 
and BCIM trade in Tashkurgan and Houqiao, the struggles of local small-scale traders in recent 
years seem to follow this very pattern. New regulation, in both regions, have favoured large 
companies and contributed to the marginalisation of local actors. As the f irst part of this book 
pointed out, by stressing a particular form of transnational connectivity – reflected by economic 
corridors and large-scale projects – another form of connectivity, more local and embedded in 
the physical and cultural landscapes of the Chinese borderlands, is virtually erased.
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by Xi Jinping’s new vision for transnational connectivity, in other words, 
brought about more security (Chapter 5) and the institutionalisation of 
illicitness. The results, far from the off icial rhetoric, are producing exclusion 
and marginalisation for many small-scale actors which have been involved 
in cross-border trade for decades. The BRI, in this regard, might as well 
signify the end of proximity.
 Coda
February 2013. Houses tell a lot about the people who live in them. They 
are a canvas upon which past lives, stories, and memories f ind a way into 
the present. They tell of someone’s aspirations and fears, of one’s loves and 
dreams. Such were my thoughts as I walked into the house of Brigadier 
Khan, in a quiet residential area in the outskirts of Islamabad. The walls 
were covered with a number of family photographs. I saw the young 
brigadier on the day of his marriage – “many years ago,” as he pointed 
out. Other pictures were showing his four daughters with their respective 
husbands and children, and one large image showed the whole family 
together. All of the brigadier’s daughters were living in different places 
now: Vancouver, Manchester, Karachi. The fourth one, I can’t recall. As 
the Brigadier pointed out, proudly, “it all started from me, and now they 
are all over the world with their families”.
In February 2013, at the time I interviewed him in his house in Islama-
bad, Brigadier Khan was 82 years old. Tall and skinny, his long f ingers 
moved quickly as he generously talked to me about his life for over two 
hours, while sipping sweet chai and eating cookies and dry fruit. He 
enjoyed his time in the army – and he certainly enjoyed recalling the old 
days. The reason I was interviewing Brigadier Khan was because he had 
been responsible of the construction of “over 400 miles” of the KKH, in 
the 1960s and 1970s, when he was a commander of the Corps of Engineers 
of the Pakistani army.
I had come to know Brigadier Khan through another prominent mem-
ber of the Corps of Engineers, Brigadier (retired) Mumtaz Khalid. Brigadier 
Khalid was the author of a two-volume history of the construction of 
the KKH (2006; 2009), which I had carefully read and discussed with 
him over meetings at his house in Rawalpindi. Yet when my questions 
lingered around the relationships between Pakistani engineers and their 
Chinese counterparts, he suggested I get in touch with Brigadier Khan. 
He, Mumtaz Khalid told me, was working closely with the Chinese, and 
travelled extensively to Xinjiang and Beijing to discuss cooperations 
and protocols with Chinese off icers. He had even met Zhou Enlai once, 
I was told.
Brigadier Khan, as I arrived at his house, invited me to sit in a large 
living room, surrounded by sofa, with a big window pointing toward the 
small garden beside the street. As I walked in, I couldn’t avoid noticing 
the huge carpet that was covering most of the room’s space, a beautiful 
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Bijar specimen with an impressive central f loral medallion design and 
a beautiful f loral border. Beside it, I noticed a much smaller carpet, of 
Caucasian design, with three medallions of rather odd pink colour. I 
immediately complimented the Brigadier on the carpets, hoping that 
he would tell me more about the small Caucasian one, which I found 
particularly interesting. As I suspected, the Brigadier told me that he 
had bought it in Xinjiang, “in Khotan to be precise,” in the course of a 
visit to the XUAR in the 1980s. Another object, in the living room, was 
representative of the Brigadier’s past Chinese experiences. It was a Chinese 
cinnabar lacquer plate depicting a view of the Great wall.
“I used to work in close contact with the Chinese, we used to have 
discussions and meetings about all sort of problems,” Brigadier Khan 
recalled. “We used to meet the Chinese in Hunza, they worked there,” he 
continued, but “the main headquarter was in Gilgit. They [the Chinese] 
used to come there, commander and director general. They had very good 
engineers, very outstanding. They also had all the security personnel, the 
army, and also a group of interpreters, Urdu and English interpreters.” Yet, 
while Pakistani and Chinese engineers and off icials held regular meet-
ings to discuss all matters related to the road’s planning and execution, 
equipment, and labour, Chinese workers employed in Pakistan kept to 
their own camps and interactions with locals were minimal. As Brigadier 
Khan put it: “many [Chinese] students also came and work on the road. 
But they were all kept in the north. They were devoted communists, Mao 
Zedong was alive, and I think most people were not allowed to talk to us.”
Most Chinese workers were members of the Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps. They had military training and were used to the 
hardship of an alien terrain and cultural space. They also knew how to 
keep by themselves. Nevertheless, the distance at which they were kept 
from entering in any contact with any local chafes with the language of 
friendship and brotherhood often employed by authorities to def ine the 
China-Pakistan relation. Instead of being encouraged, “people-to-people 
exchanges” – as the same rhetoric often phrases it1 – were prevented. 
As Brigadier Khan observed, ideology – specif ically, Maoism – played 
a part in hindering such relations from taking place and developing. 
Security concerns also played a role. As Chinese accounts of the lives 
and experiences of construction workers on the Pakistani side of the 
KKH reveal, contacts were for the most part limited to the few Pakistani 
1 See, for instance, the off icial Pakistani government website of the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor: http://cpec.gov.pk/project-details/61 (accessed May 2019).
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soldiers who were helping their Chinese counterparts to guarantee the 
safety of Chinese workers (Li Menghe 2017).
While the dominant ideology of the time has hardly survived four 
decades of modernisation, along today’s KKH some of the same problems 
remain. As I could observe in Karimabad, Hunza Valley, where most 
Chinese workers employed in the construction of the tunnels around 
the Attabad lake were residing in 2013, contacts with locals were kept to 
a minimum. I was often told that Chinese workers were “not allowed” 
to talk to locals, to eat at local restaurants, and to leave their camps and 
workplace without an armed escort. Since 2013, moreover, the issue of 
the security of Chinese workers in Pakistan had become an element 
of paramount importance in the relations between the two countries. 
Pakistan has repeatedly stressed that it will do its best to protect Chinese 
workers, while China had begun employing its own security contractors 
to protect its interests in the country. The result, much like in the early 
days of the construction of the KKH, is that relations between Chinese 
workers and Pakistani are limited to the workplace.
A corridor can take many different shapes. In its quest for producing friction-
less connections, it is always incongruous. Local frictions cannot be fully 
eliminated, and the forces of proximity are playing an important part even 
in the Belt and Road era. A corridor, in other words, is always aspirational 
– yet in its material encroachment it produces concrete consequences. In 
projecting ideas of connectivities, it prevents contiguities. In producing 
connections, it erases existing relations. In its attempts to bring together, 
it separates.
Such is the story of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Such is the 
future the Belt and Road Initiative is set to shape.

 Conclusion
In the summer of 2016, during a two-week visit to Xinjiang, I travelled up the 
Karakoram Highway from Kashgar to Tashkurgan in the company of two 
colleagues. Not long after the Gez canyon checkpoint, upon reaching the high 
plateau that would lead us to Karakul Lake, we made a short detour to visit 
a new village to which a few hundred Kyrgyz have been recently resettled. 
The outline of the village followed a familiar pattern, with concrete houses 
built in orderly fashion along straight roads, each separated by a concrete 
wall enclosing a small garden. To the southernmost edge of the village a 
few buildings were meant for livestock, which families were prohibited 
from keeping in their own yard for “hygienic” reasons. Not unlike the new 
villages in the Dulong Valley described in Chapter 3, the Kyrgyz village in 
Xinjiang also featured Party off ices, a building for communal activities 
with a basketball court, and a school. At the time of our visit the village was 
mostly unoccupied. Young men and women, as well as the livestock, were 
camped at higher altitudes, in the summer pastures, and would not come 
back until the change of the season. Driving through the village’s empty 
street we could not help but feel a distinct sense of desolation.
Nevertheless, we decided to take a short walk around to talk with some of 
the few elders who had remained in the village, and to snap a few pictures. 
As we reached the school, we observed a number of murals that had been 
painted on the school wall, not unlike most schools China. What was rather 
different in this case were the subjects, focusing mostly on praising ethnic 
unity and crushing the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and religious 
extremism. In one mural, a f ist displaying the national emblem of the 
PRC crushed three “terrorists,” depicted with beards, white turban, and 
carrying knives and explosives. “This is how we respond to extremists,” 
the handwriting said, in both Chinese and Kyrgyz. On a nearby wall a 
group of CCP off icials, Kyrgyz herders and SWAT policemen were f ighting 
armed terrorists with pitchforks and guns. Yet, what caught my attention 
was another mural, depicting yet another violent scene (Figure 21). An axe, 
carrying the national emblem of the People’s Republic of China, had fallen 
on what was set to represent a group of terrorists. Two, carrying sword and 
spears were beheaded, leaving traces of red blood. A third was depicted as 
a snake, cut in half. A fourth, a man dressed in blue was cut by the axe at 
his knees, while lying face down. This man was not carrying weapons, but 
a flag. A green flag, with a white crescent and star in the top-right corner. 
The f lag, a clear reference to Islam, was not close to that of any terrorist 
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group we could think of. What it resembled, however, was the flag of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan – the only noticeable differences the fact that 
the crescent was facing downwards, instead of upwards, and the absence 
of the white stripe on the left.
Upon reaching Tashkurgan, only a few hours later, we were welcomed 
by another f lag – or more specif ically, by two flags placed alongside one 
another. This time, the flag of Pakistan was depicted correctly, on a large 
poster at Tashkurgan’s main intersection along the KKH (Figure 22). The 
f lag of the Islamic Republic was placed beside that of the PRC, above a 
sentence written in large Chinese characters as well as in the following 
English translation: “Warmly celebrate the 65 anniversary of the diplomatic 
ties establishment of China and Pakistan!”
This vignette encapsulates some of the key themes that I have discussed 
in this book. On the one hand, China’s anti-terrorism and security paranoia 
is reflected in the Kyrgyz village’s murals. In it, what looked like a Pakistani 
flag resonates with many Han Chinese’s views of Pakistan. An ally, certainly, 
but also an underdeveloped and dangerous (weixian) country – and one in 
which terrorists are rumoured to thrive. On the other hand, the large poster 
in Tashkurgan speaks to the CCP’s off icial line towards its “iron brother” – a 
key strategic and economic partner, to which China has promised a plethora 
of infrastructure and development projects as part of the CPEC. This poster 
Figure 21: Mural in Kyrgyz village along the KKh. The text, in Chinese and Kyrgyz reads, “Firmly 
strike the ‘three evils’” (picture by the author, 2016)
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also reveals something else, particularly through what is missing. Written in 
Chinese and English, it does not present any local language – Uyghur, Kyrgyz, 
Wakhi, or even Urdu. Implicitly, then, it seems to point to the “high-level” 
relations that are at stake – one that, clearly, does not reflect entirely at 
the local level.
In what follows, as a conclusion to the book and a sobering appendix to 
much of the discussions and expectations surrounding the BRI, I suggest 
that such ambiguities represent China’s main obstacle in the development 
of its transnational project and will ultimately hamper its ambitions. By 
doing so, I reflect upon what a view from the borderlands can tell us about 
the Chinese state and the future of China. Lastly, I return to the notions of 
proximity, curation, and corridor, which I have discussed throughout this 
book, in order to show how they can be employed as points of departure for 
understanding some of the dynamics cross-cutting not just the borderlands, 
but China as a whole.
From the margins to the centre: Development, Security, and the BRI
The concept of “community of shared destiny (mingyun gongtongti)” has gained 
popularity in Chinese foreign policy in recent few years. Xi Jinping first elabo-
rated on this concept in the course of a 2013 keynote address to the “Conference 
Figure 22: Celebratory sign along the KKh in Tashkurgan (picture by the author, 2016)
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on Diplomatic Work with Neighbouring Countries,”1 shortly after his launch 
of the BRI between Kazakhstan and Indonesia. At its core, the idea is neither 
new, nor particularly well-elaborated, vaguely referring to the need to develop 
good relations with neighbouring countries thus ensuring peace and stability. 
Xi pledged to cooperate with neighbours on the basis of friendship, reciprocity, 
and inclusiveness. That way, he added, neighbouring countries “can benefit from 
China’s development and China can benefit and gain support from theirs” (Xi 
2014b: 327). This particular approach, Xi stressed, has a strategic component 
too: to safeguard peace and stability in the region.2 Only a few months later, 
at the Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building 
Measures in Asia (CICA) in Shanghai, Xi Jinping presented another major 
foreign policy framework of his administration: the New Asian Security Concept. 
Employing a similar vocabulary to Xi’s Belt and Road speeches, the New Asian 
Security Concept was defined as a “common, comprehensive, cooperative and 
sustainable” (Xi 2014a) security framework, ultimately revolving around the 
three main pillars of development, cooperation, and inclusiveness.
When taken together, as they rarely are, these two approaches to China’s 
foreign policy seem to ref lect the CCP’s approach to the governance of 
the country’s peripheries. As discussed in this book, this revolves around 
the two pillars of development and security. One, in Xi Jinping’s China, 
cannot exist without the other. Or, as Xi himself put it in the same speech 
in Shanghai: “Development is the foundation of security, and security the 
precondition for development.”
Let us focus on this particular correlation in the context of the Belt and 
Road Initiative. In a recent article, Shahar Hameiri, Lee Jones, and Yizheng 
Zou (2018) look at the case of China-Burma relations to argue that not only 
security did not follow decades of Chinese economic engagement in its 
neighbouring country, but that the opposite outcome has occurred. As 
they summarise:
On the Myanmar side, Chinese economic engagements have been associ-
ated with increased organised crime, environmental degradation, land 
1 The main points of the speech are included in Xi (2014b: 325). On the community of shared 
destiny see Rigby and Taylor (2014).
2 Xi’s remarks seem to be at odds with his administration’s assertive attitude towards many 
of China’s neighbours, particularly in the context of ongoing territorial dispute in the South 
China Sea. As two observers pointed out, “it is diff icult to recall a period, in recent history at 
least, where there has been such a substantial gap between Beijing’s public rhetoric and what 
it has been doing in practice, with the result that it has alienated, alarmed and infuriated many 
of its neighbours” (Rigby and Taylor 2014)⁠.
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grabs, and escalating socio- political conflict. On the Chinese side, closer 
integration with Myanmar has intensif ied problems of smuggling, illegal 
gambling, narcotics traff icking, drug abuse, and HIV/AIDS. The Sino-
Myanmar borderlands thus exhibit a development-insecurity nexus (3).
They further identify two causes. First, as the critical literature on develop-
ment has consistently shown, the liberal mantra of peaceful development 
is misleading: processes of capitalist accumulation are rather inherently 
violent and conflict prone. Secondly, Chinese engagements in Burma have 
been largely in the hands of businesses operating out of Yunnan, thus in 
conjunction with an agenda set not by the central government in Beijing. 
This fragmentation and decentralisation of power, they argue, led to an 
uncoordinated and incoherent approach that is generative of conflicts. In 
this book, particularly in Chapters 2 and 6, I have shown how locally-driven 
development initiative at the China-Burma borderlands collided with the 
agenda set by CCP leaders in Beijing – a conflict that eventually led to a 
change of policy around the mid-2010s and to a more centralised approach 
to foreign policy.
To be sure, BRI projects in Burma, Pakistan, and elsewhere have raised 
several controversies, doubts, and fears. As I showed in this book, such 
scepticism over China’s promises of inclusiveness and win-win outcomes 
is well placed, yet for reasons that go beyond geopolitical anxieties. As 
I have discussed at length, by projecting a new, ambitious geography of 
transnational connectivity, the Belt and Road Initiative has ignored much 
of the pre-existing forms of mobility and exchange at the borderlands. As 
such, we can see the BRI as an ontogenetic project: it produces as imaginary 
of global connection that does not exist, never existed, and probably will 
never exist in such forms. In so doing, however, it jeopardises the viability of 
pre-existing networks and threatens the livelihoods of those dependent on 
them. Small-scale traders, in particular those who opened up many venues 
for China’s outbound trade throughout the reform period, have not only lost 
their strategic advantage, but are struggling to keep their businesses afloat 
altogether. By increasing legibility and control, particularly in connection 
with security paranoia in Xinjiang, communities of local traders have been 
de facto excluded from profiting in any way from BRI investments.
This book shows that insecurity at China’s borderlands is not only the 
outcome of the inherently violent nature of “peaceful” development and 
of the lack of coordination between peripheries and centre in China. The 
very discursive and material priorities at the core of Chinese investments 
abroad are likewise responsible for policy initiatives that disregard and 
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jeopardise existing connections and forms of exchange. The example of 
Pakistani traders mentioned in Chapter 1 and Chapter 6 is emblematic, in 
this sense. For them, as I stressed, a certain level of unpredictability was 
“part of the business.” Be it landslides, new regulations, or transportation 
issues, they could never guarantee a precise timeframe for the shipping of 
certain goods. On the other hand, new China-led infrastructure projects aim 
precisely at reducing such uncertainties, increasing speed and projecting 
an image of accountability. This tension, I argued, is not only the result 
of a different infrastructural or political landscape. Rather, it underlines 
differing notions of mobility. Notions that, embedded in small-scale traders’ 
practices, cannot be measured. The other, represented by smooth arrows 
across maps of Eurasia, that focuses on A-to-B connections and removing 
local frictions. There is a fundamental element of incommensurability at the 
heart of this tension. This incommensurability points, as I have argued in 
the f irst part, to different, at times diverging notions of connectivity. What 
it also points to, as the rest of the book elaborated upon, is to the ways in 
which such plans impact local livelihoods, transnational mobilities, and 
the very construction of the state in such contexts.
Aihwa Ong and Li Zhang (2008) have argued that in contemporary China 
neoliberal policies coexist with socialist rule. In order to make sense of this 
apparent contradiction, they define this particular articulation of neoliberal-
ism as “socialism from afar.” The adoption of neoliberal reasoning, particularly 
evident in self-governing practices that are integral to neoliberalism as a 
technology of rule (Rose 1999), has thus allowed the Chinese state to maintain 
authoritarian rule “from a distance.” To be sure, they view “China’s selective 
embrace of neoliberal logic as a strategic calculation for creating self-govern-
ing subjects who will enrich and strengthen Chinese authoritarian rule” (Ong 
and Zhang 2008: 10). Thus, against totalising views that see neoliberalism and 
socialism in contradictory terms (Harvey 2005; Hardt and Negri 2000), the 
Chinese state exemplifies a particular configuration of power where different 
logics of ruling are at play (Ong and Collier 2005). This book, particularly in 
Chapters 3 and 4, presented a number of examples that spoke to this mix 
of self-governing and socialist governing that characterises contemporary 
China. Unlike Ong and Zhang’s discussion, however, I have argued that this 
particular configuration is made possible not by distance, but by the sheer 
visibility and lumbering presence of the state in the borderlands. While 
promoting practices of self-management and self-control, in both Xinjiang 
and Yunnan the state showcases its presence in spectacular ways.
To be sure, one of the key arguments of this book has been that development, 
in the context of the Chinese borderlands, is always ideologically charged. In 
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her work on Soviet architecture, anthropologist Caroline Humphrey (2005) 
reminds us that a seeming “straightforward” relation between ideology and 
infrastructure was, in fact, challenged by the everyday usage of particular 
spaces. She thus sees the material structure that, according to a Marxist 
perspective, should have generated a new society, more like a “prism” through 
which particular ideas and ideologies were continuously deflected and re-di-
rected. The purpose of this book, on the other hand, was not to address the 
ways in which, for instance, new socialist villages in China can become sites 
of “deflection,” or perhaps even of resistance to a particular ideological project. 
Rather, my intent was to address such project and to describe the Chinese state’s 
approach to rural development in the borderlands as an ideologically driven 
effort. To highlight the political core of an intervention that is often framed 
in developmentalist – here read, economic – terms. The concept of curation 
conveyed this particular aspect of China’s contemporary political-economic 
system. Through it, and through the discussion that I developed in the context 
of Dulong and Kashgar, it appears clear that it is impossible to understand 
China’s contemporary development approaches outside of the socialist legacies 
that gave rise to it. Only moving from such backdrop can we fully understand 
the idiosyncrasies of China’s global role and position.
On 17 January 2017, Xi Jinping spoke at the World Economic Forum in the 
alpine setting of Davos, Switzerland. Xi presented himself – and the People’s 
Republic of China – as a champion of globalisation, a force that “powered 
global growth and facilitated movement of goods and capital, advances 
in science, technology and civilization, and interactions among people” 
(CGTN 2017). The speech, using many turns of phrases – from “win-win” 
to “inclusive development” – typical of BRI lingo, was delivered only a 
few days before Donald Trump’s inauguration as the 45th president of the 
United States. The timing of the two events signalled what many analyses 
have indicated as a historical turn of events: as Washington became more 
inward-looking, Beijing took over the helm of global economy. Compared 
to a conservative and nationalist majority in the United States, Xi’s rhetoric 
of global development and Belt and Road connections seemed to conjure 
China up as the new global leader.
As part of this shift, and particularly due to the ambitiousness of the BRI, 
China’s borderlands began to crop up in international news headline. Special 
Economic Zones under construction in seemingly remote places were covered 
by major news outlets, while the language of economic corridors spread well 
beyond the circle of experts to which it had been confined so far. Since the 
initiative was launched in 2013, China has hosted hundreds of BRI-themed 
conferences and workshop, while research papers and reportages on BRI 
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projects seem to know no end. By late 2018, we were nevertheless told that 
Asia had already “[fallen] out of love” with the Initiative (Marlow and Li 2018).
Despite all of the attention that the BRI gathered, little has been said 
about those who actually live at the borderlands. The language of “win-win” 
outcomes and geopolitical considerations seem to have overshadowed the 
logic of local dynamics. Who, along China’s borderlands, is left out of such 
projects? This is a question that has been rarely asked. This book, however, 
addressed precisely this paradox by focusing on how large-scale interven-
tions ended up marginalising small-scale transnational traders and local 
ethnic minorities, but also diasporic groups outside of the PRC territorial 
boundaries. In particular, by showing the ideologically charged nature of 
such projects, this book attempted to place displays of global friendship 
and orientation such as Xi Jinping’s Davos performance in perspective.
A view from the borderlands brings us back, then, to the very centre. To 
the ways in which the Chinese state is built and functions. But also, and most 
importantly, to how it is experienced and enacted at the level of everyday 
lives. The borderlands are not a space of exception, something that can be 
glossed over through the old cliché of “the emperor is far away.” If anything, 
while representing the material edges of the state, they are also one of the 
places where state presence is more visible. They offer, then, a privileged 
perspective from which to observe and study it. Not from above, or below 
– but from the margins, much in the spirit of canonical anthropological 
tradition. In doing so, the notions of proximity, curation, and corridor that I 
developed throughout this book in the context of the Chinese borderlands, 
are also conceptually useful departing points for looking at China as a whole.
Proximity, Curation, Corridor
Over the course of my most recent visit to China, in the summer of 2019, I 
travelled to the Houqiao border crossing, over two years after my previous 
visit. To my surprise, the Houqiao International Trade City remained in 
the same, incomplete state, as I remembered it. On the ground floor, facing 
the road, two small stores sold basic items – drinks, snacks, cigarettes – to 
passing truck drivers and the occasional tourists, as well as to residents of 
the newly built Lisu village across the street. Beside them, two eateries and a 
pharmacy were all there was to it. The other floors of the Trade City remained 
unfinished, without windows, doors, and of course, businesses. Construction 
tools were still scattered around, as if workers were just taking a short break. 
Yet, it had been two years and there was no sign that construction would 
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resume anytime soon. The off ice of the Hong Yi Da company was shut, with 
only a large banner hanging outside of it: “The project [the Trade City] is 
seeking partners or transfer of equity.” Not a good sign, for what was initially 
branded as key project along the BCIM Economic Corridor.
Activity around the Trade City, however, had not stopped. If anything, 
the empty rooms of the Trade City functioned as an echo chamber carrying 
the message of infrastructure-led-development dear to both local off icials 
and private developers. Across the street, between the Trade City and the 
new Lisu village, a hotel was under construction. A few hundred metres 
beyond the massive border gate, visible from the roof of the Trade City, 
another project was taking place. As part of the plan-cum-slogan “within 
the border, outside of customs ( jingnei guanwai),” a new cluster of tax-free 
shopping malls and logistics centres appeared to be almost completed. Mr 
Yu had mentioned the project in the course of our conversations, yet during 
our last meeting construction had not yet begun. Now, I reasoned with the 
Sichuanese owner of one of the stores in the Trade City, it would soon be 
time to inaugurate it.
The owner of the store, a young man whom I had previously met when 
he f irst moved to Houqiao in 2016, had all the time in the world. “This port 
of entry,” he pointed out, “gets busy only during banana season,” when 
hundreds of trucks exit China heading for plantations in Kachin State, 
and return full. In the summer, however, between April and October, there 
is not much going on. “Still,” he complained, “I am paying 4000 RMB per 
month in rent and have no customers!” He shook his head, but then told me 
that he was confident that things will get better soon. “This,” he stressed, 
“is a Belt and Road corridor. Things must get better.” His optimism aside 
little seemed to have happened in the past two years, and after a few more 
words on tourism and cross-border business in the area I decided to take 
a little stroll through the Lisu village across the street. There, what caught 
my attention was a three-sentence slogan that occupied the entire side wall 
of one of the village houses, facing the massive border gate. In large, red 
characters, the slogan read as follows:
Different ethnic groups unify and progress together (minzu tuanjie jinbu)3
Border areas are prosperous and stable (bianjing fanrong wending)
The port of entry is open and dynamic (kou’an kaifang huoli)
3 This sentence could also be translated as “ethnic unity (minzu tuanjie) improves.” Minzu 
tuanjie (generally translated as “ethnic unity” or “national unity”) is a set phrase and was a 
popular slogan particularly in the Hu Jintao years.
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This terse slogan encapsulates some of the key threads that I have followed 
in the course of this book: the marked emphasis on cross-border trade as a 
source of prosperity, the role of ethnicity in processes of rural development, 
and the importance of maintaining security in border regions. In turn, I 
have analysed these processes through the notions of proximity, curation, 
and corridor – something to which I will now turn to, one last time.
The port of entry is open and dynamic. The first chapter of this book detailed 
a tension characteristic of many border areas in today’s China. On the one 
hand, I described the persistence of cross-border connections that pre-date not 
only China’s opening up and reform period, but the People’s Republic of China 
itself. These connections can take the forms of particular trading practices, 
kinship relations, linguistic commonalities and shared cultural references. On 
the other hand, I discussed how the Chinese government’s current emphasis 
on developing cross-border infrastructure and “people-to-people” ties not 
only ignore, but purposely try to do away with such forms of connectivity. 
The notion of proximity developed the former, while the image of the corridor 
captured the ways in which the latter is spatialised in today’s China. Proximity, 
in particular, was defined as the continuously evolving socio-spatial configura-
tions that underpin exchange practices, affording particular opportunities to 
specific groups. Through it, my aim was to capture histories and connections 
that would have otherwise remained hidden. Such were, for instance, Karim’s 
ties with the Tajiks of Tashkurgan, as well as his regular efforts to ingratiate 
Chinese border off icials. Or Ali’s ability to learn Uyghur and strengthen 
business ties in Xinjiang through frequent visits and the establishment of 
relations of trust. As such, proximity is not necessarily specific to border areas. 
Since the beginning of China’s reform period, and following a much older 
tradition, groups of itinerant traders have played a pivotal role in the ways in 
which goods are purchased, transported, and distributed across the country 
and beyond its borders. Such communities are often built around shared 
connections to a particular place and often reinforced through kinship ties. 
These are groups that, in other words, share a language, cultural references, 
and place of origin – business, for them, is but one element of a more complex 
relation. This, in a nutshell, is what I call proximity.
Different ethnic groups unify and progress together. Hiding in plain sight, 
under the “tight skin” of the Chinese nation, is a most common imperial 
legacy: indigenous groups that have been – more or less forcefully, more 
or less successfully – ushered into a modern project of nation-building. 
In today’s China such groups are categorised as minzu, and their role and 
position vary greatly in different contexts. They all are, however, at the 
receiving end of Party instructions, generosity and violence. They are, as I 
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put it, subjected to a specif ic form of care – yet one that is not necessarily 
def ined by affection. Curation, rather, identif ies the current condition of 
many ethnic groups in China, at the convergence of economic development, 
increased state control and monitoring, and the turn to heritage as both a 
source of opportunity and a def ining aspect of minority identity. As with 
proximity, processes of curation are not limited to border areas, although 
the focus on “stability” here makes it more visible here than elsewhere. 
Curation as “healing” process can be a useful analytical category to address 
the struggles of minorities (not necessarily “ethnic”) across increasingly 
uneven Chinese landscapes. Furthermore, curation as a “selective” process, 
that is, one that aims as “preserving”, sheds light on the “active” role of 
heritage-making in both non-Han and Han areas.
Border areas are prosperous and stable. If Shohrat Zakir’s interview with 
which I began this book brought to the fore the nexus of development and 
security that lies at the core of Xinjiang’s system of prison camps, these six 
characters on the wall of a Lisu house in Houqiao stress its relevance across 
China. Prosperity ( fanrong) and stability (wending) are but two faces of the 
same coin. In this book, the image of the corridor encapsulates this particular 
configuration of state-power in the Chinese borderlands. As such, it relates 
a number of contradictions. A corridor is both connective and divisive. It 
fosters movement by controlling it. It enhances speed by containing traff ic. 
Across China, there is no shortage of examples of how the corridor-isation of 
trade and the economy is fostering both exclusion and inclusion. From the 
high-speed railway network system to the dramatic expansion of delivery 
services (kuaidi) and online retail, movement has been re-spatialised through 
a new set of “nodes” across particular logistics (wuliu) chains. The Belt and 
Road Initiative is, in this regard, an attempt at designing and capturing a 
similar form of development across Asia and beyond. In analysing this, the 
notion of corridor that I have developed can be a most useful tool.
To conclude, in today’s China the borderlands continue to play a pivotal 
role. Yet not, as in the oft-quoted saying “the mountains are high and the 
emperor far away,” as unruly peripheries in which central power struggles 
to maintain a hold. The borderlands, while maintaining their uniqueness, 
are as integrated into the CCP national project as they have ever been. More 
than that, they have become central to China’s global efforts to develop a 
new world order – one pivoted around the People’s Republic of China. The 
Xinjiang and Yunnan borderlands, then, are not just exceptional, marginal, 
out-of-the-way places. On the contrary, these borderlands offer a glimpse 
into the past, present and future of China. Of its relations with neighbouring 
countries. Of its evolving role across Asia and the world.
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